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Abstract 
 
This study explores the role of the Anglo-Libyan relationship and the British military 
facilities in WKH/DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶V foreign and defence policy from 1964 to 1970. 
This relationship, EXLOW XSRQ D ³VKDUHG WUDGLWLRQ´ RI VWUDWHJLF VHOI LQWHUHVW ZDV given 
form in the 1953 treaty which permitted British deployments. The military presence 
enabled the British to maintain their wider strategic interests East of Suez as well as 
provide security for the Idris regime in Tripoli.  As the Labour Government made cuts 
LQ%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHSROLF\Libya lost its strategic value but grew in importance for the 
trade opportunities it offered. In line with defence cuts and a Libyan withdrawal 
request in 1967, the facilities were scaled back. The remaining presence enabled the 
British to exploit the growing Libyan economy and maintain influence and defence 
interests in the country. Tripoli grew increasingly unnerved by the political and 
territorial ambitions of its Arab Nationalist neighbours, Egypt and Algeria, whilst 
London regarded Libya as vulnerable to economic and political penetration from the 
Soviet Union, placing the relationship within the context of the Cold War and Western 
security. As a consequence the Labour Government encouraged the Libyans to take 
greater responsibility for their defence, exporting arms to Tripoli and welcoming 
attempts by Prime Minister Al-Bakkoush to develop the country using oil revenue. 
After the 1969 Libyan revolution the Labour Government, concerned by the strategic 
implications of an Arab Nationalist regime in Tripoli, sought to secure %ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQ
and steer the regime away from participating in the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, 
Tripoli was no longer politically inclined towards the West and /RQGRQ¶V attempt to 
forge a relationship, using existing arms contracts, was complicated by the 
contentious issue of the sale of Chieftain tanks negotiated with the previous regime. 
Negotiations floundered and British interests, including a residual presence were lost. 
Not until thirty years later did the relationship regain any of its former geniality as a 
VWUDWHJLF³VKDUHGWUDGLWLRQ´re-emerged to bring the two nations together once more.  
ii 
 
Attestation 
,XQGHUVWDQGWKHQDWXUHRISODJLDULVPDQG,DPDZDUHRIWKH8QLYHUVLW\¶VSROLF\RQWKLV 
I certify that this Thesis reports original work by me during my University project  
 
 
Signature       Date 
iii 
 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank the following: Dr Spencer Mawby, for his guidance and support as 
well as meticulous reviewing of my work which has enabled me to complete this 
thesis. Dr Wynn Rees of the Politics Department, University of Nottingham for 
providing me with the opportunity to undertake this study in the first place. Finally 
thanks to Dr T Allen of the University of London for providing encouragement, support 
and technical back up. 
I would like to thank Amal (Molly) Tarhuni, fellow doctoral student LSE, for providing 
me with encouragement by providing links to other researchers, academics and 
students involved in the study of Libya. I would also like to mention Brian Wildeman, 
ex RAF, for furnishing myself with an interest in the Libyan deployments. 
Personal thanks go to those individuals who have always shown an interest in my 
studies and thereby have encouraged me to persevere. Special mention goes to Andy 
B, for being Andy B and believing in me more than I do myself at times, colleagues at 
Coventry Local Authority (Education) who regularly asked about my progress, 
including Janice Taggart. I must also mention Michael Scott for being an inspiration in 
enthusiasm and focus.  
iv 
Contents 
Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. vi 
List of Figures................................................................................................................. viii 
Map 1 Libya 1967 ............................................................................................................ ix 
Map 2 East of Suez .......................................................................................................... x 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Analysis ............................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 Methodology ........................................................................................................ 8 
1.3 Historiography .................................................................................................... 10 
1.4 Britain and Libya 1945 to 1964 ........................................................................... 27 
2 The Anglo-Libyan Review 1964-1965 ........................................................................ 47 
2.1 Libyan Defence and Political Relations ............................................................... 50 
2.2 Economic Interests............................................................................................. 61 
2.3 Strategic Concerns............................................................................................. 67 
2.4 Conclusion ......................................................................................................... 72 
3 East of Suez and Libya 1965-1966 ............................................................................ 74 
3.1 Strategic Contraction .......................................................................................... 77 
3.2 Libyan Defence and the United States................................................................ 84 
3.3 The Facilities and Political Relations .................................................................. 99 
3.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 114 
4 The Six Day War 1967............................................................................................. 116 
4.1 The War and Anglo-Libyan Relations ............................................................... 120 
4.2 Anglo-Libyan Economic Relations .................................................................... 138 
4.3 %ULWDLQ¶V6WUDWHJLF3ROLF\ ................................................................................... 148 
4.4 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 166 
5 Twilight of Relations 1968 -1969 .............................................................................. 169 
5.1 Rebuilding the Relationship .............................................................................. 173 
5.2 Defence Planning ............................................................................................. 184 
5.3 /LE\D¶V&RPPHUFLDO(QYLURQPHQW ..................................................................... 190 
v 
5.4 The End of East of Suez .................................................................................. 200 
5.5 Expanding Military Involvement ........................................................................ 212 
5.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 217 
6 The Revolution 1969-1970....................................................................................... 219 
6.1 New Political Relations ..................................................................................... 226 
6.2 Strategic Implications ....................................................................................... 231 
6.3 Securing Economic Interests ............................................................................ 234 
6.4 The Chieftain tank ............................................................................................ 239 
6.5 Reviewing the Relationship .............................................................................. 252 
6.6 Labour Leaves Office ....................................................................................... 276 
6.7 Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 284 
7 General Conclusion ................................................................................................. 289 
Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 302 
Primary Sources ....................................................................................................... 302 
National Archives .................................................................................................. 302 
Official Publications .............................................................................................. 305 
Memoirs and Dairies ............................................................................................. 306 
Secondary Sources .................................................................................................. 307 
Books ................................................................................................................... 307 
Articles ................................................................................................................. 311 
Electronic Sources ................................................................................................ 313 
 
vi 
Abbreviations  
BP   British Petroleum 
BT  Board of Trade 
CAB  Cabinet Papers 
C/CC Cabinet Conclusions 
COS  Chiefs of Staff 
CENTO  Central Treaty Organisation 
Cmnd Command Papers 
CP  Cabinet Memoranda 
D  Defence Committee 
DEFE Ministry of Defence 
DOPC  Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee 
DOPC (O)  Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (Official) 
DP  Defence Policy Staff 
DRWP Defence Review Working Party  
FO   Foreign Office 
FCO  Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
FP   Future Policy 
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States 
HQBFNE  Head-quarters British Forces Near East 
JIC  Joint Intelligence Committee  
LIC  Local Intelligence Committee, Libya 
MOD  Ministry of Defence 
Mtg  meetings 
NAAFI Navy, Army, Air Force Institutes 
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NEAD North and East Africa Department (FO) 
OPD Defence and Overseas Policy Committee Papers 
OPEC Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
vii 
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organisation 
PREM 3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V2IILFH 
PWP Planning Working Party, Foreign Office 
RCC  Revolutionary Command Council 
SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation 
SOVMEDRON Soviet Mediterranean Squadron 
T  Treasury 
UDI   Unilateral Declaration of Independence 
WEU  Western European Union 
WO   War Office 
viii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1 UK and US military facilities, summer 1967 ............................................ ix 
Figure 2 Principal UK military deployments and alliance member states East of 
Suez, 1967 .............................................................................................. x 
 
 
ix 
Map 1 Libya 1967 
Figure 1 UK and US military facilities, summer 1967. 1 
  
 
                                                   
1
 Adapted from R Worrall, µ7KHVtrategic limitations of a Middle East client state by 
the mid-1950s: Britain, Libya and the 6XH]&ULVLV¶Journal of Strategic Studies, 30 
(2007), 311. 
 
x 
Map 2 East of Suez  
 
Figure 2 Principal UK military deployments and alliance member 
states East of Suez, 1967  
 
1 
1 Introduction 
 
The British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) web site proclaims that there 
LV D ³VKDUHG WUDGLWLRQ´ EHWZHHQ %ULWDLQ DQG /LE\D 7KHUH LV OLWWOH H[SOanation of the 
QDWXUHRI WKLV ³VKDUHG WUDGLWLRQ´but it involves a close relationship between the two 
countries which,   since the release of the convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdelbaset Ali 
Al-Megrahi in August 2009, has come under growing scrutiny. According to the 
website the relationship was forged between the British and the Senussi Arabs during 
World War Two against the Italian colonialist regime and contributed to the creation of 
the modern Libyan state on 24 December 1951. 1 The partnership was reaffirmed 
through the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance signed in 1953 and remained anchored 
to this agreement until January 1972 when Tripoli terminated the treaty. The website 
has nothing to narrate regarding the next thirty years and evidently WKHUHLVQR³VKDUHG
tUDGLWLRQ´ during this later period.  
 
From 1969 Anglo-Libyan relations were deeply troubled. Colonel *DGGDIL¶VUHJLPH, 
which had overthrown King Idris in September 1969, stood strategically opposed to 
the West. *DGGDIL DWWHPSWHG WR ³LQWHUQDWLRQDOLVH´ WKH /LE\DQ UHYROXWLRQ 5HVRXUFHV
including money, hardware and training camps were provided for terrorist 
organisations around the world including the Provisional Irish Republican Army, 
waging a conflict with the British presence in Northern Ireland. Gaddafi also supported 
Palestinian resistance groups.  The Colonel became the head of a campaign aimed at 
undermining colonialism and opposing oppression. Relations with London worsened in 
April 1984 when Police Officer Yvonne Fletcher was shot dead by bullets fired from 
WKH/LE\DQ3HRSOH¶V%XUHDX6HYHUDOprominent Libyan ex-patriots were murdered in 
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  UK in Libya, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2010. Our Shared Tradition. 
London. Available from http://ukinlibya.fco.gov.uk/en/working-with-libya/shared-
tradition  [22 January 2010].  
2 
London in the 1980s whilst Libya was linked to a bomb explosion at La Belle 
discotheque in Berlin on 5 April 1986. This episode was used as justification for a US 
air attack on Libya on 15 April 1986.  UN Security Council mandated sanctions were 
raised against Libya in 1992 over the bombing of a Pan Am flight over Lockerbie, 
Scotland, for which the British and United States held Tripoli responsible. 2 
 
Therefore, considered a terrorist-sponsoring pariah state by the West, Libya spent 
34 years in a diplomatic, military, economic and political standoff with Britain and the 
USA.  Diplomatic relations between Britain and Libya were not reinstalled until 1999. 
In 2003, faced with a stagnating economy and political opposition from Islamic 
fundamentalism, Gaddafi reached out to the West to secure his regime.  Tripoli 
renounced terrorism and gave up its weapons of mass destruction programme in 
chemical and nuclear technology. This move was welcomed by the West because it 
offered an element of strategic security in North Africa and the Arab world, politically, 
economically and geographically. The poverty of the region had made the population 
YXOQHUDEOHWR,VODPLFIXQGDPHQWDOLVPZKLOVW/LE\DDQG$OJHULD¶VRLODQGJDVUHVHUYes 
offered a less vulnerable energy source than supplies from the Soviet Union or the 
Middle East.  Libya also served as a transit point for illegal immigration from Africa into 
Europe and it was to EuURSH¶VEHQHILWWKDWVHFXULW\LQWKLVDUHDZDVWLJKWHQHG. 
 
In early 2004 British Prime Minister Tony Blair visited Tripoli and a general 
rapprochement with the West has since developed which has seen the Anglo-Libyan 
relationship blossom, especially in trade agreements. The Libyan oil market has 
opened up to foreign oil and gas companies and in May 2007 BP struck a £453 million 
exploration and production deal with the Libyan InvestPHQW&RUSRUDWLRQDQG/LE\D¶V
National Oil Company.3  Strategic security for the West is being sought through the 
                                                   
2
 G. Simons, Libya and the West, From Independence to Lockerbie (Oxford, 2003), 
pp.123-128. 
3
 %%&1HZV³%35HWXUQVWR/LE\DLQ0LOOLRQGHDO´/RQGRQ$YDLODEOH
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/6700255.stm [2 March 2010]. 
3 
H[SDQVLRQ RI (XURSH¶s security borders into the Sahara desert, to prevent illegal 
LPPLJUDWLRQ*DGGDIL¶VUHJLPHKDVSOD\HGD significant role in this task.  Furthermore, 
the development of a more amenable regime in Libya dampens the threat from Islamic 
fundamentalism in North Africa to European security. The economic development of 
the country has helped to undermine /LE\D¶VLQWHUQDOpolitical opposition and enabled 
the regime to secure its own domestic security, as well as promote Libyan strategic 
interests in Africa. Harbouring long held pretentions to political as well as 
³PRQDUFKLFDO´OHDGHUVKLSRIWKHFRQWLQHQW*DGGDILDZDUGHGKLPVHOIWKHWLWOHRI³.LQJRI
.LQJV RI $IULFD´ LQ $XJXVW  DQG Ln February 2009 Gaddafi acquired the 
chairmanship of the African Union. 4 
 
Knowledge of the Anglo-Libyan political relationship in the 1960s establishes that 
the developments of today are D PDQLIHVWDWLRQ RI WKH ROGHU ³VKDUHG Wradition´ 7KLV
³WUDGLWLRQ´ ZDV EDVHG XSRQ VWUDWHJLF FRQFHUQV ZKLOVW HFRQRPLF LQWHUests grew in 
importance. Close relations during this period were not based so much on any cultural 
or historical ties, LPSOLHGE\ WKHZRUG ³WUDGLWLRQ´but rather   a mutual strategic self- 
interest.  'XULQJ WKH V WKH ³WUDGLWLRQ´ ZLWQHVVHG D PXWXDOO\ EHQHILFLDO $QJOR
Libyan political relationship that incorporated British military facilities in Libya, in return 
for a British defence guarantee and sizeable subsidy paid annually to the regime of 
King Idris, which the regime was not obliged to spend in any specific way. The 
defence guarantee provided Idris with strategic security, sandwiched as the country 
was between Arab Nationalist regimes in Algeria and Egypt. Most significantly, the 
IDFLOLWLHVSOD\HGDUROHLQ%ULWDLQ¶VODUJHr defence strategy East of Suez. They enabled 
London to service commitments and project British interests into the Middle East and 
South East Asia and undertake relatively cheap training exercises in the Libyan 
desert.  With the discovery of oil in Libya in 1959 and rapid growth in the FRXQWU\¶V
economy, the deployments were involved in promoting British trade, particularly in 
                                                   
4
 %%& 1HZV  *DGGDIL $IULFD¶V ³.LQJ RI .LQJV´ /RQGRQ $YDLODEOH IURP
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7588033.stm  [29 August 2008].  
 
4 
arms and continued to secure the political relationship by reassuring Idris of /RQGRQ¶V 
commitment to Libyan defence.   
 
This study is focused upon the Anglo-Libyan relationship and the British military 
facilities in Libya, during a period when British defence and foreign policy strategy 
witnessed a withdrawal from East of Suez.  For the benefit of this study the Libyan 
facilities are considered to be all those military deployments granted under the terms 
of the 1953 treaty.  In 1964 these consisted of RAF El Adem and forces stationed at 
the garrisons of Tripoli and Benghazi in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica which provided for 
the defence of Libya. Furthermore there were naval and military missions, which were 
tasked with military liaison duties and organizing training exercises with the Libyan 
Government. The presence at El Adem also facilitated the additional treaty sanctioned 
functions of staging and over-flying rights for British aircraft along an air corridor 
through Libya, Sudan, Aden and on to deployments East of Suez. References to 
³EDVHV´UHIHUVSHFLILFDOO\WRWKRVH³JDUULVRQHG´IDFLOLWLHVVXFKDV7ULSROLDQG%HQJKD]L
The British did not consider facilities at Tobruk and El Adem a base, but rather a 
staging post and generally as one facility, with a landing strip. 
 
This study is important primarily because very little has been written about the 
Anglo-Libyan relationship during the 1960s.  It adds to our knowledge of British foreign 
and defence policy during the 1960s and the realignment of British defence strategy 
from its global orientation to a policy centred upon Europe and NATO. Finally, it offers 
insights into the foreign policy of the Labour Government. It will supplement as well as 
provide new evidence relating to the priorities of the Wilson Government and in 
SDUWLFXODUWKHLUSHUFHSWLRQVRI%ULWDLQ¶VUROHLQWKHZRUOGDQGZKDWFRQVWLWXWHG/RQGRQ¶V
policy concerns as the country withdrew from its global role.  
5 
 
1.1 Analysis  
 
British foreign and defence policy during the 1960s aimed at strategic security for 
Britain and the West. %ULWDLQ¶V East of Suez defence strategy, which the Libyan 
facilities serviced, diminished as a result of a strategic realignment but London had 
growing economic and commercial concerns in the country and exploited the close 
relationship between Tripoli and London to maintain and develop these. This study 
focuses around two core areas of analysis:   
 
Firstly, the nature and development of the Anglo-Libyan relationship from 1964 to 
1970 and the importance of the British military presence. Analysis will consider how 
the relationship was affected by the Anglo-Libyan Review of 1965, the Defence 
Review of 1966, the consequences of the Six Day War, the withdrawal request of 
1967 and the review of the remaining facilities and the treaty in 1968. Concurrently it 
will consider the importance of the growth of the Libyan economy and the increasing 
political independence of the country as well as the part the facilities played in these 
developments. Finally it will consider the revolution of September 1969 and the 
emergence of an Arab Nationalist regime which London attempted to forge a new 
relationship with. 
 
The second area is wider British foreign and defence policy, which had implications 
for British facilities in Libya. The deployments lost their significance as policy shifted 
from a strategy based East of Suez, to a politically Eurocentric and Atlantic defence 
policy from 1965 to 1968.  Additionally, the consequences of the Six Day War for the 
capability and effectiveness of military facilities as tools of foreign policy, as well as 
%ULWDLQ¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVVLQFRQWULEXWLQJmilitarily, politically or diplomatically to the crisis 
in the Middle East will be considered.  The revolution of 1969 tilted the strategic 
environment of the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa further towards Arab 
6 
Nationalism and Soviet influence and this event had consequences for British interests 
and the future of the remaining facilities.  
 
The /DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶VFRQWULEXWLRQLVH[DPLQHGZLWKLQHDFKRIWKHDERYHILHOGV
'HVSLWH D FRPPLWPHQW WR %ULWDLQ¶V ZRUOG UROH /DERXU KDG FRPH WR SRZHU RIIHULQJ
increased welfare spending and this, along with economic problems and a gradual 
acceptance that the role was no longer tenable, was to lead to cuts in defence 
spending and eventually a withdrawal from an East of Suez defence strategy.  This 
had repercussions for the continued maintenance of the Libyan facilities. Whilst 
Labour ministers sought to disengage from the Anglo-Libyan commitment, the 
increasing British economic stake in Libya was considered to be too important to risk 
losing if the commitment was completely abandoned.  After the revolution British 
ministers were keen to secure a relationship with Libya and some of the remaining 
facilities, because commercial benefits were gained through them. This enterprise 
proved unsuccessful, as did the attempt to secure the strategic environment in the 
eastern Mediterranean by forging a relationship with an Arab Nationalist regime in 
Tripoli. 
 
Within these areas there are a number of recurring policy considerations, or 
themes, which thread through the historical narrative and contribute towards the 
development of British policy on Libya. Firstly, British policy had to take account of the 
defence guarantee granted to Libya through the treaty of 1953 which obliged London 
to come to the defence of Tripoli if the North African state was attacked.  London had 
to plan for this obligation   and this required a minimum military presence in the 
country. Defence of the country also had the potential to engage the British in a 
conflict with Egypt and this could have had enormous strategic repercussions, with the 
very real chance of super power involvement.   
 
The second theme involves consideration of the part other nations played in British 
SROLF\FDOFXODWLRQV/RQGRQ¶Vstrategic deliberations were also those of the West and 
7 
had to take into account the role of the United States, Algeria, Egypt and the Soviet 
Union.  Policy was increasingly concerned with the political, economic and defence 
implications of Soviet penetration of the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean along 
ZLWKWKHSROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\WKUHDWSRVHGE\1DVVHU¶V(J\SWWRBritish interests in the 
Arab world. British policy also had to consider and react to the diplomatic pressure 
brought to bear by Washington regarding %ULWDLQ¶V SROLF\ RI VWUDWHgic withdrawal. 
Washington had looked to London to provide support for US global defence policy 
during the 1960s DQGZLWKGUDZDOIURP/LE\DUDLVHGFRQFHUQVLQWKH86WKDWWKH:HVW¶V
position in North Africa and the Middle East would be undermined and lead to a 
political vacuum. This concern also troubled London as withdrawal progressed.  
 
The final theme is the growing importance of trade in oil and arms with Libya and 
the benefits this brought to the British economy. The Anglo-Libyan relationship and 
facilities grew in significance as a result of oil development and exploitation, which led 
to opportunities for London to exploit the booming Libyan economy. Of special 
significance, the facilities allowed the British to promote arms sales.  The securing of 
oil supplies was also of importance to London in the 1960s, especially after the Six 
Day War when an embargo of supplies by Arab producers to Western nations 
underlined the significance of a continued safe, energy supply. Disruption of oil 
supplies had the potential to undermine the fragile British economy.  
8 
 
1.2 Methodology 
 
The thesis is structured in chronological order, the first three sections consider the 
period 1964 to 1967 as the Labour Government sought to withdraw from some of the 
facilities. The next section considers the period between the Six Day War and the 
revolution as the Anglo-Libyan relationship developed and Britain maintained a limited 
presence. Finally the focus is on the events following the revolution as the British 
Government sought a relationship with the new Libyan regime. Within each section 
the main fields and policy themes outlined above are addressed.   
 
Turning to the use of primary material to inform the research, it was necessary to 
use official government documents available at the British National Archives. There is 
little secondary material on the Anglo-Libyan relationship during the 1960s and so the 
documents enabled a picture to be drawn of the main events as well as provide 
material for the key areas of analysis. Many documents are related to the day to day 
administration of the facilities, developing trade in arms and oil, British military training 
and brief security reports on nationalist and Egyptian subversion prior to the 
revolution. Documents are plentiful upon significant events such as the Libyan Review 
of 1965, the 1967 withdrawal demand, the revolution and the withdrawal of British 
troops from Libya in 1970. The contentious sale of arms and Chieftain tanks to Libya 
in 1969 and 1970 is covered in detail in the records. These significant events are 
documented at Defence and Oversea Policy Committee (DOPC) and Cabinet level as 
well as at official level. Primary material from the National Archives has also been 
used on broader Cabinet defence and foreign policy making at DOPC and Cabinet 
level.  There are auto-biographies and diaries that also cover the period of the Labour 
Government from 1964 to 1970 and these inform the study.  
 
9 
Other primary materials used were $PHULFDQGRFXPHQWVDYDLODEOHLQWKH³)RUHLJQ
5HODWLRQV RI WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´ VHULHV DQG WKHVH KDYH enabled an alternative 
perspective upon the strategic concerns at the time. Only recently have Libyan 
archives in Tripoli, from the period in question, become available, although these as 
yet have not been translated and are poorly organised. As a result it is not entirely 
possible to have a picture of the relationship from both sides.  
 
 Secondary material in the form of books and articles have been utilised on the 
/DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶Vdefence and foreign policy. These publications have helped to 
inform the research, particularly on foreign and defence policy priorities at the time, 
both at official level and in the Labour Cabinet. Secondary material on US and Soviet 
foreign and defence policy adds to an appreciation of the nature of the strategic 
environment during the 1960s whilst texts on Nasser and Egypt have enabled the 
research to draw conclusions about the threat to British interests in Libya and the 
Middle East. The Six Day War and its repercussions for British interests, the economic 
background to British Government policy at this time, %ULWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLFstake in the 
Middle East, including arms sales, have all been considered using a variety of 
secondary sources.  
10 
 
1.3 Historiography   
 
The historiography of Anglo-Libyan relations in the 1960s is limited. Research has 
been centred upon the 1950s and where there is a discussion on the 1960s it forms 
just a small part of a larger study of Libyan post-war history.  The Wilson 
Government¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH relationship is only addressed on the margins of 
literature on the Government.  In contrast wider British foreign and defence policy of 
the period has been the subject of detailed research focusing on the broad issues of 
defence reviews, East of Suez, and specific issues like UDI in Rhodesia and the 
Anglo-American relationship. This has been supplemented by literature on the Labour 
Government during the 1960s, building upon a large collection of diaries, biographies 
and auto-biographies and archival material that has become available since the late 
1960s; for example, the diaries of Cabinet ministers Richard Crossman and Barbara 
Castle. This has helped to inform discussion of the dynamics of the Government and 
its approach to foreign and defence issues.  
 
The historiography of themes considered in this thesis is also limited. Anglo-
American diplomatic relations have been examined in relation to the position of 
sterling DQG :DVKLQJWRQ¶V JOREDO IRUHLJQ SROLF\ SULRULties in the 1960s in texts and 
articles.  %ULWDLQ¶VGLSORPDWLFUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH0LGGOH(DVWKDValso been examined 
in the context of the relationship with Nasser and the Six Day War in several texts, 
whilst Brenchle\¶V ZRUN RQ %ULWDLQ¶V trade with the Middle East is a worthy and 
considerable docuPHQWRQ%ULWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWV5 However, there is little written 
RQ %ULWDLQ¶V defence concerns in the Mediterranean and the growing perception of 
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 F. Brenchley, Britain and the Middle East: An Economic History 1945-1987 
(London, 1989). 
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Soviet threats in the late 1960s, although Hughes¶ work on the Labour Government 
and the Cold War has informed our understanding.6 
 
To turn back to the fields of study, the issue of Anglo-Libyan relations has been 
addressed in a number of journal articles with a strong strategic focus and orientated 
towards the ¶V 6WHSKHQ %ODFNZHOO¶V µ6DYLQJ WKH.LQJ $QJOR-American strategy 
and British counter-subversion operations in Libya, 1953-¶ stresses the strategic 
value of the country to British and American interests in the 1950s. Libya was of 
importance in the Middle East and as a defence against Nasser, as well as providing 
logistical support for WKH 1RUWKHUQ 7LHU VWDWHV¶ GHIHQFH DJDLQVW WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ
Blackwell stresses that the Libyan facilities were operationally redundant because the 
WUHDW\DOORZHGWKH/LE\DQVWRGHQ\WKHXVHRIWKHPLIWKLVFRQIOLFWHGZLWK/LE\D¶VRWKHU
diplomatic responsibilities, namely to the Covenant of the League of Arab States.  
Therefore they could not be used against Nasser. By the late 1950s the British sought 
to reduce the expense of maintaining troops, whose only activity seemed to be to 
³SHUIRUP FRXQWHU-insurgency duties´ ZKLFK FRQVLVWHG RI WUDLQLQJ WKH /LE\DQ GHIHQFH
forces and maintaining a visible presence to deter opposition to the King.  Blackwell 
considers tKH.LQJ¶V³OHJLWLPDF\ZDVH[KDXVWHGDQGGHSHQGHQWRQH[WHUQDOSRZHUV´
The British had acknowledged, even by the late 1950s, the bankruptcy of using troops 
to prop up Idris, as military intervention only served to distance regimes further from 
their populations.7   
 
5LFKDUG :RUUDOO¶V µ7KH VWUDWHJLF OLPLWDWLRQV RI D 0LGGOH (DVW FOLHQW VWDWH¶ also 
VWUHVVHV WKHUHGXQGDQF\RI%ULWLVKIDFLOLWLHV 6XH]³VWDUNO\ UHYHDOHGWKH OLPLWDWLRQVRI
BritDLQ¶V PLOLWDU\ SUHVHQFH LQ /LE\D ZKHUH WKH IDFLOLWLHV KDG EHHQ XQSRSXODU HYHQ
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before the treaty was signed´EHFDXVHWKH/LE\DQVIRUEDGHWKH%ULWLVKIURPXVLQJWKH
facilities in an attack on Egypt. 8  $OLVRQ3DUJHWHU¶V µ$QJOR-Libyan Relations and the 
Suez CULVLV¶VLPLODUO\IRFXVHVXSRQWKHVDQG/LE\D¶VJHR-strategic importance to 
the British. Pargeter notes the outdated nature of the British bases but the political and 
strategic motives for maintaining facilities are emphasized.  Withdrawal was an option 
but political reasons won the day, as it was concluded the regime would probably turn 
towards Egypt or the Soviet Union if British support was seen to be withdrawn. A plan 
to withdraw some troops from Libya was reversed when the Iraqi revolution of 1958 
led to the toppling of a British installed monarchy in Baghdad. Pargeter gives a short 
overview of the /DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶s approach to Libya. She indicates that the desire 
to intervene to maintain the regime had weakened by the early 1960s and suggests 
the Labour Government¶V SROLF\ RI ³SURJUHVVLYH ZLWKGUDZDO´ PHDQW WKDW LQWHUYHQWLRQ
was no longer a viable option, especially as by the late 1960s ³%ULWDLQ FDPH WR EH
viewed by many in Libya as an imperialist power that was antithetical to the 
progression of Arab Nationalism and whose influence had to be removed´9 
 
A picture of Anglo-Libyan relations in the 1960s can be drawn from several works 
on the political and social- economic development of Libya, although little investigation 
is made in any of the works specifically on the Anglo-Libyan relationship. 
&RQVHTXHQWO\ WKHUH LV YHU\ OLWWOH PHQWLRQ RI WKH :LOVRQ *RYHUQPHQW¶V DSSURDFK WR
Libya.  The picture drawn is of a British subsidized, poor, undeveloped client state in 
the 1950s that became a corrupt, unstable country that had grown rich on oil revenues 
in the 1960s.  Simons¶ Libya: The Struggle for Survival outlines developments in the 
1950s and 1960s and points out that   Libya  was the poorest nation state in the world,  
exporting mainly esparto grass and scrap metal from arms left behind from the 
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Second World War. In the 1960s Libya achieved remarkable wealth from the 
discovery and production of oil.  SimRQV¶ work narrates developments in the oil 
industry from the first discoveries to the oil bonanza of the 1960s.10 
 
9DQGHZDOOH¶V VWXG\ Libya since Independence concludes that by the end of the 
1960s the country had become a corrupt state, lacking identity and integrity, politically 
backwards and burdened by bureaucratic chaos. Libya was governed by families and 
tribal elites with little interest in the future development of the country.11 9DQGHZDOOH¶V
more comprehensive later study, A History of Modern Libya has several chapters of 
relevance to the study. Idris is portrayed as woefully unable to commit himself to 
effective leadership of the country, ZKLOVWKLV UHJLPH LVFKDUDFWHUL]HGE\³LQWULJXHE\
personal, family, and royal Diwan politics, and by a growing inability to control the 
H[WHQVLYH FRUUXSWLRQ WKDW H[LVWHG´ 7KH .LQJ ³LQFUHDVLQJO\ UHWUHDWHG IURP DFWLve 
LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V OLIH´ 7KH ³FORVH DIILOLDWLRQ´ ZLWK WKH :HVW SROLWLFDOO\
VXVSHFW DW D WLPH ZKHQ ³DQWL-Westernism provided a convenient theme for a wide 
range of grievDQFHVLQWKH$UDEZRUOG´, just FRPSRXQGHG,GULV¶SROLWLFDOGLIILFXOWLHV.12 
 
:ULJKW¶V ZRUN Libya, a Modern History, includes a chapter on the Kingdom and 
FRQFXUV WKDW D ³PRUH QDUURZO\ SDWHUQDOLVWLF WKDQ RSSUHVVLYH´ UHJLPH H[LVWHG LQ WKH
1960s, although corruption was endemic.  The regime was never truly neutralist and 
ZDV³IRUPany years too closely associated militarily and economically with the main 
Western powers´ 7KH.LQJ¶VIDLOXUHWRcriticise the British and the West did not help. 
Wright examines the disturbances of 1964 when Libyan opposition groups, enthused 
E\1DVVHU¶s rhetoric, demanded the withdrawal of British troops.  Wright considers this 
was D³FOHDUZDUQLQJWKDWDOOZDVQRWZHOO LQWKHNLQJGRP´The 1964 disturbances in 
Benghazi led to street demonstrations by students declaring their support for Nasser. 
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Protestors were killed and Nasser made a point that after three years of oil revenues 
Libya was still harbouring Western bases.  The 1967 ZDU ZLWQHVVHG D ³VFDOH RI
violence....ZKROO\XQH[SHFWHG´ in Libya and these protests were followed by trials of 
conspirators and opposition members. HoweverE\WKHUHDSSHDUHGD³FDOP´ in 
Libya ZKLFK³LQUHDOLW\KLGYDULRXVSUHSDUDWLRQVIRUDVHL]XUHRISRZHU´DQWLFLSDWLQJ the 
death or abdication of the King. Wright makes reference to the 1960s Anglo-Libyan 
relationship and mentions the British facilities briefly.  He VWDWHV WKDW ³WKH /LE\DQV
themselves were becoming increasingly aware that the presence of foreign facilities 
belied any pretence to a truly independent foreign policy´  Wright considers that by 
/LE\DZDV³FRQVSLFXRXVDPRQJ$UDEVWDWHV LQVWLOO ³OLYLQJRQ LWVJHRJUDSK\´E\
leasing military facilities when there was no longer even the excuse of economic 
necessity for doing so.  This over-reliance on the facilities ZDVLQGLFDWLYHRIWKH³PRUDO
collapse of the old regime´13 
 
E.A.V de Candole, a former British administrator in post-war Libya, in his work The 
Life and Times of King Idris produces a very sympathetic portrayal of the King, and 
whilst his material is probably too compassionate towards the King it is useful mainly 
DVDJHQHUDOELRJUDSK\RI.LQJ,GULV¶OLIH7KHLPSUHVVLRQRQHGUDZVIURPde &DQGROH¶V
work is that the King was ascetic, retiring and committed to his country. His offers to 
resign during times of crisis were not bluffs but made through a genuine desire to do 
what was best for the country. De Candole underplays the British presence and 
stresses that the British military deployments in Tripoli and Benghazi were never more 
than a brigade group in size and there was never a major British base in the country.14 
 
Turning to the wider strategic issues behind British foreign and defence policy we 
find that little attention is paid to Libya. Young in The Labour Governments 1964-1970, 
International Policy identifies the Libyan staging posts as facilities important to the 
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East of Suez role.15 Libya is only mentioned by Saki Dockrill in terms of its relevance 
to defence cuts in 1965, which formed part of the progressive withdrawal from East of 
Suez.16 7KHUH LVPRUHPDWHULDODYDLODEOHRQ%ULWDLQ¶VEast of Suez strategy. Balfour-
Paul in The End of Empire in the Middle East considers that from 1945 the basic 
attitudes to empire had changed and instead a new conviction grew  ³WKDW%ULWDLQZDV
still responsible for the security of Western interests (DVWRI6XH]´DQd this became 
³WKH PDLQ FRPSXOVLRQ´ IRU PDLQWDLQLQJ VWUDWHJLF IDFLOLWLHV DQG PLOLWDU\ LQWHUHVWV.17 
Pickering in %ULWDLQ¶V :LWKGUDZDO IURP (DVW RI 6XH] 7KH 3ROLWLFV RI 5HWUHQFKPHQt 
FODLPV WKHVH IDFLOLWLHV ³KHOSHG OXEULFDWH GLSORPDWLF UHODWLRQV LQ WKH DUHD´ which is 
evident from the Libya experience.18 Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World 
Power in the Twentieth Century by David Reynolds stresses the continued importance 
of British trade with the area East of Suez and argues that the facilities provided 
stability, a policy supported by the armed services.19 Michael DockULOO¶VBritish Defence 
Since 1945 notes that there was an DVVXPSWLRQWKDW%ULWDLQ¶VUROHEast of Suez, along 
with the important trade and investment opportunities, were actually dependent upon  
%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHUROHworldwide which incorporated military bases and facilities in the 
Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and Far East.20 The British continued to 
maintain a military presence in Libya because of these economic concerns and 
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because they helped diplomatic relations between London and Tripoli during the 
1960s. 
 
(GZDUG 6SLHUV¶ µThe Significance of the Suez Canal for Western Strategy since 
¶  considers that during the 1950s and early 1960s the East of Suez role was 
³VWHDGLO\ XSJUDGHG´, explained by a requirement to honour commitments, undertake 
peacekeeping missions and preserve an economic stake in the region. 21 Darwin¶V
µBrLWLVK'HFRORQLVDWLRQVLQFH¶ concurs that WKH³(DVWRI6XH]UROHFRQIRUPHGZHOO
with the instinct, common to politicians of both major parties, WR UHWDLQ%ULWDLQ¶VJUHDW
power spheres of influence ± for just a little longer´22  But, as Garnett states in µBritish 
Strategic Thought¶, ³QRRQHDVNHGZKDWWKHIDFLOLWLHVZHUHIRURUZKHWKHUWKHWUDGLWLRQDO
imperial role was sustainable´23  Frankel¶VZRUNBritish Foreign Policy indicates that 
the facilities constituted commitments, power and influence and no government could 
give up such assets ³voluntarily´ )UDQNHO EHOLHYHV LQVWHDG ³DGMXVWPHQW SLHFHPHDO´
followed in response to a range of pressures but the value of facilities remained 
unresolved.24 Young considers that even in the early years of the Labour Government, 
prestige, anti-FRPPXQLVP DQG DOOLDQFH FRPPLWPHQWV KHOSHG WR ³justify a global 
SUHVHQFH´ DQG PLQLVWHUV WRRN WLPH WR DGMXVW WR %ULWDLQ¶V FKDQJLQJ HFRQRPLF DQG
political fortunes. Young points out policy-makers were beset with uncertainties about 
³VSDUNLQJQHZFULVHVXSVHWWLQJDOOLHVDQGGDPDJLQJ%ULWLVKLQIOXHQFH´  by changing the 
status quo.25 Wilson himself considered the East of Suez role integral to British 
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VWUDWHJ\DQGVWDWHGLQ-XQHWKDW³LIZHDEGLFDWHUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZKRZLOOH[Hrcise 
WKDWUROH"´ 26 
 
In the 1960s the East of Suez policy was increasingly criticised, as the facilities 
became an expense the British economy struggled to finance. Sanders¶ extensive 
work, Losing An Empire Finding a Role LGHQWLILHV ³&DELQHW shifts, alterations in the 
machinery of government and policy calculation played equally an importanWUROH´LQD
revised view of facilities.27 Balfour-Paul notes that ³Labour Party leaders...«ZHUH
increasingly exposed to the hostility of party ideologists to the practice of empire´28 
The whole intellectual concept of military facilities was queried. These critiques 
questioned the cost of fighting against nationalist groups and maintaining deployments 
despite opposition within the host country. Furthermore doubts over the practical 
strategic concept of the defence of British interests through overseas facilities were 
raised whilst there was a psychological withdrawal from political and economic 
imperial-FHQWULF QRWLRQV RI %ULWDLQ¶V UROH LQ WKH ZRUOG DV WKH $WODQWLF $OOLDQFH DQG
Europe grew to be at the core of British security.29 
 
3KDP¶VEnding East of Suez sets out to explain how the Wilson Government came 
to decide to withdraw Britain from its global commitments. His focus is on the 
withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore. Pham notes that, like the Libyan 
deployments, the bases in Malaysia and Singapore served some strategic and political 
interests because they helped maintain Western interests in the region. The presence 
DOVR HPERGLHG %ULWDLQ¶V DOOLDQFH ZLWK WKH 86 +RZHYHU WKHVH EHQHILWV ZHUH
undermined by the regional hostility they attracted and the difficult political position 
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they put their host countries in. Furthermore the cost of maintaining these bases 
began to outweigh the benefits enjoyed.30 Pham states that the Labour Government 
was initially supportive of the East of Suez role but policy changes resulted from the 
politicaOFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHGHYDOXDWLRQDQGLWVDIWHUPDWK7KH³ROGVWUXFWXUHRI
DXWKRULW\´RI:LOVRQ&DOODJKDQDQG%URZQEURNHGRZQ7KLVZDVDJURXSLQJWKDWKDG
maintaiQHGWKHUHPQDQWVRI%ULWDLQ¶V(DVWRI6XH] role before devaluation. Thereafter,  
with 5R\-HQNLQVDV&KDQFHOORUDQGDOHDGLQJILJXUHLQ:LOVRQ¶V*RYHUQPHQWD³QHZ
RUGHU´LQ&DELQHW³UHTXLUHGWKHHOLPLQDWLRQRI%ULWDLQ¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUROHDVDV\PEROLF
VDFULILFH EHIRUH %ULWDLQ ZRXOG DFFHGH WRPDMRU VRFLDO FXWV WR VKRUH XS WKH FRXQWU\¶V
fiQDQFLDOEDVH´ as a result of devaluation.31  
 
Pham claims that the archival records show that the CKDQFHOORU¶V VWUDWHJ\ IRU
getting a comprehensive package of cuts through Cabinet was to demand defence 
suffer heavy reductions first. The other components of this package, including the 
introduction of prescription charges and postponement of the raising of the school 
leaving agH³FRQIOLFWHGZLWKGHHSO\KHOG/DERXULGHDOV´-HQNLQVZDVRQO\DEOHWRKDYH
major social cuts approved by a deeply apprehensive Cabinet by ensuring that 
defence policy was sacrificed at the outset. In conclusion empire was abolished as a 
SROLWLFDO QHFHVVLW\ EHIRUH D /DERXU *RYHUQPHQW ³FRXOG FRQWHPSODWH UHGXFLQJ the 
ZHOIDUHVWDWHVEHQHILWV´rather than paving the way for a welfare state.32 
 
%ULWDLQ¶VH[SHULHQFHLQ/LE\DLVQRWGLVVLPLODUWRWKHFDOFXODWLRQVDQGFRQVLGHUDWLRQV
attendant to the withdrawal from other facilities in the Arab world.  In 1966 Elisabeth 
Monroe in µBritish facilities in the Middle East; Assets or Liabilities?¶  believed the 
British presence to be an embarrassment, and for Michael Howard in µ%ULWDLQ¶V 
VWUDWHJLFSUREOHP(DVWRI6XH]¶ WKH*XOI IDFLOLWLHVZHUH ³LQHVFDSDEOH OLDELOLWLHV UDWKHU
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than Imperial assets´33  However, as Simon Smith has shown in µPower Transferred? 
Britain, the United States and the Gulf, 1956-1971¶ Washington was reluctant to take 
RYHU%ULWDLQ¶VUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVSDUWicularly in the Gulf and urged the British to maintain 
DVPXFKRID³QRQPLOLWDU\´SUHVHQFHDVSRVVLEOH, tied down as the United States was 
with a growing involvement in the war in Vietnam.34 This was also the case in Libya.  
 
Tore Petersen¶VZRUNVWUHVVHVWKHFRQWLQXHGimportance to Washington of BritDLQ¶V
role East of Suez, the strength of Sterling and a British presence in Germany which 
supplemented US global strategy. He argues that Wilson and the Labourites were in-
WHQW ³RQ HQGLQJ WKH 8.
V RYHUVHDV FRPPLWPHQWV IRU UHDVRQV RI LGHRORJ\´ 7KH SRRU
VKDSH RI WKH HFRQRP\ ZDV ³MXVW DQ DGGHG LQGXFHPHQW WR VSHHG XS WKH ZLWKGUDZDO
SURFHVV´. Whilst the Labour Government ³ZDVIOH[LEOHLQWKHZD\VDQGPHDQV the de-
FLVLRQZDVLPSOHPHQWHG´WKH\KLGWKHLU³LQWHQWLRQVLQUKHWRULFFRPPLWWHGWRHmSLUH´35 
 
3HWHUVHQ¶VZRUNIRFXVHVXSRQWKH0LGGOH(DVWZKHUHWKH8K had cooperated with 
the USA supplementing and complementing each other especially in Egypt, Jordan 
and the Arabian Peninsula.36 Post war Prime Ministers had attempted to keep the 
Middle East within the 8.¶VVSKHUHRILQIOXHQFHDQG%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVDJUHDWSRZHU
relied upon the significance of British power in that region.37  FURP  /DERXU¶V
"predisposition to liquidate the empire was hidden by the fig leaf of fiQDQFLDOH[LJHQF\´
to remedy chronic economic problems. As a result the pound and the British role East 
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of Suez were intimately tied to Anglo-American relations.  In order to gain American 
assistance to maintain the stability of the currency, the British pledged to remain East 
of Suez7KH8QLWHG6WDWHV ³ZRUNHG DVVLGXRXVO\ WRGLVVXDGH%ULWDLQ IURPFXWWLQJ LWV
overseas defence commitmenWV´However, Petersen considers the succession of de-
fence reviews was actually DFRQFHUWHGDFW³WRGLYHVW%ULWDLQRILWVEDVHV(DVWRI6XH]´
DQG KH EHOLHYHV WKH\ UHSUHVHQWHG ³D UHPDUNDEOH FRKHUHQW DUJXPHQW IRU WKH %ULWLVK
ZLWKGUDZDO(DVWRI6XH]´Petersen believes London was ultimately able to disengage 
from global commitments whilst extracting support for the pound.38  
 
2IVSHFLILF UHOHYDQFHWRWKLVVWXG\ LV3HWHUVHQ¶V focus on the withdrawal from the 
Persian Gulf; oil rich British base areas ruled by monarchs supported by London in 
much the same way as in Libya.  %ULWDLQ¶VWUHDWLHVZLWKVKHLNs and sultans enabled the 
British to take charge of their defence and foreign affairs and maintain military bases 
in Bahrain, Sharjah, and in the case of Oman, Maisrah Island and Oman itself. 
Petersen believes, like Pham, that the withdrawal from the Gulf sheikdoms had little to 
do with saving money, but was necessary to get left-wing acceptance for cuts in 
domestic social spending to balance the budget after the pound was devalued in 
 7KH GHFLVLRQ WR OHDYH WKH *XOI ZDV EDVHG RQ ³GRPHVWLF H[LJHQFLHV´ %ULWLVK
investment in the region was small considering the oil wealth emerging from it but 
³/DERXUVHL]HGHYHU\RSSRUWXQLW\WRGLVPDQWOHWKHHPSLUHDQGUHIXVHGWRH[Slore any 
SROLWLFDO RU HFRQRPLF RSSRUWXQLWLHV WR UHPDLQ´ %ULWLVK SROLF\ ZDV ³RQH GLPHQVLRQDOO\
LGHRORJLFDOO\FRPPLWWHGWRWKHHQGRIHPSLUH´39 
 
$GHILQLQJPRPHQWIRU%ULWDLQ¶VPLOLWDU\LQIOXHQFHLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDSSHDUVWREH
the Six Day War, which also had consequences for British facilities in Libya.  In Keir 
Thorpe¶VDUWLFOHRQWKH6L['D\:DUDQGRLOHPEDUJRthe ZDU³KHOSHGWRFRQILUPthe 
British military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf´EHFDXVHPLOLWDU\EDVHVIDLOHGWREHRI
any use during the conflict.  In July 1967 the &DELQHWQRWHGWKDW³RXUPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFH
                                                   
38
 Ibid., pp. 7, 60, 66, 67. 
39
 Ibid., pp. 74, 77. 
21 
WKHUH ZDV RI QR YDOXH WR RXU HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWV´ ZKLFK ³OD\ SULPDULO\ LQ WKH $UDE
countries´ Thorpe claims ³the 1967 oil crisis is a clear marker in the shift in British 
relations with the Middle East, finally stepping away from the remnants of formal 
imperialism, backed by a military presence, to a profitable, purely commercial 
relationship´40  Brenchley¶s text Britain, the Six Day War and its Aftermath recognizes 
that :LOVRQ¶VIDLOHGELG to avert the Six Day War and keep open the Gulf of Aqaba was 
a result of the much reduced strength of %ULWDLQ¶V GHIHQFH IRUFHV ZKLFK made a 
unilateral act impossible without American support. The events of 1967 in the Middle 
EastZHUHLQ%HQFKOH\¶VFRQVideration, the last time the British took a leading part, if 
unsuccessfully, in Middle Eastern affairs. $VWKHH[SHULHQFHLQ/LE\DVKRZV%ULWDLQ¶V
policy priorities were now focused on economic considerations and Brenchley 
considers ³WKHVHFRXOGEHSXUVXHd without undue involvement in the political problems 
of the area´41 Abba Eban, Israeli diplomat and politician, went so far as to state that 
:LOVRQDQG³KLVFROOHDJXHVFDPHWRWHUPVZLWK%ULWDLQ¶VGZLQGOLQJSRZHULQWKH0LGGOH
East and gave short shrift to the Arabists who still dreamed of a Pax Britannica 
sustained by friendly Arab clients´42  Young  agrees  that  %ULWDLQ¶VLQDELOLW\WRSOD\D
UROHLQWKH6L['D\:DUDVZHOODVWKHZLWKGUDZDOIURP$GHQ³VHHPHGWRVKRZWKH
country was unable to project PLOLWDU\SRZHULQWKHUHJLRQHIIHFWLYHO\´DQGWKHLabour 
Government ³VDZDVKLIWIURPDSROLF\EXLOWRQDUHJLRQDOPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHFORVHWLHV
to traditional  rulers and opposition to Nasserism, to one that sought to protect British 
interests through a military withdrawal, acceptance that the days of the Sultan and 
sheikhs might be numbered and a readiness to come to terms with radical leaders 
SDUWLFXODUO\ LQ WKH *XOI´ This policy was illustrated by the withdrawal from Aden, 
improved diplomatic relations with Egypt, the withdrawal from the Gulf, as well as 
disengagement from the Arab-Israeli conflict. A Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
study in 1969 even went so far as to call for D OHVV ³IRUWKULJKW´ SROLF\ LQ WKH0LGGOH
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East, whilst another paper called for Britain operating through NATO in the 
Mediterranean.43  However, total disengagement proved an elusive goal, given that 
the British maintained considerable economic interests in the region.  
 
7KH/DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶VIRUHLJQDQGGHIHQFHSROLF\KDVEHHQwidely studied. At 
the centre of the foreign policy making process was Harold Wilson. Helen Parr notes 
in µBritain, America, East of Suez and the EEC: Finding a Role in British Foreign 
Policy, 1964-1967¶ that his colleagues have LGHQWLILHG :LOVRQ DV ³YDLQ´ DQG ³HDVLO\
seduced by the opportunity to strut upon the international stage´, holding a belief he 
FRXOG SURGXFH UHVXOWV ZKHUH RWKHUV KDG IDLOHG +H RYHUVWDWHG %ULWDLQ¶V VWDWXV DQG
³VKDUHG the grandiose notions of the Labour Left...believing in the moral weight of 
British foreign policy to bring good to the world´44  John Young identifies the nature of 
the decision-PDNLQJ SURFHVV LQ &DELQHW DQG :LOVRQ¶V VLJQLILFDQFH :LOVRQ DOORZHG 
meetings to ³WDON WKHPVHOYHV RXW´ ZLWK ³FRQFOXVLRQV EHLQJ UHDFKHG WKURXJK Vheer 
boredom´ In theory, Cabinet ministers could comment on foreign affairs, but relatively 
little was considered in Cabinet, other than an oral update. 5LFKDUG &URVVPDQ¶V
GLDULHV LGHQWLILHG HDUO\ LQ WKH ILUVW JRYHUQPHQW WKDW *RUGRQ :DONHU :LOVRQ¶V ILUVW 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, would talk to the Prime Minister first and they 
would agree on what to discuss or keep quiet about.45   
 
=LHJOHU:LOVRQ¶VELRJUDSKHUQRWHV:LOVRQ¶VWHQGHQF\WRGLVSOD\DGLVSURSRUWLRQDWH
amount of time upon periodic crises PRUH ³WKDQ KLV FORVHVW DGYLVRUV WKRXJKW ZDV
proper´DQG:LOVRQZDVJUHDWO\LQWHUHVWHGLQVSHFLILFIRUHLJQSROLF\LVVXHVVXFKDV8',
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in Rhodesia and the Biafran war.46  Wilson took interest in the sale of Chieftain tanks 
to Libya and frequently reminded his ministers of his concerns or asked for updates on 
progress. Hennessy, in his work on British Prime ministers notes that Wilson worked 
to remove the most strategic decision-making opportunities from the purview of the full 
Cabinet.47 This was possibly because, as Ziegler notes , Wilson was anxious that 
ministers did  not play too much of a potentially disruptive role in formulating foreign 
policy, split as the Cabinet was between ministers from Left and Right. Ziegler notes 
that Wilson warned his Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart that he was anxious to 
NHHS GLVFXVVLRQ DERXW WKH 1LJHULDQ FLYLO ZDU RXW RI &DELQHW IHDULQJ DQ ³LQWROHUDEOH
VLWXDWLRQ´ZKLFKZRXOGSXW ³foreign policy much more into commission in the Cabinet 
than we could accept; and we might find that, having once tasted blood, they would 
subject otheULVVXHV««WRWKHVDPHWUHDWPHQW´48   
 
:LOVRQ¶VDSSURDFK OHG WRDFFXVDWLRQV WKDWKHdid not welcome forward thinking.49  
He appeared to show little vision or long term outlook and %ULWDLQ¶V IRUHLgn and 
GHIHQFHSROLF\E\KDGDV<RXQJFODLPVEHHQ³DFKLHYHGPRUHE\PXGGOHDQGD
collapse of alternatives than any long-WHUP YLVLRQ´50 Wilson therefore has been 
FRQVLGHUHG WR KDYH ³KDG QR FOHDU VHQVH RI GLUHFWLRQ QR LGHD RI ZKHUH WKH FRXQWU\
must head´51  Healey, his Secretary of State for Defence believed Wilson lacked a 
FOHDUVWUDWHJ\ IRU ³Ke had no sense of direction, and rarely looked more than a few 
months ahead. His short-term opportunism, allied to a capacity for self-
GHOXVLRQ««RIWHQSOXQJHGWhe Government into chaos´52   However, 2¶+DUDDQGParr 
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in WKHLULQWURGXFWRU\DUWLFOH µThe Fall and Rise of a Reputation¶ consider that much of 
:LOVRQ¶V SUREOHPV ZHUH D consequence of tactics rather than strategy.53 Further 
H[SODLQHGLQ3DUU¶VµBritain, America, East of Suez and the EEC¶,  :LOVRQ¶VSROLF\ZDV
apparently grounded in strategic rationale and geared towards retaining British 
independence and bolstering %ULWDLQ¶VLQIOuence in Europe and the USA. In the 1960s 
Britain turned from a foreign and defence policy strategy focused East of Suez to a 
European orientation. This enabled the Labour *RYHUQPHQW WR ³VKRUH XS %ULWDLQ¶V
position in the world´:LOVRQ³KDYLQJHPEDUNHGRn an internationalist policy... altered 
this policy in response to domestic, political considerations´ 54  %XW -RKQ <RXQJ¶V 
article µInternationaO )DFWRUV DQG WKH  HOHFWLRQ¶ considers this strategy more 
reactive than proactive for ³RQFHLQSRZHULabour failed to cut back quickly enough on 
defence, hopes of Commonwealth cooperation came to nothing and by 1967 Wilson 
was thrown back on another attempt to enter the EEC´ This policy failed and the 
strategic policy of East of Suez colODSVHG<RXQJFRQFOXGHVWKDWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V
foreign pROLF\ KDG ³WKH VHQVH RI EHLQJ FRQWUROOHG E\ Hvents rather than controlling 
them´55  Hughes in +DUROG :LOVRQ¶V &ROG :DU 7KH /DERXU *RYHUQPHQW DQG (DVW-
West Politics, 1964-1970 FODLPVWKDWWKHFRQGXFWRI/DERXU¶VGHIHQFHSROLF\ZDVQRW
JRYHUQHGE\DQ ³DSSUDLVDORIZKHUH WKH8.¶V LQWHUHVWV OD\EXW WKURugh a process of 
³PXGGOLQJWKURXJK´ and whilst the withdrawal from East of Suez did have a strategic 
UDWLRQDOHLWVPDQDJHPHQW³KDGDOOWKHFKDUDFWHristics of a scuttle´56 
 
It must also be remembered that Wilson managed a Cabinet with conflicting 
interpretaWLRQVRI%ULWDLQ¶V foreign and defence role. Young identifies Secretary to the 
Cabinet, Burke Trend, as having great influence. Trend UHDOL]HGWKDW³%ULWDLQFRXOGQR
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longer play a world role´ Young also identifies that from 1968 to 1970 Wilson also 
came to rely more on his final Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, than any other 
minister, but Stewart himself showed little radicalism in foreign affairs.57 Richard 
Crossman recognised that Wilson and Stewart only allowed foreign policy issues to be 
debated at DOPC when there was disagreement between the two ministers.58  
Conversely the Foreign Secretary from August 1966 to March 1968, George Brown, 
with whom Wilson had a stormy relationship, ZDVPRUHYLVLRQDU\DERXW%ULWDLQ¶VIXWXUH
and was pro-withdrawal from East of Suez whilst supporting entry into the EEC.  
Chancellor of the Exchequer, James Callaghan was supportive of the Commonwealth 
and the role East of Suez whilst his successor in 1967, Roy Jenkins, who was on the 
Right of the Labour Government, was for joining the European Common Market and 
ILUPO\ DJDLQVW %ULWDLQ¶V SUHVHQFH (DVW RI 6XH]  Young notes that Wilson has been 
UHFRJQL]HG DV ³QRW Oacking in principle or idealism´ but his Government generally 
followed a traditional course in foreign policy.59 This led to accusations of hypocrisy, 
particularly from the Left. The supply of arms to the military regime in Greece led   
Cabinet member Richard Crossman to claim, in his diary, that Wilson and Stewart 
were ³VPXJ SHRSOH´ ZKR FRPELQHG ³KLJK PRUDO SULQFLSOH with highly expedient 
SUDFWLFH´60  Wilson also had to contend with the strong Left-wing of the party which 
was anti-American, internationalist, anti-capitalist and an ardent critic of the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\+HOHQ3DUUEHOLHYHVWKDWover time individuals and the Left-wing 
of the party, with a more domestic orientated agenda, came to have increasing 
influence, DV:LOVRQ¶VDSSDUHQWGHOXVLRQRIJUDQGHXUZDVZRUQDZD\E\WKH³UHDOLWLHV
of RIILFH´61   As Wrigley identifies in µ1RZ\RXVHHLWQRZ\RXGRQ¶W+DUROG Wilson and 
LaERXU¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\-¶, :LOVRQ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\Kas to be seen against the 
back-JURXQGRI³LQWHUOLQNHGSROLWLFDOQHHGV´7KHVH³QHHGV´LQFOXGHGRWKHULQWHUQDWLRQDO
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issues, the opinion of the Labour movement, party and unions, national opinion and 
threats to his leadership. Wilson sought to maintain the Labour Government in power 
and pursue policies that did not cleave the party and the Cabinet into two. 62  
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1.4 Britain and Libya 1945 to 1964 
 
From 1912 to 1943 the territory of modern Libya had been under Italian colonial 
rule. During this period the indigenous people had waged an armed struggle against 
the 150,000 Italians who had settled mainly in the northern lands of Tripolitania and 
Cyrenaica. Idris, the Chief of the religious Senussi order led Libyan resistance to this 
occupation, which was eventually ended, in cooperation with the British, in 1943.  
From 1943 to 1951 Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were placed under British 
administration, whilst the French held the Fezzan region in the south. The Italians 
relinquished all claims to the country in 1947.63 
 
When the Second World War ended in 1945 London considered Libya to be of 
great strategic value to defence and foreign policy in the Middle East. As Alison 
Pargeter has recognised, Libya was considered part of this region, which itself was the 
centre of strategic defence planning foU%ULWDLQ¶VJOREDOSUHVHQFH:ith the loss of  the 
Palestine Mandate in 1948  and uncertainty over WKH IXWXUHRI%ULWDLQ¶VSuez bases,  
Libya gained increasing importance for it enabled the British to maintain a presence in 
the region  and consequently great power status. 64  Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign 
SecretDU\ ZURWH LQ $XJXVW  WKDW ³Ln view of the potential strategic value of 
&\UHQDLFD« LW LV KLJKly desirable that the territory should be brought under British 
influence´65  Libya was also considered part of the Eastern Mediterranean, a 
politically fragile area given the communist threat to Turkey and Greece. Finally, Libya 
bordered Egypt and the strategically sensitive Suez Canal. As Pargeter has noted, 
/LE\DZDVDQDWLRQWKDW³WKH:HVWHUQSRZHUVFRXOGQRWDIIRUGWROHWVOLSLQWRWKH6RYLHW
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camp´$IWHUWKH6HFRQG:RUOG:DU0RVFRZVKRZHGLQWHUHVWLQJDLQLQJDWUXVWHHVKLS
in the territory or at least influencing the future political development of the region. 66   
 
From 1945 London was instrumental in the creation of a pro-Western Libyan 
regime to secure %ULWDLQ¶V strategic position. This goal FRPSOHPHQWHG:DVKLQJWRQ¶V
strategic concerns in the region and the Americans supported the idea of permanent 
British bases in Cyrenaica to thwart Soviet interests in the Mediterranean.  
Washington even considered drawing Libya into the NATO Alliance, so important was 
its strategic value.67  William Roger Louis has called the Anglo-US role in creation of 
/LE\D DV ³DQ XQEOXVKLQJYHQWXUH RIPLOLWDU\ DQG HFRQRPLF LPSHULDOLVP´68 Saul Kelly 
states that for Washington and London: 
 
 ³WKH IXOILOPHQW RI WKHLU VWUDWHJLF UHTXLUHPHQWV GHSHQGHG XSRQ D VDWLVIDFWRU\
outcome, namely the creation of a federal sate which would safeguard British-
American influence in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. The creation of a client state was 
LQWHQGHG WREROVWHU%ULWDLQ¶VSUHGRPLQDQWSRVLWLRQ LQ WKH0LGGOH(DVW LWV VWDWXVDVD
world power and its infOXHQFHZLWKLQWKH$PHULFDQGRPLQDWHG1RUWK$WODQWLFDOOLDQFH´.69 
 
However, Kelly points out that it was noticeable during this period that the US 
³EDXONHGDW%ULWLVKDWWHPSWV WRSHUVXDGH LW WRDVVXPHVRPHUHVSRQVLELOLW\´ for Libya, 
insteaG ³SUHIHUULQJ WKDW the British Government should bear the burden of protecting 
86VWUDWHJLFLQWHUHVWV´70 Washington was to follow this line during the 1960s. 
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The opportunity to secure strategic interests in Libya came when a UN plan for a 
British, Italian and French trusteeship in May 1949 failed to obtain the support of a 
voting majority at the UN General Assembly. The only option left was independence, 
particularly as the Anglo-Italian trustee plan had been met with civil disobedience in 
Tripoli and demonstrations of support for the Soviet Union. British officials decided it 
would be best to "climb on the band wagon´71  This did not mean the British had 
resigned themselves to genuine Libyan independence because the country would now 
become, in many respects, a British client state.72  /LE\D¶V VXEVHUYLHQW SROLWLFDO DQG
defence status was a consequence of the political system that the British had devised 
in the country. From the end of the war the British Military Administration of the region 
had been supportive of the political ambitions of the now Emir, Idris of Cyrenaica. In 
September 1949 Britain announced that it was giving Cyrenaica full responsibility for 
its internal affairs, under the authority of Idris, effectively declaring that an independent 
/LE\D³ZRXOGWDNHRQO\Whe form that Idris, Britain and Britain's Western allies wanted: a 
federal monarchy under the Senussi crown".73 By backing Idris Britain could exercise 
³DNLQGRILQIRUPDOFRORQLDOLVP´74 This practice was in NHHSLQJZLWK%ULWDLQ¶Vpolicy of 
courting influence amongst traditional, political elites in the Arab world and the 
6HQXVVLZHUH³DQLGHDOEDVLVIRUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIWKLVSDWWHUQLQ/LE\D´75  
 
On 1 January 1951 Libya attained independence and on 29 July 1953 an Anglo-
Libyan political relationship was formalized in the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance.  In 
accordance with article two of the treaty the parties agreed to come to the aid of the 
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RWKHUDV³DPHDVXUHRIFROOHFWLYHGHIHQFH´76 Article two of the Anglo-Libyan treaty was 
clarified in a classified ³VHFUHW´ QRWH, termed the Kirkbride note, after the British 
Ambassador to Libya at the time.  It made clear to the Libyan Government, the 
Foreign Office considered, ³WKDW LQ WKH HYHQW RI ZDU RU WKUHDW RI ZDU +HU 0DMHVW\¶V
Government will do all they can to defend Libya´77 The note emphatically stated that 
WKHUHZDV³QRGRXEW´ WKDWDUWLFOH WZRRI WKH WUHDW\GLG LPSO\³WKHSURYLVLRQRIPLOLWDU\
DVVLVWDQFH´78   
 
The treaty did not require the British to deploy military forces in Libya for this 
purpose, but under article three of the tUHDW\ ERWK DJUHHG WR ³IXUQLVK´  ³IDFLOLWLHV´ LQ
RUGHUWKDWHDFKFRXQWU\FRXOG³SOD\WKHLUSDUWLQWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFH
and security´79 British military deployments from 1953 consisted of airbases and 
landing strips at Tripoli, Benina and El Adem and army deployments in Tripoli, Homs, 
Barce and Derna. Article three gave rise to the ³AgreemenWRQ0LOLWDU\)DFLOLWLHV´which 
entitled the British to extensive jurisdictional and extraterritorial rights in Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica, as well as allowing the use of land for extensive military purposes and 
training.  8QGHUDUWLFOHRQHRIWKH³Agreement on Military Facilities´, Libya and Britain 
agreed to their WZRDUPHGIRUFHVZRUNLQJWRJHWKHU³WRVHFXUHHIILFLHQF\LQFRRSHration 
DQGXQLIRUPLW\´RI WUDLning and equipment. This article allowed the British to promote 
weapons sales and gave rise to the creation of military missions in the country 
operated by the British Army and the Royal Navy. The British were also granted over- 
flight and staging facilities in Libya.80 
 
The military missions were to be of great value for promoting the sale of arms but 
also encouraged military and political relations between Britain and Libya and enabled 
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the British to play a role in the developPHQWRI WKH.LQJ¶VDUPHGIRUFHVThe Libyan 
armed forces had their origin in the Libyan Arab Forces raised by British authorities in 
Egypt during the Second World War. The army preferred to be known as the Senussi 
army and were reluctant to be disbanded after the war and as a result were 
transferred to the Cyrenaican police force.  After independence they then transferred 
to the newly created Royal Libyan Army. As the army grew after 1952 politically less 
trusted city dwellers joined the conservative tribal members of the military. The King 
grew to be distrustful of the army and relied increasingly on Cyrenaican officers, who 
owed him personal loyalty, to fill important command positions whilst his forces were 
organised on regional and tribal lines. To neutralise any potential threat to his authority 
the army was balanced by regional police forces in the country. For example, the 
mobile National Security Force and the Cyrenaican Defence Force, which were 
UHFUXLWHGIURPWULEHVOR\DOWRWKH.LQJ¶VRZQ6HQXVVLFlan, had a combined strength of 
14,000 men and their armour was very similar to that of the army.81 The Defence 
)RUFH¶s role:ULJKWFRQVLGHUVZDVWR³SURWHFWWKHPRQDUFK\IURPDUPHGLQVXUUHFWLRQ´
or an attempted coup by the army. Tripolitania raised a police force of 4200 men, 
ZKLFKPHUJHGZLWKWKH)H]]DQIRUFHLQLQWRDVLQJOH1DWLRQDO6HFXULW\)RUFH´82 
British Ambassador Sarrell brought to the attention of the Foreign Office in September 
WKHDSSDUHQWGLVOR\DOW\RI ³FHUWDLQRIILFHUV´ LQ WKH/LE\a army. He reported that 
,GULV³PLVWUXVWVWKH/LE\DQDUP\DQGSUREDEO\DOZD\VZLOO´EXWZRXOGQHYHUSXUJHLWRI
GLVOR\DOHOHPHQWV OHVW WKDWDFWLRQ³UHPRYHWKHYHU\GLYLVLRQVZLWKLQ WKHDUP\ZKLFK LW
KDVEHHQKLVSROLF\WRSUHVHUYH´83 
 
The British role in the shape of the military missions involved a naval mission 
tasked with building up Libyan coastal defences and was mainly advisory, virtually 
running the Libyan navy following agreement in London in November 1962 to create a 
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Libyan navy although this  never grew beyond 200 personnel.84 The military mission 
provided advice to the Libyan army. The Head of the British military mission was 
³GLUHFWO\ UHVSRQVLEOH WR WKH $PEDVVDGRU´ DQG ZDV WR ³advise and assist´ the Libyan 
GHIHQFHPLQLVWHU³LQDOOPDWWHUV´FRQQHFted with development, equipment and training 
of the Libyan army.85 The missions were also involved in promoting and organising 
joint training exercises in the Libyan desert where British hardware was demonstrated 
and marketed to the Libyan armed forces.  Expatriate technicians were loaned to the 
Libyan army under the auspices of the military assistance office. The British military 
mission had their headquarters in Benghazi with a smaller detachment in Tripoli. The 
British naval   mission was based in Tripoli. The missions also enabled the British to 
monitor the Libyan regime, particularly the military forces, if somewhat obliquely.  Idris 
forbade the use of military attaches in Libya and the British Chiefs of Staff held firm to 
the notion WKDW ³WUDLQLQJ PLVVLons should not be charged with tasks involving the 
FROOHFWLRQ RI LQWHOOLJHQFH´86  However Blundy and Lycett quote an unnamed British 
NCO who claimed ³ZHZHUHWKHUHQRWUHDOO\WRWUDLQWKHDUP\EXWWRNHHSDQH\HRQLW
to find out what was really going on. We made regular reports about it to the British 
Embassy people. I felt for a long time that something pretty drastic was going to 
KDSSHQ´87  By the mid 1960s 6LPRQVQRWHVWKDW³Pany observers perceived that the 
situation was ripe for revolution´DQGWKLVencouraged the British not to arm the Libyan 
army too heavily because it was FRQVLGHUHG  ³that many of the Libyan Officers were 
interested in politics and much influenced by talk of Arab Nationalism´ Therefore it 
appears that, as the Head of the Royal Libyan Military Academy in Benghazi from 
1960 to 1966 Colonel Lough stated: ³RXU SROLF\ ZDV QRW WR DUP WKHP WRo well´88  
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Lough claims that the KLQJ³IHDUHGKLVDUP\´DQGZRXOGnot even allow them to use six 
Centurion tanks provided by the British.89  
 
British involvement in the armed forces of Libya went further. London set up the 
Libyan Military Academy in Benghazi in 1957 DV6LPRQVSRLQWVRXW ³WR VHUYHXQGHU
%ULWLVKJXLGDQFH´6LPRQVIXUWKHUHODERUDWHVWKDW³LWZDVDVVXPHGWKDWWKHQHFHVVDU\
quotas of reliable pro-:HVWHUQRIILFHUVFRXOGEHJHQHUDWHGLQVXFKDQLQVWLWXWLRQ´7KH
revolution of the 1 September 1969 which over-threw the monarchy was led by 
Captain Muammar Gaddafi who had enrolled in the Military Academy and attended a 
military training course in Britain on signals, driving maintenance and gunnery.90 
Simons also claims that army officers were monitored, pointing out that there was a 
³GHWDLOHGGRVVLHU´RQ*DGGDILJRLQJEDFNWR&RORQHO$]L]6KHQLEQXPEHUWKUHH
in the Libyan army, stated that GDGGDIL¶VSORWZDVactually well know amongst senior 
officers. Such dissension, which appeared common and which the regime feared 
could lead to a successful coup, was dealt with by a policy of moving officers around 
posts frequently. 91   
 
Under article three of the treaty it was recognised that in return for military facilities 
the British agreed to provide long-term budgetary assistance, which amounted to a 
subsidy totalling £3,750,000 per annum from 1953. This subsidy would be reviewed 
every five years and gave Britain tremendous political leverage over Libya because 
the country was poor and entirely dependent on foreign financial assistance. 92  In the 
1950s :DVKLQJWRQFRQFOXGHGWKDW/LE\DZDVXQGHUKHDY\%ULWLVKLQIOXHQFHDQG³WKH
sheer fact of her pressing needs makes Libya a veritable bargain basement, where 
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extraordinary values can be had at a very low cost´93  The United States also 
acquired military facilities in Libya, secured under the US-Libyan agreement of 
December 1954. The agreement entailed no defence commitment from Washington, 
although the presence of American forces on Libyan soil at the Wheelus air base 
reassured the security concerns of the Libyan Government. The base also 
demonstrated an American presence in the Middle East and Mediterranean, providing 
support for potential air operations in the region.94 
 
Franco-Libyan relations were also formalised at this time. In 1954 the French 
maintained a limited troop presence in Libya at Sheba, Ghat and Ghadames in the 
southern Fezzan district of Libya. Faced with hostility from Libyan nationalists towards 
French policies in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia the Libyan Government signed a 
WUHDW\ RI ³IULHQGVKLS DQG JRRG-QHLJKERXUOLQHVV´ ZLWK 3DULV LQ $XJXVW  7KLV
agreement stipulated the withdrawal of French troops by the end of November 1956 
whilst the French would continue to have air and transit rights over and through Libya, 
in return for contributions to Libyan development spending. Without the troop 
presence the area became a transit point for the smuggling of arms from Egypt to 
Algeria in support of the uprising against French rule.95 
 
Returning to the Anglo-Libyan relationship, the treaty was underscored by the 
political relationship between the Libyan monarchy and British diplomats. This 
relationship was particularly close and King Idris, who held considerable power in the 
country, had strong affection for the British as a result of his war time experiences and 
he looked to London for his own personal security.  In return the treaty and 
relationship enabled the British to secure military facilities in Libya and support 
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%ULWDLQ¶VZLGHUGHIHQFHVWUDWHJ\$UWLFOH WKUHH of the treaty affirmed that the facilities 
ZRXOGHQDEOH%ULWDLQDQG/LE\DWR³SOD\ WKHLUSDUWLQWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
peace and security´ Initially these deployments were to be peacetime locations for 
IRUFHV ZKLFKFRXOGQRWEHVWDWLRQHG LQ(J\SW%ODFNZHOO FRQVLGHUV/LE\DZDV ³DNH\
WRROLQSURWHFWLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VLQWHUHVWVLQWKH0LGGOH(DVW´DQG³DQHVVHQWLDOOLQN´LQSODQV 
to defend the region. 96 Additionally Pargeter believes WKDW WKH IDFLOLWLHVZHUH ³DYLWDO
FRPSRQHQWLQ%ULWDLQ¶VVWUDWHJ\RIPDLQWDLQLQJ:HVWHUQUHJLPHVLQWKH0LGGOe East that 
would counter Arab Nationalism and provide convenient facilities for use against 
radical Arab states where necessary´97 In this case the perceived enemy was the 
Prime Minister and later President of Egypt, General Nasser. Blackwell agrees that 
³WKHUHWHQWLRQRI WURRSV LQ&\UHQDLFD«ZDV LQWHQGHGWRPDLQWDLQSUHVVXUHRQ&DLUR
following the 1954 (Anglo-Egyptian) DJUHHPHQW´ZKLOVW/LE\D¶VUHJLRQDOSRVLWLRQ³OHGWR
an increased Anglo-American emphasis on the country as a pro-Western bulwark 
against the Cairo regime´98  The facilities also provided Britain with alternative military 
bases following the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954 which resulted in a British 
evacuation from the Suez Canal Zone. The British military presence demonstrated 
/RQGRQ¶V commitment not just to Libya but to other conservative, monarchical Arab 
states, whilst serving, on a purely military basis, to deter Egypt from seeking to attack 
/LE\D 7KH IDFLOLWLHV E\ V\PEROLVLQJ %ULWDLQ¶V PLOLWDU\ FRPPLWPHQW WR /LE\D,   also 
served to counter a very low level, anti -Idris, subversive threat sponsored by Egypt, at 
least in the eyes of British planners.99   The 1953 treaty did not require the British to 
intervene in internal affairs but the strategic value of the country was such that the 
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British were willing, up until the late 1950s, to restore the King or a friendly 
government in the event of a revolution having taken place.100    
 
Even from its conception the newly independent Libyan state was split by internal 
opposition to the constitutional set-up and the regime was criticised for the close 
relations maintained with the WestHUQ SRZHUV 6LPRQV QRWHV WKDW WKH ³VZHHSLQJ
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO SRZHUV RI .LQJ ,GULV ZHUH IUHTXHQWO\ DEXVHG´ DQG WKH UHJLPH ZDV D
³YHKLFOH IRU FRQWLQXHG :HVWHUQ +HJHPRQ\ LQ WKH UHJLRQ´ RQ D PRGHO VLPLODU WR WKH
Hashemite Kingdom in Jordan.101 Simons also notes that nationalists were unhappy 
with the federal basis of the constitution which would continue to be dominated by 
³WUDGLWLRQDO IRUFHV QRW OHDVW E\ WKH HYHr-SUHVHQW (XURSHDQ SRZHUV´ The three 
provinces of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan were given excessive powers and 
WKH.LQJ ³UHSUHVHQWHGDQXQZHOFRPHFRQVWUDLQWRQGHPRFUDWLFGHYHORSPHQW´  Libya 
ZDV³KHDYLO\FRPPLWWHGWRWKH:HVW´DQGWKLVZRXOGEHD³IXQGDPHQWDOFDXVH´RIWKH
revolution in September 1969. TULEDO OHDGHUV DQG ³LPSRUWDQW XUEDQ SROLWLFal centres, 
often under the influence of the Arab NDWLRQDOLVWV´ZHUHRSSRVHGWR ,GULV¶ LQVWDOODWLRQ
DV.LQJ³7HQVLRQVEHWZHHQWKHROGWUDGLWLRQDOLVPDQGWKHQHZFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPZHUH
TXLFN WRVXUIDFH´3ULRU WR LQGHSHQGHQFH WKHVH WHQVLRQVKDGDOUHDG\ OHG to disputed 
elections in 1952 which the pro-Arab League Congress party claimed to have won. 
Congress party supporters invaded government buildings and the party was promptly 
banned. As a result multi-SDUW\ SROLWLFV LQ /LE\D ³FROODSVHG DW WKH ILUVW WHVW´ Dnd 
opposition operated on a clandestine basis. The government¶V cabinet served the 
Palace and candidates in subsequent elections were ³government nominees, and 
YRWLQJ FULWHULD ZHUH PRVW FKDUDFWHULVWLFDOO\ WULEDO DQG QHSRWLVWLF´ 6RPH SROLWLFDO
opposition continued in sports clubs and trade unions although these were heavily 
FLUFXPVFULEHGDQG UHSUHVVHGE\ WKH LQWHUQDO VHFXULW\ IRUFHV 6LPRQVFODLPV ³%ULWDLQ
continued to train and offer advice to the Libyan police forces and military, and there 
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was little doubt that the hostility of the Libyan Government to trade union organisation 
was supported by the British´102 Opposition remained underground until the mid 
1960s and was mainly republican in outlook, although the King was generally well 
respected as a figure.  In 1961 the Libyan General Federation of Trade Unions was 
VHYHUHO\UHVWULFWHGE\ODZDQGZDV³HIIHFWLYHO\FRZHG´103 Wright recognises that it was 
then left to the students to take up the cause of opposition. This opposition was largely 
³VKDGRZ\ VPDOO DQd ineffHFWLYHGLVXQLWHG´ EXW VKDUHG LGHDV RI ³QDWLRQDO Oiberation, 
republicanism and Arab uQLW\´104 In April 1963 the federal basis of the constitution 
ZDVDEROLVKHGDQG WKHXQLILFDWLRQRI WKHVWDWHD ³UHVSRQVH WR WKHFRXQWU\¶VQHHG WR
develop oil richeVDQGWRDFKLHYHLQWHJUDWLRQ´DFWXDOO\JDYHWKH.LQJDQGKLVFORVH
DGYLVRUVDQGUHODWLRQV³LQRUGLQDWHSRZHU´+RZHYHU³ZLWKDQHHGWRPDLQWDLQSROLWLFDO
quiescence the regime turned towards large scale patronage and distributive 
PHDVXUHV´ WKDW ZHUH invariably corrupt and ineffective. In the meantime the Libyan 
authorities continued to suppress opposition.105  
 
Western military presence in Libya soon became a political target for the opposition 
after independence.  During the Suez crisis of 1956 public demonstrations against the 
%ULWLVK PLOLWDU\ SUHVHQFH ZHUH KHOG DQG ³WKUHDWHQHG WKH FRXQWU\¶V LQWHUQDO VWDELOLW\´
The British were warned by the Libyan Government that if the bases were used 
against the Egyptians then Tripoli would not be able to control popular discontent. 
3XEOLF UHDFWLRQ ³ZDV VWURQJ´ ZLWK VWUHHW GHPRQVWUDWLRQV LQ $XJXVW DQG LQ 1RYHPEHU
WKLV LQFUHDVHG ³HQFRXUDJHG E\ 5DGLR &DLUR¶V LQFLWHPHQW WRYLROHQW DFWLRQ´  5LRWV LQ
Benghazi occurred and industrial action was called by dock workers who would not 
handle British goods. The Libyan regime found it difficult to balance its support for 
$UDE QDWLRQV DV ZHOO DV LWV VXSSRUW IRU WKH :HVW ZKR ZHUH ³SURYLGLQJ HVVHQWLDO
                                                   
102
 Simons, Libya: The Struggle for Survival, 2nd edn., pp. 155-156, 158-159, 161. 
103
 Wright, Libya, pp. 92-93.  
104
 Ibid., p. 92. 
105
 Vandewalle, Libya since Independence, pp. 51-52. 
38 
subsidies´106  The British respected the Libyan demands which fell within one of the 
stipulations of the Treaty, namely article four which stated that nothing in the treaty 
VKRXOGSUHMXGLFH/LE\D¶VREOLJDWLRQVWRWKH&RYHQDQWRIWKH/HDJXHRI$UDE6WDWHV$V
a result the Libyans were entitled to forbid the use of the facilities if Britain chose to 
use them against another member of the League. In due course the ineffectiveness of 
the deployments for action against Nasser led London to conclude that the value of 
/LE\D ZDV ³PXFK H[DJJHUDWHG´ DQG WKDW WURRS UHGXFWLRQ, to save on defence 
expenditure, ZDVSRVVLEOHZKLOVW³OHDYLQJLQDVPDOOIRUFHLQ&\UHQDLFDDVDSODWHJODVV
window against Egyptian invasion and perhaps to protect the King´107  In 1957 the 
Cabinet decided that the commitment should be reduced to a minimum to safeguard 
the essential needs of the RAF and the staging facilities.108  Simultaneously the British 
VRXJKWWR³SHUVXDGHWKH$PHULFDQVWRWDNHRQWKHPDLQILQDQFLal and military burden in 
/LE\D´ H[SORLWLQJ:DVKLQJWRQ¶V LQFUHDVHG FRPPLWPHQW WR FRQWDLQPHQW RI WKH 6RYLHW
threat in the Middle East. Washington attached great importance to the British 
continuing to contribute substantially to what they saw as a combined effort to keep 
Libya within the Western camp but was reluctant to mention any figure of financial 
support for Libya.109  These issues were to reappear during the 1960s. 
 
Despite the military restrictions and cost implications involved in maintaining British 
forces in Libya, the facilities were grafted oQWR%ULWDLQ¶VZLGHUVWrategic commitments, 
mainly as a result of the staging and over-flight facilities available. Libya was an 
integral part of the ³HDVWDERXW´DLUURXWH to the Middle East and Far East. This route 
consisted of two alternatives. Firstly therH ZDV WKH ³Qorthern rRXWH´ DFURVV &\SUXV
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Turkey, Iran, the Gulf and Gan for communication with forces in South East Asia and 
WKH )DU (DVW 7KH DOWHUQDWLYH ZDV WKH ³VRXWKHUQ URXWH´ ZKLFK LQFOXGHG /LE\D WKH
Sudan and Aden. AQDOWHUQDWLYH³ZHVWDERXW´URXWH, via the United States would only 
become viable once heavy transport C130s and VC10 aircraft came into service later 
in the 1960s. 
 
 These staging facilities were considered important to the East of Suez strategy 
that encompassed defence commitments in the Middle East and South East Asia. 
Within the Middle East, London had security commitments to Gulf States and to the 
Baghdad Pact. The Pact was a military alliance between Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan 
and the UK created in 1955. The British were keen to encourage other Baghdad Pact 
countries to take interest in Libya.110  During the 1950s officials urged the retention of 
British troops in Libya not just WRFKHFN1DVVHU¶VDPELWLRQVDQGPDLQWDLQWKH.LQJEXW
because they served this wider strategic role.111  When the Baghdad Pact began to 
stall with the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958 the British sent additional troops 
to Libya to reassure the King and conservative Arab regimes of continued British 
support.  Plans to withdraw troops were shelved and a partial rather than a total 
withdrawal, as originally envisaged in the Defence White Paper of 1957, was 
implemented. London decided to station one major unit at Benghazi indefinitely and to 
reverse planned cutbacks in the subsidy.  The Libyans were granted £3.25 million in 
aid and a programme for training and equipping the Libyan army was initiated with a 
military mission created in Benghazi for this purpose.112  The Anglo-Libyan 
relationship was reaffirmed and Libya continued to be an important factor in British 
strategic calculations in the Middle East and for supporting BULWDLQ¶VREOLJDWLRQVWRWKH
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Baghdad Pact, renamed CENTO in 1959 after the Iraqi withdrawal.113  /LE\D¶V
significance to Western strategic interests in the region increased with the rise of Pan-
Arab Nationalism in the Middle East, the creation of the United Arab Republic in 
February 1958 and increased Soviet political, economic and military involvement in 
the Arab world. The staging and over-flying rights through Libya and the Sudan to 
Aden were considered particularly important for the defence of the Middle East and 
provided an air route to Kuwait, where the British landed troops in defence of the Emir 
in 1961.114    
 
The facilities were also considered valuable to the East of Suez strategy into the 
Far East, once again providing vital staging facilities.  The British East of Suez 
presence in this region comprised bases and military deployments in Malaysia, 
Singapore and Hong Kong as well as defence commitments to the South East Asia 
Treaty Organization (SEATO) and London was resolutely committed to these in the 
early 1960s.   In 1962 the Macmillan Government recognised that, despite economic 
FRQVWUDLQWV LW ZDV ³FOHDUO\ LPSRVVLEOH WR GHFLGH WR UHGXFH H[SHQGLWXUH E\
DEDQGRQLQJDQ\RIRXURYHUVHDVFRPPLWPHQWV´115 The 1961 Macmillan Future Policy 
Study had foreseen no change in policy on the Libyan facilities as the treaty was due 
to be reviewed in 1963, but economic and financial concerns regarding the funding of 
the facilities meant consideration had been given to reducing the subsidy along with a 
reduction of forces in Libya to save on overseas sterling expenditure.116 Such 
consideration was headed off in 1962 when the Libyans asked for a postponement of 
the review of the treaty in the following year until 1965. Alec Douglas Home, the 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was happy to agree, because the facilities had 
become essential to British strategy East of Suez and to defence obligations to 
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SEATO.  Douglas Home considered it LQ%ULWDLQ¶V LQWHUest to keep discussion of the 
treaty and military agreement to a minimum.117   
 
The Service Chiefs stressed the importance of the Libyan facilities to British 
strategy East of Suez, whether in the Middle East or Far East.  From their point of 
view none of the alternative routes through Turkey or across central Africa were 
satisfactory because they were not guaranteed. The Chiefs of Staff also attached 
great importance to the unique training rights the British had in Libya which allowed air 
movement practice for strategic reserves, tank training and bombing. A 1963 report on 
British policy towards Libya considered that the loss of   ³El Adem would mean the 
......execution of defence policy anywhere East of Suez or indeed in the Levant 
...would be rendered vastly more difficult´DQG  ³ZKLOVWWKHWLPHZRXOGFRPHWRGHFLGH
what IDFLOLWLHV ZHUH QHHGHG WKLV ZRXOG GHSHQG RQ ZKHWKHU ³RU QRW ZH PDLQWain our 
present defence policy East of Suez and other issues such as the situation in Middle 
East and Libya´118  As a result the facilities were framed firmly in the concept of an 
East of Suez strategy.   
 
British policy, in line with the United States and other Western countries, was to 
keep Libya politically within the Western camp. The facilities were considered by 
British officials as a stabilizing factor in Libyan politics, because they reassured the 
King that he had military support and they posed a deterrent to anti-government 
forces. However, the British were not obliged by treaty to intervene in internal 
³FRQIOLFWV´RUHYHQPDLQWDLQD military presence in the country, and they showed less 
appetite to do so by the 1960s as the financial burden of maintaining facilities in Libya 
and elsewhere in the world came to weigh more heavily on policy decisions. The 1963 
report on British policy towards Libya claimed iWZDV³SROLWLFDOO\RXWRIquestion´to use 
military force to establish whatever regime the British wished to see in Libya. London 
had a policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Arab states. Such action in 
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/LE\DFRXOGEH³VHOIGHVWUXFWLYH´and lead to Britain being    ³discredited in Libya and 
throughout the Arab world´  Instead the British were now happy to maintain the 
³IUHHGRPWR UHVSRQG WRFKDQJHVRISROLWLFDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ LQRUGHU WRVHFXUH WUHDW\
rights with any successor regime they could work with.  The very minimum facilities 
the London considered important to hold onto were the strategically important over-
flying and staging rights.119 These considerations were to play a significant role in 
/RQGRQ¶VDSSURDFKWRWKHUHYROXWLRQ¶Vleaders in September 1969. 
 
During the early 1960s %ULWDLQ¶V position in Libya became vulnerable as the Idris 
regime failed to address the anti-Western and pro-Arab sympathies of a population 
heavily influenced by Nasserite Pan Arabism. The conservative monarchy in Libya 
also discovered itself to be strategically isolated from similar regimes in the Arab 
world, sandwiched between Egypt and newly independent Algeria. Internal opposition 
had been largely quashed or had become clandestine but WKH ³PDLQ WKUHDW WR WKH
monarchy .......appeared tREHIRUHLJQUDWKHUWKDQGRPHVWLF´120 
 
A threat to Libya came from the west and was posed by Algeria which considered 
LWVHOI D UHYROXWLRQDU\ VWDWH ZLWK D ³GXW\ WR VSUHDG UHYROW´ DJDLQVW FRORQLDOLVP 7KLV
persuasion was born of its struggle against the French colonists led by the National 
Liberation Front. This political party developed strong relations with the newly 
LQGHSHQGHQW VWDWHV RI 7XQLVLD 0RURFFR DQG 1DVVHU¶V (J\SW121  Algeria was 
considered a significant threat to Western interests from the very first days of its 
independence. IW EHFDPH ³RQH RI WKH PRVW YLVLEOH DQG DGPLUHG RI WKH WKLUG ZRUOG´
countries.122 Under the leadership of Ahmed Ben Bella the precedent of backing 
UHYROXWLRQDU\JURXSVWKDW³RSHQO\DGYRFDWHGWKHXVHRIWHUURULVP´ZDVHVWDEOLVKHGand 
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Algerian independence reinvigorated the Non-Aligned Movement.123 The regime was 
courted by Warsaw Pact countries as well as China, Egypt and the Soviet Union itself.   
 
&RPPXQLVW VHUYLFHV ZHUH DOVR RIIHUHG WR %HQ %HOOD¶V VXFFHVVRU +RXDUL
Boumédienne who overthrew Ben Bella in June 1965. He undertook a policy of 
formulating an industrial policy to modernise the country and enable it to survive. He 
also instituted the construction of a highly centralised state and the transformation of 
the FLN party into a SRZHUOHVVSDUDOOHODQG³LQHUWDGPLQLVWUDWLYHDSSDUDWXV´7KHVWDWH
then exercised all executive, legislative and judicial power and nationalised the 
HFRQRP\ 7KH VWDWH EHFDPH WKH ³SULQFLSDO DJHQW RI LQGXVWULDOLVDWLRQ DQG
GHYHORSPHQW´124 Algerian oil and gas were at the heart of the FRXQWU\¶VGHYHORSPHQW 
plans. Simultaneously Algeria ³DVSLUHG WR H[SRUW WKHLU EOHQG RI UHYROXWLRQ DQG
nationalism to other countries in Africa and the Arab world´125 The Palestinian 
0RYHPHQW ZDV D ³PDMRU IRFXV DQG EHQHILFLDU\ RI Whe Algerian policy of exporting 
rHYROXWLRQ´ DQG $OJHULD later DGRSWHG D ³KDUG-OLQH´ SROLF\ WR WKH 6L[ 'D\ :DU DQG
Boumédienne remained committed to a Palestinian insurgency as being the only 
means to resolve the Arab-Israeli problem.126 Slonim recognises that during the 1960s 
$OJHULDJUHZ³HYHQPRUHH[WUHPH´WKDQ(J\SWRQ³JHQHUDODQWDJRQLVPWRWKH:HVW´127 
Moscow was an irreplaceable source of arms, expertise, and commerce with Algiers 
and this reflected Soviet involvement in Egypt. At the same time $OJHULD¶s relations 
with its Maghreb neighbours including Morocco and /LE\DZRXOGEH³DF\QLFDOKLVWRU\
of detente and dispute´ERWKWKHVHUHJLPHVEHLQJPRQDUFKLHVDQGSROLWLFDOO\RSSRVHG
to the Algerian model. 128 
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/LE\D DQG %ULWDLQ¶V interests in the country were further threatened, as we have 
seen, by Egypt. Egyptian newspapers were widely available in Libya and Cairo 
5DGLR¶V ³9RLFH RI WKH $UDEV´ KDG ³D ODUJH DQG LPSUHVVLRQDEOH DXGLHQFH´ /LE\DQ
teachers, Libyans trained in Egypt and (J\SWLDQ ³FXOWXUDO LQIOXHQFH´ channelled 
³1DVVHULWHSDQ-Arab and anti-:HVWHUQ´ LGHDV LQWR WKH.LQJGRPDOWKRXJK WKHUH ZDV
ZLGHVSUHDGVXVSLFLRQRI(J\SWLDQLQWHQWLRQVJLYHQWKHGLSORPDWLFSUHVVXUHDQG³SODLQ
VXEYHUVLRQ´1DVVHULQVWLJDWHGDJDLQVW his neighbour. By 1965 Cairo was considered to 
have significant political influence over Libya and this interest was focused on /LE\D¶V
growing oil development.129 Turning to British interests, London had been in a 
confrontation with Egypt for over a decade and it was believed that Nasser, backed 
financially and politically by the Soviet Union, posed a continued threat to British 
interests in Libya and the Middle East.  Anglo-Egyptian relations had remained at best 
frosty since the 1956 Suez Crisis and had become strained over the civil war in the 
Yemen. Egyptian troops had been deployed in increasing numbers in support of the 
revolutionary regime LQ6DQD¶D, fighting Royalist forces supported by Saudi Arabia and 
Britain.  British facilities in Libya, along with the US Wheelus base became the focus 
of increased anti-Western protests and there were repeated calls from the Libyan 
nationalist opposition and President Nasser of Egypt for the abrogation of the treaty 
and the removal of the facilities.  
 
In early 1964 Nasser had secured a political rapprochement with his fellow Arab 
states following the Cairo Summit held in January of that year. Political differences 
between Egypt and other revolutionary Arab states like Syria as well as conservative 
monarchies in Jordan and Saudi Arabia were assuaged. At the summit it was agreed 
to carry out planning to address conflicts between Arab states and to address the 
issue of the diversion of water from the Jordan by Israel. The summit also established 
a joint military defence command under Egyptian leadership.130 Riding high on an 
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improvement in relations, Nasser signalled out the deployments on 22 February 1964 
when he declared that the foreign facilities in Libya were a danger to all Arabs and 
called for their liquidation. 1DVVHU¶VVSHHFKDQGLibyan public demonstrations against   
%ULWDLQ¶VPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHOHGWRULRWVLQLibya on the 8 and 9 March and on 16 March 
1964 the Libyan Chamber of Deputies agreed in principle to the termination of the 
treaty and complete evacuation of all foreign troops.131 To the opposition in Libya the 
military deployments represented not only Western colonial oppression but WKH ³ILUVW
line of defence against insurrection´132  
 
The Conservative Government in London concluded that, in view of the important 
strategic interests at stake, the British could not acquiesce in any unilateral cancelling 
of the treaty and therefore would not agree to take part in negotiations directed to its 
termination. The Foreign Office (FO) FRQVLGHUHGWKDW³Ze maintain our bases whether 
in Cyprus, Libya, Aden or Singapore because we believe that they play a vital part in 
preserving stability. They help to deter communist aggression against our allies in 
CENTO and SEATO and they enable us to honour our commitments´133 London, 
whilst seeking to retain over-flying, staging and training rights, would accept 
withdrawal from the garrison presence at Benghazi and Tripoli.  The approach was to 
persuade the Libyans to review the treaty instead of abrogating it and to secure 
Britain¶VGHIHQFHREOLJDWLRQWR/LE\Dwhich guaranteed military facilities in Libya. The 
British were not obliged to maintain troops in Libya, but a deployment that facilitated a 
point of entry for troops would, in the view of the Chiefs of Staff, enable the defence 
plan for Libya to be carried out more efficiently.  To keep the treaty and political 
relationship in being, the British considered they hDGWRVDWLVI\WKH/LE\DQVRI/RQGRQ¶V 
capacity to fulfil obligations to defend them. Planners advised that a minimum force at 
Tobruk and El Adem, to secure a point of entry for troops, would reassure the Libyans.  
The Foreign Office calculated that such a deployment would be less obtrusive than at 
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Benghazi, where troops were already deployed and which had once itself been the 
point of entry. 134  
 
The King was able to reassert his authority during 1964 and formal talks between 
the British and Libya led to an agreement to evacuate the Tripoli garrison by the end 
of 1965.  The garrison at Benghazi was to be evacuated at an unspecified later date. 
%ULWDLQ¶VPLOLWDU\Sresence would comprise of an armoured car squadron stationed at 
El Adem with an infantry company at Tobruk.135  Therefore, by the summer of 1964 
%ULWDLQ¶VSROLWLFDOUHODWLRQVKLSDQGVWUDWHJLFstake in Libya had been secured , although 
IROORZLQJ /DERXU¶V *HQHral Election victory in October 1964 these were to be 
reviewed, revised and ultimately abandoned before Labour were removed from power 
in 1970. 
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2 The Anglo-Libyan Review 1964-1965  
 
Upon taking office in October 1964 the Labour Government sought to maintain an 
extensive defence policy East of Suez and the Libyan facilities were considered 
important for that role. However, faced with an ailing economy, ministers sanctioned 
withdrawals from some of the facilities in order to save on overseas expenditure, in 
line with agreements made by the previous Conservative and Libyan Government. 
These withdrawals were confirmed as part of the Anglo-Libyan review in January 
GHVSLWH.LQJ,GULV¶UHTXHVWthat the British should remain, but a residual military 
presence was still important to London. 
 
As we have seen %ULWDLQ¶V military presence in Libya served to support wider 
strategic defence plans East of Suez, by providing staging and over-flying facilities to 
allies in SEATO and CENTO as well as in the Gulf.  The military presence in Libya 
was part of a chain of deployments stretching from Gibraltar to Malta, Cyprus, Bahrain 
and Aden. They represented both a political and military commitment to the Arab 
conservative regime in Libya and signalled British and Western support for other such 
regimes. This demonstration of support contributed to wider Western security in the 
region.  The Middle East had enormous strategic importance as it was a focal point of 
communication, a rich source of oil and a defence shield against   Soviet 
aggrandisement into Africa. The region was also politically unstable, split between 
traditional, conservative and nationalist regimes, as well as by the on-going Arab-
Israeli confrontation. Libya was considered the western extremity of the Middle East 
by British planners.136  
 
Retaining the Libyan deployments enabled the Anglo-Libyan relationship to be 
maintained. They facilitated British political influence through practical working 
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relations between the Libyan leadership and army, and British military and diplomatic 
representatives.  King Idris, who remained politically powerful, was endeared to the 
British, not just as a result of mutual war-time experiences and the support the British 
had given him prior to the creation of the independent Libyan state, but also because 
he considered the defence agreement a security guarantee for himself and his regime, 
given the military and political threat from Egypt.   
 
The military presence, enabling London to promote political influence and good 
relations, also secured preferential commercial treatment for the British, especially in 
arms sales. During this period Libyan oil revenues began to grow as the country 
exploited its rich reserves which had been discovered in the late 1950s. British oil 
companies, including British Petroleum, were instrumental in the development of 
Libyan oil.137 Military missions, garrisons and staging sites were considered to be 
invaluable as points of contact to sell arms and services to the regime and, to a lesser 
degree, providing a miliWDU\ SUHVHQFH LQ GHIHQFH RI %ULWDLQ¶V JURwing oil concerns.  
Policy makers considered the deployments instrumental in DLGLQJ %ULWDLQ¶V PDWHULDO
welfare and believed that their loss could in turn lead to a decline in political influence 
and associated British interests in Libya.  Furthermore a military presence in Libya 
facilitated inexpensive and extensive training opportunities that lowered /RQGRQ¶V
global defence bill.  
 
From January 1965 the Labour Government was engaged in a review of the Anglo-
Libyan relationship. This was partly D UHVXOWRI.LQJ ,GULV¶appeal in late 1964 that a 
military presence remain in Libya, as well as part of a larger review initiated after the 
/LE\DQ *RYHUQPHQW¶V withdrawal request earlier in that year. In January 1965 the 
Government agreed that the military presence was to be run down to a minimum 
necessary presence to defend Libya and for supporting strategic responsibilities. This 
involved a withdrawal from the Tripoli garrison and airport, a planned withdrawal from 
the Benghazi garrison and a limited presence at Tobruk and El Adem. 
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Because both Britain and Libya had an interest in maintaining the military 
deployment, complete disengagement was not an option, not   at least until the treaty 
expired in 1973.  Meanwhile the facilities   were   a drain upon the Exchequer, both in 
terms of the stationing of troops   as well as the   payment of a subsidy to the regime.  
Alternative ways of both financing and fulfilling this treaty commitment were 
considered. These included replacing the subsidy ZLWK DOWHUQDWLYH ³WHFKQLFDO´
assistance, which was only partly successful, as the British were aware that they 
already gained considerable advantages through the treaty and were not willing to 
force a formal reinterpretation. Officials believed D ZULWWHQ DJUHHPHQW RQ ³WHFKQLFDO´
assistance would undermine the relationship. The second idea, of requesting the 
Libyans to pay for the deployments, was deemed inappropriate as no Arab country 
would be likely to accede to such a request.  
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2.1 Libyan Defence and Political Relations 
 
In the spring of 1964 British facilities in Libya consisted of RAF Idris at Tripoli 
Airport and the Tripoli garrison, both in Tripolitania. In addition the British maintained 
the Benghazi garrison and the staging facilities at El Adem, which included a small 
military presence at Tobruk in Cyrenaica. Finally there were the military missions.  In 
February 1964 President Nasser of Egypt had criticised the presence of British forces 
in Libya. To assuage popular Libyan protest against the British presence, the Libyan 
Government demanded the termination of the 1953 treaty and liquidation of the 
remaining facilities.  The Conservative Government at the time were eager not to 
WHUPLQDWHWKHWUHDW\DQGORVH³YLWDOVWDJLQJDQGRYHUIO\LQJIDFLOLWLHV´ and sidestepped 
the issue by agreeing to a review of the treaty.138  Subsequently the British agreed to 
withdraw from RAF Tripoli and the Tripoli garrison. A withdrawal from Benghazi at 
some unspecified time in the future was additionally sanctioned.   
 
By the end of 1964, King Idris had reasserted his power in Libya and was eager for 
the British to reconsider the planned withdrawal from Tripoli and Benghazi given the 
political and possibly military threat to his regime from Algeria and Egypt.  In January 
the following year the Labour Government were faced with making a decision on 
either to maintain present facilities in Libya or continue to pursue the withdrawal as 
negotiated under the Conservative Government. The Defence and Oversea Policy 
Committee (DOPC), the senior Cabinet committee on defence and foreign policy, 
reached general agreement on 3 February 1965 with proposals of the Official 
Committee of the DOPC (DOPC (O)). This sub-committee of senior officials on 
defence and foreign policy had made recommendations on the future deployments of 
British troops in Libya in light of the Anglo-Libyan Review.139 These proposals 
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recognised that remaining in Cyrenaica ZRXOG VDWLVI\ WKH .LQJ¶V UHTXHVW that the 
British remain, which had been based upon his oZQ DQG KLV JRYHUQPHQW¶V IHDU RI
Nasser. A continued limited deployment would maintain faith with the regime. The   
King had implied that he would like the British to remain in Benghazi indefinitely, 
possibly because this garrison lay nearest to the Egyptian border. Idris was suspicious 
DQG DQ[LRXV DERXW &DLUR¶V LQWHQWLRQV DQG WKHVH FRQFHUQV JUHZ DV RLO SURGXFWLRQ
expanded in this area of the country.  Furthermore, a Cyrenaican deployment lay 
within ,GULV¶ DQFHVWUDO DQG WULEDO ODQGV DQG KH FRQVLGHUHG D PLOLWary presence 
contributed to internal stability.  During negotiations in August 1964 the Libyans had 
agreed in principle to the withdrawal from Benghazi and the stationing of an armoured 
car squadron at El Adem at some point in 1967. The King was to be urged to comply 
with this plan  by the Ambassador,  with the threat that the longer British forces 
remained in Benghazi, the less likely an estimated £500,000 building programme 
would be granted for El Adem to accommodate any new deployment, given that the 
treaty had only eight years to run. The Ambassador was to explain that if British forces 
remained at Benghazi but were subsequently asked to withdraw, then the military 
units would have to be withdrawn in their entirety, as there would be no suitable 
facilities to move to and such a situation would diminish British capabilities to fulfil the 
defence element of the treaty.  The DOPC also agreed that there was no military value 
in maintaining the Tripoli garrison because the obligation to defend Libya could be 
insured by maintaining a minimum presence in the eastern territory of Cyrenaica 
rather than in western Tripolitania. Troops from Tripoli would be withdrawn during 
1966. To assuage the King, should he be unwilling to accept British proposals, an 
offer of an unaccompanied infantry company at Tripoli on a rotational basis was to be 
made, but only as a last resort. The RAF presence at Idris airport was to be run 
down.140  
 
In formulating these proposals on Libya facilities, the Foreign Office had 
considered the rising costs of maintaining overseas facilities as well as the growing 
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concern that maintaining troops in Libya carried unnecessary political risks. These 
risks were anti-Western opposition in Libya and throughout the Arab world to British 
deployments and interests ZKLFK FRXOG HQIODPH ³QaWLRQDOLVW IHHOLQJ´141  The DOPC 
were advised that the positioning of British forces in a less conspicuous place, namely 
El Adem, would attract less criticism.142  The Foreign Office believed that the remaining 
facilities would reassure the King and maintain his support whilst making a 
³FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKHPDLQWHQDQFHRI LQWHUQDO VWDELOLW\´. By meeting, to some extent, 
WKH .LQJ¶V ZLVKHV LQ &\UHQDLFD, the Foreign Office stated that ³ZH VKDOO EH LQ D
stronger position to reduce our financial expenditure on Libya and to make use of 
WKH« WUDLQLQJ IDFLOLWLHV LQ 7ULSROLWDQLD´ A continued presence also gave the British 
³DGGLWLRQDOFDUGVLQDQ\VXEVHTXHQWQHJRWLDWLRQV´143  
 
In summation, the 1965 planned deployments for the defence of Libya was to be 
that which had been agreed in July 1964 by the Chiefs of Staff and would enable the 
British to meet the 1953 treaty defence requirement. The British would withdraw from 
the Tripoli in 1966 and remove their presence from Tripoli airport. The Benghazi 
garrison would close at some unspecified point in the near future. Instead the British 
presence would now consist of an infantry company at Tobruk and a stockpiled 
squadron at El Adem, reinforced by an armoured car squadron, transferred from 
Benghazi following its closure. This arrangement was considered the minimum force 
necessary to maintain a point of entry, for rapid reinforcement, by an infantry battalion 
from Malta, as well as providing an effective air defence facility. Air defence would 
come from Akrotiri in Cyprus and an armoured reconnaissance   regiment in Cyprus 
would also be available.144 The original point of entry had been Benghazi on the 
Cyrenaican coast, three hundred miles to the west of El Adem. The new deployments 
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did not affect the continued use of the British military missions.  In accordance with the 
DOPC decision, British Ambassador Roderick Sarrell met King Idris on 22 February 
1965 and explained British plans for the facilities, which Idris accepted. Whilst 
reportedly sad, Idris contented himself with the thought that the Americans would 
remain at the Wheelus air base near Tripoli and that at the very least the British would 
continue to maintain a presence in his homeland, Cyrenaica.145  
 
As we have seen, when considering the British presence in Libya officials in 
/RQGRQWRRNDFFRXQWRI.LQJ,GULV¶position on the military deployments   and the likely 
repercussions for the Anglo-Libyan political relationship. The deployments symbolised 
a British political commitment to the monarchy. King Idris considered they provided 
insurance not only against a military attack from Egypt but a degree of domestic 
stability and represented a personal obligation on his behalf to the British.146  
Maintaining a good political relationship also enabled the British to preserve a military 
presence that serviced the defence plans and reinforced British influence in the 
country. However the annual subsidy that London paid to Libya for these facilities was 
a drain on the Exchequer and during 1965 the British attempted to end the payments 
as part of the Anglo-Libyan Review. 
 
The Foreign Office regarded Idris as WKH³VKHHWDQFKRURIUHODWLRQVZLWK/LE\DDQG
the facilities we enjoy´DQGWKDWZDVZK\DFRPSURPLVHVROXWLRQRYHUWKHHYDFXDWLRQRI
Tripoli had been mooted should the King have refused.147  Relations between London 
and the King remained strong. Former Head of Chancery, Sir Ivor Lucas claims  that, 
³XSWLOOWKDWWLPHZH¶GKDGTXLWHDVSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH/LE\DQVEDVHGRQRXU
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friendship with, and service to, King Idris´148 This was of special importance because 
it was the King who held considerable power and influence in Libya as well as over 
any elected government. British plans existed for the evacuation of the Royal Family in 
the event of a revolution and until the early 1960s the British had been prepared to 
intervene in domestic confrontations, although they were not treaty bound to do so.  
Despite this, the relationVKLSEDVHGRQ ,GULV¶ UROHDSSHDUHG not likely to last for too 
much longer. In 1964 the King was already 74 years old and physically fragile, 
although   ³QRWQHDUO\DVROGDQGIUDLODVSHRSOHWKRXJKW´The opposition, composed of 
student groups and heavily proscribed trade union members EHOLHYHG KH ³KDG GLHG
some years before but, in order to maintain their hold on Libya, the British had made a 
ZD[ HIILJ\ ZKLFK WKH\ VWXFN LQ WKH EDFN RI WKH 5ROOV´ DQG GURYH DURXQG 7ULSROL DW
regular intervals.149 7KH.LQJ¶VSRVLWLRQZDVIDLUO\VHFXUHJLYHQWKDWLibyan opposition 
had been largely crushed by the early 1960s through the prohibition of political parties 
and consolidation of power within the hands of Idris and his immediate family and 
favoured ministers.150 Despite this British planners were concerned by the implications 
for British interests if Idris should die.  The King had no immediate family heir and it fell 
to Sayid Hasan ar-Rida al-Mahdi as-Senussi, his nephew, the Crown Prince, to 
succeed to WKH WKURQH LQ WKH HYHQW RI ,GULV¶ GHDWK But the Crown Prince appeared 
unpopular, lacking in ability and unsuitable for the position.  A draft Joint Intelligence 
Committee (JIC) UHSRUWLQWKHVXPPHURIFRQFOXGHGWKDWWKH.LQJZDVVWLOO³ILUPO\
LQ FRQWURO RI DIIDLUV LQ /LE\D´ DQG LQWHUQDO VWDELOLW\ ZDV VHFXUHG E\ KLV SUHVHQFH
However, tKH ³SURVSects for an immediate succession are at present slightly better 
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WKDQ HYHQV´. By 1967 the KLQJ VWLOO DSSHDUHG WR ORRN ³KHDOWKLO\ GHFUHSLW´ DV RQH
journalist observed.151 
 
As long as the King remained on the throne, the British continued to deal 
personally with him on political and diplomatic matters.  In 1964 and 1965 he was 
approached over the future of the facilities as well as the outstanding political issue of 
the subsidy. The military deployments were only possible because the British 
Government paid a subsidy under article three of the Anglo-Libyan treaty. From 1953 
to 1959 the total subsidy was £3.75 million per annum, and from 1958 to 1963 £3.25 
million. From 1963 to 1965 it had continued at this rate because a tenth anniversary 
review in 1963 had been postponed by Libyan request.152 The subsidy issue had  
been used by the Conservative Government to side-step the 1964 liquidation request, 
by steering the Libyans to review the treaty and hence the subsidy, rather than 
acquiesce to a full withdrawal.153   
 
By %ULWDLQ¶VHFRnomic position had deteriorated and the Libyan subsidy was a 
suitable target for cuts, given that Tripoli had grown rich through oil royalties and 
exploration.  The Foreign Office gave consideration to alternative methods of payment 
whilst continuing to maintain and enjoy the benefits of the facilities.  One option 
considered was technical and development aid, although the Foreign Office legal 
advisor suggested these could not be substituted within the terms of the treaty. 
Alternatively a grant of a sum tied to technical assistance was considered 
acceptable.154 The King had agreed with the British Ambassador, Roderick Sarrell in 
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December 1964 that the provision of experts would be a more appropriate way of 
assisting Libya than financial assistance and the subsidy had been withdrawn from the 
Libyan budget for 1965. A formally agreed replacement for the subsidy though had not 
been agreed upon with the King or in Whitehall.155   
 
Meanwhile 7UHDVXU\ RIILFLDOV FRQWLQXHG WR XUJH WKH ³QHHG WR JUHDWO\ Ueduce our 
commitments to Libya´156 The Treasury observed that the Foreign Office had 
previously advised that the ³LQVXUDQFHSUHPLXP´of the subsidy had not been D³stable 
guarantee´ of British interests in Libya. To illustrate this point, Treasury officials 
emphasised that the Sudanese had restricted over-flying of their country, which 
neutralised the value of the Libyan staging post at El Adem.157  In reply the DOPC was 
advised by the Foreign Office that the Sudanese action was not as damaging as the 
Treasury considered, as in time the Sudanese were expected to lift the ban. The 
Foreign Office claimed that any attempt to emphatically reinterpret the subsidy 
obligation could affect the existing political relationship and so jeopardise /RQGRQ¶V 
strategic position.158 To complicate matters further, in January 1965 the Libyan 
Government had pointed out that if the British used facilities they should be prepared 
to pay for them. As a result, the Foreign Office accepted that London might, as some 
point, have to accept continuation of budgetary aid.159   
 
At DOPC on 3 February 1965 it was concluded that it would be impracticable, 
without further negotiation, to make a firm commitment about the level of technical 
assistance that could be usefully attained as a replacement for the subsidy. The 
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British Ambassador was to inform the King that London wished to terminate the 
subsidy and replace it with training or technical assistance and possibly a small sum of 
money. The Ministry for Overseas Development had calculated technical assistance to 
be set at a figure of £100,000 a year, but subsequently developed little in the way of a 
programme, except for the provision of teachers and university lecturers.160 British 
Ambassador Sarrell urged the introduction of a small technical assistance programme, 
which could be developed when the Libyans requested, rather than attempting to draw 
up an elaborate plan of technical aid when the Libyans ZHUH³so unsettled about their 
economic plans´ By September 1965 a replacement for the subsidy had not been 
formulated. The Foreign Office considered that because the Anglo-Libyan Review was 
essentially an oral matter with the King, iWZDV³XQZLVHWRSLQWKHPWKH/LE\DQVGRZQ´
DQG ³maybe use agreed minute but not formal exchange of letters´  An alternative 
approach to reducing costs was to get the Libyans to pay for an element of the 
facilities. The Foreign Office considered it was ³WDFWIXOO\ LQDSSURSULDWH WR IRUFH the 
Libyans to pay for future services if they are needed after 1966/1967, as all facilities 
ZHUHSUHVHQWO\ WDNHQDWJUHDWO\UHGXFHGFRVW´. The British were already deriving ³WKH
very valuable fringe benefits of our military presence in Libyan, particularly in the sale 
of substantial quantities of arms and civil aircraft´161   
 
Meanwhile the political implications RI%ULWDLQ¶VSURMHFWHGGHSOR\PHQWplans caused 
Ambassador Sarrell some concern. The proposals involved a sole presence at Tobruk 
and El Adem. Sarrell believed that withdrawal from the Benghazi garrison would 
undermine the relationship with the King, who was greatly concerned by the threat 
from Egypt on the eastern border with Cyrenaica.162 The February 1965 decision had 
been to withdraw from Benghazi at the end of 1967, but along with the threat from 
Cairo, circumstances in Libya had now changed. )LUVWO\ WKH .LQJ¶V SRVLWLRQ KDG
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steadily grown in strength and it was considered important to remain on good terms 
with Idris, even if that entailed maintaining costly facilities. Secondly the British had 
begun to develop interests in the exploitation of Libyan oil and trade opportunities 
ZHUHJURZLQJDVDUHVXOWRI/LE\D¶Vrising oil revenue. Thirdly, the planned move to El 
Adem was becoming more expensive as land and labour prices were soaring in that 
area. The increase in land costs led the Chiefs of Staff to instruct the army and air 
force to review the plan for future facilities later in 1965.163  Finally, the Libyan military 
were opposed to a move to El Adem, Ambassador Sarrell having reported in March 
WKDWWKH\FRQVLGHUHGLW³DVEHLQJXQsound militarily´164  
 
Sarrell favoured the retention of the Benghazi garrison, even if only of squadron 
strength, in addition to an infantry company in Tobruk. He believed the Benghazi 
garrison was the best deployment as the King stressed its function in maintaining 
stability in the city and throughout Cyrenaica.  Sarrell considered it acted as a 
GHWHUUHQW ³QRW RQO\ WR WKH ORFDO KRW KHDGV EXW DOVR WR WKH (J\SWLDQV´165   6DUUHOO¶V
interpretation of the Benghazi garrison as a deterrent to Libyan and Egyptian 
opposition was in line with WKH)RUHLJQ2IILFH¶Vinterpretation of the role of the facilities. 
This role was based on a bluff because   the British sold the Egyptians the idea that 
British forces would intervene in an internal issue in Libya, possibly a coup or even a 
revolution, although as we have seen, this was highly unlikely by the mid 1960s.166  
 
The bluff had been nurtured by the handing over of a draft of BritaLQ¶V /LE\DQ
LQWHUYHQWLRQ SODQ ³2peration Rufford´, dating from the early 1960s, to Egyptian and 
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Iraqi military attachés by Staff Sergeant AlleQ LQ  2SHUDWLRQ ³5XIIRUG´ ZDV
withdrawn by the MOD in December 1964. $OOHQ¶V ³5XIIRUG´ documents had 
specifically spelt out internal security action in Libya and this led the Egyptians to 
believe the British were sanctioned to intervene in any internal issue.167  A withdrawal 
from Benghazi would undermine the bluff, which was considered as DQ ³LPSRUWDQW
HOHPHQW LQ 1DVVHU¶V FDOFXODWLRQV´ , deterring Egypt from involving themselves too 
closely with anti-Idris opposition.168  Cairo was sRWDNHQZLWKWKHUHYHODWLRQVLQ$OOHQ¶V
documents, which also included plans for Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria that at 
the end of May 1965 the Egyptian paper Al Ahram published all the documents 
outlining British strategy in the Middle East.169  
 
Ambassador Sarrell considered that the political disadvantages of retaining troops 
in the capital of Cyrenaica had actually been overplayed and the Cyrenaicans were 
happy with the British presence.170   In June 1965 he emphasised the political basis for 
stationing troops in Benghazi. He believed that no mob of students would attack the 
garrison at Benghazi   (which was actually what happened in the summer of 1967) and 
moving to El Adem would encourage a new irritant as it was not entirely isolated from 
the population as the Foreign Office thought.  Sarrell added that moving from 
Benghazi would unnerve the Libyan Government, concerned as they were with the 
threat from Egypt.  Giving up Benghazi would also be one less card to play for the 
British, should further requests be made for abandoning facilities.171 The Foreign 
2IILFHGXO\QRWHG6DUUHOO¶Vand local comPDQGHUV¶VXSSRUWIRU maintaining Benghazi as 
WKH³SRLQWRIHQWU\´IRU%ULWLVKWURRSV172   
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As we have seen, earlier in 1965 the Foreign Office had envisaged that by the end 
of March 1966 one infantry battalion would be withdrawn from Tripoli, which as a 
military deployment would be wound down. The Benghazi garrison, consisting of one 
armoured regiment and one infantry company would be withdrawn from Libya and an 
armoured car squadron would go to El Adem around the end of 1967. Whilst the 
Ambassador pressed for a Benghazi presence the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and 
Military Headquarters Malta and Libya and Headquarters Middle East carried out an 
examination during the summer of 1965 on the manpower and costs involved in three 
possible deployment options, each of which involved maintaining an infantry company 
at Tobruk and the El Adem staging post facilities.  Course A would amount to one 
unaccompanied armoured squadron at El Adem housed and administrated on a 
shoestring budget.  Course B would retain one unaccompanied armoured car 
squadron at Benghazi, with minimum essential overheads and finally course C would 
be composed of an accompanied armoured reconnaissance regiment (less one 
squadron in Cyprus) at Benghazi, which was the present deployment. Feeling in the 
Ministry of Defence was that course A was the most likely deployment plan although it 
involved no presence at Benghazi.  
 
Therefore by the autumn of 1965 the British had decided to withdraw from Tripoli 
and Benghazi although the Ambassador strongly urged a retention of a military 
presence in Benghazi. The issue of how to formally end the Anglo-Libyan review in 
terms of a suitable legal or financial resolution to the question of the subsidy remained 
unanswered. However the political value of keeping some deployments grew, 
especially as the economic interests tied up with the relationship emerged as a 
significant issue in policy decisions.173   
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2.2 Economic Interests  
 
The deployments in Libya enabled the British to not only defend the country, but to 
FRXUW SROLWLFDO IDYRXU DQG JDUQHU YDOXDEOH WUDGH RSSRUWXQLWLHV  %ULWDLQ¶V   HFRQRPLF
difficulties in the mid-1960s made the relationship with the Libyan regime more 
important than ever.  7KH /DERXU *RYHUQPHQW¶V VWUXJJOH ZLWK WKH balance of trade 
deficit meant that the promotion and sale of goods overseas was an economic priority.  
The Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and in turn the Labour Government were 
anxious to maintain the relationship and the increasing trade benefits which flowed 
from it.   
 
Libya during the 1960s was an emerging trade market, a result of the rapid 
development of an oil industry which brought in huge amounts of revenue. This had 
been a complete reversal in fortunes for the young country because from 
independence to the first exports of oil in the early 1960s the country had been 
tremendously poor.174  Oil exploration had begun in 1957 when   a dozen major 
American, British and multinational oil companies like Esso and BP and independents 
such as Continental, Oasis and Bunker Hunt had been awarded about 60 
concessions.  In 1959 oil was discovered by Esso at the Zeltan field, Sirtica   in 
Cyrenaica.  Libya blossomed rapidly into one of the world's leading petroleum 
producers as American and British oil companies rushed in to take advantage of the 
bonanza profits. From 1960 the Libyan state began to experience rapid economic 
growth. 
 
British concerns, pioneered by BP, were initially unsuccessful but in early 1963 the 
BP exploited Sarir field was shown to be the largest in Africa and twice the size of the 
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greatest in the US, the East Texas.  The field was situated 500 km from the coast 
where the site for a new oil terminal was chosen at Marsa al-Haiga, on the deep 
natural harbour opposite Tobruk.175 The presence of the British military facility may 
have played a part in deciding to site the terminal there, along with the deep water 
access available on the coast.  Pipeline exports began in 1967.  
 
In 1965 the Libyan GRYHUQPHQWRIIHUHG³QHZ´oil concessions. These concessions   
consisted of  territory handed back after 5 years , under a clause in the 1955  
Petroleum Law, which required concession holders to relinquish  a quarter of their 
holdings five years after its award, with further relinquishments after 8 and 10 years. In 
1966 many awards went to little known foreign companies vying for coveted 
concessions, previously held by larger companies. Some of these concessions went 
to Occidental Petroleum, led by Armand Hammer, who exploited the oil fields in a 
³EULOOLDQWO\VXFFHVVIXO/LE\DQRSHUDWLRQ´176 
 
From limited oil exports in 1960, by late 1963 Libya had 437 producing wells and 
WKLVPDGHXSSHUFHQWRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VH[SRUWV177   By 1967 Libya was producing 
6.8 percent of global oil production, as extraction by up to 40 US and European 
companies developed swiftly.  Libya was fortunate to have had a degree of control 
over this development, not witnessed in many other oil producing Arab states. Wright 
FRQVLGHUV WKDW /LE\D¶V  3HWUROHXP /aw enabled the country to escape the 
GRPLQDQFH RI DQ\ RQH RU JURXS RI RLO FRPSDQLHV DQG ZDV GHVLJQHG WR ³HQFRXUDJH
diversity and competition among concessionaires´178 Despite this, the major 
companies did succeed in obtaining a generous contract through the law. As Wright 
explained: 
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³7KHODZPDGHSURILWVOiable to a 50% tax ±after deduction of operating costs-
with a 12.5 % royalty treated as a partial advance towards tax. But the law was 
unusually generous, both allowing allowances for deductions against tax and in linking 
WKH LQFRPH RI FRQFHVVLRQDULHV WR WKH UHDOL]HG ³SRVWHG SULFH´ DV ZDV WKH FRPPRQ
practice in the Middle East´ 179  
 
The oil boom saw Libyan Government revenue leap from $3 million in 1961 to 
$1,175 million in 1969.180  /LE\D¶VRLODOVRKDGDGYDQWDJHVRYHURWKHURLOSURGXFHrs in 
the Arab world: It was bountiful and of high quality, the oil was easily marketed as it 
was close to Europe, west of Suez and therefore also cheaper to transport than from 
other Arab countries.  In 1962 Libya joined OPEC and in 1966 accepted an OPEC 
resolution outlining new pricing arrangements amongst members.  As Wright explains, 
this actLRQXQGHUPLQHGWKHLQGHSHQGHQWFRPSDQLHV¶VWURQJSRVLWLRQ)rom then on the 
Libyan GRYHUQPHQW KDG WKH SRZHU WR ³PRGLI\ WKH WHUPV RI DQ RLO FRQFHVVLRQ LQ LWV
favour ³181  2LOUHYHQXHVHQDEOHGWKHFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRP\WRJURZLQH[FHVVRISHU
annum.182 
 
With oil revenue flowing into the country the Libyan Government aimed to develop 
the economy. A Ministry of Industry was established   in 1961 to develop private and 
state industries. Through economic development it was hoped that Libyan 
dependence on foreign imports would be reduced,   although the domestic market was 
small and skilled labour was in short supply. Oil revenue meant Libya was no longer 
reliant on sterling and dollar subsidies and in 1963 the government launched its first 
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Five Year Plan with a budget of £170 million. From the budget £30 million was 
allocated to forestry and agriculture to revitalize that ailing sector of the economy and   
a considerable amount spent on public works. Expansion of Libyan industry was 
largely unsuccessful and by the late 1960s the economy was still reliant on oil 
revenues.183 
 
Oil prospecting, production and the resultant huge revenues generated not only 
great wealth but new political and social aspirations in Libya. Whilst expectations for a 
better life grew amongst the population, so did corruption and patronage as the ruling 
elites, including members of the Senussi order and privileged business communities   
exploited opportunities for wealth creation.184 Oil development created a layer of 
speculators, a new urban middle class and drew in tens of thousands of foreign, 
mainly Egyptian workers. The failure of the regime to manage this rapid social and 
economic change and to distribute wealth   exposed them further as incompetent and 
corrupt.  In April 1963 the British Ambassador Andrew Stewart warned that 
developments in Libya on the political level had implications for the British military 
position ZKLFKZHUH³IDUIURPFRPIRUWLQJ´185  As a result, Arab Nationalist rhetoric and 
propaganda had great appeal to students, workers and disaffected elemHQWVRI/LE\D¶V
armed forces whose aspirations were frustrated. 
 
/LE\D¶V HFRQRPLF JURZWK DQG LQFUHDVLQJ ZHDOWK GUHZ JUHDW LQWHUHVW LQ:KLWHKDOO
From 1964 the opportunities for securing and increasing trade   with the Kingdom 
were stressed in policy documents. The military facilities were seen as important 
elements in maintaining and developing trade, particularly in arms. Whilst abandoning 
the military presence would enable cost cutting in the defence budget, the existence of 
British facilities allowed London to promote arms sales and provide training and after 
sales services as outlined in the Agreement on Military Facilities. The maintenance of 
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a British military presence also reassured the King and ensured the British had 
preferential treatment in arms sales. The Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence 
stressHG WKH OLQN EHWZHHQ %ULWDLQ¶V UHODWLRQVKLS with Libya, based upon maintaining 
facilities, and the trade benefits enjoyed. Any undermining of the relationship would 
threaten these interests. 
 
,Q6HSWHPEHU WKH)RUHLJQ2IILFHQRWHG   ³WKHYHU\YDOXDEOH IULQJHEHQHILWV´
from the military presence in Libya, ³SDUWLFXODULQ WKHVDOHRIVXEVWDQWLDOTXDQWLWLHVRI
DUPV´DQGSURMHFWHGVDOHVRIFLYLODLUFUDIW186   Arms sales were promoted   through the 
military missions and joint training operations of the British and Libyan military.  British 
arms exports to Libya were in excess of £9.2 million, in addition to other exports 
totalling £13 million for the first 6 months of 1966.187   The possible   damage to British 
trade was considered when policy on the facilities was formulated.  As we have seen, 
in September 1965, as part of the Anglo-Libyan Review, it was considered 
inappropriate to get the Libyans to pay for the facilities as the British already gained 
valuable trading fringe benefits from them.  
 
Trade between Libya and Britain continued to grow significantly during the 1960s. 
In 1960 visible trade with Libya accounted for £12.7 million in exports from Britain and 
£0.7 million in imports from Libya, giving a balance in BritaiQ¶VIDYRXURIPLOOLRQ. In 
1963, as Libyan oil development and exports grew, British exports to Libya accounted 
for £14.4 million but Libyan imports stood at £38.3 million. By 1965 the figures had 
grown to £22 million in exports to the country and £71.6 million in imports giving an 
imbalance of PLOOLRQ LQ /LE\D¶V IDYRXU188  However the British did not have a 
monopoly on trade with Libya. The USA, France and Italy became involved in oil 
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exploration and production, whilst Italy and France also became engaged in the trade 
in arms, services and consumer goods. There was also an emerging trading threat 
from the Soviet Union, Warsaw Pact countries, and Yugoslavia.  Moscow already had 
a VLJQLILFDQWWUDGHDQGDGYLVRUSUHVHQFHLQ(J\SWDQG$OJHULDDQG0RVFRZ¶VLQWHUHVWLQ
Libya portended a potential economic thrust into the Kingdom as well as a strategic 
threat in the Mediterranean, given the increasing reliance of Europe on Libyan oil.189 
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2.3 Strategic Concerns  
 
The Libyan military facilities enabled Britain to maintain a productive political and 
economic relationship with the Idris regime, as well provide an effective defence plan 
for Libya. The primary strategic purpose of the facilities was to enable Britain to 
service defence concerns beyond Europe.  These interests constituted a collection of 
commitments and treaties linking %ULWDLQ¶V    foreign and defence policy East of Suez, 
spanning out into the Middle East, South Asia and South East Asia.190  As Young has 
pointed out, the term (DVWRI6XH]ZDV³VRPHWKLQJRIDPLVQRPHU´ for East of Suez 
signified a world role for Britain that incorporated facilities closer than those situated 
between AdHQ DQG 6LQJDSRUH  7KHVH ³were important staging posts to the Middle 
East and Far East in the Mediterranean with facilities in Cyprus, Libya, Malta and 
Gibraltar´191  
 
These military deployments were of strategic value because they allowed the 
British to protect Arab independence and Western oil concerns as well as service the 
East of Suez strategy WKURXJK WKH ³HDVW DERXW´ DLU URXWH WR WKH )DU (DVW  Labour¶V
defence and foreign policy from 1964 envisaged maintaining the East of Suez defence 
strategy and the Libyan facilities remained valuable to that strategy.192  Specifically the 
Libyan deployments enabled Britain to service defence commitments to allies in 
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CENTO and SEATO.193 In 1964 Harold Wilson was happy to speak of 1000 men East 
of Suez EHLQJ SUHIHUDEOH WR PHQ LQ*HUPDQ\VR HPSKDVLVLQJ %ULWDLQ¶V JOREDO
defence priorities.194  
 
%ULWDLQ¶Vdefence strategy was already under immense strain by 1964.  This was a 
result of the financial commitment to maintaining defence forces overseas, which 
drained the exchequer and undermined the balance of payments and placed pressure 
on an already fragile economy.  In 1962 defence reviews identified a loosening of the 
dependence on overseas facilities with a move to mobile forces   in the Defence White 
Paper of that year. +RZHYHU%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHSROLF\ Uemained reliant on access to 
bases around the world despite the costs involved.  8OWLPDWHO\WKH³GLFKRWRP\EHWZHHQ
(British) defence aims and commitments and insufficient growth in the economy to 
ILQDQFHWKHP´FDPHWRGRPLQDWHWKHIRUHLJQDQGGHIHQFHSRlicy considerations of the 
Labour Government. This would lead to the questioning of the rationale behind 
maintaining facilities.195 
 
Whilst maintaining bases overseas was a costly policy, the role of such military 
facilities actually grew in importance.  During WKH V WKH ZRUOG¶V SROLWLFDO FHQWUH
moved from NATO and the West to the Third World and the Middle East. %ULWDLQ¶V
defence obligations seemed to require a   commitment to Western as well as British 
security East of Suez. These deployments played a role in sharing the global defence 
burden with the US; a burden which increased further as Britain was drawn into the 
Malaysian-Indonesian Crisis and the US became embroiled in Vietnam. Saki Dockrill 
notes that the US and Britain   looked to each other for support of their mutual global 
defence interests. Following the Wilson-Johnson 1964 Summit the US endorsed 
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%ULWDLQ¶V FRQWLQXHG Zorld global role, and Wilson reVWDWHG WKH 8.¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR
global responsibilities and confirmed the Anglo-American partnership.196 Bartlett even 
goes as far to claim that ³British forces .....help(ed) to secure protection for the United 
6WDWHV´197   
 
British policy makers perceived the Libyan facilities to have continued value to 
strategic priorities. In March 1964 when ,GULV¶JRYHUQPHQWrequested the closure of all 
foreign bases, strategic priorities meant that the British negotiated a limited withdrawal 
and the continuation of the treaty and the maintenance of those facilities. In February 
1965, under the Labour Government, the value of the facilities to wider defence 
strategy influenced the British position regarding the Anglo-Libyan treaty review.  
When the Anglo-Libyan review reached DOPC on 3 February 1965 the Committee 
were reminded of the continued strategic role of the facilities and that the call for the 
WHUPLQDWLRQ RI WKH WUHDW\ LQ  DQG OLTXLGDWLRQ RI WKH ³EDVHV´   had threatened 
%ULWDLQ¶V YLWal staging and overflying facilities´  There was now D ³QHHG WRSUHVHUYH
RXU RYHUIO\LQJ DQG VWDJLQJ ULJKWV LQ /LE\D´ DOWKRXJK WKLV LJQRUHG WKH UHVWULFWLRQV
imposed on overflying in Sudan enforced by the regime that had come to power during 
the October revolution of 1964.  The ³VRXWKHUQ´URXWHfor British military aircraft to the 
Middle East and Far East through Libya, Sudan and Aden was considered particularly 
important given the uncerWDLQW\RIWKH³QRUWKHUQ´URXWHWR(DVWRI6XH]WKURXJK&\SUXV
and Turkey, which was reliant on over flight permission from Nicosia and Ankara.198   
D S Laskey, Under Secretary in the Cabinet Office, believed that the Sudanese 
government would change their policy and indeed the bases were considered to be an 
insurance policy agaiQVW WKH³XQFHUWDLQW\DERXWRXUFRQWLQXHGSUHVHQFH LQ0DOWDDQG
&\SUXV´LIQRWPRUHimportant than those Mediterranean facilities.  Laskey did accept it 
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as ³XQUHDOLVWLF WR VXSSRVH WKDW ZH FRXOG UHWDLQ EDVHV LQ /LE\D IRU DQ H[WHQGHG
period´199 
 
Burke Trend, the Cabinet Secretary, stressed to Prime Minister Wilson the 
strategic implications of British facilities in Libya in a briefing note prior to the DOPC 
meeting   on the 3 February. BritLVKSURSRVDOV UHSUHVHQWHGD ³FRPSURPLVHEHWZHHQ
WKH.LQJ¶VUHQHZHGGHVLUe that we should maintain a substantial military presence in 
Libya and our own desire to do no more than is necessary to ensure that overflying 
DQGVWDJLQJULJKWVDUHSUHVHUYHGDVDQLQVXUDQFH««DJDLQVWDQLQWHUUXSWLRQRIWKH
QRUWKHUQURXWH´. Trend acknowledged doubts over relying upon the Sudan route and 
he considered the proposals were a compromise and   ³QRW ORJLFDO RU WLG\´ 
Nevertheless Trend considered iW ³UHSUHVHQWHG WKH ULJKW FRXUVH´ DQG ZRXOG also 
enable the British to maintain defence commitment to Libya.200  :KLWHKDOO¶V  emphasis 
upon the strategic value of the facilities was further illustrated in the political debate 
over replacing the subsidy with technical assistance later in 1965.  The British 
Ambassador was instructed by the Foreign Secretary to drop the issue of replacing 
the subsidy if the strategic concerns of the staging and over-flying rights were 
jeopardised during the negotiations.201  
 
Whilst   Whitehall perceived that the Libyan facilities played a significant defence 
role in British global strategy, adequate fulfilment of this role was, in reality, greatly 
circumscribed. Firstly, the facilities could not serve any anti-Nasserite purpose and 
could not be used against another Arab nation. This was because   under the terms of 
article four of the treaty no use could be made of the facilities that contradicted Libyan 
commitments to other Arab states.  &RQVHTXHQWO\ /LE\D¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH $UDE
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League trimmed her obligation to Britain. Secondly,   the facilities could be effectively 
isolated and neutralised by anti-Western   demonstrations, as seen during   the Suez 
crisis and the 1964 withdrawal request.  The bases   were considered by Arabs to be 
symbols of Western hegemony and interference in the Arab world and they were likely 
to be exploited by Nasserite propaganda as such. Therefore it was debatable what 
value they served in maintaining peace and stability   specifically in the Middle East.  
Burke Trend stated that this value was ³a matter of judgement´202   Finally, as we have 
seen, if in the worst case the Sudanese were not to rescind their withdrawal of 
overflying permission for the British, then the facilities would lose their global strategic 
role.  A report for the DOPC in November 1965 recognised and emphasised that 
³IRUFHVVWDWLRned in Libya are small and the facilities of little external use to us now 
that our over flying rights are no longer useable, because of the present attitude of the 
Sudanese government´203  Wider policy changes in strategic policy initiated by the 
Labour Government would further undermine the strategic role of the Libyan facilities. 
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2.4 Conclusion  
 
In the first year of the Labour Government the Anglo-Libyan political relationship 
remained intact. The Anglo-Libyan Review in 1965 illustrated that the British were 
committed to good relations with the Idris regime and the maintenance of the military 
facilities, but at a minimum level, enabling the implementation of the defence plan 
whilst economising on expenditure. The Foreign Office had urged and the Cabinet 
accepted the retention of a limited, but adequate presence in Libya. The decision had 
been rationalised on the basis of three considerations.  
 
Firstly, the facilities had a continued strategic value to East of Suez commitments.  
The Anglo-Libyan relationship, secured through a military presence, enabled the 
%ULWLVKWRPDLQWDLQWKHLURZQDQGWKH:HVW¶VVWUDWHJLFLQWHUHVWVEast of Suez. This was 
accepted in the January review.  Secondly, the political implications of maintaining the 
.LQJ¶V WUXVW DQG VXpport were also factored into the GHFLVLRQ IRU ZLWKRXW WKH .LQJ¶V
political support %ULWDLQ¶VGHSOR\PHQWVcould be lost altogether. British policy continued 
to be amenable to Idris and aimed at maintaining the political relationship as it stood. 
Foreign Office offLFLDOVZHUHVHQVLWLYHWRWKH.LQJ¶VUHTXHVWin late 1964 that the British 
not withdraw but also recognised the unpopularity of the British presence in Libya and 
the Arab world. The Foreign Office was also aware of the political repercussions of 
replacing the subsidy or requesting the Libyans pay for the maintenance of the 
facilities. They were instrumental in advising that the subsidy issue be allowed to 
lapse WR EH UHSODFHG ZLWK XQRIILFLDO ³WHFKQLFDO´ DLG DQG IXUWKHU DGYLVHG DJDLQVW DQ
exchange of letters to confirm the new arrangement. The Labour Government 
sanctioned this policy with little discussion.  Thirdly, during this period the Anglo-
Libyan relationship became of increasing significance because of the economic 
benefits the British gained through it. The Foreign Office and diplomatic community in 
Libya recognised that the facilities, particularly the missions, secured preferential 
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treatment for British trade in the country, especially in arms. The oil exploration and 
export market in Libya boomed and there was an emphasis upon the economic 
EHQHILWVRU³YDOXDEOHIULQJHEHQHILWV´LQSROLF\IRUPXODWLRQ These considerations were 
frequently emphasised. 204    
 
Despite the planned redeployments envisaged in 1965 the British Ambassador 
raised concerns over WKHFORVXUHRIWKH%HQJKD]LJDUULVRQ7KH/DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶V
greater strategic calculations would have implications for British deployments in Libya 
from 1965.  
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3 East of Suez and Libya 1965-1966 
 
From 1965 to 1967 the Labour Government pursued reductions in defence 
expenditure and withdrawal from the Libyan facilities, as envisaged by the January 
1965 Anglo-Libyan Review, was incorporated into the 1966 Defence Review. The 
Libyan cuts were part of a general reduction of forces in the Mediterranean which 
serviced the East of Suez defence strategy and which the Libyan facilities played a 
diminishing role in.  However, the military presence remained important to British 
interests.  They served a limited strategic role and enabled the British to maintain their 
defence commitment to Libya7KLVUHDVVXUHGWKH.LQJ¶VDQ[LHWLHVRYHU(J\SWLDQDQG
Algerian intentions, strategically, sandwiched as the country was between the two 
Arab Nationalist regimes, whilst enabling the training of British forces cheaply for their 
East of Suez commitments. The military presence also allowed Britain to steer Libya 
towards the Western camp through the maintenance of a military and political profile in 
Libya and reassured Idris of British support.  In turn the British were able to exploit 
trading opportunities. The deployments, particularly the missions, promoted arms 
sales and support packages and joint training exercises enabled the British to promote 
their own weaponry.  
 
So important was the military presence, both to the relationship and British 
interests that officials in London considered reversing plans in 1966 for a withdrawal 
from Benghazi. However, as BriWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLFSRVLWLRQJUHZSHULORXVLQWKHVXPPHU
of that year, with strikes, a balance of payments deficit and problems with sterling, 
withdrawal from the garrison was reconfirmed, given that defence cuts needed to be 
made.  Furthermore, during the 1960s it became questionable about just how far 
%ULWDLQ¶VZRUOGZLGHEDVHs augmented international influence and, in some instances, 
such as Libya, it was considered they actually undermined /RQGRQ¶VSROLWLFDOVWDQGLQJ
in the Middle East.  In addition a military presence was seen as impractical and 
RXWGDWHG6DQGHUVVWUHVVHV³,WZDVLQFUHDVLQJO\UHFRJQLVHGLQWKHVWKDWLf war 
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ZHUHWREUHDNRXWLWZRXOGSUREDEO\³JRQXFOHDU´YHU\TXLFNO\´DQGEDVHVZRXOGVHUYH
little purpose.1 Therefore overseas garrisons could not guarantee success on the 
battlefield and the strategic emphasis was shifting to mobile-forces. To compound 
criticism further, the bases became a focus for indigenous, nationalist protests in the 
host country against British and apparent Western Imperialism, as well as against the 
established pro-Western regimes that allowed the bases to be maintained. As we 
have seen the military presence in Libya had become the focus for anti-Idris and anti-
British demonstrations in 1956 and 1964. Their military value was also questionable 
given the restrictions placed upon them by article four  and because the Sudanese 
government had prohibited the British use of Sudanese air space , effectively 
undermining the strategic   ³VRXWKHUQ´DLUURXWHWR$GHQWKH,QGLDQ2FHDQDQGWKH)DU
East.  The military presence had also become so small   that their defence role in 
Libya was to offer only a delaying and point of entry facility for reinforcements. 
 
The rejection of a defence strategy based on overseas military facilities was 
resisted within government and by officials.  This was because, as Sanders has noted,   
treaty obligations remained, there was a lasting perception of the potential military 
strategic value of bases and bureaucratic inertia prevented a wide ranging policy over- 
haul of the concept of maintaining bases.2  Furthermore, in the case of Libya, the 
Wilson Government were increasingly aware of the benefits the Libyan military 
deployments offered.  Therefore, during this period British policy remained committed 
to the Libyan deployments; although as a result of economic difficulties and financial 
stringency the facilities were reduced to the minimum practical level. To continue to 
service the Libyan defence commitment the Government sought, unsuccessfully, US 
military support. In addition, the cost of maintaining the remaining presence led the 
Foreign Office and MOD to exaPLQHWKH/DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶VSURSRVDOof getting the 
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Libyans to pay, but this was judged too diplomatically and politically sensitive a matter 
to approach the King about.  
77 
 
3.1 Strategic Contraction  
 
From 1964 ministers, service chiefs and senior officials met to consider Britain¶V
future defence policy.  What emerged over the next four years was a strategic 
realignment as defence costs were cut; the result of worsening economic conditions in 
Britain and the Labour Government¶VSolitical commitment to funding a social agenda.  
Successive defence reviews focused first on PLOLWDU\KDUGZDUHWKH³FDSDELOLWLHV´WKDW
VHUYHG %ULWDLQ¶V RYHUVHDV FRPPLWPHQWV DQG WKHQ ³commitments´ until it was 
accepted that a withdrawal from East of Suez and the overhaul RI%ULWDLQ¶s defence 
strategy was necessary.  This shift in strategy had implications for the Libyan facilities. 
 
Initially the Labour Government was committed to the East of Suez role. The Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson, a staunch supporter of the Commonwealth and highly 
knowledgeable in foreign affairs, ³GRPLQDWHG GHFLVLRQ PDNLQJ LQ WKLV DUHD´ GXULQJ
Cabinet.3  At Chequers in the autumn of 1964    the Labour Cabinet reaffirmed 
%ULWDLQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRDSHDFHNHHSLQJUROH(DVWRI6XH]GHVSLWHWKHJULPHFRQRPLF
position.4 This policy appeared in contrast to that of the Conservatives. Andrew 
7KRUSH FRQVLGHUV WKDW WKDW SDUW\ KDG EHHQ FRQYLQFHG E\ WKH 6XH] ILDVFR ³WKDW WKH
HPSLUHFRPPRQZHDOWK KDG ODUJHO\ H[KDXVWHG LWV XWLOLW\´ DQG WKH IXWXUH OD\ ZLWK WKH
Common Market. Labour only came to this realisation much later in the 1960s.5 
Nevertheless, economic problems led the Treasury to urge a strategy of reducing 
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expenditure and ³VLQJOHG RXWGHIHQFH DQG SUHVWLJH SURMHFWV´ IRU FXWV6 Defence 
equipment projects, including the prestigious TSR2 aircraft were cancelled, helping to 
produce economies in the defence programme to help meet a £2000 million ceiling set 
for 1969-1970. These measures were not sufficient and in 1965, to meet a financial 
gap of £200 million, the focus turned to commitments that might be cut. Libya, along 
with bases in the Middle East and Mediterranean were amongst the first to be 
considered.7 The cost of stationing troops East of Suez during this period were  for 
Aden and Persian Gulf £21 million , East Africa £6 million, Malaysia  £63 million and 
Hong Kong  £10 million.  This total of £100 million represented 44 per cent of total 
overseas stationing costs.8 
 
Cutting commitments and costs in the Mediterranean would have a direct impact 
upon %ULWDLQ¶VEast of Suez strategy.  Libya, Cyprus and Malta   provided   operational 
and base functions in maintaining that role and Wilson recognised this.  In March 1964 
KHKDGH[SUHVVHGFRQFHUQRYHU/LE\D¶VZLWKGUDZDO UHTXHVW in a meeting with Prime 
Minister Home; Wilson believed that to send troops to India, the staging facility at El 
Adem was essential and he was concerned that without that presence Britain was 
more reliant upon the Simonstown Agreement. This was a naval cooperation 
agreement with South Africa that allowed British ships to use the naval    base and so 
police and protect the sea lanes to the Middle East and Far East.9  As we have 
already seen Libyan facilities had been a target for cuts since the 1950s. In January 
1961 the Conservative Defence Secretary Harold Watkinson stated there was an 
³XUJHQW QHHG WR VDYH RYHUVHDV H[SHQGLWXUH RI sterling´ DQG XUJHG UHO\LQJ XSRQ WKH
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availability of reinforcements in Cyprus in order to reduce units in Libya.10  During the 
Anglo-Libyan review in January 1965 the Treasury had been concerned over the 
financial burden involved in maintaining deployments in Libya.  
 
At a Chequers meeting on 13 June 1965, which was part of the Labour 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VGefence rHYLHZSURFHVVFRQVLGHUDWLRQZDVJLYHQWRWKH³SRVVLELOLWLHV
of achieving defence economies in the light of the current defence review´ Cutting 
commitments in the Middle East and Mediterranean was part of that discussion. These 
commitments comprised   the inter-connected chain of bases of Malta, Cyprus, Libya, 
Aden, the Persian Gulf and Southern Arabia. The Foreign Office was particularly 
VXSSRUWLYHRIPDLQWDLQLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VPLOLWDU\SRVLWLRQLQ&\SUXV, which incorporated the 
Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia, and in the Persian Gulf. They had also 
favoured maintaining Libyan facilities during the Anglo-Libyan Review.11  By contrast, 
the Paymaster General George Wigg at the Treasury urged withdrawal from the 
Mediterranean and Middle East for reasons of cost. 12   
 
At the Chequers meeting Wilson stressed that this was not the occasion to make   
decisions on the subject. Secretary of State for Defence Denis Healey suggested that 
Britain should not determine which worldwide commitments it should maintain or 
DEDQGRQEDVHGRQ³DQDUURZFDOFXODWLRQRIWKHGLUHFWHFRQRPLHVRUSROitical advantage 
from a specific commitment as against its miliWDU\FRVW´EXWshould plan to reduce its 
commitments and its military deployments in Europe, the Middle East and 
Mediterranean, and Far East.  In the Mediterranean and Middle East, assuming a 
withdrawal from Aden by 1968, WKHQ  %ULWDLQ ³VKRXOG SODQ WR UHGXFH LWV H[LVWLQJ
commitments to the Persian Gulf and to CENTO which might possibly allow Britain to 
dispense with the current highly sophisticated and more expensive intervention 
capabilities reTXLUHG IRU WKHGHIHQFH´RI/LE\DDQG.XZDLW As an alternative Healey 
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suggested they ORRNWRREWDLQLQJD³ZHVWDERXW´DSSURDFKWRWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQG)DU
East to replace the over-flying and staging rights of the eastern route. Defence 
Secretary Healey also urged relying upon the financial support and defence 
cooperation of %ULWDLQ¶VDOOLHVVHHNLQJWRPDLQWDLQ%ULWDLQ¶VZRUOGUROH³DWDORZHUFRVW´ 
In mid-1965 the Labour Government WKHUHIRUHUHFRJQLVHGWKHQHHGWRVKULQN%ULWDLQ¶V
defence strategy role b\ SODQQLQJ D JHQHUDO UHGXFWLRQ LQ %ULWDLQ¶V FRPPLWPHQWV
although the East of Suez role had not been abandoned at this stage. 13  Healey later 
exSODLQHGWKDW³P\SUREOHPZDVWRH[WULFDWHRXUIRUFHVIURPWKHLUFRPPLWPHQWV(DVWRI
Suez with the least possible GDPDJH WR%ULWDLQ¶V LQIOXHQFHDQG WR WKHVWDELOLW\RI WKH
DUHDV ZKHUH WKH\ ZHUH SUHVHQW´ 7KHVH SULRULWLHV ZHUH WR EH RI VLJQLILFDQFH WR WKH
Libyan commitments.14 
 
Following the Chequers meeting a number of departmental studies were 
conducted into the natuUH RI %ULWDLQ¶V GHIHQFH VWUDWHJ\ LQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVW DQG )DU
East. Both the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office agreed that the two areas 
offered potential savings because of a planned withdrawal from Aden and the fact that 
the US and NATO could be expecWHGWRPDLQWDLQWKH:HVW¶VSRVLWLRQSDUWLFXODUO\LQWKH
Mediterranean. For example, NATO had an headquarters in Malta, and the US 
maintained its Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. The Ministry of Defence, LQD³FRVWLQJ´
study on commitments in July 1965 called for the abandonment of British 
commitments to CENTO, Libya, Kuwait and Cyprus with the Malta base being reduced 
to a staging post.  The Foreign Office were alarmed by these drastic measures and 
proposed less savage cuts.15 
 
Libya was an important element in generating economies in the Mediterranean 
because the defence of the country was considered by the government   to be reliant 
upon forces deployed in Malta and Cyprus. The commitment to Libya was projected to 
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cost £5 million in 1969-1970, with the British retaining the small point of entry and 
staging facilities at El Adem, with military support from Cyprus and Malta. If London 
could abandon its commitment to Libya and reduce its presence to a staging post, 
then this would in turn lead to a reduction in expenditure in Malta and Cyprus as well 
as in Libya, to £3 million in 1969-1970.  Alternatively, retaining the commitment but 
sharing with the US ³WKHJUHDWHUSDUWLILW´ZRXOGNHHSFRVWVDWWKHVDPHOHYHOSURMHFWHG
at £5 million, but the commitment would not entail any expense in Malta and Cyprus.16 
The Foreign Office was firmly against reneging upon the treaty with Libya, but agreed 
to persuade Washington to share the cost of defending the country.17  
 
To reconcile opposing positions the DOPC in early August 1965 called for three 
studies of %ULWDLQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR(XURSHWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQGWKH)DU(DVW7KLVOHG
to a report by the Defence and Overseas Policy Official Committee,   submitted to 
ministers for review on 13 and 14 November and at DOPC on the 24 November, when 
the Labour Government DJUHHG WR UHGXFH %ULWDLQ¶V FRPPLWPHQWV WR WKH
Mediterranean.18  This decision meant that Britain would not maintain naval   forces in 
the Mediterranean on a permanent basis, although the commitment to CENTO would 
continue.  The British strike force at Akrotiri, Cyprus would remain but a stockpile of 
equipment for reinforcing the Libyan commitment held at Dhekelia in Cyprus was to be 
run down. Malta was to be reduced to a staging post with a reconnaissance squadron 
whilst one infantry battalion would be withdrawn from the island. In effect the British 
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plan for Libya, which involved redeploying troops and equipment to Libya should the 
defence treaty be activated had been degraded as now reinforcements would have to 
come from Britain. The British would try to persuade Washington to take over their 
commitment to Libya, but if this failed then London would retain a small force to 
ensure a point of entry at Tobruk El Adem.19  The decision to withdraw from Aden was 
confirmed and the obligations to the Persian Gulf, particularly to the defence of 
Kuwait, would continue. East of Suez strategy would   also see reductions in British 
deployments as the Indonesian Confrontation concluded and by a reduction in 
remaining IRUFHVWRD³YLVLEOH´SUHsence. 20 
 
These decisions led in part to the Defence White Paper of February 1966. The 
paper stated that: 
 
³DVIDUDVFRPPLWPHQWVDUHFRQFHUQHGZHVKDOOEHDEOHWRNHHSRXUFRQWULEXWLRQLQ
Europe at roughly its present level but only if some means is found of meeting the 
foreign exchange costs. We shall discharge our commitments in the (Mediterranean) 
area includLQJWKRVHLQ/LE\DDQG&(172´ 
 
The paper did not mention Libya at length, but its priorities had repercussions for 
%ULWDLQ¶VLQYROYHPHnt in the country. Whilst the British would maintain an East of Suez 
role, their   influence in that region was heavily circumscribed by cuts. Britain would no 
longer be able to fight even a limited war against a sophisticated enemy. The paper 
stated that Britain would not undertake major operations of war except in cooperation 
with allies. Additionally the British would not accept an obligation to provide another 
country with military assistance, unless that country was prepared to provide facilities 
to make such assistance effective. Finally, there would be no attempt to maintain 
defence facilities in an independent country against its wishes. These factors had 
relevance to the Libyan commitment and meant the British could only conduct major 
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operations in Libya in cooperation with the US; that Britain required the Libyan military 
presence to conduct those operations and should access to these be denied then the 
defence of Libya could not be fulfilled. Finally, should the Libyans not wish for those 
facilities to be maintained then they would be abandoned.  The 1966 Defence Review 
DOVRUHIHUUHGWRWKHUHOHYDQFHRIPLOLWDU\EDVHVDQGFRQFOXGHGWKDW³PLOitary force is not 
WKHPRVWVXLWDEOHPHDQVRISURWHFWLQJ´HFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWVLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQG$VLD, 
althRXJK %ULWDLQ VKDUHG D JHQHUDO LQWHUHVW ZLWK ³RWKHU FRXQWULHV´ LQ ³VHHLQJ SHDFH
PDLQWDLQHG´DQGWKLV³MXVWLILHVRXUPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHRXWVLGH(XURSH´21 
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3.2 Libyan Defence and the United States  
 
British defence plans for Libya were considered feasible despite planned 
withdrawals envisaged by the 1965 Anglo-Libyan Review and the 1966 Defence 
Review, which involved the evacuation of the Benghazi garrison leaving only the El 
Adem and Tobruk facility. These plans were intended to meet an external attack from 
Egypt and comprised an increase in security of the point of entry for British troops in 
Libya   by redeployment and the introduction of additional air and ground units under 
the guise of training.  This would be followed by a build up of air and naval   forces in 
the Mediterranean with the aim of deterring and if necessary defeating Egyptian 
aggression. Regular training also enabled the British to maintain the credibility of their 
forces in Libya.22 
 
In attempting to cut expenditure, implementation of the Defence White Paper 
required drawing Washington into providing support for the Libyan defence 
commitment.  American military support would enable savings on expenditure on the 
Malta and Cyprus deployments, which served the Libyan defence plan by providing 
reinforcements to those already deployed in Libya. The rationale behind drawing the 
US into the obligation was that London and Washington were bound together by 
mutual interests in global defence, including the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
In a DOPC Official Committee Report submitted in November 1965  it was hoped that 
WKH $PHULFDQV ZKR ³KDYH D VWURQJ LQWHUHVW LQ VHHLQJ WKH LQGHSHQGHQFH RI /LE\D´,  
³PLJKW EH SUHSDUHG WR HQWHU LQWR MRLQW SODQQLQJ RQ WKH EDVLV RI D UHGXFHG %ULWLVK
contribution´23  There were good reasons to suppose that this might be possible.  
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By the mid-1960s the weakness of sterling and the British economy PDGH%ULWDLQ¶V
strategic responsibilities increasingly difficult to fulfil. In turn the British Government 
looked to Washington to support sterling. The Johnson administration, fearful that 
devaluation and erosion of sterling could lead to subsequent attacks on the dollar and 
harm trading relations between Western powers supported the currency in return for 
British support for the war in Vietnam and British peace keeping actions East of Suez. 
This support underpinned and legitimised American policy and helped Washington to 
maintain a global military strategy. The maintenance of sterling¶VYDOXHZDV therefore 
considered vital to US national interests. The Johnson administration had been 
prepared to offer financial assistance to prop up sterling, sustained by a loan from the 
IMF in the autumn of 1964 and an international American led rescue operation. In the 
summer of 1965 pressure on the pound  had continued and the British were  forced to 
borrow a further $1.4 billion from the IMF.24   
 
:KLOVW WKH :LOVRQ *RYHUQPHQW¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR East of Suez   continued to 
supplement American global defence strategy, the British could expect to continue to 
extract financial and political support from the United States. It was therefore 
concluded by ministers and at official level that an approach on the Libyan 
commitment could well be successful. Of particular mutual interest was the political 
and security position in the Middle East and the fact that Libya was one of several 
friendly, conservative Arab states. :DVKLQJWRQ¶VFRQFHUQDWULVLQJ6RYLHW involvement 
in the region had led in the 1950s to the Eisenhower Doctrine which espoused military 
and economic assistance to any state in the Middle East threatened by international 
communism. This doctrine replaced the role formerly played by the British in the 
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region, prior to the Suez crisis of 1956.25  The Eisenhower Doctrine was not only 
directed at preventing Soviet encroachment but was utilised to contain the radical 
Arab Nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser was perceived by Washington as an 
agent of Soviet expansionism from whom the General acquired weapons, so opening 
WKH0LGGOH(DVWWR0RVFRZ¶VLQIOXHnce.   Therefore the United States provided aid and 
protection to moderate Arab states to retain their allegiance, isolate Nasser and 
undermine Soviet political approaches.26   
 
US-Egyptian relations were to become highly fractious and to a point where Little 
FODLPVWKDW³IRUHYHU\RFFXSDQWRIWKH:KLWH+RXVHIURP(LVHQKRZHUWR1L[RQ´GHDOLQJ
ZLWK1DVVHU³ZDVWDQWDPRXQWWRGLQLQJZLWKWKHGHYLO´$VDUHVXOW:DVKLQJWRQ³KRSHG
to exorcise the demon of Nasserism and shield Western regimes from revolutionary 
chDQJH´27  Despite this Petersen recognises that during the 1960s and particularly 
during the Johnson administration the United States resisted forceful intervention in 
the region whilst the President and his advisors questioned the value of continued 
intereVWLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDVDUHVXOWRI1DVVHU¶VDQG$UDEUDGLFDOV¶ anti-americanism 
and tilt towards the Soviet Union. Meanwhile Nasser continued to hold it to be his duty 
to eject Western influence and colonialism from Arab lands and he was highly 
regarded by many Arabs.28  3UHVLGHQW -RKQVRQ ZDV ³VFHSWLFDO´ DERXW diplomatic 
DSSURDFKHVWR1DVVHUSDUWO\EHFDXVHRI1DVVHU¶VVXSSRUWIRUUHYROXWLRQLQWKH0LGGOH
East and elsewhere in the Third World. Cairo remained committed to supporting an 
Arab Nationalist regime in the Yemen and was calling for the export of revolution to 
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/LE\D 6DXGL $UDELD DQG -RUGDQ DV ZHOO DV VXSSRUWLQJ WKH QDVFHQW 3/2 1DVVHU¶V
support for the Viet-Cong, allowing them to open an office in Cairo in 1966 and his 
criticism of the Shah of Iran DQDOO\RI:DVKLQJWRQ OHG ³VRPH WRSSROLF\PDNHUVWR
ZULWH 1DVVHU RII´ altogether. In 1966 Walt Rostow, who had recently become 
JohnsRQ¶V 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW\ $GYLVRU became a staunch critic of Nasser, especially 
RYHU&DLUR¶VFRQWLQXHGFULWLFLVPRI$PHULFan policy in Vietnam.29   
 
Washington saw Britain as a vital ally in the Middle East, and the British continued 
to be active in the region, despite the Suez crisis and the withdrawal of Iraq from the 
Baghdad Pact in 1958. Military intervention in Oman between 1957 and 1959, troops 
sent to Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in 1961 and counter-insurgency operations in Aden 
and the Yemen illustrated continued British interest in the region.30 Thereafter during 
WKH V :DVKLQJWRQ DQG /RQGRQ FRRSHUDWHG ³HIIHFWLYHO\ LQ Whe main to maintain 
WKHLULQIOXHQFH´LQWKH0LGGOH(DVW31   
 
An approach on Libya by London was also considered likely to be successful 
because Washington and London had mutual interests in the country.  Like the British 
the Americans maintained a base facility at Wheelus. This base served a diminishing   
strategic role but was one of 375 American foreign military bases which had grown by 
the mid-1960s as part of the American policy of containing the Soviet threat.  
Washington was reluctant to remove themselves from these bases, finding new 
missions for them as time passed.32  Bombers were originally based at Wheelus but 
by the mid 1960s the strategic value of Libya to the US global strategy had dwindled 
as the focus of its nuclear deterrent shifted from long range bombers to 
intercontinental missiles and B52s.  The base was used for fuel storage and target 
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practice but the strategic value of Libya, particularly in oil production and the huge 
American stake in the industry was growing. Wheelus also served as a major 
employer for the local population and accounted for a US investment of $450 million 
dollars by 1965.33 Furthermore, Washington and London considered Libya an 
important strategic ally in North Africa. The Foreign Office stressed that the British   
shared a general interest with other Western governments in making sure that Libya, 
sited between Egypt and the Maghreb, develop as a stable and prosperous country, 
linked to the West or at the very least not closely linked to the east and the Soviet 
Union.34  The US considered the Wheelus base, like the British facilities, as a bulwark 
to Nasserite aggrandisement in North Africa. David Newsom, the US Ambassador to 
Libya regarded Wheelus as a symbol of the US Libyan relationship.35   In 1963 the 
British and Americans were concerned enough to protect their interests in Libya  by 
IRUPXODWLQJ D SODQ  ³)RXU 6TXDUH´   WKDW outlined action to be taken to ensure the 
&URZQ 3ULQFH¶V VXFFHVsion upon the death of Idris and to maintain a pro-Western 
regime.36   
 
During Anglo-American talks in March 1965 both countries had agreed that  
continuing attention to Libya was justified, because the independence, stability and 
economic welfare of the country were of a major importance to the West and because 
of the overflying rights and oil production.37  At the time Washington had been 
informed of the planned reductions in the British presence, in line with the 1965 Anglo-
Libyan Review. Later that year Washington referred to a diplomatic  initiative  they 
were planning , which would inform King Idris that the US  would be prepared to 
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oppose any unprovoked and aggressive attack on Libya and would join with the British 
in discussions on the best means of defending Libyan territorial integrity.38 The 
diplomatic initiative ZDVWKH³-RKQVRQ OHWWHU´,Q-XQH,GULVDVNHG:DVKLQJWRQWR
enter into a defence treaty with Libya.  President Johnson responded with a ³/HWWHURI
Interest in the Territorial IntegULW\ RI /LE\D´ ZKLFK VWDWHG that the United States 
regarded as highly important the political independence and territorial integrity of Libya 
and they could not remain indifferent to an unprovoked and aggressive attack on 
Libya. In such an event the President would consult with the Libyan Government and 
other interested countries on the appropriate steps to take. The President made clear 
WKDW WKH ³PDLQWHQDQFHRI IULHQGO\PLOLWDU\ IDFLOLWLHV ZLWKLQ/LE\DSURYLGHGDFRQWLQXLQJ
deterrent to such aggression and would be a significant factor in their ability to lend 
assistance in such circumstance´39 The British saw an opportunity to persuade the 
8QLWHG6WDWHVWRGHYHORSWKLV³OHWWHU´LQWRDILUPHUSROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\FRPPitment to 
the defence of Libya.  A report by the DOPC (Official) in November 1965 considered   
³ZHFDQSUREDEO\SHUVXDGH WKem, because of their concern for Libya, to accept the 
guarantee to defend Libya as a shared commitment of which they carry the greater 
part´40   
 
On 13 November Defence Secretary Denis Healey promoted the concept of 
drawing Washington into taking responsibility for the protection of Libya at a meeting 
of ministers and officials.41  On 24 November at the DOPC it was agreed that Britain   
³VKRXOGVHHNWRSHUVXDGHWKH86*RYHUQPHQWWRWDNHRYHURXUFRPPLWPHQWLQUHVSHFW
RI/LE\D´. The British were prepared to retain, if necessary, a small force at El Adem, 
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to ensure a point of entry and staging facilities should the Americans request it, but 
this would be of limited cost and reduced in size.42  As we have seen, the Chiefs of 
Staff, in March 1964, had concluded that RAF El Adem with an armoured car 
squadron and a minimum infantry company at Tobruk would be sufficient to provide a 
point of entry for British forces should the defence treaty be activated by the Libyans.43   
Politically the Foreign Office considered that LW ZDV ³LPSRVVLEOH´ WR KDQG RYHU WKH
commitment to the US, as the Johnson administration opposed British withdrawal 
³VWURQJO\´ Consequently the British would have to keep some forces in Cyrenaica and 
encourage Washington to provide support for these.44  Indeed, against the backdrop 
of the 1966 Defence Review it was concluded that   Washington would, as a 
consequence, put up strong opposition even to the imminent British withdrawal from 
Tripoli in February 1966.45   
 
In January 1966, John  Root, Director oI WKH 6WDWH 'HSDUWPHQW¶V 1RUWK $IULFDQ
Affairs section informed the British Embassy in Washington that a British withdrawal 
from Libya was unsettling in an already fragile strategic environment. He considered 
the British had a special relationship with Libya, which the USA could never replace, 
as the British ZHUH³EHWWHUSROLWLFDOO\VXLWHG´ He added that the US State Department 
was reluctant to take on this role because Washington was already under pressure to 
take a supportive role in Morocco and Tunisia.46  However, from there onwards British 
ministers and officials endeavoured to procure an American commitment to the 
defence of Libya.  At talks in Washington on 27 January 1966 between   US Secretary 
of Defence Robert McNamara, US Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Denis Healey 
and Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, WKH%ULWLVKVRXJKWFODULILFDWLRQRI:DVKLQJWRQ¶V
commitment to Libya, whilst offering an explanation of the nature of proposed British 
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defence cuts.  Attempting to draw the Americans, Stewart said withdrawal from 
Dhekelia in Cyprus meant the British could not carry out its defence commitment to 
Libya which was supported through the Cypriot base and McNamara accepted this but 
stated that no overt commitment from Washington was necessary.47 Rusk explained 
WKDW³LWZDVQRWFOHDUKRZORQJWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVZRXOGZLVKWRNHHSLWVEDVHLQ/LE\D
but so long as the base remained, its presence implied a certain degree of 
commitment. The US did not wish to make LWVFRPPLWPHQWVDQ\PRUHIRUPDO´  As a 
result WDVKLQJWRQ ZDV RQO\ ZLOOLQJ WR KROG ³FRQWLQJHQF\ GLVFXVVLRQV´ UDWKHU WKDQ
³FRQWLQJHQF\SODQQLQJ´IRUWKHGefence of Libya and stressed that Britain and the US 
VKRXOG³NHHSFORVHO\LQWRXFKRYHU/LE\DRQDZHHNWRZHHNEDVLV´48  
 
Healey explained that BritaiQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR/LE\DFRQVLVWLQJRIWKHHQWU\SRLQWDW
Tobruk and El Adem would require heavy reinforcements from the British mainland, as 
the Cyprus Dhekelia and Malta bases, where the British maintained troops in support 
of Libya, were to be run down. Reaction time would be slower and Healey believed 
that this delay could be compensated by a greater formal commitment from the US. 
This was the bait the British attempted to use to draw Washington into the 
commitment. Rusk deflected Healey by explaining that this would have to be 
discussed within the Johnson administration, but Idris already had an assurance from 
the President which the US could not go beyond, although Rusk called for further 
discussions.49 
 
Anglo-American talks, at the official level were held between 1 and 5 of February 
1966 in Washington.  The talks focused on Africa and   Libya was once more 
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discussed. British objectives for these talks, as previously,   were to persuade 
Washington to enter a formal commitment enabling the British and Americans to share 
the obligation to defend Libya. If a formal commitment could not be arranged then 
officials hoped an Anglo-American arrangement, including an American agreement to 
joint planning for defence of Libya, would be suitable. The Foreign Office considered 
that Washington was already overly committed in Vietnam and therefore it was 
unlikely that they would commit militarily and certainly not formally. 50    
 
This did not mean the approach would be unjustified on a military basis because 
Washington would have a contingency plan for Libya and it was hoped his could be 
dovetailed with British plans. A further military reason to suppose that an approach 
was likely to succeed was that %ULWDLQ¶Vdefence plan for Libya had been based on a 
concept of operations  agreed in an Anglo-American  study on Libya in 1962. The  
plan  was defined as primarily to deter Egyptian  aggression by demonstrating 
intention and ability  to defend Libya.  It was hoped new defence plans could be 
formalised, possibly in a private   minute, in which both governments recorded their 
willingness to support each other in assisting Libya. 51  
 
The talks failed to achieve much of benefit for the British delegation.52  It was clear 
the Johnson administration were reluctant to enter into any new political commitment, 
but US representatives appeared to understand the problems over the rundown of 
Dhekelia and the need for the British to maintain the treaty commitment. Sir Roger 
Allen, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office stated that at the official 
OHYHOWKH6WDWH'HSDUWPHQWDSSHDUHGWRDSSUHFLDWH%ULWLVKGLIILFXOWLHVEXWZHUH³ERXQG
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by strict instructions from the top´53 Washington had agreed to talks continuing, in 
London. These March talks were to explore, as Rusk stated, ³H[actly where the 
problem lay, whether in availability of forces, logistical support or political 
FRPPLWPHQW´ 54 
 
The Anglo-American defence talks in the early part of 1966 were more productive 
on the discussion of mutual strategic interests and illustrated :DVKLQJWRQ¶VSHUFHLYHG
importance of the Libyan facilities to wider strategic policy.  The Johnson 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶Vconcerns over British defence cuts and those in Libya were assuaged. 
The British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Patrick Dean, considered that the most 
LPSRUWDQWSRLQWLQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶VH\HVZDVWKDWWKH%ULWLVKZHUH³PDLQWDLQLQJDPLOLWDU\
SUHVHQFHLQ/LE\D´DQGZKLOVWWKH\GLGQRWDSSHDUZRUULHGE\WKHUHGXFWLRQVLQ&\SUXV
WKH\ KRSHG WKH %ULWLVK ZRXOG ³PDLQWDLQ D VLJQLILFDQW FDSDFLW\ IRU LQWHUYention´ The 
Ambassador EHOLHYHG WKH WDONV ³FUHDWHGDPRRGRI V\PSDWK\ WR UHSODFH WKHDQ[LHW\
and even mistrust which had been buildLQJXSRYHUWKHODVWIHZPRQWKV´RYHUWKH1966 
Defence Review and they KDGDYRLGHG OHDYLQJ ³H[SOLFLWO\RU LPSOLFLWO\ WKH LPSression 
that the United States own military and political commitments have been extended, or 
that they are being left to carry on the burden of Western defence on their own´55   
'HDQ¶V assessment appeared to have some validity given the warm reception 
President Johnson gave the Defence White Paper.  On 3 March 1966 the President 
H[SUHVVHG KLV ³JUHDW DGPLUDWLRQ´ IRU :LOVRQ¶V ³FRXUDJH DQG WKH PDVWHUIXO ZD\´ in 
ZKLFKKHKDGKDQGOHG³WKHSUREOHPRIPDWFKLQJ\RXUUHVRXUFHVWRWKHQHHGVRI%ULWDLQ
and the free world´.56 
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Meanwhile US responses in January and February to British requests for sharing 
the Libyan defence had led to some confusion in London.  The Foreign Office was 
unsure what was planned for the March talks and whether or not they had any chance 
of securing a commitment from the US.  Sir Roger Allen suggested that if the British 
FRXOGJHWWKH$PHULFDQVWRXQGHUWDNH³FRRUGLQDWHGPLOLWDU\SODQQLQJ´WKHQWKH%ULWLVK
PLJKWDFKLHYHD UHVXOW WKDW WKH$PHULFDQV WKHPVHOYHV ZRXOGFRQVLGHU ³QRW WRREDG´
from their point of view. This planning agreement might then be made into a political 
commitment.57 However, at the end of February the Washington Embassy reported 
that the Johnson administration ZDV³GHFLVLYHO\RSSRVHGWRDQ\H[WHQVLRQ of the US 
commitment in LibyD´largely on account of increasing involvement in Vietnam.58 The 
Foreign Office still considered it was necessary to pursue the March talks to try and 
reach a mutual agreement on the nature of the threat to Libya and to identify the 
military problem which would arise when Britain removed the Dhekelia stockpile. 
Furthermore the Foreign Office sought ³WRVHHLILWZRXOGEHWHFKQLFDOO\IHDVLEOHWRILWLQ
an American contribution to the defence of Libya´59 The Foreign Office hoped that 
with patience the Americans would be drawn in.60 
 
The talks on 7 and 8 March in London were in two parts, covering an examination 
of the threat to Libya and the current military plans and how these would be affected 
by the proposed reductions in forces in the Mediterranean. The United States 
delegation emphasised the continuing strategic value of Libya to the US and the West 
whilst Root emphasised that the Anglo-Libyan treaty was useful for intervening in 
Libya.  Despite the cuts the US delegation hoped Britain would continue with the 
military as well as the political aspect of the treaty and stated that whatever brought 
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British intervention, would bring about US intervention. Geoffrey G Arthur, Head of the 
Permanent Under-6HFUHWDU\¶V 'HSDUWPHQW DW WKH )RUHLJQ 2IILFH attempted to tease 
out an American explanation of their commitment, by pointing out that it would be hard 
to imagine circumstances in which the US would stand aside. John Root reservedly 
said that if things went wrong then the US would want to get with the British and 
consult. 61 
 
The British representatives also sought to discover the attitude of US officials to 
further British reductions and on negotiating an end to the Anglo-Libyan treaty. The 
reply was that Washington would view this with great concern and could not see itself 
as fulfilling the same role politically in Libya. Dean Rusk had previously made it clear 
that Washington could not add to its commitments and John Root said that British 
withdrawal was a terrible thought and could not be entertained. 62 Furthermore the 
British also tried to induce the Americans to make a contribution to British military 
contingency plans, by once more emphasising the weakened logistical arrangements 
caused by withdrawal from Malta and Cyprus. By 1968 it was considered that there 
would be no stockpile at Dhekelia, Cyprus (though the eventual introduction of new 
aircraft would to some extent offset this loss). There would also be no Royal Navy 
ships stationed in the Mediterranean and the Luqa airbase in Malta might cease to be 
available as a base for the V bomber reinforcements.  As a result there would be a 
corresponding reduction in the Libyan deterrent.  British forces in Cyrenaica would 
have no reinforcements nearer than 1500 miles, leaving them seriously exposed. The 
British concluGHG WKDW ³WKHLU SRVLWLRQ ZRXOG RQO\ EH DFFHSWDEOH ZLWK 86PLOLWDU\ DQG
naval   backing´63 This portrayal of the British military situation was not strictly true 
and was used to draw out a commitment from the USA.  The Ministry of Defence 
revealed on 3 March 1966 that with the introduction of new transport aircraft in 1968 it 
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would be possible to mount an operation in Libya from Britain. 64  It therefore seemed 
the removal of the stockpile at Dhekelia ZRXOGQRW³WHDUWKHKHDUWRXWRIRXUSODQVIRU
/LE\D´65 
 
7KH $PHULFDQ GHOHJDWLRQ VWUHVVHG WKDW WKHUH ZHUH SUREOHPV ZLWK :DVKLQJWRQ¶V
involvement in Vietnam and the legal position of US intervention in Libya. Jeffrey   
Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs at the State 
Department was willing to go back to Washington to examine how the British military 
gap might be filled. Whilst the State Department might be agreeable to closer liaison 
by US and British planners on this problem, it would not formally increase its 
commitment.  Root had said that the US did not want to get involved in joint 
contingency planning with Britain and Libya, but was amenable to a contribution to the 
deterrent. Rusk was reported as remaining interested in continuing the exchange of 
political and military information on present lines. 66 
 
The British concluded that United States officials had been given strict instructions 
WR OLPLW WKH GLVFXVVLRQV WR DQ H[FKDQJH RIYLHZV RQ KRZ WR ³VWXG\ WKH SUREOHP DQG
narrow it down, with the understanding that the US was unable to consider further 
FRPPLWPHQWV´ The US attitude appeared more rigid and the talks were considered 
³GLIIXVH´ 'HVSLWH WKLV Geoffrey G Arthur concluded that the British had achieved 
limited objectives. The US had generally agreed about the political threat to Libya, and 
discussions would take place through intelligence channels on reaching a joint 
assessment of the scale of the Egyptian menace. 7KH 86 GHOHJDWLRQ XQGHUWRRN ³WR
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raise the matter in Washington, with a view to seeking a modification of instructions to 
the US element of the Anglo-American planning group, so that coordinated military 
planning could take into account the problems which would arise in British plans´DVD
result of the Defence Review. The United States delegation also agreed that it was 
unlikely a situation would arise in which British forces were resisting Egyptian 
intervention and American forces were not. Arthur believed the British could not have 
got any more from the talks and that the United States delegation accepted that they 
should be ready to help with air lift and naval    support, although the American 
contribution was woefully less than what British ministers were expecting. Indeed 
Labour ministers KDGKRSHG%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWULEXWLRQFRXOGEH OLPLWHG to air support and 
securing a point of entry and the United States could be drawn into a solid 
FRPPLWPHQWWR/LE\D¶VGHIHQFH,Q$UWKXU¶VRSLQLRQWKHPRVWWKH%ULWLVKFRXOGKRSHIRU
was that Washington would fill the gap and he FRQFOXGHGWKDW³,W¶VJRLQJWREHDORQJ
process to get WKH$PHULFDQVHYHQWKXVIDU´67  The subsequent process was indeed 
slow. Talks on a US contribution to the defence of Libya continued into the summer of 
1966, within the sphere of a pre-existing Anglo-American military planning group on 
Libya.  Discussions   focused on the logistic requirements of supplying British troops 
through US air support, rather than from Malta and Cyprus, but little was achieved to 
the advantage of the British. 68 
 
Meanwhile the British economy continued to deteriorate. The White House, US  
Defense Department and US State Department were particularly concerned about the 
effects of the falling pound on British  defence policy, but  gave the impression that 
they believed the British  could maintain commitments, while at the same time cutting 
back expenditure. Washington was averse to the Labour Government using the 
devaluation of sterling as a remedy for the ailing economy because they saw the 
SRXQGDV³WKHILUVW line of the defence for the GROODU´69  Washington was  well aware 
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that the %ULWLVKFRXOG³WKUHDWHQXVRQGHIHQFH´ZKLFKZDV³WKHLUELJJHVWOHYHU´EXWE\
mid-WKHUHZDV³JURZLQJVFHSWLFLVPLQ:DVKLQJWRQDVWRZKHWKHU%ULWDLQZRXOGEH
able to fulfil the promises Wilson made on defence and this was compounded by a 
sense of resigQDWLRQDERXW%ULWDLQ¶VSUHFDULRXVHFRQRPLFSRVLWLRQ%ULWDLQZDVQRZD
liability rather than an asset´ US Under-Secretary of State George Ball suggested   
WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV³VKRXOGUHOD[RXUSUHVVXUHRQ%ULWDLQWRGRWKLQJVWKDWVKHZLOOHLWKHU
refuse to GRRUZLOOGRRQO\DWVXEVWDQWLDOFRVWWRXV´70  
 
In July 1966 a further financial crisis hit sterling and speculation grew of a possible 
devaluation of the currency. The Labour Cabinet chose deflationary measures and 
sought further cuts on defence expenditure. On 20 July the Cabinet discussed the 
possibility of making cuts of £100 million, half of this being achieved by accelerating 
the redeployment of troops as had been planned in the 1966 Defence Review.  
Despite the cuts, at the Washington Summit on the 29 to the 30 July 1966   Wilson 
told Johnson WKDW KH ZDV ³UHVROXWHO\ GHWHUPLQHG WR VROYH %ULWDLQ¶V EDODQFH RI
payments criVLV´without devaluing the pound and insisted that the Britain would not 
³VKLUN´ IURP LWV UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV East of Suez.  He insisted that the savings of 
£100million sought on the defence budget would not alter the policies set out in the 
1966 Defence Review. 71 
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3.3 The Facilities and Political Relations  
 
The British garrison left Tripoli in February 1966. As a result of the conclusions of 
the 1965 Anglo-Libyan Review and the January 1966 Defence Review it was expected 
that the Benghazi garrison would close at some point in 1967. However, as we have 
seen, there were strong arguments raised in the Foreign Office and by the 
Ambassador for maintaining the deployment. The debate on Benghazi and the policy 
decisions taken in 1966 shed light on officials and the LaERXU*RYHUQPHQWV¶DSSURDFK
to the Libyan facilities and the economic importance of the deployments.  
 
The Foreign Office considered tKDW .LQJ ,GULV¶ SROLWLFDO SRVLWLRQ LQ /LE\D KDG
improved during the course of 1965, whilst conversely, his main adversary, President 
Nasser, had found his position in the Arab world had diminished. King Idris, a solitary 
man, had a strong tendency to retreat to his palaces or the desert, but he remained a 
SRSXODUILJXUH7KH.LQJ¶VSROLWLFDOSHGLJUHHERUQRIKLVOHDGHUVKLSGXULQJWKHZDUDQG
his relatively simple ascetic lifestyle made him a respected character. Furthermore his 
self imposed distance, both personally and geographically from mainstream politics in 
Libya isolated him from the more harmful criticism of anti-Western Nasserite 
propaganda. However his over reliance on the influential Shelhi family did undermine 
his credibility.  Ibrahim Shehli had been his principle assistant for forty years until his 
murder in 1954. He was succeeded by his sons: first Busiri, killed in a car accident in 
1964, and then Omar. The 6KHOKL IDPLO\ ZHUH FRQVLGHUHG ³XWWHUO\ FRUUXSW´ EXW KHOG
considerable influence and power in Libya.72  
 
1DVVHU PHDQZKLOH ZDV FRQVLGHUHG WR EH QR ORQJHU ³ULGLQJ KLJK´ LQ $UDE SROLWLFV
Egypt had been drawn further into the war in Yemen, committing troops against a 
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Royalist counter insurgency and alienating still further conservative Arab regimes.73  
The war was a huge financial drain upon the Egyptian economy and Cairo looked to 
court favour from oil rich monarchies. However Kerr notes that there was a major 
ideological cleavage between the Arab Nationalist Cairo-Damascus-Sana axis and the 
conservative monarchies of Amman-Riyadh. Many members of the Arab League, 
including Libya, Sudan, Lebanon, and Kuwait were targets for Arab Nationalist states. 
7KH\ ZHUH ³PRUH RU OHVV YXOQHUDEOH WR LGHRORJLFDO GHQXQFLDWLRQ E\ WKH 6\ULDQV DQG
subversion by the EJ\SWLDQV´EHFDXVHWKH\ZHUHFRQVHUYDWLYH in political orientation.74  
 
The Libyans remained concerned with their own strategic security. In particular 
tKHUHZDV³DJURZLQJIHHOLQJLQ/LE\D«WKDW/LE\DQRLOLVWRRSULFHOHVVDFRPPRGLW\WR
be allowed to fall into the hands of Egypt´75  The Cyrenaican oil fields in the east 
seemed especially vulnerDEOHWR&DLUR¶VGHVLJQVA further threat came from a military 
revolution in Algeria in 1965, which effectively ringed the Libyan monarchical state 
with Arab Nationalist regimes and made the country even more vulnerable.76 The 
Libyans had been concerned by a potential military threat from Algeria, first under the 
regime of Ahmed Ben Bella and then Houari Boumedienne,  because  both leaders 
had been developing in  Algeria a socialist and authoritarian political system, 
diametrically opposed to that of the monarchy in Libya. The construction of a direct 
road from Amenas to Ghadames in Algeria in 1963 established a direct link with Libya 
ZKLFK WKH /LE\DQV FRQVLGHUHG KDG ³Pilitary objectives in mind´ $OJHULD¶V FKLHI
competitor in oil and gas was Libya and speculation of an Egyptian-$OJHULDQ³VHFUHW
SODQ´ IRU D SLQFHU DWWDFN RQ Libya circulated at this time.77  The US Ambassador at 
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large, Averell W. Harriman, considered that the Algerian revolutionaries were not 
nearly as extreme as Nasser, but the Libyans frequently drew attention to the threat 
from Algeria in discussions with the British. 78 The presence of British facilities not only 
reassured the anxious King but reaffirmed DFRPPLWPHQW WR WKHSURWHFWLRQRI/LE\D¶V
territorial integrity. Furthermore the Algerian interest in LibyaOLNH(J\SW¶VZDValso a 
threat to British and Western strategic oil and political interests in the region given that 
,GULV¶ UHJLPHZDVDSUR-Western Arab monarchical regime.  $VWKH.LQJ¶VSRVLWLRQ LQ
Libya had grown stronger and external dangers escalated, there was corresponding 
Libyan political pressure on the British to remain at their present facilities. The Foreign 
Office considered that the /LE\DQV VDZ %ULWDLQ¶V SUHVHQFH LQ WKH FRXQWU\ LQ D ³QHZ
OLJKW´ JLYHQ WKH FRQWLQXHG threat from Egypt and Algeria.79  The Libyans had an 
DOWRJHWKHUPRUHZHOFRPLQJDWWLWXGHWR%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQ%HQJKD]LJLYHQWKHYDOXHRI
the Cyrenaican area in oil resouUFHV DQG /LE\D¶V YXOQHUDELOLW\ %ULWLVK IRUFHV now 
appeared more defensive. 80 
 
As we have seen, the DOPC on 3 February 1965 had agreed to a withdrawal from 
Benghazi sometime in 1967.  Ambassador Sarrell continued to have ³FRQVLGHUDEOH
doubts about the wisdom of deploying to the El Adem area´DQGGuring 1966 the future 
of the Benghazi facility was reconsidered.81 There were a number of benefits 
associated with remaining at Benghazi. Firstly the deployment was essential to the 
³EOXII´WKDWWKH%ULWLVKFRQVLGHUed prevented Egypt from attacking Libya. Secondly the 
British now had their own growing interest in Libyan oil, exploited and exported from 
Cyrenaica, making a British military presence there significant. In April 1967 CJD 
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Frost, Major General, Officer Commanding HQ Malta and Libya, called for maintaining 
the British presence in Cyrenaica and recasting the treaty, especially as oil would 
make Libya a stronger exporter than the Gulf. Frost concluded that Britain should be 
prepared to stay there for the security of the oil companies who feared sabotage from 
Arab Nationalists.82   The Benghazi garrison also appeared to secure a degree of 
internal stability and acted as a deterrent to protests in Cyrenaica. 83  
 
Another argument for the maintenance of the Benghazi facility was the apparent 
realisation that the value of El Adem was questionable. The air bridge through the 
region had already been undermined first by the loss of British influence in Egypt in 
1956, and the Sudanese restrictions in 1965.  The 1966 decision to leave Aden further 
DGGHGWRWKHURXWH¶VUHGXQGDQF\We have seen that throughout 1965 there had been 
some hope that the Sudanese Government, in time, would withdraw the restrictions, 
but this appeared to be increasingly unlikely.  Whilst El Adem would continue to 
provide staging facilities for aircraft engaged in training, involved in contingency 
operations in Africa and as a valuable diversion airfield between Malta and Cyprus, 
the restrictions neutralised the airfield¶s role as a major staging post on the ³HDVW
DERXW´ southern route to the Middle East and Far East.84  Secondly the El Adem 
facility was also becoming expensive as land values rose in the region during 1965 
and this added to the foreign exchange payments the British would need to make to 
extend facilities in Tobruk and El Adem. In 1965 the Chiefs of Staff had instructed the 
army and air force to review the plan for future deployments but this study had been 
suspended in March 1966 pending the results of a further defence review and the 
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quest for a US contribution to the defence of Libya, which would have allowed a 
reduction of the El Adem and Tobruk presence. 85 
 
In May 1966 GG Brown, First Secretary at the Foreign Office believed that whilst 
military grounds would form the basis for a decision on Benghazi, financial grounds 
would have an influence and this was not surprising given the economic difficulties the 
Labour Government had to contend with.86  In June, Head of the Near East and 
African Department, Denis J Speares, concluded that the political advantage now lay 
³GHFLVLYHO\LQIDYRXURIUHPDLQLQJLQ%HQJKD]L´3ROLWLFDOO\, nationalist pressure on the 
%ULWLVK SUHVHQFH KDG YHU\ ODUJHO\ GLVDSSHDUHG DQG ³WKHUH KDV EHHQ D JURZLQJ
understanding by the Libyans of the importance of the presencHRI%ULWLVKWURRSV´,Q
addition, Ambassador Sarrell reported that the King would find LW ³XQSDODWDEOH´ WR
receive any communication of a decision to withdraw from Benghazi, particularly as he 
feared internal subversion more than an external attack, and the most likely site of 
subversion in his eyes and British calculations would be Tripoli and Benghazi. Any 
attempted revolution was likely to occur in these cities and to be supported by 
Egyptian agents.  British officials reasoned that a withdrawal from Benghazi would 
undermine British political support for the regime, LQ WKH H\HV RI ,GULV¶ FULWLFV, and 
UHPRYH WKH ³EOXII´ WKH %ULWLVK VROG WKH (J\SWLDQV DERXW D %ULWLVK FRPPLWPHQW WR
intervene in an internal political crisis in Libya.  To remain in Benghazi would serve to 
keep Egyptian sponsored subversion at bay; although in 1964 the Benghazi garrison 
had served to attract criticism from Nasser and demonstrations from Libyan 
nationalists.87 
 
On 16 June 1966 Ambassador Sarrell, who had returned on leave to London, met 
the Chiefs of Staff and, with Foreign Office support, called for maintaining a Benghazi 
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base.  This meeting had come about after Sarrell had demonstrated considerable 
support for the maintenance of the Benghazi facility following talks with local military 
commanders in Libya.88  6DUUHOO¶VFRQFOXVLRQZDVEXWWUHVVHGE\Head of the NEAD at 
the Foreign Office, Speares whose own conviction was that there were good political 
and military reasons for staying, based on a trip he made to Libya himself.89  This had 
led the Foreign Office to raise the issue with the Ministry of Defence, above any 
financial considerations. From a military perspective the Chiefs of Staff concern was 
for securing the minimum required garrison presence in Libya to implement the 
defence plan 90 As we have seen the 1966 Defence Review was to lead to changes in 
the British military presence in Malta and Cyprus.  If defence review targets were to be 
met, Libyan defence had now to be considered against a near complete withdrawal 
from Malta, rundown of the stockpile in Cyprus and substantial reductions in 
administrative support there. The 1966 Defence Review had envisaged an American 
political and military contribution, which could lead to deployment reductions in the El 
Adem and Tobruk facility.  At the Anglo-American talks in March the Americans were 
not prepared to enter into a formal commit to Libya, simply offering to modify 
instructions to the US element of US/UK joint planning group so that coordinated 
military planning could take into account the problems which would arise in British 
plans as a result of 1966 Defence Review. Therefore the British were still required to 
service the defence requirement of the treaty.  
 
During the early summer of 1966 Service Chiefs reconsidered the three 
prospective Libyan deployments.  Course A specified one unaccompanied infantry 
company at Tobruk on rotation from Gibraltar and one unaccompanied armoured car 
squad at El Adem, housed and administered on a shoestring basis. Course B was 
based on the maintenance of one unaccompanied infantry company at Tobruk and 
one unaccompanied armoured car squadron in Benghazi with minimum essential 
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overheads. Course C was the current facility of one unaccompanied infantry company 
at Tobruk and one accompanied armoured reconnaissance regiment (less one 
squadron in Cyprus) at Benghazi.91 The Chiefs of Staff concluded that, this time, 
course C best met the political and military requirements.  On 19 July 1966 course C 
was accepted   but the Chiefs recognised that course C might be unacceptable to the 
Treasury due to the additional £500,000 foreign exchange cost required to finance this 
option by remaining at Benghazi. 92 
 
Other financial issues occurred in the summer of 1966 related to the Anglo-Libyan 
relationship. As referred to earlier, during the summer of 1966 the Cabinet were 
looking for further ways to reduce costs as part of a £100 million savings exercise on 
foreign exchange, which had been proposed by Callaghan on 20 April.  Subsequently, 
LQWKHFRXUVHRIWKH&DELQHW¶s discussions the concept of getting the Libyans to pay for 
base facilities emerged and led to a ministerial decision in Cabinet, on 20 July 1966, 
that the Libyans should be asked to pay the whole foreign exchange cost of forces in 
Libya.93  Defence Secretary Healey indicated that Hong Kong already provided some 
contribution to the stationing of troops and thought it reasonable to ask Libya and 
Brunei to pay for stationed troops as they were both enjoying large oil revenues. He 
estimated that ³WKLVPLJKWSURduce a further saving of about £5 million (and) on this 
basis the total of defence savings which would be about £55 million´94  Wilson 
HQGRUVHG+HDOH\¶VFDOO 
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At its meeting on 27 July 1966, the Defence Review Working Party (DRWP) 
requested consideration on the practicality of obtaining from the Libyans a 
³VXEYHQWLRQ´WRthe cost of stationing troops.  The Ministry of Defence recommended 
the DRWP should seek ministerial approval for an early approach to be made to the 
Libyan Government requesting payment.  The cost of British military facilities in Libya 
in the summer of 1966 was cited at £5.1 million per annum. Should there be a 
redeployment from Benghazi the total costs would be a projected £2.3 million. The 
Ministry of Defence believed that there was a good case to ask the Libyans for a 
contribution because the Libyan ecoQRP\ZDV³EXR\DQW´DQGWKH%ULWLVKcould not be 
H[SHFWHGWRH[FOXGH/LE\DIURPWKH³JOREDOVHDUFKIRUHFRQRPLHV´LQIRUHLJQH[FKDQJH
costs. To withdraw from Benghazi would not help any approach to the King to fund 
remaining British deployments, but the MOD concluded that the Libyans should be 
required to pay for British forces in Cyrenaica. 95   
 
The Foreign Office was firmly against such a move. On 3 August John Dodds, First 
Secretary at the Foreign Office, said it would be hard to sell the idea of paying for a 
British presence to the Libyans, particularly as Libya was not a colony like Hong Kong 
and Brunei.96   The Foreign Office emphasised that the King had already agreed, in 
February 1965 WRD  FKDQJH LQ%ULWDLQ¶V ILQDQFLDOFRPPLWPHQW WKHVXEVLG\GHVSLWH
opposition from his ministers. As a result the major part of the technical and military 
assistance programme was now provided by the cost of maintaining the military and 
naval    missions which had existed before the termination of the subsidy. The Foreign 
Office believed, therefore, that London KDGREWDLQHG ,GULV¶ FRRSHUDWLRQ LQVHFXULQJD
VXEVWDQWLDOUHGXFWLRQRI%ULWDLQ¶VILQDQFLDOREOLJDWLRQunder the treaty. They concluded 
that this markedly reduced the chances of obtaining further concessions from the 
Libyan Government to pay for the military commitment. The Foreign Office also 
argued that Libya was a foreign and independent country and it was politically 
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impossible for an Arab country to be seen to pay for such facilities, which would have 
FRQVHTXHQFHVIRU%ULWDLQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKRWKHU$UDEVWDWHVAsking for payment could 
also lead King Idris and his ministers to question the reliability and economic and 
military strength of Britain. Finally, despite the booming economy, the Libyans could 
well not even be in a position to pay: The King might find it difficult to pay because 
70% of oil revenue was for development and only 30% for general budget and this in 
turn could put the Libyans in an embarrassing position.  The cost of stationing forces 
in Libya   was already offset by ample trade opportunities particularly in military orders 
and oil investments.  7KH)RUHLJQ2IILFHFRQVLGHUHG WKDW ³Ze are convinced that the 
confidence we enjoy as a strong treaty partner is of material importance in maintaining 
DQG H[SDQGLQJ WKHVH YDOXDEOH WUDGH OLQNV´ )XUWhermore, the Libyans held large 
sterling reserves in London and asking for payment from the Libyans could lead to the 
deposits being withdrawn from the Sterling Area, thus weakening sterling further. The 
Libyans had been persuaded not to with-draw sterling in 1964. 97  The Foreign Office 
FRQFOXGHG WKDW QR DSSURDFK VKRXOG EH PDGH IRU D ³PDMRU FRQWULEXWLRQ´ 98 Within 
%ULWDLQ¶V GLSORPDWLF FRPPXQLty in Libya similar sentiments were expressed. Peter 
Wakefield, Counsellor and Consul General in Benghazi warned that any request for 
the Libyans to pay for the deployments would also be counter-productive for it could 
put BritDLQ¶VLQFUHDVLQJWUDGH in Libya and in the Arab world under threat.99  
 
As a result, the Defence Review Working Party on 16 August 1966 accepted the 
impracticability of obtaining any Libyan contribution, but because the issue came from 
ministers it was decided that these views would have to be brought to their attention. 
At the end of September the Foreign Office suggested to the new Foreign Secretary 
George Brown, who had been appointed in August 1966, that it would not be in British 
interests   to request a contribution. Brown considered that it was bad tactics to 
circulate a paper to his colleagues proposing such a reversal. He was not wholly 
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convinced by the arguments against the request. 100  He suggested that as the idea 
came from the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office may wish to sound them out 
and, if the departments concurred on the issue, he would speak with Healey and they 
would send a letter saying the proposal should not be followed up.101 %URZQ¶V
approach to management in the Foreign Office was to attempt to reduce the written 
ZRUNORDGDQGFRQYHQHEULHILQJVDQG³WKUDVKRXWSDUWLFXODULVVXHV´ZKLFKHQDEOHGKLP
to have wider background knowledge on any issue.102  In the event the Foreign Office 
failed to make any progress with the Ministry of Defence as it was considered that 
they were honour bound to support their minister. 103   
 
Pressed to make significant defence cuts, Healey was frustrated that he could only 
make £20 million savings instead of a £75 million target which had been agreed and 
he continued to pursue a Libyan contribution, hoping to dress it up so it would be more 
palatable to the Libyans.  The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, George 
Thomson, discussed the question with Healey on 10   October and it was agreed that 
Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence officials should be instructed to prepare an 
agreed paper for presentation to the two ministers on the prospects of obtaining a 
Libyan contribution and how this might be presented. Healey would then consider 
whether it could be forwarded as a joint paper by himself and Brown. 104  
 
The line taken in the joint draft paper was very much a reiteration of the Foreign 
2IILFH¶VDSSUHFLDWLRQRI WKH LVVXH IURP$XJXVW7KHUHZHUH ³YHU\VWURQJ´DUJXPHQWV
³ILQDQFLDOHFRQRPLFDVZHOODVSROLWLFDOagainst approaching the Libyan Government 
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with a request to meet the foreign exchange costs of our forces in Libya´.105  Libya 
was an independent Arab country and as a consequence it was almost impossible for 
Idris to subsidize the British presence and Libya had already dropped the subsidy.  
The economic consequences of an approach were emphasised.  A request would be 
damaging for political relations and would have financial consequences for sterling 
and would damage exports. The conclusion was that the political, economic and 
financial arguments were overwhelmingly strong against requesting payment from the 
Libyans DV³Dt present we enjoy a special and favoured position with the Libyan King 
and government and we derive tangible benefits from this. A request for financial 
assistance would come as a shock to the Libyans and the confidence and goodwill 
which we at present enjoy would be shaken seriRXVO\´106  
 
On 20 October 1966 George Brown discussed the draft joint paper with Healey. 
Healey suggested that if a paper was to be circulated it should be by the Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs only. Brown accepted this but said that he would prefer to let 
WKLVUHVWIRUWKHWLPHEHLQJXQWLO³DVDQGZKHQWKH7UHDVXU\VWDUWSUHVVLQJIRUDFWLRQ´107  
However the idea of asking the Libyans to contribute to the cost of forces in Libya was 
dropped without any paper being circulated to ministers. Speares, aware of the 
political and economic consequences of a request to Libya, did not want the subject 
reopening. 7KH &DELQHW¶V GHFLVLRQ WR UHTXHVW SD\PHnt for the facilities from the 
Libyans had been symptomatic of the climate at the time in Whitehall.  Speares 
believed that the costs of missions and foUFHV LQ/LE\DJRWEOXUUHGLQD³FOLPDWH«RI
ruthless cutting of exSHQGLWXUHRIDOONLQGV´108 
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In fact the £100 million defence cut Callaghan had called for earlier in the year did 
not end the pressure from the Treasury for further savings. They had been 
disappointed with the result of the recent Defence Review during which the defence 
budget of 1969/1970 had not been brought down to a £2000 million target.  ³Public 
expenditure was rising faster than the growth of GNP.... chiefly the result of the 
expansion of expenditure on social provision´. In the aftermath of the July financial 
crisis Callaghan had requested a further reduction of defence expenditure to a new 
ceiling of £1850 million by 1970/1971. The Ministry of Defence and Healey were 
willing to look at these cuts, but the Chiefs of Staff believed this would be impossible 
without re-examining the political restriction Wilson placed on them. This restriction 
ZDVWKDWDQ\GHIHQFHHFRQRPLHVPXVWEHDFKLHYHG³ZLWKRXWDOWHULQJWKHEDVLFOLQHVRI
external policy on which the 1966 Defence RHYLHZZDVIRXQGHG´109  
 
Meanwhile the question of maintaining the Benghazi facility had still not been 
resolved. The matter was being considered by the Ministry of Defence, but no doubt 
mindful of the required cuts in defence, Speares did not wish to press for the retention 
of a deployment there, if it was more costly than El Adem and Tobruk.110  In November 
1966 the Foreign Office told Healey that whilst the political advantages of staying in 
Benghazi were strong they did not wish to press for it if it could only be achieved at a 
foreign exchange cost higher than that of El Adem provided for in Defence Review 
option A.111 The financial commitment of maintaining the facility at Benghazi was 
therefore considered too great.  Whilst political and military reasons had influenced 
officials to reconsider a withdrawal from Benghazi during 1966, the economic 
pressures to withdraw proved too great. On 24 November 1966 the Chiefs of Staff 
finally   agreed that the future deployment in Libya should be that provided for in the 
Defence Review, course A and evacuation from Benghazi would be completed by the 
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end of 1967.112 This did not stop Ambassador Sarrell, who had consistently argued in 
favour of keeping a presence in Benghazi asking IRUD³KLJKOHYHO´YLVLWWRFheck over 
the facts.  He remained  concerned that the decision was false economy, as land 
values continued to rise in El Adem  making the redeployment all the more 
expensive.113  
 
 In addition Washington continued to show concern over British cuts in the Libyan 
facilities.  In December 1966 the US Ambassador to Libya, David Newsom, said the 
United States Government had a strong desire that British forces should remain in 
Libya as on the spot evidence that the British intended to fulfil the treaty commitment.  
Washington considered that any reduction in British forces was regrettable and they 
hoped that a complete withdrawal from Benghazi would not be necessary.114 
 
The prospects of swaying ministerial views on the Libyan facilities appeared 
unlikely to succeed. The defence priorities of the Labour Government were beginning 
to shift determinedly towards a withdrawal from East of Suez and costly Libyan 
deployments such as those in Benghazi could not be maintained if defence 
commitments were to be further reduced.  At Chequers on   22 October 1966 Healey 
put forward defence saving proposals to a small gathering of ministers including 
Wilson and Brown7KLVZDV+HDOH\¶Vresponse to requested further cuts following the 
summer sterling crisis and consisted of cuts in the British Army on the Rhine (BAOR), 
combined with a 50% reduction of the forces in the Far East from the level agreed in 
the Defence Review. In the Persian Gulf cuts could be found by not sending a second 
battalion to Sharjah in the Gulf   and the strategic value of CENTO would need to be 
reconsidered. Reductions in the CENTO obligation would enable the British to 
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withdraw forces in Cyprus and it was recognised that Libyan facilities were of limited 
use to CENTO. ,QWKHHYHQWWKH&KHTXHUVPHHWLQJ³FRQVLGHUHGWKLVWKHEDVLVRIDQ
approach to a further defence review´ On 10 November 1966 the Labour Government 
announced that it would reapply to join the Common Market which signalled %ULWDLQ¶V
growing economic and political interest in Europe and strategic realignment from East 
of Suez.  Subsequently at DOPC on 9 December ministers decided that there should 
EHD³IXOOVWXG\RIWKHSROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\LPSOLFDWLRQVRIWRWDOZLWKGUDZDOIURPWKH)DU
East´ 115  
 
The economic crises of July 1966 began the process which was to lead to the 
withdrawal from East of Suez and by 1967 the Labour Government   found it difficult to 
maintain a global strategy as balance of payment and sterling problems occurred and 
unemployment rose. There was a growing consensus that government spending 
overseas had become a crucial element in balance of payments problems, because 
this spending did not come back to Britain through purchases of British goods and 
services.116 0LFKDHO 'RFNULOO VWDWHV WKDW ³:LOVRQ DQG +HDOH\ ZHUH IRUFHG E\ HDFK
successive financial crisis to withdraw from bases and commitments which they had 
only shRUWO\EHIRUHLQVLVWHGZHUHHVVHQWLDO´117   
 
Pham believes the sWHUOLQJ FULVLV RI  ³RSHQHG D PDMRU VSOLW ZLWKLQ WKH UXOLQJ
economic triumvirate´ of Wilson, Brown, Secretary of State for Economic Affairs and 
Callaghan, the Chancellor.  Brown argued that it was time to re-H[DPLQH %ULWDLQ¶V
international role and that should be re-orientated to Europe. Furthermore, he was in 
conflict with Callaghan over the projected defence cuts.118 Brown was moved to the 
Foreign Office and his position would assist in BritaLQ¶V shift away from South East 
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Asia and the East of Suez policy.119 Pham believes the sterling crisis signalled that the 
consensus within the government on the direction of British foreign policy was starting 
to dissolve.  Furthermore economic departments were no longer willing to accept the 
political GHSDUWPHQWV¶ definition of the necessary extent of Britain¶s defence role and 
became much more vigorous in pursuing tighter defence expenditure, rather than 
DFFHSWLQJ WKH )2¶s DVVXUDQFHV WKDW %ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ was already at a minimum 
acceptable to allies.120 Dockrill concludes that the 18 July 1967 Supplementary White 
Paper on 'HIHQFH³represented the Wilson Government¶VILQDODGPLVVLRQWKDWILQDQFLDO
and political realities had made the sacrifice of the major part of British responsibilities 
EDVWRI6XH]LQHYLWDEOH´121  
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3.4 Conclusion  
 
From 1965 to 1966 The Anglo-Libyan relationship remained important to both 
parties but the British military presence was reduced to the minimal requirement 
considered suitable to service the treaty defence requirement and provide staging 
facilities to East of Suez. The presence of British deployments in Libya played a 
diminishing role in /RQGRQ¶s strategic focus East of Suez.  The Labour Government 
and Foreign Office initially believed that the facilities had some continued value to the 
CENTO and East of Suez commitments but as economic difficulties grew the Labour 
Government sought cuts in defence commitments.  These cuts fell upon deployments 
in the Mediterranean and included Libya, Cyprus, and Malta. The practical strategic 
value of the Libyan facilities also came under some scrutiny whilst the concept of 
maintaining military bases was questioned.  A revised British policy on military 
deployments was resolutely stated in the 1966 Defence White Paper, as defence 
expenditure was scaled back.  
 
Defence expenditure cuts led to an attempt by the Labour Government to draw 
Washington into a defence commitment to Libya WR UHGXFH /RQGRQ¶V financial 
REOLJDWLRQV WR /LE\D¶V GHIHQFH.  The British were aware that both London and 
Washington had shared strategic interests as well as mutual political and defence 
concerns in Libya.  This course of action proved ineffective, the Americans 
considering that they had enough of a political commitment in tKH³-RKQVRQ/HWWHU´$W
the same time Washington came to the realisation that the British probably could no 
longer be relied upon to supplement US global defence strategy, as they had done 
since World War Two, given the weakness of the British economy. In July 1966 
Healey looked for further ways of reducing defence expenditure and mooted the idea 
of requesting the Libyans pay for the deployments, but the Foreign Office rejected this 
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approach, feeling this would undermine the valuable relationship, British economic 
developments in the country and generally harm /RQGRQ¶Vposition in the Middle East.  
 
Within Libya the British presence remained an integral part of the relationship. This 
was brought out during the debate over deploying troops in Benghazi. Withdrawal had 
been accepted during the 1965 Review but was re-H[DPLQHG EHFDXVH RI /LE\D¶V
importance, particularly in terms of oil and trade. The Libyans grew concerned with 
their security, especially in Cyrenaica and because London was keen to maintain and 
reassure the regime, officials considered preserving a military presence in Benghazi.  
/LE\D¶Vdiminishing role in an East of Suez strategy also shifted British priorities from 
securing a staging post at El Adem back to holding the original point of entry at 
%HQJKD]L WKH ³EOXII´ WR 1DVVHU IRU VWULFWO\ GHIHQFH SXUSRVHV  7KH )RUHLJQ 2IILFH
MOD and British diplomatic representation in Libya strongly urged the retention of the 
Benghazi garrison but the need to enforce economies in defence spending, pursued 
by the Labour Government, ended this plan.  
 
Despite the planned withdrawal from Benghazi, the Anglo-Libyan political 
relationship ZDV UHDIILUPHG WKURXJK /RQGRQ¶V FRQWLQXHG GHIHQFH REOLJDWLRQ DQG WKH
maintenance of the remaining facilities at Tobruk and El Adem. The British took 
advantage of training privileges and promoted   economic interests in the rapidly 
developing economy of Libya. Meanwhile, whilst the significance of the facilities to 
British policy East of Suez had declined, London had a strategic interest in maintaining 
,GULV¶ pro-Western government in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Libyan regime 
welcomed British protection. Events from the middle of 1967 would put great strain on 
WKHUHODWLRQVKLSDQGWKUHDWHQHGWRXQGHUPLQH/RQGRQ¶VDQG7ULSROL¶Vmutual interests 
when Tripoli requested the withdrawal of British forces in June 1967.
116 
4 The Six Day War 1967 
 
In the summer of 1967 British military facilities in Libya were an RAF staging post 
at El Adem, a garrison of army deployments at both Benghazi and Tobruk and El 
Adem, limited stockpiles for training and for operations in support of the Libyan 
defence plan, as well as naval and military missions.  On 5 June the Six Day War 
broke out and protests against Israel and the West occurred in Libyan cities. The 
Benghazi garrison was involved in rescue operations in the city, providing refuge to 
the entire British and American population. Mobs attacked the British and American 
embassies in Benghazi and burnt down the British reading room, a NAAFI club (the 
trading organisation of the UK military) and a number of Jewish shops. Riots went on 
from ten in the morning until eight in the evening. British forces had always steered 
clear of becoming visibly involved in Libyan internal affairs and   no request from the 
Libyan Government for British military assistance was received. In any case the 
Consul General, Wakefield, in Benghazi believed ³LWZDVTXHVWLRQDEOHKRZ HIIHFWLYH
they (British forces) FRXOG KDYH EHHQ LI WKH\ KDG EHHQ FDOOHG XSRQ WR LQWHUYHQH´
because they were so busy looking after the expatriate community.  Wakefield 
concluded that the tidHRIKRVWLOLW\WRWKH:HVWQRZ³seemed to swing the balance of 
advantage against the retention of troops in Benghazi´1 Ambassador Sarrell 
commented that ³WUXO\ K\VWHULFal emotions ....ZHUH XQOHDVKHG LQ /LE\D´ ZKLFK KH
believed had been inspired by Egyptian, anti-Western propaganda, broadcast through 
Radio Cairo.  Teachers, students and mob leaders, themselves trained in Egypt, led 
street level opposition to the government. 2 7KH³%LJ/LH´DFFXVDWLRQWKDWUnited States 
planes, operating from the Wheelus base had helped Israeli forces was broadcast 
from Cairo Radio and further inflamed the situation. Ambassador Sarrell felt that 
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(J\SWLDQ SURSDJDQGD ³FDXVHG (a) week of troubOH´. 3 The Libyan media carried 
Egyptian propaganda, which did not help matters and Sarrell was not happy about this 
because the Libyan Ministry of News and Guidance had denied UK embassy staff any 
communication with the Libyan population. The Ambassador saw a political gap 
between government and people and he felt Libyan students needed political 
education and guidance.4 However he recognised that Libyan youth were also 
influenced by feelings of strong anti-colonialism.5 Although Wright claims the political 
YLROHQFH LQ WKHFRXQWU\ZDV ³QRW FKDUDFWHULVWLF´SDUWLFXODUO\EHFDXVH WKH UHJLPHKDG
previously managed to crush opposition, events illustrated the depth of feeling against 
military deployments in Libya. 6   
 
A Libyan Government request for the withdrawal of Western forces was inevitable 
following this political disruption, intensified by criticism from other Arab nations of the 
Libyan GRYHUQPHQW¶Vweak anGYDFLOODWLQJSROLF\RQWKHZDU7ULSROL¶VIDLOXUHWRcommit 
emphatically to the Arab cause had only increased the criticism.  Libyan Prime 
Minister +XVVHLQ0D]LTµVZLWKGUDZDOUHTXHVWRQ June assuaged popular domestic 
and pan-Arab discontent. A state of emergency was declared, a curfew imposed and a 
ban on meetings and demonstrations was announced as strikes by the Port Workers 
Union, ordinary workers and students engulfed the country.  Libya joined an Arab oil 
embargo on Britain and the USA, which had been announced on 6 June 1967, in an 
effort to further dampen criticism. Wright considers that the events of June 1967 were 
D ³FOHDU ZDUQLQJ WKDW WKH GD\V RI WKH PRQDUFK\ ZHUH HQGLQJ´ 7KH UHJLPH IHOW
threatened enough to later put on trial and imprison seven leaders of the oil workers 
on charges of incitement and demonstration.7 
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The Labour Government initially saw the withdrawal request as an opportunity to 
end the treaty obligation to defend Libya and to withdraw from the remaining facilities, 
but the perceived value of the relationship to British economic and training concerns 
WHPSHUHGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶V response. Ambassador Sarrell   saw the King on 22 June 
and Idris agreed that the Benghazi garrison should pull out in the autumn; Idris 
pointedly asked that the El Adem facility should remain. He regarded this as security 
for himself should he be forced to flee in the event of a revolution.8  The King replaced 
Prime Minister Maziq, who had resigned on 27 June, with Abdul Qadir al-Badri on 1 
July and a degree of order was restored. Ambassador Sarrell believed that the King 
had been eager to remove Maziq and restore confidence.9  The calmer atmosphere 
witnessed an improved tone towards the British in the Libyan media. The Arab wide oil 
embargo against the West was maintained only until the Khartoum Arab League 
Summit meeting on 27 August, which allowed Libya to resume oil exports.  At the 
conference the Libyans agreed to donate £30 million in aid to Egypt and Jordan. Libya 
commenced the shipping oil to Britain, the US and West Germany on 4 September.  
 
Improved relations were also a result of /LE\D¶V separate talks in August with 
Britain and the US on the topic of the liquidation of foreign military facilities and the 
withdrawal of forces. It was at these talks that the principle of the Benghazi withdrawal 
was accepted by the Anglo-Libyan negotiation team. In separate talks the Americans 
agreed to allow an observation group into the Wheelus Airbase, although there was to 
be no withdrawal. The remaining facilities at Tobruk and El Adem enabled the British 
to service the defence obligation and, along with the missions and joint training 
exercises, continue to promote British trade in Libya. The economic importance of the 
Anglo-Libyan relationship grew as Libyan oil exports increased and revenue made the 
country extremely wealthy.   
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At the same time British strategic contraction gathered pace as the Labour 
Government fought with economic problems at home and implemented further cuts in 
defence spending. The strategic redundancy of the Libyan military deployments was 
underlined by events during the war and Whitehall finally appeared to accept, at the 
official level, that the deployments were of no use as staging and over-flight facilities to 
the East of Suez role. 'HVSLWH:DVKLQJWRQ¶VSURWHVWDWLRQV%ULWLVKVWUDWHJLFZLWKGUDZDO
East of Suez and in Libya continued and British foreign and defence policy refocused 
upon Europe. The Foreign Office and MOD showed concern with the strategic threat 
to Libya and those regions bordering the eastern Mediterranean from the Soviet 
Union, Algeria and Egypt.  The Libyan Government also remained anxious over 
Algerian and Egyptian intentions towards 7ULSROL¶V oil but was politically and 
diplomatically vulnerable to criticism from those Arab states for being too closely 
aligned to the West. Meanwhile London sought to rebuild its political and diplomatic 
standing in the Arab world. 
120 
 
4.1 The War and Anglo-Libyan Relations  
 
In the aftermath of the June withdrawal request British officials sought to secure, 
and then subsequently rebuild the Anglo-Libyan relationship. The aim of officials was 
to maintain El Adem DQG7REUXNDQGSUHVHUYH%ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ in the country. The 
Anglo-Libyan treaty was due to expire in 1973, although the treaty would continue 
WKHUHDIWHUXQOHVVRQHRIWKHSDUWLHVJDYHD\HDU¶VQRWLFHRIXQLODWHUDODEURJDWLRQThe 
reaction to the Libyan GRYHUQPHQW¶V ZLWKGUDZDO UHTXHVW LOOXVWUDWHV WKH SUHPLXP WKH
Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence placed upon securing political advantage 
through a military presence. Officials promoted a reinterpretation of the treaty in order 
to retain this political advantage and so British interests in Libya. In contrast the initial 
reaction of the Labour Government shows the continued priority the Cabinet placed 
upon withdrawal, as part of the strategy of economic retrenchment and cuts in defence 
expenditure.  
 
The initial withdrawal request made at the height of the Six Day War appeared to 
be a Libyan Government political expedient; pandering to nationalists in Libya and a 
symbolic demonstration to other Arab governments that Libya was not in the Western 
camp. The call was initiated by Prime Minister Maziq who Ambassador Sarrell 
SHUFHLYHG KDG  SUREDEO\ FRQYLQFHG .LQJ ,GULV WR ³MHWWLVRQ WKLV EDOODVW´ RI WKH %ULWLVK
bases, to court favour with Arab states in the aftermath of the war.10  From the British 
side, withdrawal from the bases would entail cost-saving benefits which would be 
commensurate with the current strategic policy of withdrawal.  However Chiefs of Staff 
were concerned with the security implications of withdrawal.  The Libyan regime would 
be more vulnerable to external attack from Egypt and internal subversion from anti-
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government groups because the bluff of a military presence would have been 
withdrawn. 11    
 
British officials need not have been too concerned with the implications of the 
withdrawal request; the final decision on whether or not the British stayed was 
ultimately with King Idris.  From the initial request for withdrawal the Libyan position 
changed   as Idris reasserted his authority and subsequently diluted the original 
proposal in order to retain the political relationship with the British.  Idris had a tacit 
understanding with British diplomatic representatives in Libya, who were well aware of 
his need to balance an apparent independent political stance in Libya, whilst 
continuing to harbour personally strong and somewhat sentimental ties to the British. 
Ambassador Sarrell saw in the Libyan GRYHUQPHQW¶V-XQHUHTXHVWDQRSSRUWXQLW\³WR
play the same game as the King and take advantage of the situation to trim our 
dispositions in /LE\D´ ZLWKRXW JLYLQJ WKH .LQJ WKH IHHOLQJ WKDW KH ZDV EHLQJ
abandoned.12  +HVXUPLVHGWKDW³WKH.LQJLVSOD\LQJIRUWLPHDQGPD\ZHOOEDFNWUDFN
when it VXLWVKLP´DQGVXJJHVWHGWKDW³XQOLNHWKHUHZDVQRPHQWLRQRIDEURJDWLRQ
of the treaty´13 Indeed Minister of State, Suleiman Jerbi, stated that negotiations for 
withdrawal would only be a continuation of the 1964 talks.14 Ambassador Sarrell 
recommended preserving the treatyZKLOVWWDNLQJWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WRUHDSSUDLVH³WKH
justification of attempting to fulfil our defence commitment to Libya through retention of 
a British military presence´ 15  
 
SarUHOO¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHVLWXDWLRQDSSHDUHG WREHYDOLG   On 18 June Sarrell 
reported Prime Minister Maziq appearing fULHQGO\ EXW ³VRPHZKDW GHIHQVLYH and 
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apologetic and as regards the bases he seemed in no hurry having achieved his 
immediate political objectives´.  Maziq admitted that the announcement on bases had 
EHHQ PDGH ³WR KHOS WKH /LE\DQ GHOHJDWLRQ DW YDULRXV $UDE PHHWLQJV´ DQG WR FDOP
public opinion. The announcement had also enabled the regime to resist pressure for 
the rupture of Anglo-Libyan diplomatic relations and Maziq did not appear to be in any 
hurry for detailed negotiations to start.16  6DUUHOOXUJHGDVZLIW UHVSRQVH³LIZHDUH WR
safeguard our interests here´ so as to avoid further hostility in Libya and other Arab 
countries towards Britain.17   He believed that British interests could best be secured 
E\LPSURYLQJ/LE\D¶VVHFXULW\IRUFHVDQGFRXQWHUVXEYHUVLRQSROLF\ZKLOVWZLWKGUDZLQJ
from the Benghazi garrison, which only the previous year he had sought to retain. 18 
 
The Foreign Office considered WKH UHTXHVW WR EH D ³PDMRU SROLF\ LVVXH´ which 
required some deliberation. British Government policy, as outlined in the Defence 
Review of February 1966, which the Foreign Office quoted to the Ambassador, stated 
WKDW³WKHUHZLOOEHQRDWWHPSWWRPDLQWDLQGHIHQFHIDFLOLWLHVLQDQLQGHSHQGent country 
DJDLQVW LWV ZLVKHV´ 6DUUHOO ZDV EULHIHG WR VD\ WKDW ³ZH DUH SUHSDUHG WR HQWHU
immediate discussions for the application of this principle to the British military 
facilities in Libya´19  At ministerial level, preliminary discussion between Foreign 
Secretary George Brown and Defence Secretary Healey concluded with them 
agreeing that this was an opportunity for Britain to withdraw from the treaty obligation, 
saving valuable foreign exchange costs on the facilities. This approach was based on 
an interpretation that without deployments in Libya Britain could not carry out defence 
commitments, an interpretation the Chiefs of Staff endorsed. 20   In Cabinet on 20 June 
WKHYLHZZDVH[SUHVVHGWKDW³ZHVKRXOGQRWDLPDVZHZHUHGRLQJDWSUHVHQWWR
retain our forces in Libya in the hope that the situation there would become calmer 
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and the request for their removal be withdrawn, but that instead we should seize the 
opportunity to withdraw these forces quickly´ 7KH /DERXU *RYHUQPHQW WKHUHIRUH
supported a complete withdrawal from Libya. 21  
 
In contrast to the politicians, military chiefs and the Foreign Office were eager to 
stress the benefits the British enjoyed directly or indirectly through the maintenance of 
the treaty and facilities and their arguments would influence Cabinet policy. The 
Foreign Office concluded that, from the Ambassador¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ WKHGHVire to get 
out of the treaty obligations would have political and economic repercussions and 
could lead to loss of most if not all arms exports to Libya and probably a sharp drop in 
other exports. 22 The Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, Paul 
Gore-Booth advised that the policy should be played ³IDLUO\ ORQJ LQ WKH KRSH WKDW
events might develop in such a way as to enable us to retrieve something while giving 
up whatever the Libyans might continue to insist on´23   Foreign Office policy remained 
committed to maintaining the minimum required presence necessary to service the 
defence obligation; that was El Adem and Tobruk.  A Foreign Office memorandum on 
29 June 1967 summarised the British approach, which was to seek to understand the 
true nature of the Libyan request, whilst considering alternative ways of maintaining 
the treaty and privileges should the withdrawal demand be for total evacuation by 
British troops. The Foreign Office was anxious for the treaty to be retained because of 
the benefits the British secured from it. Training and RAF staging facilities were 
FRQVLGHUHG³RIYDOXH´EXW³ZKDWLVRIJUHDWHULPSRUWDQFHLVWKDWWKHWUHDW\WKHSUHVHQFH
of British forces in Libya and the existence of a substantial Libyan market for our 
exports must all be regarded as part of a whole. Without the treaty we could not 
expect Libya to look to Britain as she now does as a major source of imports´ 24  The 
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Ambassador urged retention of the 1953 treaty both for the training facilities and trade 
benefits the British obtained. Trade in 1966 included arms purchases worth £12 million 
with a £50 million contract in the offing and a general Libyan import market worth £28 
million. 25 
 
The withdrawal request also WKUHDWHQHGWRXQGHUPLQH%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHFapability in 
Libya, because total withdrawal would make military plans unworkable. British forces 
ZHUHLQ/LE\DWRVHUYH³DVDGHWHUUHQWWRVHFXUHSRLQWVRIHQWU\IRUUHLQIRUFHPHQWVWR
provide an initial screen and to hold the necessary stockpiling of heDY\HTXLSPHQW´
The British also found it necessary to liaise with the Libyan army and Cyrenaica¶V
Defence Force.  Without Tobruk and El Adem the Defence Planning Staff considered it 
was ³GLIILFXOWWRHQYLVDJHFRQWLQXRXVWUDLQLQJLQ/LE\D´ZKLFKHQDEOHGWKe British to fulfil 
their defence plan for Libya by demonstrating an effective deterrent. 26   Although the 
treaty did not specifically compel Britain to keep troops in Libya, a DOPC review of 
British forces LQ /LE\D IURP -XO\  VWDWHG ³LWV IXOILOPHQW REliges us to do so. The 
commitment under article two would be far more difficult to fulfil without our small 
garrison in Libya to secure a point of entry´ 27  Total withdrawal would also effectively 
annul the treaty as under article three the British were to be furnished with facilities to 
enable them to provide for the defence of Libya. However, tKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V 1966 
Defence Review had stated that SROLF\ZDVWRPDNHQR³DWWHPSWWRPDLQWDLQGHIHQFH
IDFLOLWLHVLQDQLQGHSHQGHQWFRXQWU\´DQGWKH³8.*overnment can only provide military 
assistance if facilities are provided´ 28     
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A withdrawal, which would XQGHUPLQH %ULWDLQ¶V DELOLW\ WR IXOILO GHIHQFH
commitments, so negating the treaty, could potentially lead to the loss of benefits 
associated with a close Anglo-Libyan relationship. Foreign Office officials were 
anxious to secure some form of guarantee that would modify the defence element of 
the treaty and recognise that ZLWKGUDZDO RI DOO IRUFHV IURP /LE\D ZDV ³LQFRPSDWLEOH
with a continuing commitment to aid LQ WKHGHIHQFHRI/LE\D´EXWZRXOGHQDEOH WKH
British to retain the benefits the treaty had secured. Specifically the Foreign Office was 
ORRNLQJIRUD³IDLUO\SUHFLVHGHILQLWLRQRIWKHOLPLWV´WRZKLFK the British would come to 
/LE\D¶V DLG in the expectation that this would exclude military aid in the event of 
outside attack.  They also suggested that the offer of equipment and technical 
assistance, IRU /LE\D¶V VHFXULW\ IRUFHV DQG DUPHG VHUYLFHV DQG DVVLVWDQFH LQ
countering subversion might be a suitable substitute.29  The ferociousness of the 
demonstrations signalled to the British that the regime was highly vulnerable to 
criticism from internal opposition, not least because they entertained a Western 
military presence. The social and economic dislocation that ensued and mounted each 
year, as a result of the conditions brought about by the receipt of oil revenues was 
exploited by Cairo in both 1964 and 1967. However, Ambassador Sarrell felt that 
Libyan youth were motivated to demonstrate not just by Egypt propaganda but also by 
a deeply felt anti-colonialism and as a reaction to the British base presence. 30 The 
student movement and trade unions played a significant role in mobilising the poor 
and those with political grievances. The defence of Libya and British interests now lay 
in bolstering the regime and reform and extension of internal security.  
 
The Ministry of Defence were also concerned with the potential damage to the 
military presence as a consequence of the Libyan request. Service Chiefs were keen 
to hold on to training rights in Libya because these also served wider defence 
priorities.  El Adem offered the only ground area in which it was practicable to carry 
out large scale training for strategic reserve units economically and under realistic 
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conditions, DQG ³LWV ORVV ZRXOG EH YHU\ VHULRXV´ %RPELQJ DQG DLU WR JURXQG ILULQJ
ranges at El Adem were considered the best available within economical reach of the 
UK, Germany and Cyprus. The desert training areas were used by the RAF V force for 
conventional low level and radar bombing. The only other available facilities were in 
Canada or Australia which were expensive alternatives. The Libyan low flying routes 
ZHUHFRQVLGHUHG³XQLTXH´ A report by the Defence Planning Staff suggested that total 
withdrawal could lead to the loss of training facilities and military missions including 
liaison with the Libyans, arms sales and unofficial after sales help. The report stated 
WKDWWKHUHZDVDQ³XUJHQWQHHGIRURXUIXWXUHSROLF\LQ/LE\DWREHGHFLGHG´although 
RQFHWKH0LGGOH(DVWFRQIOLFWUHFHGHGWKH/LE\DQVZRXOGEHOHVV³H[WUHPH´. The MOD 
left the initiative with the Foreign Office. 31   
 
On the 21 June the Foreign Office instructed Ambassador Sarrell to speak to King 
Idris and stress the link between the treaty commitment and the military deployments 
and encourage him to focus on the internal threat to his regime. They further advised 
that any discussion on HYDFXDWLRQVKRXOGILUVWGHDOZLWK%HQJKD]LEXWµWKDWZHVKRXOG
try to avoid committing ourselves on El $GHP¶ ZKLFK ZDV considered important for 
facilitating training and the defence plan. 32  
 
The British SROLF\RI³SOD\LQJLWORQJ´ZDVLQGXHFRXUVHWRVHHWKH/LE\DQSRVLWLRQ
on withdrawal change. Whilst Libyan media continued to carry Egyptian based 
propaganda throughout June, before the end of the month the King was able to 
reassert his position. The British were also able to promote a more pro- Arab image 
IROORZLQJ*HRUJH%URZQ¶V1RWWLQJKDPVSHHFK in that month which called for a lasting 
peace in the Middle East. 33  Ambassador Sarrell was able to see the King on 22 June 
and Idris agreed that the Benghazi garrison should pull out in the autumn.  Idris asked 
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that the El Adem facility be retained and he expressly requested that military exercises 
continue there in the future, probably to warn off the Egyptians from considering any 
attack.34  In essence, withdrawal in 1967 was to be a dressed up version of a pre-
planned withdrawal dating from 1965.  The Ambassador concluded that, in view of the 
King's remarks about El Adem ³KHZRXOGQRW UDLVH WKHVXEMHFWRIWKH WUHDW\´35   The 
Foreign Office believed that King Idris, who still retained ultimate authority, would 
FRQWLQXHWRGRKLVEHVW³WRDYRLGVHYHUDQFHRIWKH%ULWLVKFRQQH[LRQLQSUDFWLFH´36 
 
The Foreign Office believed the best way to preserve British interests in Libya was 
with the regime of Idris, and the 1953 treaty, to which the King was strongly attached. 
After all, the King had softened the demands of the previous withdrawal request in 
1964 and had accepted and facilitated the dropping of the subsidy. BuW %ULWDLQ¶V
political position in Libya had been endangered by the riots in Benghazi and the 
Foreign Office UHFRJQLVHGWKDWWKH/LE\DQSROLWLFDOVHWXSDOVRKDGEHHQ³EDGO\VKDNHQ´
DQG LW ZDV JRLQJ ³WR EH D long time before it recovers´ Britain was reliant on the 
JRRGZLOORIWKH.LQJZKRZDV³LQFUHDVLQJO\RXWRIWRXFKZLWKPRGHUQWUHQGVLQWKH$UDE
world´DQDFNQRZOHGJPHQW WKDW$UDE1DWLRQDOLVPSRVHGD VHULRXVSROLWLFDO WKUHDW WR
the Libyan monarchy. 37 
 
By 29 June, and at the official level, the Libyan Government had not defined which 
facilities should be withdrawn and no alteration in the treaty had been requested. The 
/LE\DQ3ULPH0LQLVWHUVHHPHGLQQRKXUU\WRSXUVXHZLWKGUDZDOV³KDYLQJDFKLHYHGKLV
immHGLDWH SROLWLFDO REMHFWLYH E\ D SXEOLF VWDWHPHQW RQ  -XQH´38 On 8 July 
Ambassador Sarrell sent a lengthy despatch to the Foreign Office with his 
interpretation of the political situation in Libya following the events of June.  Sarrell 
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warned that Britain¶V interests were under threat but strongly urged retention of the 
treaty. He considered the troop presence was counter-productive. Sarrell believed the 
treaty was the formal seal on traditional friendship rather than insurance policy against 
attack but LiE\D¶V LQWHJULW\ DQG SROLWLFDO VLWXDWLRQ KDG FKDQJHG DQG WKH VLWXDWLRQ
VHHPHG³WRPHULWIUHVKSROLWLFDOVWXG\´6DUUHOOargued WKDWWKH.LQJ¶VSROLWLFDOSRVLWLRQ
was growing weak and the main threat to British concerns and the Libyan regime was 
Egyptian subversion. Libyan youth, alienated by an unreceptive regime, was 
motivated by Egyptian propaganda, anti-colonialism and the events of the Six Day 
War. He believed that Libyan youth MXVWZDQWHG WKH%ULWLVK WR³DGDSWRXU UHODWLRQVKLS
ZLWK/LE\D´ZKLOVWWKHSUREOHPZDV³WRFRQYLQFHWKH.LQJKLPVHOIRIWKHQHHGWRWXUQKLV
attention from the frontiers to the home front´ 39  
 
Sarrell endorsed a withdrawal from Benghazi and suggested that the King be 
persuaded that the problem was not external defence but defence against subversion, 
which required improved security and reform of the Libyan political system. London, 
Sarrell believed, should be prepared to match withdrawal by an offer of advice and 
training in the field of security and counter subversion. Sarrell did not see article two of 
the treaty as an obstacle to withdrawal as it did not specify the type of defence aid the 
British should supply.  He thought that Britain was not bound specifically to military 
action in defence of Libya.  Furthermore, he believed that the Libyans would not wish 
to renegotiate; they had expressed no desire to end the treaty and there was a 
precedent for this.  In 1966 the French Government had approached the Libyans 
concerning the ten year review of the Franco-Libyan treaty of friendship, pointing out 
that certain provisions required renegotiation in view of Algerian and Tunisian 
independence. The Libyan reaction was to ask for the treaty to be left as it stood. 40   
 
Rather surprisingly Ambassador 6DUUHOO¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI WKH WUHDW\ and %ULWDLQ¶V
actual commitment was flawed. He was unaware of former British Ambassador to 
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LibyD 6LU $OHF .LUNEULGH¶V QRWH RI 29 July  ZKLFK HPSKDVLVHG WKDW %ULWDLQ¶V
commitment to defend Libya was through military assistance. Furthermore the Ministry 
of Defence FRQVLGHUHG WKDW ³DOWKRXJK LW PLJKW EH DUJXHG WKDW WKH WUHDW\ GRHV QRW
specifically compel us to keep troops in Libya, its fulfilment obliges us to do so´ 41   
 
Whilst the Foreign Office was endeavouring to maintain the treaty and British 
facilities in Libya, they GHYHORSHG WKH FRQFHSW RI D JXDUDQWHH WR VHFXUH /RQGRQ¶V
interests into an ³H[FKDQJHRIOHWWHUV´proposal should the Libyans continue to demand 
a complete withdrawal.  Such an exchange of letters would be attached to the treaty 
stating that the Britain might not be ablHWRFRPHWR/LE\D¶VDLGXQGHUDUWLFOHWZR of the 
treaty, as a result of a withdrawal. This initiative was purely speculative at the time and 
ZRXOG³GHSHQGRQWKHGHFLVLRQRIministers how much to withdraw and how much to 
leave in Libya; and in the texts of the draft notes themselves´ 42  The Ministry of 
Defence had strong reservations about any reinterpretation of the treaty; particularly 
should there be a limited withdrawal. As long as the facilities remained in Tobruk and 
El Adem the MOD were satisfied that the military plan would still be implementable.43  
El Adem and Tobruk were seen as interdependent and as points of entry if the plan for 
the defence of Libya   ever had to be implemented. The Ministry of Defence believed 
that the Libyans had not requested the termination of prime elements of the treaty 
which facilitated the British defence plan, namely regular training as well as the 
maintenance of liaison with Libyan forces secured through the naval and military 
missions.44 The loss of Benghazi was acceptable because British forces could still 
LPSOHPHQW D ³.XZDLWL VROXWLRQ´, a reference to the British intervention in Kuwait of 
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1961, with the provision of air and sea forces.  The only concern the MOD had was 
with the provision of British land forces to implement the plan, which was dependent 
on adequate warning time of a threat to Libya. The MOD considered that a proviso 
outlining this could perhaps be clarified in an exchange of letters.45 Despite this 
advised diplomatic supplement to the treaty, the Ministry of Defence feared that any 
³DWWHPSWWRUHLQWHUSUHWWKHDJUHHPHQW«PD\ZHOO MHRSDUGLVHWKHZLGHUEHQHILWVZKLFK
ZHHQMR\XQGHULW´ LQFOXGLQJWUDLQLQJDQGDUPVGHDOV46 7KH\DUJXHG³WKDWUHWHQWLRQRI
the commitment is a small price to pay if we are to avoid a risk of a loss of Libyan 
confidence´, HPSKDVLVLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI /LE\D¶V UHODWLRQV ZLWK %ULWDLQ47  The 
Ministry of Defence placed responsibility on the issue with the Foreign Office but 
³PLVMXGJLQJWKHVLWXDWLRQPD\ well rebound on the Ministry of Defence´ 48  
 
On 15 July the Ambassador met Ahmed Bishti, the Libyan Foreign Minister, who 
had already spoken with Foreign Secretary George Brown at the United Nations in 
New York between 19 and 24 June. Bishti claimed the King and Libyan GRYHUQPHQW¶V
³ILUPSROLF\´ZDV³WRPDLQWDLQWKHtreaty indefinitely in the common interests of the two 
countries´ He considered evacuation of Benghazi would EH³DJUHDWKHOSWRWKH/LE\DQ
GRYHUQPHQW´EXWGLGQRWZLVKWRKXUU\WKH%ULWLVK*overnment.49  After considering the 
Ambassador¶V despatch, Ministry of Defence views and the /LE\DQ 3ULPH0LQLVWHU¶V
appreciation of the treaty, the Foreign Office believed it would be best to leave the 
question of renegotiation of the treaty defence commitment and any further 
withdrawals until British forces were out of Benghazi. Furthermore it would also be 
best to try to persuade Idris that the requirement for British troops to protect Libya 
frontiers was no longer realistic and to match a withdrawal by an offer of advice and 
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training to Libyan security forces.50  The Foreign Office concluded that renegotiation, 
particularly of article two, was probably not a good idea as the treaty, in its original 
form, continued to have symbolic force and value as a formal seal on traditional 
friendship and this also had significance from the point of view of Egyptian 
perceptions.51   
 
A renegotiation of the treaty seemed less likely by the end of July as the political 
situation inside Libya calmed and Anglo-Libyan political relations began to improve.  
British goods were now handled in ports (although British flag ships were not yet being 
accepted) and the Libyan authorities had rounded up anti-government protestors, 
imprisoning a thousand people in Tripoli over offences related to the events of June.  
Libyan Prime Minister al-%DGUL¶Vgovernment was also appreciative on the line adopted 
by the British regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, which presented a more positive 
image of Britain in Libya. The British diplomatic community in Libya believed that the 
Libyans had calmed dissent in the country and answered Arab criticism by demanding 
withdrawal of British forces. In private the Libyan Government were happy to retain the 
political benefits the treaty relationship offered them with a continued British military 
base presence.  Abdul Qadir al-Badri claimed that withdrawal from Benghazi would be 
a great help as the Libyans would be attending an Arab Summit Conference in 
Khartoum in August. 52 
 
The Libyan Government announced on 20 July that a joint Anglo-Libyan 
Committee on the liquidation and withdrawal of British forces in Libya would meet on 1 
August in Benghazi.53  These talks would be focused on the Benghazi facility, as other 
base withdrawals had not been defined. Wakefield, Counsellor and Consul General at 
the Benghazi Embassy believed the basic element of the negotiations was the date for 
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withdrawal of the armoured regiment in Benghazi and predicted there was ³no 
indication that the Libyans will press for earlier withdrawal than we have been 
contemplating (in the 1966 Defence Review) but they are keen on announcing quickly 
a timetable for the handover of the camps in order to convince the public that things 
are moving´ Badri hoped the British   would arrange to leave at their own 
convenience.54 The Libyans also announced that a Libyan-US negotiation team were 
to meet to discuss the Wheelus base on 10 August.  
 
At DOPC on 28 -XO\  /RQGRQ¶V SRVLWLRQ UHJDUGLQJ the forthcoming 
negotiations was considered. A memorandum was presented by Foreign Secretary 
George Brown which urged probing the Libyans to establish their true intentions, 
limiting the first round of negotiations to discussion of Benghazi only and leaving the 
issue of El Adem and Tobruk until the next round, when the British would be in a 
better position to assess Libyan objectives. The formal reinterpretation of the treaty 
issue was to be entertained   only if the Libyans were to press for the removal of all 
facilities.55  The memorandum therefore assumed a continued British presence in El 
Adem and Tobruk, based on a need to keep the confidence of the King, training rights 
and trade preferences. The defence commitment would remain unchanged.56  At the 
same time it was considered important to secure the regime by persuading Idris that 
/LE\D¶VLQWHJULW\QHHGHG first to be safe-guarded by Libyan security forces, and that the 
UHTXLUHPHQWIRU%ULWLVKWURRSVWRSURWHFW/LE\D¶VIURQWLHUZDVQRORQJHUUHDOLVWLF,WZDV
concluded that a major effort to encourage the King and the Libyan Government to 
tackle the problems of internal subversion and winning popular confidence would   
help to ensure the maintenance of a moderate and pro-Western regime after Idris' 
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death.57 This policy was to be implemented through the building up of the Libyan 
defence forces.58   
 
The scale of the anti Western protests had undermined British faith in the long term 
future of the Idris regime. Whilst the removal of the facility at Benghazi would benefit 
the Libyan monarchy from the perspective of the Libyan pHRSOH %URZQ¶V
memorandum also recognised that the Benghazi withdrawal would benefit British 
interests sometime in the future if a new, possibly pro-Nasserite, nationalist republican 
regime were to wrest power from the mRQDUFK\%ULWDLQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWZDVGue to end 
after 1973 and the memorandum concluded that ZKLOVW³WKH/LE\DQVKDYHDOUHDG\VDLG
they would like to continue it indefinitely we can clearly not keep our commitment for 
longer that the minimum necessary and PXVW XVH WKH WLPH´ WR EROVWHU WKH UHJLme.59  
The DOPC approved the line taken by Brown in the memorandum.60  
 
At the negotiations in August it was immediately apparent that the Libyans did not 
wish to take the discussions too far, and were only empowered to discuss Benghazi.  
On 31 July the Libyan team expressed a hope that the British would not raise any 
question of the treaty or of withdrawal from the Tobruk and El Adem area. 61  The King, 
having now gained the political upper hand in the country had wanted to reverse the 
withdrawal request, but ZDV³SHUVXDGHGWROHWWKHGHFLVLRQVWDQGRQWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
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that the request concerned the Benghazi garrison only´62 The British put forward a six 
month timetable for withdrawal and by 4 August both sides had agreed in principle on 
the withdrawal of British units in Benghazi over the following months.63  
 
A continued British presence at El Adem was not raised during the negotiations. 
7KH'23&RQ-XO\KDGUHVROYHGWR³SUREH´WKH/LE\DQVLQWHQWLRQVIRUEl Adem after 
Benghazi was dealt with, but on 12 August Wakefield warned it was not a good time to 
open up the subject of El Adem³7KH/LE\DQVDSSHDUMXVWDVZDU\RIVWLUULQJXSWKDW
KRUQHW¶VQHVWDVZHRXUVHOYHVDUH´64   In fact on 18 August the majority view in the 
Libyan cabinet showed support for a continued British presence in El Adem and 
Tobruk, not least as a result of fears over Algerian territorial ambitions in Tripolitania.65  
Ambassador Sarrell on 21 August confirmed that the Libyans accepted a continued 
military presence in Tobruk and El Adem and they were agreeable to the stationing 
there of an armoured car squadron, as outlined in the 1966 Defence Review.66 
 
By early September the talks themselves had not formally ended but having 
agreed to the withdrawal from Benghazi and secured the continued facility at El Adem 
and Tobruk as the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence hoped, Ambassador Sarrell 
concluded that the negotiations for withdrawal should be allowed to expire. The 
Foreign Office agreed that the question of withdrawal from El Adem should not be 
raised. The Anglo-Libyan Committee was to meet only as and when required.67
 
The 
Ambassador indicated that the political repercussions of continuing negotiations would 
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be negative: ³,WLVFOHDUWKDWWRVXJJHVWZLWKGUDZDOIURPEl Adem now would produce a 
sharp and possibly bitter reaction on the part of the King and the Prime Minister´ 
6DUUHOOVDZWKH³SHQGXOXP´DVVZLQJLQJEDFNIDVWLQ%ULWDLQ¶VIDYRXUdue to a perceived   
increasing threat from Algeria to Libyan security. 68   
 
By September 1967 the British appeared to have achieved their political aims in 
Libya: to withdraw from Benghazi but to maintain a military presence at El Adem. The 
treaty DQG%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQwere intact.  Following a Libyan request the British also 
agreed to maintain the missions. Ambassador Sarrell was particularly keen in the 
summer that the missions be instructed to play a fuller role in the technical 
development of the Libyan armed forces although the Libyan army appeared to show 
little inclination to train.69 London considered that they had not yet persuaded the King 
that it was no longer realistic for British troops to protect Libya and that the Libyans 
should take responsibility for their own defence, although Tripoli was ³taking active 
steps´LQLPSURYLQJWKHLURZQVHFXrity.70  Labour PLQLVWHUV¶HQWKXVLDVPIRUZLWKGUDZLQJ
from the treaty commitment and so reducing overseas expenditure had been 
tempered by Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence interests in preserving training 
and trade preferences.  George Brown was still concerned by the expense involved in 
PDLQWDLQLQJ WKH UHPDLQLQJ IDFLOLWLHVDW(O$GHP +H LQTXLUHGDERXW ³Kow permanent 
are the works we are proposing? He (the King) is after all old and ill, is he not? Have 
we looked ahead of this"´  Brown was assured that the building works were in any 
FDVH ³GHPRXQWDEOH´ DQG FRXOG EH WDNHQ DZD\ ZKHQ WKH %ULWLVK ILnally withdrew, so 
saving on the costs of building a permanent facility.71 
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Operation Bordon, the rundown of the Benghazi garrison, was completed on 3 
February 1968. The action benefitted from the easing of tension in the Arab world and 
the withdrawal was in a ³VPRRWKDQGJRRGKRQRXUHG IDVKLRQ´72 The remaining units 
were deployed at Tobruk and El Adem which left the final British facilities in Libya as 
one infantry company, one armoured reconnaissance squadron, and one vehicle 
company and associated equipment stockpile. This force amounted to 400 ranks. The 
recent negotiations did not affect the size of the RAF garrison which maintained the 
staging post and bombing range at El Adem; the force amounting to 785 ranks.  The 
military mission consisted of 45 personnel and the naval mission at Tripoli numbering 
22 personnel to advise and assist in matters concerning the formation, development, 
equipment and training of the Libyan army and navy.73  In February 1968 Wakefield 
FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH %ULWLVK PRYH IURP %HQJKD]L ³KDs probably assisted the Libyan 
Government to surviYH´ DFWLQJ DV D ³VPRNHVFUHHQ´ ZKLOVW EHLQJ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK
Government policy on bases.74   
 
London remained aware of the sensitive nature of the remaining facilities for the 
Idris regime.  Restraint was urged when communicating the nature of the move to El 
Adem³LWVLPSOLFDWLRQVRISURORQJHGWHQXUHVKRXOGEHGHOD\HGDVORQJDVFRQYHQLHQW
and particularly until after the Arab summit conference where the question of the 
liquidation of all military bases appeared prominently on the agenda´75  The Foreign 
2IILFH GLG QRW ZDQW WR ³HQFRXUDJH SUHVV LQWHUHVW LQ RXU UHGHSOR\PHQW LQ &\UHQDLFD
particularly as it affects El Adem DQG 7REUXN´ DQG ZDQWHG LW GHVFULEHG DV D
redeployment exercise. The squadron was in effect taking the place at El Adem of an 
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infantry company brought in from Malta the previous June.76  The Foreign Office did 
not want to damage the image of the KinJDQGKLVJRYHUQPHQWE\GUDZLQJ³attention to 
the difference between the public utterances and private assurances of the Libyans´77  
The Libyan Government also requested that a resumption of training in Cyernaican go 
unpublicized for fear of drawing attention to the continued Western involvement in 
Libya so soon after the Six Day War. 78  
 
In conclusion British diplomats were satisfied with the outcome of the 1967 
withdrawal negotiations. Wakefield believed it was ³UHPDUNDEOH IRU ZKDW KDV QRW
KDSSHQHG´7KHCyrenaicans raised no protest, many seeing it as inevitable and not in 
/LE\D¶V LQWHUHVWV IRU WKH %ULWDLQ WR VWD\ 7KHUH ZDV QR VLJQ RI QDWLRQDOLVW WULXPSK RU
demand for further withdrawal, but this was aided by a muzzled Libyan media. 79 
Ambassador Sarrell FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH ZLWKGUDZDO ZDV DQ ³XQTXDOLILHG SROLWLFDO
success´ 80    Looking to the future, WakefiHOGEHOLHYHGWKDW   ³Whe Libyan authorities 
are prepared to do much to cooperate with the British and particularly with the army 
with whom they have enjoyed such a long and close relationship´ At the heart of this 
remained, untouched, the treaty. Wakefield termed the absence of a reference to the 
treaty during the negotiations, DVWKH³GRJWKDWIDLOHGWRELWH´.81   Sarrell considered the 
treaty was importDQW LQ UHWDLQLQJ .LQJ ,GULV¶ FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH IULHQGVKLS ZLWK WKH
British; a friendship that gave the British preferences in trade and commercial affairs. 
This economic consideration was to have continuing influence upon British policy.82
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4.2 Anglo-Libyan Economic Relations 
 
The economic implications of the Anglo-Libyan relationship had a profound 
influence upon policy making from 1967.  The importance of maintaining and 
developing British trade with Libya was considered vital bearing in mind the poor 
health of the British economy. During the 1960s there was a growing preoccupation 
ZLWK%ULWDLQ¶VRYHUVHDVWUDGHSRVLWLRQin Whitehall, which led to an emphasis on raising 
the status of commercial diplomacy and export promotion in the diplomatic service. 83  
In 1962 Harold Macmillan appointed the Plowden Committee on Representational 
Service Overseas partly as a result of this economic consideration, as well as there 
being a pressing need to revise the structure of British diplomatic representation given 
the changing QDWXUHRI%ULWDLQ¶VZRUOG-wide presence as independence was granted to 
colonial possessions. The 1964 Plowden Committee Report recognised that British 
representation should ³EHJLYHQVSHFLDOWUDLQLQJIRUHFRQRPLFDQGFRPPHUFLDOZRUN´84 
Its report (Cmnd. 2276) led also to the merger of the Foreign, Commonwealth and 
Trade Commission Services into the Diplomatic Service on 1 January 1965.  
 
%ULWDLQ¶V HFRQRPLF stake in Libya remained focused upon two aspects of the 
FRXQWU\¶V recent development. Firstly, Libyan oil continued to grow in significance to 
the British economy. Libyan oil supplies were of a high quality and situated to the west 
and therefore away from the strategically vulnerable Suez Canal that Gulf exports 
moved through.  The Biafran war in Nigeria from July 1967 VKRZHG³KRZYXOQHUDEOHRLO
VXSSOLHV HYHQ IURP RXWVLGH WKH 0LGGOH (DVW FRXOG EH´ VR D /LE\DQ VRXUFH ZDV
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important.85  Libyan exports of oil to Britain grew enormously at a time when demand 
from industry boomed and oil-fired central heating replaced coal as a domestic energy 
source. Additionally, crude oil imports to Britain grew to supply the demand from 
%ULWDLQ¶V H[SDQGHG UHILQLQJ FDSDFLW\ ZKLFK FRQVHTXHQWO\ benefited the economy.  
Libyan oil exports benefited from relatively cheap oil prices at the time. 86  As a result 
the oil industry grew so rapidly that by 1969 it had become the largest producer in the 
world. Total exports had jumped from $11 million in 1960 to $1.168 billion in 1967 and 
99% of this was from oil. 87  Output of oil increased from 20,000 barrels per day in 
1960 to almost three million barrels per day in 1969. The oil driven boom propelled per 
capita income in Libya from around $60 per annum in 1960 to $2000 by 1970, with the 
Libyan economy growing at an annual rate in excess of 20%.88   
 
%ULWDLQ¶V VHFRQG HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVW in Libya centred on the enormous trade and 
commercial opportunities which were a consequence of the Libyan oil bonanza. In 
Libya imports from Britain grew steadily as oil production increased and demand for 
imports grew. British exports to the country increased from £12.7 million in 1960 to 
£43.2 million in 1969 whilst Libyan exports to Britain saw an increase from £0.7 million 
in 1960 to £151.6 million in 1969 mainly as a result of oil exports.89  The British 
Government sought to exploit /LE\D¶V WUDGLQJ SRWHQWLDO for the benefit of an ailing 
British economy, particularly through the sale of military hardware.   
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Commercial opportunities in Libya were also significant to policy makers for two 
other reasons. Firstly, they complemented British defence and foreign policy as the 
British sought to wean the Idris regime away from the security guarantee of the treaty, 
whilst securing a pro-Western government through sales of military hardware. 
Secondly, British policy in Libya was also part of a larger goal of seeking to maintain 
and develop global economic and trade interests and one target area for development 
was the oil producing Arab nations of the Middle East.  The Libyan market was tied to 
the Middle Eastern trade environment   because it was an Arab country and relations 
with the mRQDUFK\ PLUURUHG DQG KDG D EHDULQJ RQ %ULWDLQ¶V UHODWLRQV ZLWK RWKHU
conservative Arab countries.  The Middle East was already a valuable trading market 
for Britain as it was a growing exporter of oil to the West and a valuable importer of 
arms.   
 
The events of June 1967 led to an Arab oil producers' partial embargo against both 
Britain and the US for their support of Israel, as well as the closure of the Suez Canal, 
which resulted in a worldwide shortage of shipping and dealt a EORZ WR %ULWDLQ¶V
balance of payments. This was particularly disturbing given that during the summer of 
1967 unemployment rose in Britain and the trade gap increased. The embargo, 
imposed following the Baghdad Conference of ministers of Petroleum and Economic 
Affairs in June called for the cutting off of oil supplies to any country believed to be 
giving aid directly or indirectly to Israel, and was widely supported by Libyan oil 
workers. Speculation grew as to whether sterling would be devalued. Matters were not 
helped by the threat to oil production from the civil war in Nigeria. However the British 
economy managed to survive through 1967. This was partly due to the fact that the oil 
export ban to the West was rescinded at the Khartoum conference at the end of 
August after Arab oil producers recognised that it hurt them more than the West to not 
produce and sell oil. For example, the cost of the 1967 embargo to the Libyan regime 
was high and led to a loss of £1.5 million per day. However, once the oil embargo was 
lifted the Libyans were able to sell 10% more oil to Britain in 1967 and then a rise of 
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over 135% in 1968, when Libya became the largest Middle Eastern oil exporter to 
Britain, just surpassing Kuwait. 90 
 
British Middle Eastern trade recovered rapidly after the Six Day War. By 1970 
exports to the Middle East accounted for 5.76% and imports from 7.96% of British 
trade. In 1970 the trade imbalance was PLOOLRQLQWKH0LGGOH(DVW¶VIDYRXUDVD
result of British oil imports which grew from £347.1 million in 1965 to £624.6 million in 
1970. Invisible financial and commercial trade with the Middle East had a favourable 
influence on the balance of payments and British investment in the Middle East was 
high, almost entirely in oil exploration and development. From the 1960s Kuwait and 
Abu Dhabi also started to invest heavily in Britain.  After devaluation in 1967 the 
greater purchasing power of oil rich Middle East states offered opportunities for 
greater British sales, particularly in arms, and as a result exports grew. 91 
 
Returning to Libya, with the enormous growth in oil production and resultant wealth 
the British sought to exploit trading opportunities in the country. In 1967 there had 
EHHQDVL]HDEOHDQG³LPSUHVVLYH´%ULWLVKSUHVHQFHDWWKHannual Libyan trade fair held 
at Tripoli in March, attended by Lord Walston, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary to 
the Board of Trade. 92  A British commercial centre was opened in Libya in May 1967 
to promote trade. British commercial work in Libya was spearheaded by diplomatic 
representation throughout the country.  Both the Consul General and the Head of 
Chancery at the British embassies in Tripoli and Benghazi were responsible for 
contacts with government departments on the commercial front. British business 
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visitors and day-to-day commercial work was handled at the lower level. The British 
maintained two embassies in Libya, at Benghazi and Tripoli, partly out of practicality. 
The main task of the embassies was to keep in touch with ministers of the 
government, who tended to move about the country on a triangular course between 
Tripoli, Benghazi and Beida, without prior announcement, often giving Embassy staff 
the impression that they were trying to avoid contact and decision making. Detailed 
knowledge of the movements of ministers was necessary if the work of the embassies 
was to be accomplished. Commercial work in Libya was therefore notoriously difficult 
to execute and this was compounded by understaffing and the almost byzantine 
complexities of negotiating with the monarchy. 93 
 
The same problems were encountered concerning oil development. Ivor Lucas, 
First Secretary and Head of Chancery in Tripoli FODLPHGWKH/LE\DQVKDG³TXLWHFOHYHU
people who were planning to spend a lot of the oil money on development and not just 
ZDVWHLWRQVRSKLVWLFDWHGZHDSRQU\´EXW³WKHPaFKLQHUHDOO\ZRUNHGWRRVORZO\´7ULEDO
lands and intricate negotiations caused delays for the constructions of pipelines and 
led the BP General Manager John Haines, as reported by First Secretary and Head of 
Chancery, Tripoli, Ivor /XFDVWRSOHDGWR.LQJ,GULV³Your Majesty, during the War II I 
was a prisoner in Tobruk, a prisoner of the Germans. I spent a great deal of time and 
effort trying to find ways of getting out of Tobruk. I never dreamed that, all these years 
later, I would be equally frustrated trying to find ways in again´ Apparently the King 
was so amused by this that obstacles for that particular project were lifted. 94 
 
Given economic developments in Britain and Libya by the summer of 1967 it is 
hardly surprising that British policy towards the Libyan withdrawal request showed a 
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marked concern with trade. The critical issue raised by the withdrawal request was 
that total withdrawal would undermine BritDLQ¶V Wreaty obligation under article two to 
defend Libya in the event of an attack, because it would remove the facilities essential 
to implementing the defence plan and so the treaty would become void. The treaty 
was considered by the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence to be of particular 
economic value because it enabled the British to maintain military missions, which 
were valuable for maintaining arms sales in the growing Libyan market. Furthermore, 
total withdrawal threatened the training rights the British enjoyed in the Libyan desert, 
which enabled them to work with the Libyan military and promote and provide after 
sales care for arms sales. The British Ambassador continued to stress his concerns 
that the Libyans had been reluctant to exercise over recent years and was eager to 
UHYLWDOLVHWKHPLOLWDU\PLVVLRQV¶HQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKH/LE\DQDUP\95 
 
In June 1967 tKH)RUHLJQ2IILFHµVSHUFHSWLRQRI British interests in Libya was that, 
whilst the training and staging facilities were of great value,  
 
³ZKDW LVRIJUHDWHU LPSRUWDQFH LV WKDW WKH WUHDW\ WKHSUHVHQFHRI%ULWLVKEDVHV LQ
Libya and the existence of a substantial Libyan market for our exports (which) must all 
be regarded as part of a whole. Without the treaty we could not expect Libya to look to 
Britain as she now does as a major source of imports´96  
 
7KHDVVXPSWLRQZDVWKDWWKHPLOLWDU\IDFLOLWLHVZHUHOLQNHG³ZLWKWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQRI
RXU LQWHUHVWV´ DQG ZLWhdrawals by British forces would make it more difficult to sell 
British arms to Libyan forces. The military and naval  missions ³in practice act as 
SURPRWHUVRIWKHVHFRQVLGHUDEOHVDOHV´DQG³LWVHHPVWKHUHIRUHLPSRrtant to retain as 
much of the treaty and military agreement as serves our interests and to ensure the 
missions themselves remain´97 Specifically, it was concluded that a termination of 
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%ULWDLQ¶V treaty obligations would lead to loss of most, if not all arms exports to Libya 
and a sharp drop in other exports.98  The Ministry of Defence also concurred with this 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ³ZLthdrawal of British forces will inevitably make it more difficult to sell 
%ULWLVKDUPVWRWKH/LE\DQIRUFHV´DQGDEURJDWLRQof the treaty would jeopardise further 
arms sales. 99  
 
The Labour Government¶VSUHVVLQJFRQFHUQZLWK%ULWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLFSUHGLFDPHQW 
overseas expenditure and the commitment to carrying out the 1966 Defence Review 
requirements meant ministers were initially eager to accede to the Libyans¶GHPDQGV
for withdrawal but even this position was tempered by trade considerations.  Whilst 
George Brown and Denis Healey had concluded that the Libyan request was an 
opportunity to get out of the treaty obligations, Healey thought it important that Britain 
should conduct themselves in as friendly a fashion as possible to the Libyans as he 
KRSHG³WRFRQtinue our profitable sales to Libya estimated at £100 million pounds in 
military orders over the next four years´ 100  
 
However ministers were to be influenced by the economic benefits associated with 
the deployments. The Foreign Office urged a sympathetic approach to Libyan 
concerns VR WKDW DQ\ ZLWKGUDZDOV %ULWDLQ PDGH GLG ³QRW XQGXO\ SUHMXGLFe our real 
FRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVWV´. 101   Within the Ministry of Defence a report on WKH³,PSOLFDWLRQV
RI WKH OLTXLGDWLRQ RI 8. EDVHV LQ /LE\D´ E\ WKH 'HIHQFH 3ODQQLQJ 6WDff in late June 
FRQFOXGHGWKDW³DFRPSOHWHZLWKGUDZDORI%ULWLVKDQG86IRUFHVZRXOGOHDYHDYDFXXP
LQ/LE\D´DQGWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ(J\SWDQG$OJHULDFRXOGH[SORLW WKHFRPPHUFLDODQG
economic situation with offers of arms and technicians and training missions. The 
Chiefs of Staff were content that a partial withdrawal to El Adem and Tobruk would 
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enable the British to maintain arms sales and training facilities but these would be lost 
with a total withdrawal.  The link between the Anglo-Libyan treaty, British training 
rights, missions and trade was heavily emphasised in the report.  Naval and military 
missions DFWHG DV H[SRUW SURPRWHUV RIIHULQJ ³XQRIILFLDO DIWHU VDOHV VHUYLFH´102  The 
Chiefs of Staff urged the strengthening of paragraphs in the report on the benefits of 
training and arms sales brought about through the military presence. 103 
 
When British policy on withdrawal was considered at DOPC on 28 July 1967 the 
memorandum presented by Foreign Secretary George Brown stressed trade 
considerations and opportunities for the British to sell arms to the Libyans. The paper 
accepted that the British should attempt to remain in El Adem, not only to keep the 
confidence of the King but to secure training rights and export preferences, whilst 
leaving the commitment unchanged. In order to preserve the regime and BritDLQ¶V
position it ZDVVXJJHVWHGWKDW/LE\D¶VLQWHJULW\QHHGHGILUVWWREHVDIH-guarded by her 
RZQ VHFXULW\ IRUFHV  DQG WKDW WKH UHTXLUHPHQW IRU %ULWLVK WURRSV WR SURWHFW /LE\D¶V
IURQWLHU¶V ZDV QR ORQJHU UHalistic, thus opening the way for  greater arms sales to 
strengthen the regime.  Finally it was necessary to agree, if the Libyans wished, to 
retain the British military and naval missions LQ/LE\DZKLFK³SOD\HGDYDOXDEOHSDUWLQ
furthering arms sales´104  
 
Within Libya Brigadier A.R.E Davis head of the Benghazi military mission was 
actually frustrated by what he saw as slow progress in procuring arms sales. He 
believed the Libyans regarded the mission personnel as spies and would often behave 
pettily towards the British. Davis also felt the Libyan army was operational inefficient, 
the officers possessed of low morale and generally apathetic.105 Ambassador Sarrell 
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considered Davis was ³WHPSHUDPHQWDOO\ LOO VXLWHG WR«FDMROLQJ WKH /LE\DQ DUP\ LQWR
improving its lRZVWDQGDUGRIHIILFLHQF\´106 Davis reportedly insulted Arab sensibilities 
E\ULGLQJDURXQGLQDERUURZHG/LE\DQVWDIIFDUZLWKKLVGRJVDQG³OROOLQJEDFNZLWKKLV
IHHWXS´107 Davis was replaced later in the year when large arms sales were being 
secured.108 His replacement, Brigadier Warren had an equally difficult posting. He was 
noted for his interference in matters beyond his military remit, his pedantic nature and 
his ability to upset Libyan colonels. The Libyan Minister of Defence Abaidi was 
particularly FRQFHUQHGE\:DUUHQ¶V³LOO-MXGJHGSROLWLFDOJRVVLS´DERXWWKH³%ULWLVKEHLQJ
JRRGDWWUDLQLQJUHYROXWLRQDU\RIILFHUV´109 
 
 Returning to the question of withdrawal, the events of June 1967, in Libya and the 
Arab world, also indicated that a limited withdrawal was of benefit to maintaining 
/RQGRQ¶Veconomic interests in the country.  The Ambassador concluded: ³WKHLQWHUQDO
political considerations in Libya and her relationship to the rest of the Arab world have 
now reached the point where we no longer gain, and indeed put at risk the valuable 
economic interest in the country by attempting to retain military forces in Libya at their 
current level´110 
 
In the event the British agreed to a withdrawal from Benghazi during August 1967.  
British troops remained at El Adem and Tobruk, military missions were maintained and 
as a result trading interests were consolidated.  By the end of 1967 the British position 
in Libya was re-secured and trade was IORXULVKLQJ  7KH )RUHLJQ 2IILFH¶V /LE\DQ
Annual Review suggested at the end of 1967 that:  
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 ³:HHQGWKH\HDUZLWKUHTXHVWVIRUDGYLFHWUDLQLQJDQGDGYLVRUVKLJKHUWKDQHYHU
with our prestige enhanced by the British resolution on the Middle East at the Security 
Council; with confidence in British consultants growing and their employment at a high 
level; with 100 British teachers working in Libya and many requests for additional staff; 
with arms orders signed´111   
 
1RUPDO H[SRUW WUDGH ZDV SURPLVLQJ WR ULYDO ¶V ILJXUHV The annual review of 
Anglo-Libyan relations claimed that ³WKH PDUNHW IRU %ULWLVK JRRGV DQG SDUWLFXODUO\
services such as consultancy is excellent; the Libyans well disposed to us and the 
demand expanding´ 112   
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4.3 %ULWDLQ¶VStrategic Policy 
  
%ULWDLQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRDQ(DVWRI6XH] defence role came under further pressure 
as financial hardship strained British capabilities during the late 1960s.  The Labour 
Government continued to struggle with the economy and the balance of payments 
deficit, caused in part by high defence expenditure and subsequent attacks on sterling 
by investors.  :LOVRQ¶V *RYHUQPHQW KDG DWWHPSWHG WR DOLJQ IRUHLgn and defence 
commitments within tight budgetary constraints but by early 1967 economic problems 
persisted and unemployment rose.  In March George Brown and Denis Healey stated 
that cuts in force levels and the maintenance of commitments were found to be 
XQWHQDEOH 7KH ZKROH LVVXH RI %ULWDLQ¶V JOREDO SROLF\ QRZ FDPH WR WKH IRUH ,Q D
Cabinet memorandum by Brown and Healey on the 31 of that month it was stated that 
³Ior the health of ouUHFRQRP\ZHPXVWFKDQJHRXURYHUVHDVSROLFLHV´ZLWKWKHIRFXV
being on reductions in South East Asia as well as the Mediterranean. 113 
 
The expensive East of Suez strategy was no longer economically viable for the 
Labour Government, simultaneously committed to NATO and maintaining an 
expensive independent nuclear deterrent whilst financing social welfare programmes 
promoted by the Left of the party.114  Capabilities had been cut and now commitments 
were to be further reduced as British defence strategy moved from the traditional 
Empire and Commonwealth areas of interest to an emphasis on Western Europe and 
the Atlantic. The Defence Expenditure Studies report by the DOPC Official Committee, 
approved by ministers on 3 July 1967 stated that: ³E\ WKHPLGV ZH Vhall have 
FHDVHG WRSOD\DZRUOGZLGHPLOLWDU\ UROH«ZHVKDOO LQFUHDVLQJO\EHFRPHD(XURSHDQ
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power; and our international influence will depend more and more on the soundness 
of our economy, rather than on our maintenance of a military presence in the rest of 
the world´115  The report suggested that the security of Britain would depend upon the 
prevention of war in Europe and the focus of British defence policy would be on 
contributing to NATO; this was particularly relevant as political and economic relations 
with Europe grew closer  and  the Wilson Government actively sought another 
application to the Common Market in late 1967. Europe offered Britain the chance to 
revitalise and reinvent itself. Alison Parr considers that the Labour Government 
believed an enlarged Europe, empowered by a strengthened technological base, 
would act as the platform for the exerFLVHRI%ULWDLQ¶VSRZHU.116  Hughes claims that 
Labour ³EDFN-benchers, both from the Left and the pro-((&OREE\UHJDUGHGWKH³ZRUOG
UROH´ DV DQ XQVXVWDLQDEOH IDQWDV\´ ZKLOH WKHUH ZDV DQ LQIOXHQWLDO OREE\ ZLWKLQ WKH
Foreign Office encouraging a more Eurocentric approach to external policy. Wilson 
and Healey displayed a greater interest in pursuing a European course for Britain after 
1966 whilst George Brown had urged during the 1966 sterling crisis the withdrawal of 
troops from East of Suez. The appointment of Roy Jenkins as Chancellor in December 
1967 played an important role in shifting British foreign and defence policy thereafter 
away from the East of Suez role.117 
 
7KH ³-XO\ 6WXGLHV 5HSRUW concluded that Britain would have left Singapore, 
Malaysia and the Persian Gulf by the mid 1970V 5HPDLQLQJ ³RXW RI (XURSH´
FRPPLWPHQWV ZRXOG EH VWULFWO\ FRQFHUQHG ZLWK ³GLVFKDUJLQJ UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV WR
dependent territorieV´FDUU\ing out the limited commitments to SEATO and CENTO, 
meeting ³PRUDO REOLJDWLRQV to Australia and NeZ =HDODQG´ DQG FRQWULEXWLQJ to 
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international peace-keeping and to other Allied operations in order to maintain 
³JHQHUDO:HVWHUQLQWHUHVWV´ It was accepted that BritDLQZRXOGKDYH³JRQHDORQJZD\´ 
towards renouncing its commitment to CENTO following a planned withdrawal from 
the Gulf States.118 However DOPC members were emphatic about keeping the 
CENTO commitment to the defence of Iran because of the importance of oil supplies 
from there to Britain and the need to deter Soviet threats.  This decision did not secure 
the strategic role of El Adem for CENTO, as El Adem was only of value to the CENTO 
route for shorter range transport aircraft and for certain contingency plans for Africa 
which needed to stage there.119  Furthermore the Chiefs of Staff in June 1967 agreed 
that there was little strategic value in the facilities given the withdrawal from Aden and 
the continuation of the Sudanese restrictions.120 The CENTO obligation meant the 
Cyprus bases would be retained and Britain would still retain some air and naval 
facilities in Malta, although the Maltese defence agreement would expire in 1974.  
 
The Supplementary Statement on Defence Policy of 18 -XO\  ³revised 
commitments and facility plans in the light of British policy to encourage indigenous 
developments to enable the withdrawal of British forces from the Far East and the 
Middle East´  The paper took into account political events, including those in the 
Middle East since the June 1967 crisis and economic concerns.  There was now a 
³SUHVVLQJQHHGWRUHGXFHRYHUVHDVH[SHQGLWXUH´GXHWRD³VORZHUUDWHRIJURZWK³DQG
³FRQVHTXHQWQHFHVVLW\ WRNHHSJRYHUQPHQWH[SHQGLWXUHDV ORZ DV SRVVLEOH´121  The 
statement acknowledged that the full East of Suez commitment was no longer tenable 
and provided for its scaling down.  
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As well as economic considerations, the events of the Six Day War had had 
LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU %ULWDLQ¶V ZLGHU VWUDWHJLF SROLF\ DV ZHOO DV WKH VLJQLILcance of military 
facilities, including those in Libya. The War provided an LOOXVWUDWLRQRI%ULWDLQ¶V0LGGOH
East impotence, as it was unable to keep the peace politically or militarily, despite 
expenditure on bases and infrastructure in the Mediterranean, Libya and the Gulf.  
British and Western policy, which aimed to maintain free production and transit of oil 
from the Arab world, had not been achieved. Military facilities appeared to serve little 
strategic purpose; a redundancy identified in other deployments in Aden, Simonstown 
and Singapore. 122  The value of facilities also appeared politically unsustainable given 
the depth of reaction to them, particularly in Libya. The riots in Benghazi and Tripoli, 
which Vandewalle claims were also an expression of popular frustration with the 
regime, emphasised the vulnerability of facilities as a focus of discontent not just 
against the ruling authorities but Western interference.123  Bartlett states that the Six 
Day War  demonstrated the irrelevance of British forces either in the context of the 
defence of specific British interests, such as an assured flow of oil, or the exercise of 
British influence in the crisis.124 By the 1960s there were also ³JURZLQJ GRXEWV
...whether force was still relevant to the defence of ecoQRPLFLQWHUHVWV´DQGLWEHFDPH
a widely held view that military facilities had become outdated and anachronistic.125  
Michael Dockrill points out that the Six Day War undermined the usefulness of 
%ULWDLQ¶VRYHUVHDVUROHDVDPHDQVRIGHIHQGLQJKHUFRPPHUFLDO ties.126  Frankel notes 
³DVWKHPLOLWDU\EDVHVWXUQHGIURPDVVHWVLQWROLDELOLWLHVVRWKHHVVHQWLDODGYDQWDJHRXV
pragmatic traditions of the past became increasingly detrimental to sound policies in a 
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rapidly deteriorating power position which made clarity of purpose and definition of 
priRULWLHVPRUHDQGPRUHLPSHUDWLYH´ 127  
 
At DOPC towards the end of June and Cabinet on 6 July 1967, it was pointed out 
WKDW WKH 6L[ 'D\ :DU KDG VKRZQ %ULWDLQ¶V PLOLWDU\ SUHVHQFH KDG QRW SOD\HG ³DQ\
worthwhile role in a critiFDOVLWXDWLRQ´ ,WZDVDQ³HPEDUUDVVPHQW´WR%ULWDLQ¶VIULHQGVLQ
the Middle East DQG³KDUPIXO´WR%ULWDLQ¶VSROLWLFDODQGRLOLQWHUHVWV 128  An attempt at 
military intervention, in the form of an ³$QJOR-American joint mariWLPHIRUFHIRUDFWLRQ´
to keep open the straits of Tiran failed to come to fruition, partly due to opposition in 
the Cabinet as well as from the Chiefs of Staff who stressed the impracticality of the 
plan.  Furthermore the United States, tied down by a military commitment in Vietnam, 
were unwilling to become involved in a military venture and they urged the British to 
take the lead. Crossman, Leader of the House of Commons and Healey considered 
such action would leave Britain isolated and ³FODVVHGDVD:HVWHUQLPSHULDOLVWWU\LQJto 
vainly to reassert (British sX]HUDLQW\ZKHQWKH\KDGQ¶WWKHPLOitary force to do so´129 
 
The realisation that Britain had little political or diplomatic influence during the crisis 
IHGLQWRDSHUFHLYHGGHFOLQHLQ%ULWDLQ¶Vrole in the Middle East. Crossman noted in his 
diaries, for 13 -XQH³WKHQHWHIIHFWRIWKLVWUHPHQGRXV,VUDHOLYLFWRU\KDVEHHQWR
expose British impotence´130  7KH6L['D\:DUZDV³DVDOXWDWRU\OHVVRQQRWEHFDXVH
WKH\ ZHUH LQYROYHG EXW EHFDXVH WKH\ ZHUH QRW´ DQG WKH ZDU KLJK-lighted BrLWDLQ¶V
vulnerability to oil supply control by the Arab states.131  As a consequence, Barbara 
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Castle, Minister of State for Transport at that time, noted in her diary for the 8 June, 
/RQGRQ¶V LPPHGLDWH SULRULW\ ZDV ³WR PHQG RXW UHODWLRQV ZLWK WKH $UDE 6WDWHV". 132 
 
:KLOVW WKH VWUDWHJLF XVHIXOQHVV RI WKH /LE\DQ EDVHV KDG ZLWKHUHG DQG %ULWDLQ¶V
political and diplomatic position in the Arab world appeared to have diminished, there 
remained strategic concerns in Whitehall over who woXOGUHSODFH%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQas 
defence policy moved to a focus on Europe and NATO.  Foreign and defence policy 
planning now became concerned with preventing vacuums in territories vacated by 
British troops. In Aden the British tried to secure the continued rule of Sheiks and a 
concern with exposing Libya to intervention from the Soviet Union and Egypt 
influenced British policy in Libya during the withdrawal request.  Frankel recognises 
WKLVDVDSROLF\IRFXVGXULQJ%ULWDLQ¶VZLWKGUDZDOIURPWKH*XOILQ133 
 
In June 1967 the Defence Planning Staff suggested that a withdrawal from Libya, 
resulting in the end of defence arrangements, would leave the country isolated in 
North Africa, surrounded by nationalist regimes in Algeria, Egypt and the Sudan who, 
with Soviet support, would seek tR ILOO WKLV ³YDFXXP´  The Defence Planning Staff 
considered that the Soviet Union and Egypt would attempt to ingratiate themselves 
with offers of arms, technicians and training missions and threaten the internal security 
of the Idris regime, so altering the strategic balance in the Mediterranean against the 
West.  It was concluded that ³ZHFRQVLGHUWKDWWKHSUHVHUYDWLRQRIDIULHQGO\DQGVWDEOH
/LE\D LV LQ WKH :HVWHUQ LQWHUHVW LQ VR IDU DV WKLV FDQ EH DFKLHYHG´.134  However to 
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continue to maintain a military SUHVHQFHZDVDJDLQVWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V'HIHQFH
5HYLHZ VWDWHPHQW DQG DV ZH KDYH VHHQ WKUHDWHQHG %ULWDLQ¶V RWKHU LQWHUHVWV LQ WKH
country.  Ambassador Sarrell counselled, ³WKHLQWHUQDOSROLWLFDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQ/LE\D
and her relationship to the rest of the Arab world have now reached the point where 
we no longer gain, and indeed put at risk the increasingly valuable economic interest 
in the country by attempting to retain military forces in Libya at their current level´135   
British officials had to balance a military withdrawal and the threat from Egypt and the 
Soviet Union with a need to maintain their position in Libya. 
 
Relations with Egypt remained frosty, not least as a result of the British presence in 
Libya which was a target IRU 1DVVHU¶V SURSDJanda and rhetoric against the West.   
0RUHRYHU DV 0RUJDQ KDV LGHQWLILHG ³WKH )RUHLJQ 2IILFH IRU DOO LWV WUDGLWLRQDO SUR-
Arabism, found itself out of touch with Cairo, diplomatic relations having been broken 
RIIRYHU5KRGHVLD´136  Caution had been urged by Foreign Secretary Brown, prior to 
the Six Day War, regarding %ULWDLQ¶VDSSURDFKWR(J\SW+HEHOLHYHG/RQGRQ³must not 
IDOO LQWR WKH WUDS RI UHJDUGLQJ«RXU 0LGGOH(DVWHUQ SROLF\ DV D VWUXJJOH WR WKH GHDWK
EHWZHHQ RXUVHOYHV DQG 3UHVLGHQW 1DVVHU«ZH DUH QRW VHWWLQJ RXW WR«topple 
Nasser...but neither are we prepared to accept that he has the right to topple another 
Middle Eastern nation at the riVNRISOXQJLQJXVDOOLQWRZDU´. 137  
 
Yet Egyptian propaganda continued to fuel Arab Nationalist discontent towards the 
West, primarily by propagatLQJ WKH ³%LJ /LH´ ZKLFK XQGHUPLQHG %ULWLVK DQG:HVWHUQ
influence.  7KH ³Big /LH´ LQYROYHG(J\SWLDQPHGLDDOOHJDWLRQV WKDW WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
and Britain participated in Israel's pre-emptive attack on Egypt and Syria. According to 
Radio Cairo, United States and British aircraft carriers provided an air umbrella for 
Israel and played an active role in the operations including United States aircraft flying 
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from the Libyan Wheelus base.138  According to Michael Oren the Egyptians used the 
³%LJ /LH´ LQ DQ DWWHPSW WR VHFXUH GLUHFW 6RYLHW DVVLVWDQFH and to reverse an Israeli 
victory achieved with Western support.139  The allegations had an immediate political 
impact leading to Syria, Iraq, Algeria, Sudan, and the Republic of Yemen severing 
diplomatic relations with the United States and Britain. The oil embargo and anti- 
:HVWHUQSURWHVWV LQ WKH0LGGOH(DVWZHUHDOVRSURGXFWVRI WKH³%LJ/LH´.  Even after 
the war the collusion story continued despite official British and American denials.  
Brown sent a personal letter to all Arab ambassadors in London, in which he ridiculed 
Cairo's allegations but it was obvious that as the British representative to the UN 
claimed: "The Arabs do not want to believe our denials´140    
 
%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH Middle East would require a new strategy as they sought to 
re-secure relations with the Arab nations whilst maintaining their support for Israel.  
Moshe Gat claims the Israeli victory had clearly delivered a colossal blow to British 
interests.141  The British looked for ways to defend the national priorities RI³securing a 
cheap and regular supply of oil, obtaining a large and profitable share of the Middle 
East oil industry, encouraging ample Arab investment in Britain, and securing for 
British exports a bigger slice of the regional market´ Gat recognises that the Foreign 
Office continued to emphasise   the ³XUJHQWQHHGWREORFNWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ¶VDGYDQFH
in the region, denying it control of the Arab Middle East and its resources´142   
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George Brown also stressed the Soviet threat to British and Western interests in a 
PHPRUDQGXPSUHVHQWHGWR&DELQHWLQHDUO\-XO\%URZQIHDUHG6RYLHW³HURVLRQ
of Western influence, including the economic interests of the United States and 
%ULWDLQ´143  A new strategy was to be implemented with a ³twin-track policy, which 
would ... seek to promote a general settlement between Israel and the Arabs, and 
LPSURYH%ULWDLQ¶VRZQGLVPDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH$UDEZRUOG´144   Despite this many 
/DERXU03¶VKDGSUR-Israeli sympathies inFOXGLQJ:LOVRQZKRP$EED(EDQ ,VUDHO¶V
)RUHLJQ0LQLVWHUIURPWRFODLPVZDV,VUDHO¶VFORVHVWIULHQGLQ(XURSH145 In 
contrast George Brown had greater Arab sympathies. Brown believed that if Britain 
wanted to maintain its interests in the Middle East, it had to do more than simply 
distance itself from Israeli policy. It had to take positive action and establish, as soon 
as possible, a good working relationship with the Arab states as well. 146   
 
Connections between events in Libya and the wider affairs of the Arab world could 
not be ignored. A limited withdrawal enabled the British to combine a policy that 
maintained a British presence and a pro-Western regime, thus thwarting Soviet and 
Egyptian interests in the country. A limited withdrawal also placated Arab criticism to 
VRPHGHJUHHLQERWK/LE\DDQGWKH0LGGOH(DVWRI%ULWDLQ¶VUROHGXULQJ-XQHDQGWKH
military presence in the region. The easing of Arab hostility towards London would 
also allow the British to re-secure oil and trade ties and calm political tensions in 
conservative Arab states if the British were seen to be responding to Arab demands, 
so undermining political opposition in those countries.  In a July 1967 DOPC 
memorandum on ³British Forces in Libya´ DXWKRUHG E\ WKH )RUHLJQ 6HFUHWDUy, the 
withdrawal request was considered in strategic terms. The memorandum stated that a 
withdrawal would give aid and comfort to pro-Egyptian extremist elements, possibly 
encouraging a revolution or revolt against the monarchy. In keeping with current 
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thinking, it was suggested that such an event could well lead to the collapse of other 
moderate regimes in Tunisia and Morocco. To remain and ³UHWDLQDSUHVHQFHLQ/LE\D
sufficient to avoid loss of confidence on the part of the Libyan monarchy´ZRXOGDYRLG
tKHULVNRIJLYLQJDVWLPXOXVWRWKH³UHYROXWLRQDU\´HOHPHQWVLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWZKRKDG
VXIIHUHGVRPHKXPLOLDWLRQLQ1DVVHU¶VGHIHDWDWWKHKDQGVRI,VUDHO7KH)RUHLJQ2IILFH
ZDVSDUWLFXODUO\NHHQQRWWRDOORZ1DVVHUD³SROLWLFDODQGPLOLWDU\´VXFFHVVLQLibya as 
a result.147  At DOPC on 28 July 1967 there was general agreement with the Foreign 
6HFUHWDU\¶V PHPRrandum.148 However British officials would face criticism from 
Washington over policy towards Libya and its likely affects on greater US strategic 
interests.  
 
British policy contrasted with the American approach to the withdrawal request and 
served to highlight British commitment to withdrawal from East of Suez.  The Libyan 
request had raised concerns in Washington and the Johnson administration was not 
willing to forego strategic interests in the region which could undermine its overall 
strategic policy. The administration therefore took seriously any attempt by the 
Libyans or the British to revise existing arrangements. Instead Washington interpreted 
the request to leave Wheelus as a natural development of the 1964 events and was 
not keen to tie the issue to the events of 1967; hoping to draw out the discussions until 
³WKHKHDWRIWKHSUHVHQWFULVLVVXEVLGHG´149  At Cabinet on 6 July Wilson noted that he 
KDG UHFHLYHG D WHOHJUDP IURP 3UHVLGHQW -RKQVRQ DVNLQJ WKH %ULWLVK ³WR JR VORZ RQ
GHIHQFHFXWV(DVWRI6XH]´150 
 
Washington was eager to work with the British on the withdrawal request.  The 
6WDWH'HSDUWPHQWDLPHGWRFRQVXOW WKH%ULWLVK³IXOly before making any decisions on 
withdrawal from the Wheelus airbase and to keep as closely in step with the UK as 
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possible´151  The Ministry of Defence DGYLVHG WKDW ³LW LV LPSRUWDQW WKDWZHVKRXOGFR-
RUGLQDWH RXU SROLF\ DQG RXU WDFWLFV´ DOWKRXJK SROLF\ ZDV FRPPLWWHG WR Whe Benghazi 
withdrawal DQG LW ZDV H[SHFWHG WKDW WKHUH ZRXOG EH ³VWURQJ 86 UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV
against our making any moves at all from Cyrenaica´152   In June Ambassador Sarrell 
SRLQWHGRXWWKDWWRNHHS%HQJKD]L³ZRXOGQRWEROVWHUWKH86SRVLWLRQDW:KHHOXVDQG 
would merely incur odium we can ill risN ZLWKRXW DQ\ UHVXOWDQW EHQHILW´ from the 
Libyans. Sarrell sugJHVWHG WKDW WKHUH ZHUH ³VRXQG UHDVRQV´ for not aligning with 
Washington   on the bases issue because the Libyans wanted the British to take an 
independent line. He emphasised the problem with the Wheelus base, which he 
considered was unpopular with the Libyans because it was noisy and near to Tripoli. 
Additionally he believed that the Libyans were suspicious of :DVKLQJWRQ¶V good 
faith.153  Later in   July Sarrell added that Washington had asked the British   not to 
take the withdrawal demand at face value and he believed that the United States 
prized the training grounds above relations with the Libyans. Sarrell felt that 
Washington would consider a British withdrawal, not just as a defence reduction but 
as a strategic retreat. He concluded that it would be interpreted as   ³WKHUHPRYDORID
bastion against Russian military penetration into Libya and North Africa and so the 
Mediterranean´154  Fraser has recognised that prior to the events of the Six Day War 
the United States had interests elsewhere, including Berlin, Cuba and Vietnam but the 
³SHDFH ZKLFK VHHPHG WR KDYH VHWWOHG´ RYHU WKH UHJLRQ ³ZDV DQ LOOXVLRQ´ DQG
Washington was now drawn to focus on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the threats to 
Western interests as a result of the Six Day War. 155  
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On 27 June 1967 Eugene Rostow, the US Under-Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs XUJHG WKDW %ULWDLQ DQG WKH 86$ ³should take a firm stand against any 
ZLWKGUDZDO´.  Rostow specifically did not want a withdrawal from Benghazi and hoped 
WKDW%ULWDLQDQG³WKH86ZRXOGZRUNWRJHWKHUWRVWLIIHQWKH.LQJDQGWRUHDVVXUHKLPRI
our support and of our intention not to do any deal with Nasser behind the backs of the 
moderate Arabs´ Rostow enquired about possible support from the British and Saudi 
monarchies and stated that US oil companies were prepared to help.  He did not want 
Washington appearing to back down in the face of Nationalist pressure, offering only 
the removal of some obsolete oil tanks at Wheelus to placate the Libyans.156  The 
Foreign Office was ³IUDQNO\UDWKHUVKRFNHGDWWKHODFNRIUHDOLVPZKLFKZDVUHYHDOHG
E\5RVWRZ¶VFRPPHQWV´DQGZDUQHGWKDW³DWWKHRIILFLDOOHYHODWOHDVWZHGRQRWVKDUH
his views´ 157   
 
British policy was now tailored specifically to reducing costly commitments, 
assuaging Libyan and Arab criticism and pursuing a withdrawal from a global defence 
strategy, despite American protestations. The British record in Libya mirrored the 
independent and determined approach the British adopted towards the Aden 
withdrawal. Simon Smith observes that the British withdrawal from Aden showed that 
³%ULWDLQ ZDV FDSDEOH RI SXUVXLQJ DQ LQGHSHQGHQW SROLF\ LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH
SHUFHLYHG QDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV´ and the same was true despite protestations from 
Washington about withdrawal from Libya.158 In Libya the Labour Government was 
GHWHUPLQHGWRUHGXFHFRPPLWPHQWVZKDWHYHU:DVKLQJWRQ¶VDWWLWXGHDQGon  29 June 
Rostow appeared to accept  that it was no good trying to maintain bases against the 
wishes of the Libyans and agreed to provide assistance in internal security to bolster 
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the regime.159  7KLVFRPSOHPHQWHG%ULWLVKSROLF\WKDWZDVDLPHGDWVWUHQJWKHQLQJ³WKH
KDQGVRIRXUIULHQGVHVSHFLDOO\WKH.LQJ´E\KHOSLQJWKH /LE\DQVWR³WREHQGEHIRUHWKH
wind of Arab NDWLRQDOLVP´ through social and economic development and building up 
the security forces. 160 
 
However the strategic threat to the stability of the area was further emphasised by 
Eugene Rostow on 10 August during talks with Ambassador Patrick Dean in 
Washington. Rostow pushed for a continued British presence in Libya and talked with 
emphasis ³DERXW /LE\DQ YXOQHUDELOLW\ WR VXEYHUVLRQ DQG WKH HIIHFWV RQ WKH :HVWHUQ
position in the Mediterranean and on oil supplies of its loss and   considered that the 
domino theory applied in this area and if Libya went, Morocco and Tunisia   would 
also´ The US urged the need for a strong ³clear position of deterrence...as subversion 
RQFH LW VWDUWHG ZDV KDUG WR VWRS´ DQG ³withdrawal would be an open invitation to 
Nasser´161 Ambassador 6DUUHOO DJUHHG ZLWK :DVKLQJWRQ¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI WKH
situation in Libya and North Africa ³EXW,GRQRWEHOLHYHWKHSUHVHQFHRIIRUHLJQWURRSV
in Libya is in itself an effective weapon of deterUHQFH´ 162 
 
Washington continued to express concerns for the security of the region during 
Anglo-American talks in September 1967. These talks were focused on the Maghreb 
but the situation in Libya was discussed on 14 September, the Americans evidencing 
a strong interest in securing the Libyan regime through development.  Rostow 
believed Libya to be one of the most sensitive and dangerous points in the region, ripe 
for attempts at a takeover, in the next year, citing threats from Algeria and Egypt. He 
believed London DQG:DVKLQJWRQVKRXOG WDNH ³DFULVSFOHDUSRVWXUH´ on the country 
and show their commitment through a military presence. The British delegation, 
headed by Denis Allen, Deputy Under-Secretary of State at   the Foreign Office, still 
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believed that political and security issues needed to be addressed especially as the 
June FULVLV³UHYHDOHGVHULRXVGHILFLHQFLHVLQWKH/LE\DQLQWHUQDOVHFXULW\IRUFHVDQGWKH
capacity of Egypt to stir up trouEOH´DQG³WKHSUREOHPUHPDLQHGRIJHWWLQJWKH/LE\DQV
to focus on the proEOHPRI WKHLU\RXQJHUJHQHUDWLRQ´7KHAmericans concurred with 
WKHLGHDRI³PRYLQJ/LE\DQVRFLHW\IRUZDUG´WKURXJKa process of political development 
and that provision of experts to train the security forces should have the highest 
priority.163 
 
Looking at the wider strategic concerns associated with Libya, Washington 
considered that the country, with British involvement, still had a role in global defence 
VWUDWHJ\ 5RVWRZ UHSHDWHG ³WKHPDLQ WKHPH´ZKLFKKHKDGPDGH LQDOO GLVFXVVLRQV 
that :DVKLQJWRQ¶Vconcern was to protect the capacity of the United States to function 
in world affairs. Rostow stated that the United States and Britain were in a stronger  
position when they were acting collectively and the main problem was to organise an 
environment in whicK WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV  FRXOG H[HUFLVH LWV UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV ³ZLWKRXW
KLQGUDQFH IURP WKH UHDU ´ HPSKDVLVLQJ /RQGRQ¶V role in US global strategy. Allen 
VWUHVVHGWKDWKHOSLQJ/LE\D³SDUWO\GHSHQGHGupon our future resources and priorities´
DQGZDV³DMREIRU$Qglo-US partnership´164 
 
Anglo-$PHULFDQ UHODWLRQV DQG WKH ZLWKGUDZDO UHTXHVW RI  LOOXVWUDWHG %ULWDLQ¶V
evolving strategic policy agenda. Whilst the British were not oblivious to global 
strategic issues and security, particularly in the Middle East, their policy now appeared 
to recognise that facilities were politically and strategically anachronistic and counter-
productive to British interests. London, restricted by cost and an evolving philosophical 
approach to facilities now determined that the strategic concerns of the West and 
Britain lay in securing the Libyan regime internally, by building an effective security 
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force, developing the country and maintaining the minimum base areas until 1973, 
rather than maintaining extensive deployments. British policy on Libya at this time 
UHLQIRUFHV 6LPRQ 6PLWK¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW %ULWDLQ ZDV ³SUHSDUHG WR DGRSW SROLFLHV LQ
GHILDQFHRI:DVKLQJWRQ´LQWKe Middle East. 165  
 
By the end of 1967 the British had secured their remaining military presence in 
Libya. They had also begun the process of reinforcing the pro-Western government of 
King Idris which in turn would enable the securing of economic and political ties in the 
wider region, both for Britain and the West, against a perceived strategic threat from 
Nasser and the Soviet Union. $)RUHLJQ2IILFH UHSRUW VWDWHG WKDW ³KDGEHHQD
WXPXOWXRXV \HDU IRU %ULWDLQ  LQ /LE\D´  DQG GUHZ WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW  ³we as British 
have many friends and great influence remaining in Libya but that as foreigners, and 
as supposed pro-Israelis we are liable to incur the hostility of the Libyan man in the 
street´ 166   
 
However, an interesting interpretation of the political and military situation in 1967 
came from the British Ambassador, Roderick Sarrell. Whilst the Foreign Office and 
MOD remained committed to the treaty and advised the Government accordingly, the 
6L[ 'D\:DU DQG WKH UHDFWLRQ LQ /LE\D KDG D SURIRXQG HIIHFW RQ WKH $PEDVVDGRU¶V
YLHZRI%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHFRXQWU\7KLVFDXVHGKLPWRTXHVWLRQ, in July 1967, the 
assumptions WKDWXQGHUOD\%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHFRPPLWPHQWDVZHOODV%ULtDLQ¶VPLOLWDU\
capacity in the 1960s given the changed VWUDWHJLFHQYLURQPHQW+HVWUHVVHGWKDW³WKH
LQFRQWURYHUWLEOHIDFWLVWKDWWKHQDWXUHRIWKHWKUHDWWR/LE\D¶VLQWHJULW\DQGWKHSROLWLFDO
pRVLWLRQRI/LE\DDVZHOODV%ULWDLQ¶VFDSDFLW\IRULQGHSHQGHQWPLOLWDU\DFWLRQRXWVLGH
colonial territories, have radically altered since the treaty was drawn up fourteen years 
ago and our ability to do so in the modern world in defence of Libya seems to merit 
fresh political study´ Ambassador Sarrell further questioned the military sense of the 
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commitment to defend against Algeria and Egypt and whether it was even politically 
feasible. He believed the treaty commitment, ³SKRQH\´JLYHQWKH/LE\DQ¶VSHUFHption 
of a rising Algerian threat. 167 
 
The Foreign Office gave these considerations some thought over the next six 
months, focusing mainly upon whether it was politically acceptable for Britain to 
intervene in the region and, although the Ambassador never received the conclusions 
because the response was delayed, they do help us to understand the Foreign 
2IILFH¶VSHUFHSWLRQRI%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKHUHJLRQDVZell as the seriousness of the 
perceived threat to Libya.  It was concluded that Britain could still intervene in Libya 
ZLWK JUHDW SRZHU ³acquiHVFHQFH´ /LPLWV RQ %ULWDLQ¶V UROH ZHUH IRU ³PLOLWDU\ DQG
eFRQRPLF QRW SROLWLFDO UHDVRQV´. There appeared to be little chance of unprovoked 
Egyptian and Algerian attack but there was the possibility of Algerian or Egyptian 
intervention in support of a revolution. Any British intervention would require 
:DVKLQJWRQ¶VFRRSHUDWLRQDQGZRXOGQRWEHentirely free of Arab criticism. The Foreign 
2IILFH EHOLHYHG WKDW WKH FRPPLWPHQW ZDV QRW ³SKRQH\´ DV WKH $PEDVVDGRU KDd 
described it, given that the commitment would make the Egyptians and Algerians 
pause for thought, aware that Washington would support Britain and Libya.  The 
Foreign Office concluded that the commitment could not be considered artificial in 
terms of BritLVK LQWHUHVWV ³EHFDXVHWKH.LQJZDQWV LWZHFRXOGQRWH[WUDFWRXUVHOYHV
IURPLWZLWKRXWGDPDJHWRRXULQWHUHVW´168   
 
)XUWKHUPRUH %ULWDLQ¶V VWDQGLQJ Ln the Middle East had improved greatly over the 
final six months of 1967. This was in part due to the defeat of Egypt in the Six Day 
War.  Dawisha notes that the war was a significant moment in the history of Arab 
Nationalism. In June 1967 Arabs lost the concept of unification. 1DVVHU¶VSRVLWLRQZDV
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irretrievably weakened as Cairo became reliant economically on oil rich Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Libya who granted $280 million to compensate it for loss of land and 
revenue as a result of the defeat. Indeed the political focus now moved from Cairo to 
these conservative states and Dawisha notes that the Khartoum summit signified that 
these states would lead on inter-Arab politics rather than Nasser.169 Little claims 
Israel¶V VZHHSLQJ YLFWRU\ KDG ³ILQDOO\ exposed the bankruptcy of Arab Revolutionary 
NDWLRQDOLVP´170  As a result of his diminished political and military position Nasser had 
begun to tone down his anti-Western attacks and take a less bellicose stance towards 
Britain and the United States, so lessening criticism of the West. 171   
 
%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDOVRLPSURYHGEHFDXVH/RQGRQDFWLYHO\VRXJht 
to rebuild relations in the Middle East. McNamara claims Britain found new 
³DFFHSWDQFHIURP1DVVHUDQGRWKHU$UDEVWDWHV´DVD UHVXOWRI diplomatic actions at 
the UN in the drafting of Security Council Resolution 242 on 22 November 1967.  
Brenchley considers that Foreign Secretary George Brown managed to undermine 
PXFKRIWKHEDGIHHOLQJRIWKH³%LJ/LH´ZLWKKLVVSHHFKDWWKHWK(PHUJHQF\6HVVLRQ
of the UN General Assembly in June 1967, calling for an Israeli withdrawal from the 
occupied territories and taking a personal initiative to suggest to Nasser the 
restoration of diplomatic relations. %URZQ OHIW %ULWDLQ¶V VWDQGLQJ LQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVW
³FRQVLGHUDEO\KLJKHURQKLVUHVLJQDWLRQ´ on 15 March 1968 after the last of a long line 
of personal and political confrontations with the Prime Minister.172  Arab appreciation 
RI%ULWDLQ¶V UROHKDGEHQHILWV LQ WUDGH, notably in arms, to Arab states, amounting to 
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£7.5 million to Algeria, Egypt, Iraq and Syria in 1967.173 However, whilst  McNamara 
notes that by the end of 1967 a long term shift in British strategy of opposing Nasser 
had come to an end, Egypt was still considered a political threat to Libya and British 
and Western strategic interests in the Arab world.174  Supplementing Egyptian power 
and posing their own significant threat to Western strategic concerns was an evolving 
Soviet involvement in the region, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
 
Following the 1967 withdrawal request British policy aimed to rebuild the Anglo-
Libyan political relationship, secure the remaining facilities and preserve economic 
interests, training facilities and the strategic orientation of the regime to the West, 
whilst remaining able to service the defence obligation. The 1967 withdrawal request 
was essentially a political statement used by the Idris regime to assuage Arab 
nationalist and internal criticism.  The British and Libyans were able to pass off the 
negotiations as a response to the withdrawal request, although London had planned 
for the Benghazi withdrawal in the 1966 Defence Review. Both sides were determined 
to maintain the treaty and the facilities and despite the Labour Government¶V
commitment to withdrawal, the Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence steered the 
Government to compromise on a complete withdrawal, aware that the facilities had 
added benefits for London.  A reinterpretation of the treaty, to maintain British interests 
should the treaty be undermined by a complete withdrawal, was even considered by 
the Foreign Office.  
 
By the end of 1967 BritDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQ in Libya was secured and the Foreign Office, 
along with the Ministry of Defence, was   instrumental in promoting a continued 
political and military involvement in the country.  However, London would retain the 
defence obligation outlined in the treaty, until at least 1973 and this necessitated 
continued expense. The Libyans were happy to continue the treaty relationship and 
hold on to British military support as a security guarantee against an Algerian and 
Egyptian threat. Whilst the events of June 1967 caused the British Ambassador in 
Libya to call for a rethink of the military and political thinking behind the treaty, the 
Foreign Office believed these assumptions underpinning the defence obligation were 
sound.  
 
167 
Wider British strategic priorities during this period continued to shift away from a 
defence and foreign policy commitment East of Suez to one based around NATO and 
Europe. The value of the Libyan military deployments to British strategy was already 
minimal.  Officials recognised that the over-flight route through the Sudan was unlikely 
to be reopened, and the withdrawal from Aden in November 1967 ended the value of 
El Adem as an East of Suez staging post.  The facilities yielded only limited staging 
and overflying functions.  The Chiefs of Staff considered there was little strategic value 
in the facilities.175  Officials had finally accepted the strategic limitations relating to 
Libyan deployments, although there appeared to have been a lapse in recognising 
these facts, or at least a reluctance to accept them until 1967 when circumstances, 
such as the British economic environment and a commitment to reducing expenditure 
provided a reason to disengage. The reluctance of Washington to countenance British 
disengagement from Libya show how far /RQGRQ¶VVWUDWHJLFSULRULWLHVhad shifted and 
how far the Labour Government was committed to these changes.   
 
7KH6L['D\:DUDOVRKDGFRQVHTXHQFHV IRU%ULWDLQ¶VPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFH LQ/LE\D
and further afield, underlining the vulnerability and obsolescence of maintaining forces 
in other countries. However, officials considered that total withdrawal from Libya had 
the potential to create a strategic vacuum in the eastern Mediterranean and North 
Africa, a region of importance to British  and Western strategic interests, which the 
USSR and Egypt would seek to exploit. The Libyans themselves remained anxious of 
Algerian and Egyptian intentions. A limited withdrawal served to not only maintain the 
British stake in Libya but restore those in the Middle East, wheUH%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQDQG
WKH:HVW¶VRQWKH$UDE-Israeli conflict was widely criticised. 
 
Despite the immediate effects of the war, %ULWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLFLQYROYHPHQWLQ/LE\D
continued to grow and the relationship was of great value to this development.  The 
Foreign Office recognised that the treaty, facilities and Libyan market were interlinked 
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and without the treaty the Libyans would not look to London so willingly for trade. A 
continued military presence therefore helped preserve British economic interests.  The 
MOD concurred with this appreciation of the relationship whilst emphasising the 
importance of the training facilities to British defence. The Labour Government 
DFFHSWHGWKLVDSSUHFLDWLRQRI%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQ/LE\D  
 
The Wilson Government had been instrumental in reviewing strategic priorities and 
the attitude of ministers to the 1967 Libyan withdrawal request showed they were 
committed to reducing costs as global strategic commitments were shrunk. Initially the 
Government had hoped to take the opportunity to withdraw from all the facilities, given 
the need to reduce costs. The Foreign Office tempered the /DERXU *RYHUQPHQW¶V
approach recognising that British priorities lay with the Idris regime and that 
maintaining some facilities was vital.  As a consequence the Anglo-Libyan relationship 
was reaffirmed and during 1968 would grow considerably stronger.
169 
5 Twilight of Relations 1968 -1969  
 
With Anglo-Libyan relations stabilised after the 1967 War, London sought to 
develop national interests in Libya. BULWDLQ¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKH treaty was reaffirmed 
in May 1968 and the remaining facilities were secured until 1973 to service the 
defence commitment. These comprised an infantry company at Tobruk, the El Adem 
staging post with an armoured car squadron and the military missions. As the Labour 
Government continued to battle with the domestic economy, further cuts were made in 
WKH GHIHQFH EXGJHW ,Q -DQXDU\  /LE\D¶V wider strategic purpose East of Suez 
was formally ended with the Labour Government¶V GHFLVLRn to withdraw from that 
theatre of operations. This led to an increase in the training importance of the Libyan 
facilities as troops were redeployed closer to Britain.  %ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFHVWUDtegy was 
now firmly aligned to NATO and the perceived strategic threat in the eastern 
Mediterranean from the Soviet Union and Egypt emphasised how important it was for 
London to maintain a political commitment to Libya.  The Libyans continued to stress 
the military threat from Algeria and Egypt whilst seeking to play a greater economic 
and political role in the Mediterranean.  Whitehall considered 7ULSROL¶V political and 
economic development necessary to maintain British and Western interests not only in 
Libya but across the region.  
 
Specifically, British policy in Libya aimed to secure the stability and future of the 
Idris regime by encouraging reform of the internal security apparatus, building up the 
military forces of Libya to a point where Libya could defend itself and sponsoring the 
economic development of the country. London focused upon promoting arms sales 
and reforming the Libyan army, which had reciprocal trade benefits for the British 
economy. Domestic opposition to the regime which had reached its zenith during the 
Six Day War had been dampened by the Libyan GRYHUQPHQW¶VSOHGJLQJRIIXQGV WR
help Egypt and Jordan rebuild their shattered military forces. Libya promised $84 
PLOOLRQ D \HDU ³XQWLO WKH WUDFHV RI ,VUDHOL DJJUHVVLRQ DUH UHPRYHG´´ DORQJ ZLWK
170 
agreement to close the Benghazi garrison.1 The Libyan monarchy also sought to 
stabilise society by addressing the social changes and disparities in wealth that oil 
revenue had brought to the country. 5HQHZHG FRQILGHQFH LQ WKH UHJLPH ³ZDV
apparently completed by the appointment of Abdul Hamid Al-Bakkoush in October 
 ZKR ³KDG WKH LGHDOVDQGEDFNJURXQG WRXQGHUVWDQG DQG V\PSDWKLVHZLWK WKH
SRVW LQGHSHQGHQFHJHQHUDWLRQRI\RXQJ/LE\DQV´+HLQLWLDWHGPLQLVWHULDOFRPPLWWHHV
ZLWKUHSUHVHQWDWLYHVRIWKHXQLYHUVLWLHVRQWKHPWR³HQFRXUDJHQDWLRQDOFRQVFLRXVQHVV´
and hoped to encourage greater citizen participation in society. However he also took 
the opportunity to put on trial 106 people on charges of plotting against the 
government over the previous seven years including during the 1967 oil industry 
strike, although sentences were light.2  The King and his government were disturbed 
enough by the events of June to spend large sums of oil revenue on bolstering their 
domestic security forces as well as those of the army. 
 
Despite a surface calm in domestic political and social affairs the future of the 
Libyan monarchy was seriously compromised.  6LPRQVFRQVLGHUVWKDWZKLOVW³PXFKRI
WKH RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKHPRQDUFK\ KDG EHHQ FUXVKHG´ WKH ³ZHDNQHVV RI WKH WUDGLWLRQDO
SRZHUVWUXFWXUHKDGEHHQH[SRVHG´3 This weakness was attributable to the role Idris 
had played.  Owen recognises that the King had confined the succession to his 
brothers and members of his own line and deprived the remainder of the royal family 
of their royal titles and of the right to hold public office, so alienating many from 
FRQWULEXWLQJWR/LE\D¶VGHYHORpment.  Whilst a popular figure, he had little enthusiasm 
in reinforcing his legitimacy or "reminding his subjects of his authority by endless 
public performance". He failed to maintain personal control over the army which he 
distrusted and he presided over a clique of close relatives and advisors strongly 
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tainted by accusations of corruption and nepotism.4  $V6LPRQVQRWHV ³WKHPDVVRI
/LE\DQ SHRSOH ZHUH UHFHLYLQJ GLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\ IHZ EHQHILWV´ RI WKH HQRUPous oil 
ZHDOWKJHQHUDWHGZKLFKHQGHGXSLQ³WKHSRFNHWVRIDSULYLOHJHG/LE\DQHOLWH´5  Unlike 
other Arab leaders such as the al-6DEDKV LQ .XZDLW ZKR DYRLGHG D ³VXIIRFDWLQJO\
close relationVKLS ZLWK WKH SURWHFWLQJ SRZHU´ Idris allowed himself to become too 
FORVHO\ ³DVVRFLDWHGZLWK LPSHULDO%ULWDLQ´6  The King ³showed little skill in distancing 
himself from the British and the Americans" and by 1967 Roger Owen considers "his 
support had crumbled away beyond repair". The link between the Monarchy and the 
West, embodied in the military deployments, were a focus for anti government 
protests and violence in June 1967.  Essentially Idris ³GHOHJLWLPL]HG´ERWKKLPVHOIDQG
the whole system of monarchical rule.7  Wright notes that it was considered unlikely 
that tKH&URZQ3ULQFHZRXOGEHDOORZHGWRVXFFHHGDWOHDVW³QRWZLWKRXWDVWUXJJOH´
The Prince had not been allowed to perform his political duties but the King would also 
not allow him to resign his position. 8   
 
Given that popular domestic opposition had been countered by repressive 
legislation on political movements and mollified by action on the foreign bases and the 
introduction of a more amenable government, it was most likely that opposition would 
come from the military.  Owen considers it was only timing and luck which determined 
which group of many would launch the first coup.9 Vandewalle states that the West 
and the Middle East considered the army and particularly senior military figures were 
always the most likely to lead any revolt against the King.10 Defence Secretary Denis 
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Healey remarked later, WKDW³LWZDVREYLRXVWKDWWKHPonarchy was likely to fall at any 
moment to an army coup´ Healey believed the influential Shelhi family would most 
likely attempt to overthrow the monarchy.11  Indeed Colonel Abd-al-Aziz Shelhi had 
become Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army in just one move by the family to consolidate 
power. In April 1969 his eldest brother, Omar took on the role as the royal counsellor 
and consolidated his position by marrying the daughter of a former Prime Minister in 
DQ³RVWHQWDWLRXVFHUHPRQ\WKDWRQO\VHUYHGWRFRQILUPSRSXODULGHDVDERXWWKHHDVLO\
DFTXLUHGZHDOWKRI WKHFRXQWU\¶V OHDGHUV´12  However the revolution would be led by 
younger officers, brought up on Arab Nationalist rhetoric and teachings, who held a 
disdain for a regime that allowed the continued presence of foreign bases that 
FRPSURPLVHG/LE\D¶VLQGHSHQGHQFH13  
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5.1 Rebuilding the Relationship  
 
From 1968 to 1969 the British nurtured and developed political interests in Libya, 
maintained the existing defence responsibilities and furthered economic ties   through 
the remaining facilities.  Mangold has recognised there was a temptation, during the 
1960s, to hold on to military deployments, SRVVLEO\ EHFDXVH WKH\ ³UHSUHVHQWHG WKH
laVWDVZHOODVWKHPRVWSRZHUIXOHOHPHQWRIWKH%ULWLVKLPSHULDOSUHVHQFH´.14  In Libya 
the facilities and the treaty remained valuable as symbols of the strength of the Anglo-
Libyan relationship.  
 
The treaty remained the bedrock of the relationship. A DOPC Defence Review 
Working Party note of 25 March 1968 stated that abandoning the treaty or removing 
the garrison would have political repercussions as it would ³DQWDJRQLVH WKH SUHVHQW
Libyan Government and any government likely to take its place in the short and 
PHGLXP WHUP´ DQG ³ZH VKRXOG ORVH WKH FRQILGHQFH RI WKH .LQJ´ $V a result oil and 
investment concerns would suffer. Secondly, if the British military presence in the 
Tobruk and El Adem area were withdrawn then training facilities would be lost, based 
as they were on close liaison between the army and Libyan authorities. The Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO, the two offices being merged in 1968), argued ³WKDW
it is overwhelmingly in our interest to maintain our support for the treaty until its first 
possible expiry GDWHRI'HFHPEHU´DQGLQ³present circumstances any attempt on 
our part to cancel or modify before then our commitment to come tR/LE\D¶V defence 
under the treaty would have serious financial and political consequences´The FCO 
further counselled that no attempt should be made to abrogate the Anglo Libyan treaty 
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unilaterally or withdraw remaining forces from Libya before the expiry date and this 
policy was endorsed by ministers in May 1968.15  
 
However, WRPDLQWDLQ%ULWDLQ¶VLQWHUHVWs it was considered vital to secure the Libyan 
monarchy. The British had not been averse to intervening militarily to prop up friendly 
governments, as had happened in Jordan in 1958 and Kuwait in 1961, and London 
had been instrumental in organising coups in the Emirates during the 1960s to install 
their preferred candidates.16  But by the late 1960s such intervention in Libya was not 
to be entertained.  ,QVWHDG ³D PDMRU HIIRUW WR HQFRXUDJH WKH .LQJ DQG WKe Libyan 
Government to tackle the problems of internal subversion and winning popular 
confidence´were considered vital to ensure the continuance of a moderate and pro-
Western reJLPHDIWHU,GULV¶GHDWK.17  The country would be weaned from their reliance 
on the military elements of the treaty and would achieve   greater autonomy in terms 
of defence. The British would continue to maintain influence through arms sales, 
training and the military missions. 
 
)ROORZLQJ WKH  :DU ZKLFK KDG KLJKOLJKWHG /LE\D¶V ZHDN VHFXULW\
arrangements, a degree of political stability had been restored in the country. Whilst 
the loyalty and effectiveness of Libyan security and defence forces remained 
circumspect, the future of the regime appeared less fragile. In March 1968 a JIC note 
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considered that the King would be able to maintain his authority if he retained effective 
control and did not place himself in an anti-Arab posture. Already a consensus of 
support appeared to be IRUPLQJ IRU ,GULV¶ H[SHFted successor, the Crown Prince, 
despite the fact that he had difficulty in gaining popularity in government and amongst 
the Libyan people. 18    
 
/LE\D¶V internal political environment had achieved some stability through oil 
wealth, but the youth of Libya remained marginalised and society was in a state of 
flux. Oil wealth had raised political and social issues the regime appeared poorly 
equipped to deal with.  The economy was not being managed well and the financial 
benefits of oil wealth were not put to good use.19   Employment opportunities were 
poor, hindered further by a poor education system and the unemployed and students 
were radicalised by the immigration into the country of teachers and technicians, with 
Arab Nationalist sympathies. The economy saw a growth in imports and inflation and 
this fed into unrest. As we have seen the regime was regarded as corrupt and 
inefficient and became more isolated from the population. 7KH.LQJ¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKH
corrupt Shelhi family did not help the monarchy, although the King himself remained 
popular. The regime was fortunate that 1DVVHU¶VORVVRISrestige in the Arab world, as 
well the Libyan SHRSOHV¶ mistrust of Egyptian aims  SDUWLFXODUO\ WRZDUGV /LE\D¶V RLO
reserve, tended to undermine some  Egyptian propaganda directed against the Libyan 
GRYHUQPHQWDQG7ULSROL¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH:HVW+RZever, the regime, to secure 
its position, appeared to focus upon modernizing the small and ineffective Libyan 
armed forces and replacing the diminishing British contribution. 20 
 
Internal security issues were addressed immediately after the disturbances of 
1967. In August the Libyan Prime Minister, Abdul Qadir Al-Badri,  handed  the British 
Ambassador a long list of military hardware needed for the security forces, some 
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specifically British. 21  Prime Minister Badri also said he would buy from the French or 
Americans if the British could not deliver.22   In December 1967 a contract for £7million 
to supply the Libyan security forces was signed; this contract incorporated 80 Saladin 
Armoured Cars, 56 Saracens Armoured Personnel Carriers, 4 command vehicles and 
90 Ferret Scout cars with ammunition, spare parts, weapons and associated 
equipment. 23 The poor and ineffective nature of the Libyan internal intelligence 
organisation during the summer disturbances led the Foreign Office to conclude that 
Tripoli also needed practical help with internal security and in countering Egyptian 
VXEYHUVLRQZKLFKKDG³EHHQPRUHVXFFHVVIXOWKDQZHWKRXJKW´ 24  
 
External security was also a concern for the Libyan Government given their 
strategic vulnerability, sandwiched between Arab Nationalist regimes in Algeria, Egypt 
and the Sudan. In July  WKH /LE\DQ 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU VDLG WKDW WKH ³WKUHDWHQLQJ
DWWLWXGH RI /LE\D¶V Qeighbours and particularly Algeria rendered urgent the 
VWUHQJWKHQLQJ RI /LE\D¶V IRUFHV´25  /LE\D¶V PLOLWDU\ H[SDQVLRQ was elaborated upon 
further durLQJ ,GULV¶ ³6SHHFKIURPWKH7KURQH´on 20 November 1967 which forecast 
WKDW /LE\D KRSHG ³WR EXLOG LQ WKH VKRUWHVW WLPH D PLOLWDU\ GHWHUUHQW IRUFH ZKLFK LW
believes should be built to replace the non-/LE\DQDOWHUQDWLYHV´ 26  The government 
had drawn up a five year plan entailing a programme of developing the Libyan army. 
The speech was significant because it was recognised by the FCO as a sign that the 
Libyans were embarking upon an independent policy, albeit in its initial stages.27  
Ambassador Sarrell suspected that the King believed he could also quash internal 
subversion by bigger and better weapons, rather than focusing on improving the 
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organization of the security forces.  However, the British benefited from large orders 
for arms  DQG6DUUHOOFODLPHG³%ULWLVKVXSSRUW WKURXJKHTXLSPHQWPDLQWHQDQFHDQG
training (which)  would be a key factor in facilitating this desirable but fundamental 
transitioQLQ/LE\D¶VGHIHQFHSKLORVRSK\´DOORZLQJWKHUHOLQTXLVKPHQt of British military 
support  and ultimately greater  Libyan political independence. 28   
 
Although the British would be reducing their military support to Libya, training 
contracts would enable the British to maintain control over internal security in Libya 
and WKH.LQJ¶VPilitary forces. From 1967 the British would arm the Libyan forces more 
substantially with missile and tank contracts, which required extensive training and 
support from British advisors given that the Libyans simply did not have the resources 
or skills available to run their own defences.   
 
Between 26 February and 8 March 1968 the Libyan Minister of Defence, Sayid 
Hamid Al Abaidi paid a visit to Britain and in talks with Healey announced his intention 
to buy only British arms and depend on Britain for training, reorganizing and re-
equipping the Libyan armed forces.29  In May 1968 a comprehensive air defence 
missile scheme manufactured by BAC (British Aircraft Corporation) for Libya was 
signed.30  A  project to reorganise  and re-equip  the Libyan armed forces , as agreed 
to by Healey and Abaidi in March 1968 led to an MOD visit to Libya on  25 March 
1968, which resulted in a rearmament and retraining report produced by Lieutenant 
General Sir John Mogg .31    
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In April 1968 the Libyan Prime Minister said that he was most anxious to secure 
training for the Libyan army, by the British army, at all levels. He wished the British 
army ZRXOG³WDNHRYHUWKH/LE\DQDUP\´WRUHVWRUHLWVPRUDOHDQGVHOIUHVSHFWDQGKH
hoped that in addition to providing training courses, the British would provide  senior 
officers to visit the army from time to time.32  Defence Secretary Healey visited Libya in 
May 1968 and the Libyan Prime Minister, Abdul Hamid Al-Bakkoush requested that 
joint training exercises should take place. Playing on the threat from LLE\D¶V
neighbours, Abdul Hamid Al-Bakkoush expressed concern over the Soviet military 
presence in the Mediterranean whilst Chief of Staff Nuri stressed the activities of the 
Soviet Union in Algeria. Healey urged on the Libyans an emphasis on self-reliance in 
internal security +HDOH\FRQVLGHUHG WKDW ³DV WKH%ULWLVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VRZQGHIHQFH
SODQVZHUHEHLQJUHDGMXVWHG«KHEHOLHYHGWKDWKLVRZQSROLF\VKRXOGEHDGMXVWHGWR
give greater priority to training for foreign friends  ... (and) undertook to give their 
training requirements special treatment´ $l-Bakkoush also welcomed help in the 
³RUJDQL]DWLRQRI LQWHOOLJHQFH´ for improving security in the army and secondly for the 
establishment of a channel of continuous information in order to improve what he 
WHUPHG³FORVHLQWHOOLJHQFH´EHWZHHQ%ULWDLQDQG/LE\D33  
 
0RJJ¶V rearming and retraining report was issued in June 1968 and stated that 
Libya, with a population of only 1.6 million, could not withstand, unaided, an all out 
attack and it  was therefore essential that Libya had allies who were prepared to come 
to her aid. However Mogg felt that Libya must present a worthwhile and credible 
deterrent to a potential aggressor through the purchase of advanced military 
equipment.34 The British agreed to arm the Libyan military with the latest equipment. 
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This arms contract would include the Chieftain tank and Abbotts self-propelled guns.35  
The Army equipment contract, valued at £46.8 million was signed by the Minister of 
Defence for Equipment, John Morris and the Libyan Minister of Defence on 21 April, 
1969. The Libyans were to receive the first six Chieftains in December 1969; the 
contract specified that delivery of 40 in the second half of 1970 and thereafter at a rate 
of four or five per month until completion of deliveries in 1973.36  0RJJ¶VUHSRUWDOVR
urged an increase in the strength of   the British military mission for advisory purposes 
and the need for British loaned officers on the staffs of Libyan HQs, in training schools 
and to units where necessary. Whilst modernising the Libyan army, the British would 
provide officers and NCOs who would wear Libyan insignia. 37  A Memorandum of 
Understanding dealing with the reorganisation and re-equipment of the Libyan Army 
was finally signed by Healey and the Libyan Minister of Defence, Abaidi on 30 
September 1968 and London agreed to provide 20 officers to assist in the 
reorganisation.38 
 
The consequences of the defence equipment sales and training packages would 
be that the visible British military presence would eventually wither away, but a 
residual, controlling element would replace it within the ranks of the Libyan armed 
forces. The British would be able to maintain if not increase their political and military 
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influence over the regime. Outwardly however the country appeared to be developing 
a more independent stance. This impression was facilitated by the appointment of the 
educated and progressive Abdul Hamid Al-Bakkoush as Prime Minister in October 
1967. Abdul Hamid Al-Bakkoush appeared to have been favoured by the King as he 
appealed to Bedouin, educated people in the towns and liberals. The British noted 
that, despite appearances, the Libyan cabinet still had some steadying, older 
members.39   Al-Bakkoush's policy on British facilities was no different from his 
SUHGHFHVVRUDQGFRQVLVWHGRIZKDW6DUUHOOFRQVLGHUHG³EURPLGH´DJDLQVWWKHIDFLOLWLHV 
in Al-Bakkoush's November policy statement.40 7KH)&2OLQHZDVWKDW³Fertainly as far 
as this country is concerned we have no objection to the Libyan Government making 
plenty of noise about this suggestion (withdrawal) so long as their sound and fury 
continues to signify no more than the wish to placate the forces of Arab NDWLRQDOLVP´
In fact Al Bakkoush had phoned Ambassador Sarrell to tell him of the content of his 
statement. 41  
 
Under Al-Bakkoush's premiership Libya, rich through oil revenue and prompted by 
pressure from Arab states involved in the Six Day War to share a commitment to Arab 
politics, began to assert itself and show signs of apparent independence. This policy 
of ³Libyanisation´ saw the Prime Minister entertain plans for an economic regional 
block with Chad, Niger, Algeria and Malta and to build up Libyan influence by the grant 
of aid. During 1968 Al-Bakkoush also embarked on an extensive tour of the Middle 
East and Europe, eager to play a significant diplomatic role and be ³DVRSKLVWLFDWHG
statesman able to discuss a wide range of subjects beyond the sphere of the Middle 
East´42 Ambassador Sarrell believed Al-Bakkoush was the first Libyan Prime Minister 
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prepared to think about the day when British troops would be gone, and was therefore 
taking active steps to prepare Libya against the time when she would have to assume 
a larger share in her own defence.43 
 
By the summer of 1968 the Libyan internal situation was calm and the pace of 
administrative change and reform set by Al-Bakkoush moved on. The Prime Minister 
enjoyed the support of the King and the confidence of the people as youthful 
intellectuals were brought into the administration. The King¶s health, always a concern 
for British policy-makers, varied from day to day but he still had firm control and stood 
by Abdul Hamid Al-Bakkoush in July   when opposition had mounted against the 
Prime Minister from conservative members of the Government. This support did not 
last and on 5 September 1968 Al-Bakkoush resigned when Idris rejected his cabinet 
reshuffle.  Conservative Cyernaican nobles opposed Al-%DNNRXVK¶V liberal reforms 
and whilst the King believed Al %DNNRXVK¶VSROLFHVZHUHULJKW, he feared they had set 
a pace which conservative elements found unacceptable. A British security report on 
Libya noted that Al Bakkoush seemed disheartened before his resignation, as 
opposition to his reforms was great.  Income tax law, the introduction of housing 
allowance for government employees and attempts to curb the size of the civil service 
and impose proper budgetary control on government expenditure were contentious 
issues.44  Wanees Al-Qaddafi took over as Prime Minister and the Tripoli Embassy 
judged this bad for British interests because he had a record of indecisiveness and it 
was likely the government would gradually lose direction.45  In November 1968 Al-
Qaddafi stated that Libya would pursue a moderate, constructive policy and was 
continuing negotiations to end foreign military bases and to convert them into Libyan 
bases.46 Wanees was to remain Prime Minister until September 1969 when the 
Monarchy was overthrown. 
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By the end of the year and despite the change of government in Libya, 
Ambassador Sarrell concluded that Anglo-Libyan relations were excellent and there 
was no talk of revising the treaty during Minister of State Goronwy Roberts¶ visit to 
Libya in October 1968. Sarrell continued to promote the opportunities for trade and 
development in the country.  He  EHOLHYHGWKDW³WKHLPSRUWDQWIDFWRUQRZLVRXUDELOLW\
to help the Libyans fill the immense technical and cultural gaps which their sudden 
DFFHVV WRZHDOWKKDVUHYHDOHG«LWLVE\RXU performance in this that the day to day 
temperature of Anglo-Libyan relations is judged´47  He added later that UK should 
³make a special effort to meet their (Libyan) requirements´48 6DUUHOO¶V DGYLFH ZDV
promoted in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and in July 1969 the new British 
Ambassador, Donald J Maitland was briefed to safeguard military equipment sales, 
encourage and develop Libyan development through oil ZHDOWKDQGLQFUHDVH%ULWDLQ¶V
economic and commercial relations by promoting British goods.49  
 
By the summer of 1969 the foundation of the Anglo-Libyan relationship, the 1953 
treaty, had only another four  years to run but no serious consideration had been given 
to bringing the treaty to an end  or to replacing it before 1973. Prior to his departure 
from the post in the summer of 1969, Ambassador Sarrell, who appeared enthusiastic 
WRFRQWLQXH WRVHFXUH%ULWDLQ¶V LQIOXHQFH LQ WKHFRXQWU\ suggested that it might be a 
good time to consider some form of negotiations, as Idris, who was growing frailer 
would be more sympathetic than a new regime to British interests. 50  Sarrell thought 
³WKDWWKHUHLVQRSRVVLELOLW\ZKDWVRHYHURIQHJRWLDWLQJDUHYLVLRQRIWKHWUHDW\RUDQHZ
treaty with the government of Libya which would secure our training facilities while 
OHWWLQJXVRXWRIRXUGHIHQFHFRPPLWPHQW´, nor did it appear that the Libyans   would 
wish to negotiate any fresh treaty on defence of the country. A British withdrawal from 
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the treaty before the expiry date would underPLQH,GULV¶confidence in Britain.51  The 
treaty relationship was to remain but its continuance was dependent on maintaining 
the external security of the regime. 
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5.2 Defence Planning 
 
From 1968 the British remained committed to the defence of Libya and military 
planning   was still firmly focused upon holding the country against an external attack 
from Egypt.52  Libya¶V Zestern neighbour, Algeria also posed a military threat which 
needed to be considered.53  Whilst Egypt had been severely and humiliatingly 
defeated in June 1967, a JIC report a year later FRQVLGHUHG WKDW (J\SW¶V VHULRXV
economic and internal political problems could tempt the leadership to seek a foreign 
policy or military success abroad and Libya, with her increasing oil wealth, offered 
better prospects than most, but a direct attack was considered unlikely in the 
immediate future.54  Libyan-Egyptian relations had improved since the summer of 
1967. In December of that year King Idris reported that Egyptian Vice President 
Hussein Mahmoud Hassan el-Shafei, during a visit to Libya, had told him that 
Egyptian policy had now changed and that Cairo wished to be in brotherly friendship 
with Libya, although the King remained distrustful of Nasser. 55 Libyan-Egyptian 
rapprochement was due in no small part to the contribution the Libyan Government 
paid to the reconstruction of the Egyptian army and economy IROORZLQJ&DLUR¶VGHIHDW
in June.  
 
In 1968, as a result of both the 1966 Defence Review and a reconsideration of the 
Egyptian threat, the Chiefs of Staff requested a wide-ranging study on the ways and 
means by which British forces could offer military assistance to Libya. Work began on 
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re-evaluating military plans for the defence of Libya, involving no other contingency 
than that of a frontal attack from Egypt. This was considered a remote possibility given 
the British deterrent. The only likely event that might lead to Egyptian involvement in 
Libya was if the internal political situation had deteriorated to a point where the 
Egyptians would wish to exploit the situation. This might occur after a period of internal 
unrest like a revolution or during a transitional period in Libyan politics.56  Although 
London was not obliged to intervene in internal trouble in Libya, any domestic political 
or military conflict which had been externally inspired could legitimately lead to British 
intervention if the King or government requested aid or British lives and property were 
at risk.  Deterrence remained the central feature of British plans for the military 
defence of Libya along with the ability to rapidly deploy forces to the country via the El 
Adem entry point. A defence planning paper identifying the means by which the British 
could come to the aid of Libya was accepted by the Chiefs of Staff on 3 July 1969 and 
a revised plan for military assistance to Libya was initiated, although the revolution of 
September 1969 subsequently halted this process.  
 
The defence planning paper is an interesting document because it recognises that 
the defence of Libya carried wider strategic consequences and was very much part of 
WKH&ROG:DUFRQIOLFW7KHSDSHUVWDWHGWKDWD³FRQWLQJHQF\´SODQRIDSUH-emptive first 
VWULNH E\ %ULWLVK DLUFUDIW XSRQ (J\SWLDQ IRUFHV PLJKW EH QHFHVVDU\ VKRXOG &DLUR¶V
mobilisation be so swift as to put British plans at grave risk of defeat. This scenario 
would place the British Government, upon whose shoulders the paper laid the 
responsibility for the decision, in an extremely sensitive political and diplomatic 
position.  Any apparent British offensive action, with echoes of the Suez Crisis in 
1956, would lead to pan-$UDEFRQGHPQDWLRQDQGULVN(J\SW¶VDOO\ the Soviet Union, 
EHLQJ GUDZQ LQWR D SRWHQWLDO UHJLRQDO FRQIOLFW *LYHQ :DVKLQJWRQ¶V FRPPLWPHQW
through the ³Johnson Letter´, the United States would be unlikely to stand by and see 
two allies, Britain and Libya, defeated and the US position undermined, thereby raising 
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the stakes in Libya into a strategic global conflict. The Soviet Union however, would in 
WKHSDSHU¶VYLHZXUJH UHVWUDLQWRQ&DLURDQ[LRXV WKDW WKH UHJLPHQRW VXIIHUDQRWKHU
military setback. 57   
 
The other threat to Libya lay from Algeria. The Libyan relationship with Algeria 
remained unsettled because Algeria was governed by a non-aligned nationalist regime 
that also competed with Libya for gas and oil sales. Libyan Prime Minister Al-
Bakkoush said in April 1968 that so long as President Houari Boumedienne was in 
command in Algeria there was nothing to be done regarding relations. 58  Both the 
Libyans and British had been nervous during the Six Day War over Algerian intentions 
because Algerian forces were allowed to transit to Egypt via Benina airfield in Libya.  
The Algerians could have chosen to use their temporary military presence in Libya to 
support any uprising and  British forces could have been drawn into any conflict, as 
this would constitute an attack from outside Libya. In June 1967 Headquarters in 
Cyrenaica had asked for permission to   ready British tanks in El Adem as a security 
precaution, although in the event Algerian forces were sent to Egypt by sea. 59  
 
/RQGRQ¶V perceptions of the scale of the Algerian threat to Libya are hard to 
discern. JIC documents are not de-classified in the National Archives but as the British 
undertook studies in conjunction with the USA on the Algerian threat it is reasonable 
WR H[SHFW :DVKLQJWRQ¶V FRQFOXVions of the Algerian threat were not dissimilar. 
:DVKLQJWRQDJUHHGZLWK/RQGRQ¶VLQWHUpretation of the Algerian menace, outlined in a 
report in September 1967. 60  ,Q:DVKLQJWRQFRQVLGHUHGWKDW³WKHOLRQ
VVKDUHRI
the $OJHULDQ *RYHUQPHQW¶V money and manpower is being spent on improving the 
domestic situation. In another significant and favourable trend, Algeria has worked 
hard to improve significantly cooperation with its Maghreb neighbours´ leading to a 
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Moroccan-Algerian rapprochement. Worryingly for Western interests, Soviet influence 
over the past year had continued to grow. Algiers steadfastly maintained they would 
not grant military bases to foreigners, but Soviet leverage, based on substantial 
military, economic and trade programs had grown stronger whilst French influence 
continued to decline. But as ³YRFLIHURXVO\DQWL-imperialist, a loud supporter of armed 
struggle by the Palestinians in the Middle East, and an underwriter of modest 
assistance for African liberation movements´ Whe regime certainly was at odds with 
the Idris regime.61  Algeria¶V PLOLWDUy threat had grown since 1963, having received 
$250 million worth in planes, tanks and ships IURPWKH8665$OJHULD¶Varmed forces 
were now almost completely dependent on Moscow for spare parts, replacements, 
training, and ammunition and between 1,200 and 1,500 Soviet military advisors and 
technicians were placed in Algeria.62 
 
Whilst Algeria was a potential threat to Libya, British defence planning to counter 
this threat was not pursued. This was because an Algerian attack was considered to 
be unlikely.63 In January 1968 the Ministry of Defence was instructed not to plan for 
meeting an Algerian attack and this position had not changed by the end of the year.64 
British planners considered that Washington was obliged to protect Libya against an 
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attack from Algeria through the Johnson Letter, which ³ZDV QRW WLHG WR (J\SW DV
such´65 Meanwhile British intelligence reports noted that the Algerian and Egyptian 
threat to Libya had subsided during 1968. In May Egyptian subversion in Libya was at 
a low ebb. 66  Algeria appeared to be too involved in monitoring its own internal and 
external security to be concerned with Libya.67  The Libyan Prime Minister visited 
Algiers in May 1968 and both countries appeared anxious to make sure the visit was a 
success and a contentious border mapping dispute dating from French colonial times 
was not raised. This issue related to the border being drawn to the east of a range of 
hills, which the Libyans considered to be the natural national dividing line. Libyan 
tribes were moving into the hills when migrating and giving the Algerians grounds for a 
grievance. The French Foreign Ministry had undertaken to look into this matter without 
commitment.68  By the end of 1968 local intelligence reports recorded that Algeria and 
Egypt were keeSLQJ WKHLU ³KHDGV GRZQ´ LQ /LE\D  The internal situation was much 
quieter.69     
 
7R/LE\D¶VEHQHILW LQ1969 the US State Department recognised that Algeria was 
WU\LQJ³WRDYRLGWRRJUHDWDGHSHQGHQFHRQHLWKHURILWVPDMRU aid donors, France or the 
USSR´ DQG ³Boumediene sought to demonstrate his independence by bettering 
relations with his conservative neighbours´  Tunisia and Libya had been less quick to 
respond to these new currents but both had been seeking to broaden their diplomatic 
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options including negotiations on border disputes.70  A worrying development in that 
same year was WKHDOOHJHGIRXQGDWLRQRI WKH³1DWLRQDO/LE\DQ/LEHUDWLRQ0RYHPHQW´
in Algiers, whose members were apparently dedicated to the overthrow of the existing 
regime in Libya and were receiving some support from the Algerian Government. 
Meanwhile Egyptian intentions towards Libya raised concerns in Tripoli .This was due 
to reports of increased Egyptian naval and air activity in April 1969 in the vicinity of the 
frontier and the defection of an officer of the Egyptian intelligence service. The officer 
led the Libyans to believe that a campaign of Egyptian sabotage and subversion in 
Libya was imminent, although he later retracted this statement. The officer did 
emphasise that the long term objective of the Egyptian Intelligence Service was the 
overthrow of the Libyan regime, but only after the King's death. 71 
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5.3 /LE\D¶V&RPPHUFLDO(QYLURQPHQW 
 
Having stabilised the Anglo-Libyan relationship and secured the remaining facilities 
after 1967, British interests in Libya now lay not only with planning for the defence of 
the country but with developing commercial opportunities, particularly in arms sales 
and so securing the regime.  The shift in British strategy from East of Suez   
commitments to a policy based upon Europe and NATO led London to consider new 
ways of influencing those countries which they could no longer afford to maintain 
facilities in.  As we have seen the status of commercial diplomacy and export 
promotion had grown so that by the late 1960s commercial work was an important part 
of the diplomatic service, as stressed by the Plowden Report.72 The Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office recognised the value of trade and commerce and concluded in 
FebruDU\WKDW³Paintaining influence is not an objective but a means to the end 
of fostering a situation in which our own interests and prosperity can grow. The most 
quantifiable of our interests are our exports, the protection of our import sources, our 
investment income and our relations wiWKRXUFUHGLWRUV´DVDQRIIVHWWR%ULWDLQ¶VJOREDO
military decline.73 Overseas sales were also vital for the recovery of the British 
economy and the devalued pound made British exports more competitive.  
 
British policy in Libya was in line with the commercial concerns of wider British 
foreign policy practice.  In the $UDEZRUOG%ULWDLQ¶VUROHhad changed from the military 
and strategic focus on Aden and Iraq during the 1950s, to a commercial one focused 
particularly on the Arab monarchies.  Selling arms to the Middle East was a lucrative 
activity and a range of British arms were exported. The Israelis bought the Centurion 
tank and armoured cars were sold to Jordan, Sudan and Tunisia. The Jordanian Air 
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Force was equipped with Hunter aircraft and the Saudis bought the Lightning fighter 
aircraft. Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait and Oman also received arms.  74 
 
But the sale of arms was a sensitive issue. Anxious not to be seen to arm or show 
preference to any side in the region it was agreed by ministers in 1967 WKDW³ZHVKRXOG
QRW VXSSO\ DUPVZKLFK DUH H[FOXVLYHO\ RIIHQVLYH LQ FKDUDFWHU´ VXFK DV PHGLXP
bombers or guided missiles.  Harrier, Lightning and Hunter aircraft and Centurion 
tanks could be supplied%XW³Lt would however continue to be necessary for specific 
approval to be given by ministers EHIRUHPDMRUQHZLWHPVZHUHVXSSOLHG´With these 
points in mind it had been agreed by ministers that Britain ³VKRXOGFRQWLQXHWRVXSSO\
arms and other equipment to Libya to build up a defence capability which we consider 
reasonable´75  
 
The active promotion of arms sales had been a result of a perception in the British 
Government and the arms industry in the early 1960s that British arms manufacturers 
were losing market share to competitor nations. The Douglas-Home Government had 
started to review US and French approaches to selling arms and the Wilson 
Government shared Conservative concerns and decided not merely to maintain arms 
exports at their present level but to increase them substantially. The Defence Sales 
Organisation (DSO) was created in the early years of the Labour Government to 
promote arms sales. 76  In 1966 Healey told Parliament that Britain must secure its 
rightful share of a £1 billion global arms market and there was some success in this 
field. British arms sales were £100million in 1967/8 rising to £150million in 1968/9. By 
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1970/1 arms sales were double what they were when DSO was founded, a real terms 
increase of 67%. 77  
 
In the mid-1960s arms sales had taken took place in three ways: direct from the 
Ministry of Defence; via nationalised companies such as Royal Ordnance Factories, 
Rolls Royce, Millbank Technical Services and International Military Services (IMS); 
and via private companies. The 1965 Stokes Report on the British arms sales 
promotion industry had suggested good commercial agents would be of the greatest 
value to the Ministry of DefeQFH¶VRZQRYHUVHDVVDOHVVWDIIby providing an additional 
source of information. Donald Stokes was head of Leyland Motors and had been 
brought in by Healey to review arms sales during the first years of the Labour 
Government.  However, the use of such third parties was to lead to accusations of 
bribery to secure contracts. 78   
 
With the Libyan Government¶V decision to rearm the Libyan defence forces in 1967 
7ULSROL¶VGHIHQFHVSHQGLQJZDVIRUHFDVWat £250 million over the next five years. 79 As 
well as the December 1967 arms order for internal security measures, the Libyans 
also placed a number of expensive orders for their defence services increasing the 
size of the army from 7,000 to 10,000 men, ³DFKDUDFWHULVWLFRI WKHQHZSURFHVVRI
³/LE\DQLVDWLRQ´´ $V:ULJKWUHFRJQLVHV³E\WKHPLG-1960s, a passive foreign policy and 
base leasing agreements seemed the best defence for a nation unable to provide 
adequate forces of its own´EXWthe Libyan regime was now forced to start looking to 
managing its own defence, a result of British disengagement and Arab criticism of 
Western bases. TKHVPDOOVL]HRIWKHDUPHGIRUFHVDQGWKHLU³XQSUHGLFWDEOHOR\DOWLHV´
meant the regime chose to invest in sophisticated and expensive defence systems.80 
Most important was the purchase of the BAC air defence scheme, the British share of 
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this involving the sale of surface to air guided missiles and related radar. Negotiations 
between BAC, the Libyan Ministry of Defence, the British Ministry of Defence and the 
Ministry of Technology led to the signing of a contract worth £115 million for the supply 
of Thunderbird and Rapier missiles with associated data handling and radar 
equipment on 28 April 1968. The contract was signed between BAC and the Libyan 
Government.  BAC was to be the prime contractor and would be responsible for 
installation, training and overall support, including additional work provided by sub- 
contractors Marconi, Elliott Automation, Plessey and Ferranti. Further support and 
training contracts valued at £20.4 million were signed on 2 February 1969.81  Upon 
taking power in September 1969 the Gaddafi regime made allegations of bribery and 
corruption against both the previous Libyan regime and BAC regarding the air defence 
contract.  The British Government had initially courted Libyan interest in the air 
defence scheme but handed negotiations over to BAC. Critics queried its cost, 
practicality and relevance. In particular doubts were expressed as to whom the air 
defence scheme was supposed to counter HVSHFLDOO\ DV 1DVVHU¶V military capacity 
was much reduced. Suspicions were high that the British had used the air defence 
scheme as a way to maintain political influence in Libya as well as sell a very 
expensive system to a country that did not require it. Wright recognises that some 
FULWLFV FRQVLGHUHG LW ³DOOHJHGO\ D ZD\ RI PDLQWDLQLQJ D %ULWLVK PLOLWDU\ SUHVHQFH´
because the system would require highly trained technicians, presumably British, to 
run it. 82 Following the revolution Libyan political figures were tried for defrauding the 
Libyan people because of their involvement in the air defence scheme. 
 
The Libyan army was to be restructured and provided with arms to project a 
credible deterrent in accordance with the report prepared by General Mogg for the 
joint Anglo-Libyan Committee in June 1968.  The Libyans were eager to expand all 
branches of their military and requested additional papers at the Committee meetings 
in 1968 covering the navy and air force. Money was no obstacle for the Libyans. The 
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army equipment contract valued at £46.8 million was signed on 21 April 1969 whilst a 
support contract was still in negotiation in the autumn of 1969. Under the terms of the 
two contracts the Libyan Government had by October 1969 paid £35.5 million. In 
addition, naval    sales totalling £6 million since 1964 had built up the Libyan navy with 
orders for a frigate and 13 patrol boats. 83  The military missions and the availability of 
British military personnel at the remaining facilities acting as informal arms promoters 
and trainers provided a significant boost to arms sales.84  
 
The United States also played a role in building up the Libyan armed forces. A 
report by the United States Air Force Survey Team on the expansion of the Royal 
Libyan Air Force on 15 August 1968 recommended a 15-year time-phased 
development program, which would provide Libya with a small but balanced tactical air 
force capable of performing air defence and ground support roles. The Survey Team 
proposed the early development of a second RLAF base, in addition to Wheelus, at 
Benina Airfield, Benghazi.85  
 
British trade policy in Libya was reviewed during the visit in October 1968 of 
Goronwy Roberts, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Talks 
were held on technical and development issues.  Ambassador Sarrell was keen to 
report to London how he personally was ³VWUXFNDJDLQE\ WKHLPPHQVHRSSRUWXQLWLHV
for us here´ He considered Libya ³DJURZWKPDUNHWLQZKLFK successful enterprise now 
can continue to pay dividends for decades to come´  The Ambassador concluded that 
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³5REHUWV«OHIW«ZLWK FOHDU LPSUHVVLRQ RI WKH QHHG IRU FORVH FRRUGLQDWLRQ RI DOO RXU
efforts, both here and LQ /RQGRQ´ WR PD[LPLVH VXFFHVV86 Roberts reported that, in 
view of the exceptional trade possibilities the British should immediately review their   
whole approach to the PDUNHW+HEHOLHYHGDVSHFLDO³OHJPDQ´should be appointed 
who would personally contact firms in Britain and authorities in Libya to develop sales 
opportunities. 87 
 
Roberts was concerned with the over-emphasis on military trade with Libya that 
threatened to undermine the political decision to distance Britain from military support 
for the country and enhance Libyan independence+LVUHSRUWVWDWHGWKDW³Gefence is 
an important element in our bilateral relations with Libya and the embassy wants our 
Ministry of Defence to supply defence personnel and to set up their own arrangements 
for servicing equipment supplied to Libyan forces instead of relying on the crown 
agents´+HEHOLHYHGVXFKD VLWXDWLRQQHHGHG WREH ZHLJKHG ³DJDLQVW WKHGDQJHURI
(becoming) too much involved in Libyan defence especially in view of our desire not to 
renew the defence agreement´ Instead Roberts advised WKDW ³FRRSHUDWLRQZLWKWKHP
should be technical rather than political otherwise we might appear to be involved in 
any armed clash between them and Algeria or Egypt´ 88  The depth of British defence 
support signalled that Libya still remained under British political influence and 
independence was not entirely complete. 
 
British commercial involvement in Libya was not solely focused on defence 
contracts. British firms were involved in diverse projects from agricultural development 
and airports, civil construction, petroleum and power supplies. The Board of Trade and 
Ministry of Technology showed interest in selling the civilian BAC 1-11 and Hawker 
Siddeley Trident aircraft to Libya in 1967 and    sought, in competition with the French 
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and Italians, the operations and service management of the Libyan state airline.89 
British commercial enterprise in Libya had expanded after the Committee for Middle 
East Trade mission visited the country in March 1966.  By the early summer of 1967 
³DQXSVXUJHRIDFWLYLW\RQWKHSart of British exporters began to win a deeper market 
SHQHWUDWLRQ´EXWSURJUHVVwas retarded by events in June. Conditions improved during 
ZLWK³PLQLVWHULDOYLVLWVLQERWKGLUHFWLRQV%ULWLVKWUDGH missions to Libya, a major 
participation in the 1968 Tripoli international fair, visits by groups of journalists and 
03V DQG WKH 7ULSROL %HQJKD]L FKDPEHUV RI FRPPHUFH GHOHJDWLRQ WR %ULWDLQ´  DOO
served to restore full market acceptance for British goods. By September 1968 exports 
to Libya were running at a rate of about £36 million a year as compared with a total of 
PLOOLRQ LQ7KHIRFXVZDVRQ³JRYHUQPHQWFRQWUDFWVDQGSXUFKDVHV´ZKLFK
offered WKHPRVWYDOXDEOHDQGFOHDUO\GHILQHGH[SRUWRSSRUWXQLWLHVZLWK³RIWKH
FRXQWU\¶V RLO UHYHQXHV VHW aside for development fund expenditure´90  The Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office recognised these developments as a by-product of 
improved political relations for ³WKHUHKDVEHHQD UHPDUkable improvement in Anglo-
Libyan relations since the nadir reached in the June WDURI«WKH/LE\DQVDUH
relying on us to a greater extent than ever before for British H[SHUWV´. 91   
 
The British non-military commercial stake was not without competition. Washington 
was eager to court political influence in Libya through development. Libya like many of 
the Middle Eastern states did not receive US financial support because they were too 
oil rich to qualify for aid. Instead Washington sought to integrate experts into these 
nations in a more systematic way rather than by expanding existing special programs. 
In order to improve US-Libyan relations, Al-Bakkoush was scheduled to visit the USA 
in September 1968 to meet President Johnson. One of the main themes Washington 
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hoped to stress was /LE\D¶VUDSLGHFRQRPLFSURJUHVVDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶GHVLUHWR
continue a close technical relationship with the new generation of Libyans.  As a 
practical move in this direction, during the visit the US would be signing a series of 
technical cooperation agreements. Washington also had an interest in oil development 
since American companies had the majority of concessions for developing Libya's oil 
reserves.92  This plans failed to come to fruition as Al-%DNNRXVK¶V trip was cancelled 
when he was removed from office later in September 1968. 
 
7ULSROL¶s economic development raised concerns in London that the lucrative 
Libyan market was opening to fierce competition DQGWKLVWKUHDWHQHG%ULWDLQ¶V trading 
position. During Al %DNNRXVK¶VYLVLWWR)UDQFHLQVSULQJDSHWUROHXPDJUHHPHQW
ZDVUHDFKHG³IRU the purposes of research and exploitation´ Of particular interest to 
the British Ambassador LQ3DULVZDVWKDW³WKHWZRJRYHUQPHQWVLQWHQGHGWRLQFUHDVH
WKHLU FRPPHUFLDO H[FKDQJHV DQG QHJRWLDWLRQV ZHUH WR EHJLQ «IRU D FXOWXUDO
agreement...with  (the) possibility of extending French technical assistance in the 
fields of petroleum, medicine, hydrology, mineralogy and TV´93  First Secretary and 
Head of Chancery at Tripoli, Alan Gordon Munro, believed the French had previously 
failed on the military supplies and capital equipment fields, and could be laying greater 
emphasis on the cultural front in an apparent longer term policy of drawing Libya into 
the French orbit in the Maghreb. This strategy accounted for the proposal to establish 
a joint Franco-Libyan institute providing teachers and television technicians.94  
President De Gaulle of France had commented that Britain¶V links with Lib\DZHUH³LQ
)UDQFH¶V LQWHUHVW´ but the Foreign and Commonwealth Office considered that French 
                                                   
92
 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Palmer) to the Under-Secretary 
of State for Economic Affairs, memorandum, 25 April 1966. FRUS, 1964-1968,Vol 
xxiv, Africa,80.  
Available from http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxiv/i.html [23 
January 2010]. 
93
 Paris to FCO, 5 April 1968, FCO 33/70. 
94 A G Munro to P Mallet, 8 April 1968, FCO 33/70. 
198 
commercial penetration in the Middle East was being orchestrated against all 
competitors and it suggested the British should be doing the same. 95  
 
More acceptable to British trade interests was a developing relationship between 
the former British possession of Malta and Libya. The British Government had signed 
a defence and financial agreement with Malta in 1964 following the completion of 
independence negotiations. However, Labour¶V'HIHQFH5HYLHZOHGWRDGLVSXWHRYHU
proposed reductions in British forces in Malta. The Maltese Government were 
concerned with the economic effects of a British withdrawal.  On 13 March 1967 an 
agreement was reached in which London obtained some reduction in commitments 
but the rundown was to be phased over a four-year period, instead of two, with the 
concession that Malta could seek a review if Maltese unemployment was to rise 
dramatically. Thereafter Malta witnessed great economic progress in the latter half of 
the 1960s which the British were eager to nurture in tandem with Libyan 
development.96  Al-Bakkoush visited Malta from 27 April to 1 May and on 31 May 1968 
trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation agreements between Malta and 
Libya were signed. Ambassador Sarrell believed the Libyans needed technically 
qualified manpower available in Malta to aid the development of the country.  The Al-
%DNNRXVKYLVLWZDVDOVRLPSRUWDQWDVLWZDV³LQWKHILUVWVWDJHRIWDNLQJWKHZUDSVoff 
his  (Al Bakkoush) own grand design for a Mediterranean and North African region, of 
which Libya forms the hub, with the objective of building up a new grouping with a 
stake in the security and stability of the eastern Mediterranean´ Ambassador Sarrell 
H[SODLQHG WKDW ³the establishment of a closer relationship between these two 
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strategically significant counWULHV«LVDSUocess which seems fully consistent with the 
aims of our policy in the Mediterranean region´97  
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5.4 The End of East of Suez   
 
%\/LE\D¶VVWUDWHJLFUROHLQ%ULWDLQ¶VEast of Suez commitments was obsolete. 
The East of Suez strategy itself was to be formally ended in that year when further 
cuts in defence spending were necessary. On 18 November 1967 sterling had been 
devalued from $2.80 to $2.40 in the wake of further balance of payment problems and 
economic difficulties. This action failed to rectify the balance of payments issue and 
actually increased the overseas defence budget bill by about £50 million.  Chancellor 
Roy Jenkins, who had been appointed following James Callaghan¶V UHVLJQDWLRQ LQ
November 1967 DQG FRQVLGHUHG E\ &URVVPDQ DV WKH ³GRPLQDQW IRUFH LQ &DELQHW´
sought further spending cuts and targeted defence, including a  withdrawal from East 
of Suez at least by the end of the financial year 1970-1971, instead of a planned mid-
1970s departure. The announcement as such was made on 16 January 1968, 
VLJQLI\LQJWKHHQGRIWKH%ULWDLQ¶VEast of Suez role. 98  Pham claims that from within a 
week of his arrival Jenkins was in serious discussions to implement stern measures to 
shore up the pound which was still very fragile at its reduced rate following devaluation 
DQG WKH &DELQHW¶V DFFHSWDQFH RI VXEVWDQWLDO FLYLO FXWV ZRXOG EH D result of a prior 
DJUHHPHQWWR³YHU\ELJFXWV´LQ defence expenditure. 99 
 
The consequences for BriWDLQ¶V 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ GHSOR\PHQWV ZHUH that the British 
would continue to maintain a staging post in Cyprus for the time being to service the 
remaining CENTO and Far East commitment.  British forces remained committed in 
Malta until 1974 although the rundown of forces was to continue. In Libya it was ac-
cepted, in a memorandum presented by Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart to Cabinet 
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LQ-DQXDU\WKDW³We should try to reshape our treaty commitment.....but if we go 
back on the commitment we should imperil arms orders estimated at up to £250 mil-
lion over the next five years and a highly important source of oil supplies West of 
6XH]´DQGWKHUefore there would be no change in the deployments. 100  
 
The accelerated end to the East of Suez role had come about due to a number of 
IDFWRUV 3LFNHULQJ QRWHV WKDW HFRQRPLF ³FULVHV KDG ILQDOO\ ZRUQ GRwn a government 
FRPPLWWHGWRPDLQWDLQLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVDZRUOGSRZHU, able to shape events and 
SURWHFW LWV LQWHUHVWV´ (FRQRPLFproblems and decline necessitated cuts which were 
³WKH VWLPXOXV IRU FKange´ DOWKRXJK ³&DELQHW VKLIWV´ DV ZHOO DV ³DOWHUations in the 
machinery of government and policy calculation played equally an important role´ 101 
:ULJOH\ FODLPV WKDW SROLF\ FKDQJH LQ  ³FDPH DERXW QRW WKURXJK D UDGLFDO
review....but because of a seriously deteriorating economy and changed international 
SROLWLFDOFLUFXPVWDQFHV´%ULWDLQFRXOG³QRORQJHUSRVHDVDZRUOGSRZHU´)XUWKHUPRUH
Wrigley states that Wilson, slow to change his mind and committed to East of Suez, 
may have been convinced by the relative unimportance of Britain during the Six Day 
:DU³FKDQJHGFLUFXmstances in Malaysia and AdHQ´DQGHYHQSUHVVXUHIURPWKH/eft 
ZLQJRI WKHSDUW\DQGIURPWKH³QHZSRVVLELOLWLHV´RIZLWhdrawal voiced by the Right-
wing Conservative shadow defence minister Enoch Powell. Wrigley considers that the 
decision to withdraw was, for Wilson, therefore a political move to secure his position 
in the party and in the country.102 Hughes states that a crucial factor behind the East 
RI6XH]GHFLVLRQZDVWKH³SUHYDLOLQJFRQVHQVXVZLWKLQ:KLWHKDOOWKDWWKH8.¶VPLOLWDU\
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rROHLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQG6RXWK(DVW$VLDZHUHQRORQJHUQHFHVVDU\RULQ%ULWDLQ¶V
LQWHUHVWV´ HVSHFLDOO\ DIWHU ,QGRQHVLD DEDQGRQHG DWWHPSWV WR XQGHUPLQH 0DOD\VLD
%ULWLVK SROLF\ DLPHG WR HQFRXUDJH WKH ³FDSDELOLWLHV RI UHJLRQDO DOOLHV WR GHIHQG
themselves ZLWK PLQLPXP H[WHUQDO DVVLVWDQFH´ +XJKHV QRWHV WKDW %ULWDLQ¶V
FRPPLWPHQWWR&(172ZDV³XQGHUPLQHGE\WKHIDFWWKDWPHPEHUVWDWHVZHUHPRUH
concerned with parochial quarrels ....Iranian-$UDEULYDOU\LQWKH3HUVLDQ*XOI´WKDQZLWK
containing Soviet expansioQ )XUWKHUPRUH+XJKHVUHFRJQLVHV WKDW ³DVERWK&(172
and SEATO lacked the credibility or cohesion to make them sustainable, it made no 
VWUDWHJLFVHQVHIRU%ULWDLQWRSURYLGHWRNHQVXSSRUWIRUUHOXFWDQWDOOLHV´DOWKRXJKDVZH
have seen earlier, ministers were reluctant to relinquish the commitment to Iran. 103  
 
Cabinet ministers also made a significant contribution to the decision. The 
HFRQRP\GHVSLWHGHYDOXDWLRQZDVSUHFDULRXVDQG5R\-HQNLQV³GHPRQVWUDWHGWKDWWKH
deficit in the last months of 1967 was aV EDG DV LQ ´104 The appointment of 
Chancellor Jenkins was important as he fervently argued that it was time for radical 
policy changes and he believed ³LWZDVRQO\ LQ WKHVKRFNRIVXFKDVLWXDWLRQDVKDG
QRZ EHHQ UHYHDOHG WR WKH JRYHUQPHQW«WKDW LW ZDV possible to obtain decisions to 
reduce our commitments´105  Jenkins¶ selection, Pickering believesZDV³LQWHQGHGWR
undermine the EDVWRI6XH]UROH´DQGZDVWKH³UHVXOWRIFDUHIXOSROLWLFDOPDQRHXYULQJ´
E\ D ZHDNHQHG 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU ZKR ³SUL]HG WKH ³ZRUOG´ role but was attempting to 
preserve his sagging influence. Saki Dockrill believes Jenkins¶ appointment expedited 
WKH VKULQNLQJ RI %ULWDLQ¶V JOREDO UROH DORQJ ZLWK WKH ³VKRFN Rf the devaluation of the 
pound´ whilst Reynolds stresses that Jenkins was determined commitments should be 
cut as well as capabilities. The Left wing of the Labour party supported this approach.  
However, Prime Minister :LOVRQ:ULJOH\FRPPHQWV ³KDGDVWURQJHUFRPPLWPHQW WR
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VWHUOLQJ DQG WR WKH (DVW RI 6XH]´ UROH106 Defence Secretary Healey also played a 
significant role in the withdrawal from East of Suez. His   biographer, Edward Pearce, 
claims that ZLWKGUDZDO ZDV ³WKH +HDOH\ SROLF\ RI DIIRUGDEOH WDUJHWHG FRPPLWPHQW
amended into the Treasury policy of disengagement, nagged on by Left-wing back 
bench protest and finally accomplished after a financial crisis by Wilson´ Pickering 
recognises WKDW+HDOH\¶VKRVWLOLW\ WRD IXUWKHU WKLQQLQJRI WKHFRXQWU\¶VRYHUVWUHWFKHG
armed forces had led him to agree to commitment reductions. Reynolds notes that in 
early 1968 Healey, who had utilised American criteria of cost effectiveness in defence, 
was united with Foreign Secretary Brown against further cuts. However, Jenkins was 
determined commitments, as well as capabilities should be reduced. 107  
 
PicNHULQJ EHOLHYHV 3ULPH 0LQLVWHU :LOVRQ¶V VXSSRUW for Jenkins ZDV ³PRUe 
LPSRUWDQW´ WKDQ +HDOH\¶V UROH, leading him to conclude that politics as well as 
economics spelt the end of the BritDLQ¶VZRUOGUROHDQGReynolds suggests that Wilson 
DEDQGRQHG WKH ³symbols of wealth and empire´ and reoriented himself and British 
policy to focus on Europe rather than the Commonwealth and Wilson also placed an 
emphasis on domestic and social expenditure over defence, to placate the Left-wing 
of the party. Young suggests that the 1967 EEC application was influenced by the 
GHFLVLRQ WR ³DEDQGRQ LWV EDVHV (DVW RI 6XH]´ DQG WKLV VKRZHG DQ DFFHSWDQFH RI
%ULWDLQ¶V ³GHPLVH DV D ZRUOG SRZHU´ /DERXU¶V DSSOLFDWLRQ WR MRLQ WKH (EC was 
unsuccessful, vetoed by de Gaulle on 22 November 1967. In contrast Hughes 
EHOLHYHV :LOVRQ ZDV ³OHVV SHUWXUEHG E\ WKH HQG RI WKH ³ZRUOG UROH´ RU E\ WKH
consequences of the defence cuts hHKDGRYHUVHHQ´+XJKHVFODLPVWilson showed 
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³OLWWOHVXEVWDQWLDOLQWHUHVWLQGHIHQFHLVVXHV´OHDYLQJGHWDLOVWR+HDOH\However Darwin 
recognises that a combination of factors led to the withdrawal and it required the 
devaluation crisis, Jenkinsite Europeanists, the Left and Wilson himself to overcome   
the ³*UHDW%ULWDLQVFKRRO´in Cabinet and extract the final avowal that ³WKHODVWYHVWLJHV
RI WKH LPSHULDO UROHZHUHDWDQHQG´. Pickering notes that tKH%ULWLVK ³ZHre making a 
statement that the pretence of being a world SRZHUZDVEHLQJVWULSSHGDZD\´RUDV
Antony Crosland, the President of the Board of Trade SXWLW³EUHDNLQg down the status 
EDUULHU´108  
 
Evolving perceptions and the conclusions, drawn in Cabinet and Whitehall about 
the East of  Suez role have particular relevance to British policy towards the Libyan 
facilities and show how the British withdrawal from Libya was grounded in larger 
strategic considerations of the period.  The Libyan facilities were of relevance to 
/RQGRQ¶VDSSUHFLDWLRQRIPLOLWDU\GHSOR\PHQWVRXWVLGHRI(XURSH $VZHKDYHVHHQ
facilities had become an anachronism in British global defence strategy and could not 
guarantee the defence of British interests. The Six Day War illustrated the military 
ineffectiveness of the facilities in Libya and underlined the redundancy of such 
facilities East of Suez. The Libyan bases attracted animosity as they were a 
manifestation of Western power and served little use LQGHIHQGLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLF
investment for they failed to prevent an oil embargo.  British defence policy was 
turning to NATO for defence and security and to the Common Market for economic 
and political relations. British global policy therefore had little need to retain overseas 
deployments. In addition, it was recognised that trade and economic interests could be 
better secured through diplomatic and political means. Sanders notes that British trade 
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was now focused upon advanced economies rather than on former imperial 
territories.109  
 
The decision to withdraw from East of Suez, events in the Middle East in 1967 and 
devaluation also led Washington to finally recognize that reliance on the British to 
bolster US global strategy was at an end.  Colman claims that the White House 
concluded they could handle the impact of devaluation as a threat to the US dollar.  
%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWLQXHGFXWV LQGHIHQFHH[SHQGLWXUH ³PHDQW WKHUHZDVQR UHDO LQWHUHVW LQ
provLGLQJ KHOS´ IRU sterling.  According to reports from the British Ambassador to 
Washington, Patrick Dean,  it was apparent that the  ³LQFUHDVLQJH[SRVXUHRI%ULWDLQ¶V
weakness and declining strategic value suggested that increasingly, the country was 
but one ally among many for the USA´. 110 The Johnson administration appeared 
UHVLJQHGWRWKHLQHYLWDELOLW\RIWKHGHPLVHRI%ULWDLQ¶VZRUOGUROH%XW'HDQDGGHGWKDW
WKH86$³KDYHQRLQWHQWLRQRIGLVSHQVLQJZLWKXVQRUKDYHDQ\ZLVKWRGRVR´DQGWKH
relationship was not at an end.111  Washington still considered that Britain would be 
DEOH ³WR FDUU\ RXW XQGHUWDNLQJV RI EHQHILW WR WKH 86 LQ GLSORPDF\ LQWHOOLJHQFH DQG
WHFKQRORJ\´DOWKRXJKLWZDVQRZUHFRJQLVHGWKDW the defence cuts had ended BULWDLQ¶V
role as a world power.112 However, in January 1968 the Americans made a final 
                                                   
109
 D. Sanders, Losing an Empire, Finding a Role, (Basingstoke/London, 1990), p. 
119.  
110 J. Colman, $ ³6SHFLDO 5HODWLRQVKLS´" +DUROG :LOVRQ /\QGRQ %-RKQVRQ DQG
Anglo-$PHULFDQV 5HODWLRQV ³DW WKH 6XPPLW´ -1968, (Manchester, 2004), p. 
147. 
111
 P Dean to P Gore Booth, Permanent Under-Secretary Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, 25 October 1967, FCO 7/771. 
112 NARA, Subject ±Numeric 1967-1969, POL 7 UK, 2.1.68 State Department 
5HVHDUFK 0HPRUDQGXP ³:KDW QRZ IRU 8." :LOVRQ¶V YLVLW DQG 8.¶V )XWXUH´ 
February 1968 in J Colman, $ ³6SHFLDO 5HODWLRQVKLS´" +DUROG :LOVRQ /\QGRQ
B.Johnson and Anglo-$PHULFDQV 5HODWLRQV ³DW WKH 6XPPLW´ -1968 
(Manchester, 2004), p. 170. 
206 
attempt to persuade the British to maintain their East of Suez role. For example, in 
light of the proposed cuts in defence, Barbara Castle notes that Washington continued 
to argue against them. She relates in her diary that Brown had met Dean Rusk and he 
concluded that "the Americans....attached more importance to our decision about the 
Middle-East than the Far EasWDQGWKH\EHOLHYHG³the Russians are waiting to move 
into the Middle East if we leDYHDYDFXXP´+H(Brown) EHJJHG³P\FROOHDJXHVWRWDNH
this danger seriously".113 
 
In due course Washington came to recognise WKDW³%ULWDLQQRORQJHUKDVWKHZLOORU
can afford, to play a major securiW\UROHLQWKH0LGGOH(DVW´DOWKRXJKthe United States 
cRXOGVWLOO³FRQVWUXFWLYHO\XVH%ULWDLQ
VUHVLGXDOSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFLQIOXHQFHLQWKH
Middle East, particularly with the Arab states, as part of our common desire to seek an 
equitable and enduring settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to resist rising Soviet 
influence´114  Whilst the East of Suez strategy KDGQRZHQGHGDQG%ULWDLQ¶VIDFLOLWLHVLQ
Libya were only of value to defend the country, British policy to Tripoli continued in line 
ZLWK :DVKLQJWRQ¶V H[SHFWDWLRQV LQ WKH $UDE VWDWHV  This was partly because Libya 
retained a strategic significance due to the Soviet and Egyptian threat.  As we have 
seen, the withdrawal request of June 1967 had had implications IRU WKH :HVW¶V
security position in   North Africa and the Arab world and the Chiefs of Staff had 
recognised the Nasserite and Soviet threat to the political vacuum that would occur.   
Furthermore the British withdrawal from a strategy based East of Suez led to a 
consolidation of defence interests to NATO and the Mediterranean theatre of 
operations which Libya was a part of. 
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From 1968 %ULWLVKSROLF\EHFDPHLQFUHDVLQJO\FRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHWKUHDWWR1$72¶V
southern flank from the Soviet Union. The Chiefs of staff had requested a study on   
EROVWHULQJ%ULWDLQ¶VQDYDOSUHVHQFH LQ0HGLWHUUDQHDQas SDUWRI1$72¶V IRUFHV LQ WKH
area  in 1968, after Greece and Italy had expressed concern at a growing Soviet 
presence in the region. 115  Maurice Foley, Under-Secretary of State for Defence 
stated in Parliament on 11 March 1968 that:   
 
³ZLWKUHJDUGWRRXUSosition west of Suez, our withdrawal from overseas will enable 
us to increase the number of ships at immediate readiness for N.A.T.O.'s shield 
forces, and so enable us to continue to play a leading part among the European 
navies in the N.A.T.O. maritime alliance...the growth in Soviet maritime strength...has 
underlined the importance of the shield forces, especially in relation to the flanks of 
Europe, Scandinavia and the Mediterranean, where the increase in the Soviet naval    
presence has been most evident´116   
 
In 1968 NATO agreed to set up a maritime force to coordinate surveillance in the 
Mediterranean and later in 1969 decided to form a naval   response force.  In line with 
this policy, Denis Healey on 10 May 1968 stated that a planned reduction of the Royal 
Navy¶V capabilities in the Mediterranean would be reversed.117  Withdrawal from East 
of Suez had focused British policy makers on strategic priorities closer to Britain and 
roles were being redefined. David Greenwood, economic advisor to the MOD from 
1966 to 1967, has claimed that the Ministry of Defence in the first half of 1968 
DSSHDUHGWREHSXWWLQJ³1$72ODEHOV´RQWKLQJVZKLFKRULJLQDOO\KDGWKHLUSODFHLQWKH
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East of Suez programme.118  As Michael Dockrill points out, when French and US 
commitment to NATO seemed to stutter, Heale\LQSDUWLFXODU³ZRUNHGWRLQMHFWDQHZ
VHQVH RI FRKHUHQFH DQG SXUSRVH LQWR 1$72¶V RUJDQLVDWLRQ DQG SODQQLQJ´119  
Following dH*DXOOH¶VZLWKGUDZDORIIRUFHV from NATO in 1966, Britain, the USA and 
the Federal Republic of Germany forged a consensus on strategy, force levels, burden 
sharing, and nuclear consultation. The Harmel Exercise and report, an effort to show 
the continued need for the Alliance in 1967, UHVWRUHG 1$72¶V SROLWLFDO SXUSRVH DQG
cemented WKHDOOLDQFH¶VFRKHVLRn. Britain played a full part in this process. 120     
 
The strategic threat from the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean appeared regularly 
in foreign and defence policy documents during the latter half of the 1960s. The Soviet 
Union was perceived as aiming to maintain and increase influence whilst weakening 
WKH:HVW¶VSRVLWLRQ. 121   NATO defence concerns centred upon Soviet threats to lines 
of communication and trade routes in the region;   oil pipeline and tanker access to the 
Middle East was of paramount importance, especially to the European partners and 
the US was anxious to maintain communication with Israel. 122 These issues were also 
important to British planners, as Britain became reliant upon oil, trade and investment 
both from and to the Middle East. Soviet forces in the Mediterranean were 
progressively built up as a response to the increasing range of US carrier based 
aircraft and the stationing of an Atlantic Nuclear Missile Submarine base at Rota near 
Cadiz. The Soviet SOVMEDRON Mediterranean Squadron was modernised in 
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response.123  Soviet naval forces paid visits to Port Said and Alexandria in Egypt and  
the USSR  made strong and repeated requests for use of Alexandria naval base, air 
force facilities at Suez and the facilities at Mersa Matrouh, on EgypW¶V0HGLWHUUDQHDQ
coast, west of Alexandria.124  The Soviet Union also had limited access to Algerian 
military air fields and the naval base at Mers el Kebir near Oran.  Soviet advisors and 
technicians were provided to Egypt along with large sales of military hardware to 
replace equipment lost during the Six Day War.125   The June war had been a setback 
to Soviet interests. Moscow was held responsible for some of the misinformation 
which contributed to the war and had not demonstrably supported the Arab cause, and 
WKHUHIRUHHPHUJHG³EDGO\EXUQHG´E\HYHQWVThereafter the Soviet leadership did its 
XSPRVW WR UHSDLU WKH GDPDJH LW KDG LQFXUUHG´ 126 Arms sales and the supply of 
advisors were part of a process of encouraging better Soviet-Arab relations. The 
USSR re-equipped the Egyptian and Syrian armies and provided military assistance to 
Sudan and Iraq. Cairo was not entirely comfortable with relying on the USSR and was 
worried by the Soviet presence in the Yemen but Nasser needed the Soviet Union as 
long as the confrontation with Israel continued.127   
 
Potentially damaging to Western concerns would be the acquisition of bases in 
Libya by the Soviet Union. The Joint Intelligence Committee in March 1968 considered 
that within Libya the USSR was unlikely to obtain bases of much influence, so long as 
the King lived, and would avoid any direct involvement in Libyan internal affairs if he 
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died, for fear of confrontation with the USA.128  The Anglo-Libyan relationship was also 
considered to be of value to NATO as a means of countering Soviet and Egyptian 
intervention and subversion in the region.129  The FCO and the Chiefs of Staff believed 
Soviet policy was working ³IRU WKH replacement of the present non-revolutionary 
regimes by governments more sympathetic to the Soviet Union´. 130  In March 1968 
WKH IXWXUH RI %ULWDLQ¶V UHPDLQLQJ IDFLOLWLHV in Libya were considered in line with the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VFRPPLWPHQW WR reducing overseas commitments and  the value of the 
Libyan facilities to strategic priorities in the Mediterranean was emphasised in a 
resulting DOPC Defence Review Working Party memorandum.  It was held that 
withdrawal would result in the military isolation of the US in Libya and would place 
Libya in a weakened defence position, surrounded by Algeria and Egypt, although an 
attack from either appeared unlikely. What is significant was the emphasis in the 
report that withdrawal from the remaining facilities would be letting down NATO allies: 
³RXU1$72DOOLHVZRXOGEHUHOXFWDQWWRVHHWKHUHPRYDORIRXUPLOLWDU\SUHVHQFHDWD
time when the increased Soviet naval    threat in the Mediterranean is causing them 
JURZLQJFRQFHUQ´7KHPHPRUDQGXPVWDWHGWKDWWKHVHFXULW\RIWKHFRXQWU\ZRXOGEH
threatened by unilateral abandonment of the facilities and the treaty. Such a situation 
cRXOGEHH[SORLWHGE\(J\SWLDQRU6RYLHWLQWHUYHQWLRQ7KHPHPRFRQFOXGHG³WKDWLWLV
overwhelmingly in our interest to maintain our support for the treaty until its first 
SRVVLEOHH[SLU\GDWHRI'HFHPEHU´131  The paper was eventually submitted to 
ministers as a minute by the Foreign Secretary Stewart and the Prime Minister on 9 
May affirmed he was ³FRQWHQW ZLWK WKHFRXUVHRIDFWLRQ´ outlined.132 The rest of the 
Cabinet agreed although Chancellor of the Exchequer Roy Jenkins EHOLHYHGWKDW³WKH
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size of our IRUFHV LQ/LE\DVKRXOGEHNHSWXQGHUFRQWLQXLQJVFUXWLQ\´ 133 The British 
commitment to Libya was therefore reaffirmed.  
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5.5 Expanding Military Involvement 
 
By the end of 1968 the FCO recognised that WKHUHZDV³less talk about getting out 
of the commitment to Libya´ DQG WKDW WKH 0LQLVWU\ RI 'HIHQFH KDG EHHQ ³busily 
increasing our involvePHQWLQWKDWFRXQWU\´134  This was the result of increased arms 
sales to the country, planned building development at the El Adem deployment to 
house troops from the Middle East and to facilitate the stepping up of training and 
stock piling in the country.  Of added VLJQLILFDQFHZDVWKHLQFUHDVHLQ%ULWDLQ¶VGHIHQFH
and commercial concerns in Libya. The British had agreed to sell the Libyans 
sophisticated weaponry and air-defence equipment and this generated more work for 
the military missions to support Libyan training. As we have seen Goronwy Roberts, 
Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had urged some caution 
with this policy during his visit to Libya in October 1968 for fear that London become 
involved in any armed clash between Libya and Algeria or Egypt. 135  
 
Of particular significance to the increasing importance of the British military 
presence in Libya was the planned expansion of levels of training in Libya to enable 
the introduction of new equipment by the RAF and Army.136  The Phantom, Buccaneer 
and Harrier, which had all recently entered service, necessitated extensive training, 
with an average of two  detachments of these aircraft at El Adem , signifying a three -
fold increase in volume of flying by combat aircraft. There was also a fifty fold increase 
in battle group exercises by the army, covering an area of around 3000 square miles 
of desert. The Royal Navy required extensive areas of coastline for helicopter borne 
amphibious force exercises, which could be carried out in Libya. As a consequence El 
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Adem would need a small increase in service population   and an extensive 
programme of works.137  
 
The Ministry of Defence and Service Chiefs placed considerable importance on the 
training facilities. Whilst there was no intrinsic merit in the desert, the wide areas 
enabled the services to carry out battle group and air weapons training with live 
ammunition and in complete freedom. Tank crews and units could operate 
unhampered, without fear of damaging property, unlike in Britain or Germany. Aircraft 
could practice very high speed and low level ground attacks without giving rise to 
complaints of noise and disturbance. Facilities of this kind were considered essential 
for training by the army and RAF for their primary role in NATO. It was also held that 
there were no comparable training areas available to the services elsewhere in the 
world, and assessments showed that in view of political, financial, logistic and 
transport factors, alternatives would be very difficult to find.138 
 
Defence Secretary Healey was fully aware that withdrawal from East of Suez and 
the concentration of forces in the British Isles would make overseas training more, 
rather than less, necessary in the years to come and he expressed, in March 1968, 
how important training facilities abroad were: ³UHJXODUWUDLQLQJH[HUFLVHVRYHUVHDVZLOO
provide visible proof of our capability to help our friends and allies in case of need´139  
The Ministry of Defence pushed for considerably greater use of the training facilities in 
Libya if British forces, including those assigned to NATO, were to be adequately 
trained.140  However the deployment at the (O $GHP ³VWDJLQJ SRVW´ ZDV becoming 
overstretched. The airfield required new buildings and extended facilities and the 
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conditions had EHFRPH³LQWROHUDEOH´141 In fact, by 1969 the RAF base at El Adem was 
the largest RAF presence anywhere in the world outside of Britain.142 
 
In February 1969 the Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the importance of El Adem, but 
decided that a full study on future tasks should be carried out. It was agreed that a 
Joint Service Working Party , under an Air Staff chairman, should be  set up to 
consider what needed to be done in way of development at El Adem.143  The Treasury 
was against additional expenditure at El Adem as the security of tenure for the base 
area would continue only until 1973 and this was considered not enough to justify a 
building and development programme. 144  As a consequence the Ministry of Defence 
requested the Foreign and Commonwealth Office give an assessment of the likelihood 
of retaining the facilities after 1973, in order to persuade the Treasury into granting 
financial support. Ambassador 6DUUHOOKHOGWKDWWKH³VHUYLFHVJHQHUally and especially 
the RAF over El Adem will be increasingly looking to us for support in their efforts to 
retain facilities after 1969 and to maintain their accommodation to an adequate 
standard´145  However , the FCO  was concerned that the estimated figure of 
£2million  for modernisation on El Adem would look like  Britain was  turning the 
VWDJLQJSRVWLQWRDEDVHDQGWKLVZRXOG³DURXVHSURSDJDQGDDQGKRVWLOLW\ZKLFKFRXOG
hasten the day when we lose our facilities altogether´146 Furthermore, Speares, Head 
of the Near East and African Department was concerned that the works could cause 
trouble with the Libyans and endanger British security of tenure after 1973 which 
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³would depend on how far we are willing to continue some kind of defence 
commitment to Libya´ although it appeared that the FCO foresaw the possibility of the 
British continuing to enjoy the facilities and allowing the treaty to continue. Speares, 
acting upon the advice of the Ambassador   believed WKDW³SURYLGHGZHGRQRWDWWHPSW
to tamper with the treaty the Libyans will be happy to let sleeping dogs lie and to allow 
DFRQWLQXDWLRQRIRXUIDFLOLWLHVIRUWKHIRUHVHHDEOHIXWXUH´.  The treaty would run   on so 
long as no one terminated it. Ambassador Sarrell was firmly on the side of 
redevelopment at El Adem. He believed it was politically embarrassing that the 
Treasury was withholding money, and identified the    failure to install a sea water 
distillation plant for El Adem.  Speares V\PSDWKLVHG ZLWK WKH 5$) DV ³VHFXULW\ RI
tenure depends on imponderDEOHV´EXW³is in our view quite enough to justify the works 
services it is now proposed to undertake´ 147  
 
In July 1969 the Chiefs of Staff endorsed the report of a Working Party on the 
development of the El Adem facilities and agreed to a draft letter being sent to the 
Chancellor outlining the financial stringency and constrained expenditure at the 
facility.148  On 1 August 1969 the Chiefs of Staff approved an additional note outlining 
the long term requirements of El Adem and they invited the Air Force Department to 
discuss with the Treasury the development of facilities whilst inviting the Defence 
Secretariat to bring to the attention of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the 
importance of preserving the use of training facilities in Libya.149  By mid August the El 
Adem issue had reached ministerial level. The Ministry of Defence had put their 
detailed proposals for the future of the base to the Treasury at official level but the 
Chief Secretary to the Treasury, John   Diamond, stated that the issue was one of 
tenure and "all our experience overseas in recent years must surely counsel extreme 
caution in adding at this kind of stage to the value of the assets we are likely to have 
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to leave behind´ 'LDPRQG ZDV also concerned that British policy was relying for 
NATO training on so insecure a base as Libya.150  'LDPRQGKDVEHHQUHIHUUHGWRDV³D
charming but relentless, dedicated scourge of spending departments and an almost 
PLVHUO\JXDUGLDQRI WKHSXEOLF UHYHQXHV´E\'LFN7DYHUQH WKH)LQDQFLDO6HFUHWDU\WR
the Treasury from 1969 to 1970.151  In reply Roy Hattersley, deputy to Denis Healey at 
the Ministry of Defence, appeared more supportive of paying for the works. He  stated 
WKDW³GLIILFXOWWKRXJKRXUSUREOHPVDUHLWVHHPVWRPHWKDWWKH8.¶VORQJWHUPLQWHUests 
in Libya are so important´  WKDW WKH *RYHUQPHQW VKRXOG  ZRUN RQ WKH EDVLV WKDW
policies would  succeed and he called for further talks on individual schemes.152 So 
important was this issue that Speares, on 13 August 1969 believed   it would need to 
go to DOPC for ministerial consideration. The Treasury concerns over security of 
tenure were proven correct when the process was halted by the revolution in 
September 1969.153  
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5.6 Conclusion  
 
From 1968 London urged the Libyans to take on more responsibility for their own 
security DQGHQFRXUDJHG7ULSROLWRGHYHORSWKHFRXQWU\¶VPLOLWDU\DQGVWUDWHJLFSRVLWLRQ
However In May 1968 the Labour Government reaffirmed the British commitment   to 
the treaty relationship. Healey visited Libya in 1968 and encouraged Libya to buy arms 
and take responsibility for their security.  British defence interests in the country 
remained concerned with the Algerian and Egyptian threat. The cost of maintaining 
the facilities remained a controversial issue and Chancellor Jenkins urged constant 
scrutiny of British expenses. Simultaneously British trade in Libya continued to 
develop. The MOD, FCO and diplomatic representatives stressed the economic 
benefits GHULYHG IURP %ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ LQ /LE\D and the importance of the treaty 
relationship and the Labour Government concurred. The remaining facilities enabled 
the British to promote British arms and they also grew in importance because of their 
training value to the RAF and Army following the withdrawal from East of Suez. 
Increased training also enabled the British in Libya to promote and sell arms, liaise 
with the Libyan military and continue to maintain political influence. 
 
During this period British foreign and defence policy was moving towards fostering 
national interests and prosperity by diplomatic and economic means, rather than by 
maintaining overseas facilities. In 1968 the East of Suez defence strategy was ended 
but the British maintained the residual military forces in Libya, which had been part of 
this strategy, to secure the regime and prevent a political vacuum from developing in 
the country.  The maintenance of a strong and pro-Western regime in Libya which 
would deny Soviet and Egyptian expansion was a priority and the FCO and the 
Ministry of Defence stressed the strategic implications of any withdrawal from Libya. 
However the threat to British and Western interests in the country was limited as long 
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as Idris remained in power and the treaty remained valid. 154 The Libyans were also   
concerned with their own strategic position, surrounded as the conservative monarchy 
was by Arab Nationalist regimes and Tripoli continued to express their anxieties to the 
British. At the same time the Libyans attempted to develop their own political and 
economic independence and secure a presence in the region to strengthen their own 
security. 
 
Whilst the Labour Government sought to divest itself of military deployments during 
the latter half of the 1960s, British political, economic and training interests in Libya, 
facilitated by a military presence, grew in importance. Therefore we see a continued 
British involvement in /LE\D¶VGHYHORSPHQWDFORVHUUHODWLRQVKLSDQGDFRQWLQXHGUROH
for the facilities during 1968 and 1969.  The future of the treaty beyond its expiry had 
not been addressed and no mention of the treaty was made by the British for fear of 
upsetting the King. The status quo satisfied both countries for the foreseeable future 
as the relationship continued to be amicable and productive, but this would not last. By 
1969 the Idris monarchy, despite the subdued political atmosphere in the country, was 
facing a serious threat to its rule from disaffected members of the military and ruling 
elites. The revolution in September 1969, long expected by Western governments, 
would usher in a new period of Anglo-Libyan relations. 
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6 The Revolution 1969-1970   
 
In the summer of 1969 British interests in Libya appeared secure. The atmosphere 
in the country seemed relaxed and detached from the politics of the Arab world.  David 
Gore-Booth, British diplomat and Second Secretary at the Tripoli Embassy, described 
WKHFRXQWU\DVD³UDWKHUDVOHHS\KROORZ very Italian in its feel´ 1   
 
The remaining British military presence consisted of the staging post at RAF El 
Adem, stationed land forces at Tobruk and one armoured car squadron at El Adem 
with attendant small operation and training stockpiles. In addition there were the naval   
and military missions which organised British and joint Anglo-Libyan training exercises 
as well as promoted arms sales. British facilities in Libya no longer served any 
strategic role East of Suez, but enabled the British to maintain their defence 
commitment to Libya and train forces cheaply.  Of greater significance, the 
deployments allowed Britain to steer Libya towards the Western camp, by maintaining 
a military and political profile in Libya and reassured the King of British support whilst 
denying Soviet and Egyptian political penetration. The military missions in particular 
enabled London to exert influence over Libyan defence and security development.  In 
turn this enabled London to exploit trading opportunities, particularly in arms, through 
preferential treatment from the King and his favoured officials.  The overflying and 
staging deployments were of limited military value although they did facilitate Harold 
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:LOVRQ¶V UHWXUQ YLVLW IURP $GGLV $EDED RQ  $SULO  DIWHU KLV PHHWLQJ ZLWK WKH
Ethiopian Emperor. 2 
 
'XULQJWKHVXPPHUPRQWKVRI.LQJ,GULV¶FRPPLWPHQWWRWKHWKURQHZDYHUHG
This was nothing new, as he frequently would express his desire to retire to the 
desert, but in the past he had done so when the political situation grew 
confrontational, as it had done in 1964 and 1967. On this occasion circumstances 
were different.  In August   there was a growing belief in Libya WKDWWKH.LQJ¶VJUDVSon 
the throne was weakening in favour of the influential Shelhi family. Whilst on holiday in 
Greece Idris proffered his abdication, after reports of the distribution of anti-regime 
publications in the country became known to him. This was the first time such material 
had been made widely available. 3   
 
The Libyan Government turned to the British, requesting they encourage Idris to 
remain in power. Meanwhile the King moved on to Bursa in Turkey.  These 
developments were turned on their head by the revolution of 1 September 1969, when 
a group of about seventy young army officers and enlisted men, mostly assigned to 
the Signal Corps of the Libyan Army, seized control of the government. The revolution 
was launched in Benghazi and within a few days the perpetrators had achieved 
FRPSOHWHPLOLWDU\FRQWURORIWKHFRXQWU\7KH)UHH2IILFHUV¶0RYHPHQWZKLFKFODLPHG
credit for carrying out the revolution, was headed by a twelve-member directorate that 
designated itself the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). This body constituted 
the new Libyan Government and was inspired by the Egyptian revolution of 1952.  The 
revolution pre-HPSWHG,GULV¶DEGLFDWLRQVFKHGXOHG Wo take effect on the 2 September, 
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which had been announced in an instrument of abdication on 4 August 1969.4  Wright 
FODLPVWKDWWKHUHZDV³PXFKUXPRXURIFRXSVDWODUJHLQWKHFRXQWU\´DWWKLVWLPHbut 
³/LE\DQVDQGWKHZRUOGDVDZKROHZHUHWDNHQE\VXUSULVH´5 
 
In its initial proclamation on 1 September, the RCC declared the country to be a 
free and sovereign state called the Libyan Arab Republic. The RCC advised 
diplomatic representatives in Libya that existing treaties and agreements would remain 
in effect, and that foreign lives and property would be protected. The Crown Prince 
and heir to the throne, Sayyid Hasan ar-Rida al-Mahdi as-Senussi publicly renounced 
all rights to the throne, stated his support for the new regime, and called on the people 
to accept it without violence.6 On 2 September Omar Shelhi called on British Foreign 
Secretary Stewart in London and requested the British Government intervene in Libya, 
by force if necessary.  Stewart simply asked Shelhi what he expected the outcome 
would be if the British were to intervene, and offered nothing in terms of support or 
advice.7  
 
The RCC revolution led to two immediate concerns for the British Government; 
firstly, what action the Government should take to protect the facilities and secondly, 
should Britain intervene to place the monarchy back on the throne.  Furthermore, the 
overthrow of the monarchy fed fears that incidents around the bases could draw 
British military forces into a confrontation with the new regime. On the morning of 2 
September Stewart held a meeting with Ministry of Defence representatives.  He was 
anxious that guidance be given to the Commander of British Forces Near East (BFNE) 
in case British troops should be drawn into events. As a result, the Commander BFNE 
was given discretion to evacuate families from Tobruk. 8  
                                                   
4
 Ibid.  
5
 Wright, Libya, p. 120. 
6
 P G A Wakefield to FCO, 1 September 1969, FCO 39/381. 
7
 M Stewart to Benghazi, 2 September 1969, FCO 39/382.  
8
 COS 34 mtg, 2 September 1969, FCO 46/253.  
222 
The treaty did not require the British to intervene in a Libyan internal situation but 
the FCO had considered that there were D UDQJHRIFLUFXPVWDQFHV ³LQZKLFK%ULWLVK
military intervention in Libya would be possible´DOWKRXJK ³LWZDV KDUG WREHSUHFLVH
without these circumVWDQFHV´ ,W KDGEHHQ recognised that British interests would be 
best served if the monarchy survived but any intervention that was too obtrusive or on 
behalf of a generally unpopular but legitimate government, would do more harm than 
good. 9 According to legal advice in the early part of 1969, if the internal situation in 
Libya deteriorated, British intervention was feasible under article two of the treaty. 
Whilst article tZRVWDWHG WKDWLQWHUYHQWLRQE\%ULWLVKIRUFHV LQ³DQDUPHGFRQIOLFW´RQO\
applied to hostilities between the Libyan Government and another state, Secretary of 
State for  Foreign Affairs, Selwyn Lloyd, had written a dispatch in May 1959 stating 
WKDWWKH%ULWLVK³FRXOGOHJLWLPDWHO\LQWHUYHQHLQFLYLOFRnIOLFW´LQ/LE\D10 
 
In September the FCO recognised that to reinstall the monarchy political and 
military support from Washington was essential.11  The State Department had no 
objection to the British trying to contact the King, but they appeared to have not 
formulated their own policy.  Washington seemed to be waiting upon developments 
and it was reported that the US Secretary of State, William P Rogers, was taking great 
personal interest in the revolution.12  The British embassy reported that Washington 
was holding back until the permanence of the RCC was assured. 13  
 
On 3 September Stewart told Wilson that intervention would be dangerous, wrong 
and not required by the treaty. Stewart believed the best hope of protecting the British 
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position in the country lay in early recognition.14 At Cabinet on 4 September Stewart 
VWDWHG WKDW LQWHUYHQWLRQZDV ³QRWDSURSRVLWLRQ WKDWZHQHHGFRQVLGHU VHULRXVO\´DQG
the situation on the ground remained unclear.15 On the same day President Nasser, in 
conversation with George Thomson, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, expressed 
his complete surprise upon hearing of the revolution and considered that any outside 
intervention in Libya ³ZRXOG VHHP OLNHO\ WR PDNH PDWWHUV ZRUVH´16 Also on 4 
September Idris publicly disassociated himself from the Shelhi mission to Britain and 
³DFNQRZOHGJHd the revolution DVDIDLWDFFRPSOL´ ,GULV LQDQH[FKange of messages 
with the RCC, through Nasser, announced he had no intention of coming back to 
Libya.17  He later told the Daily Express newspaper WKDW ³KH had not enjoyed being 
.LQJ ³YHU\ PXFK´´.18 Despite his frail condition, which had caused the British to 
continually plan for his imminent death, Idris went into exile in Cairo and died 14 years 
later aged 93, never returning to Libya. 
 
British efforts turned towards securing national interests and forging a new 
relationship with the regime in Tripoli.  This prompted swift recognition of the RCC and 
was followed by an attempt to renegotiate the continued use of the facilities, using the 
existing Anglo-Libyan arms contracts. This policy came to nothing when on 29 
September 1969 the RCC announced that the agreements covering British and 
American bases in Libya would not be renewed. The RCC demanded speedy 
negotiations for the withdrawal of all British and American deployments, so ending the 
treaty relationship with the British.  The Labour Government agreed to the withdrawal 
of the facilities and negotiations for the termination of the treaty, hoping this would 
facilitate a productive relationship with the RCC.  On 23 December agreements were 
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signed providing for the evacuation by British troops no later than 31 March 1970. 
Washington agreed to the closure of facilities at Wheelus Air Force Base by June 
1970.  Meanwhile the RCC instituted an Arab Nationalist interpretation of socialism in 
Libya.  Islamic principles were blended with socialist social, economic, and political 
reform. Significantly, the country shifted strategically from the camp of conservative 
Arab traditionalist states to that of the radical nationalist states like Egypt and Algeria, 
Sudan and Syria, undermining the position of the British and the West in the Arab 
world and the Mediterranean and potentially opening the country to Soviet political 
penetration. 
 
Whilst the first couple of months of RCC rule had not been SURGXFWLYHWR/RQGRQ¶V
aims in Libya, from November 1969 the Labour Government continued to seek a new 
relationship. London hoped to secure trade, training rights and a limited military 
presence in the form of the missions.  To achieve this the Government considered it 
important to first determine the attitude and intentions of the regime, particularly over 
the Arab-Israeli conflict, which would allow them to gauge the implications for British 
priorities in the wider region and then formulate their position accordingly. The British 
Ambassador had made it quite clear within days of the revolution that events in Libya 
ZHUH ³SDUW DQG SDUFHO RI WKH SROLWLFV RI WKH UHVW RI WKH 0LGGOH (DVW´ DQG WKDW /LE\D
³FDQQRWEHLVRODWHGIURPWKH$UDE-,VUDHOVWUXJJOH´2SSRVLWHWKH(PEDVV\RIILFHVRQa 
ZKLWHZDOOZHUHGDXEHG³ 6HSWHPEHUWKH5HSXEOLFRI/LE\D´19  
Government policy aimed to steer Libya to a moderate line on the Middle East conflict 
rather than allow the RCC to enflame the situation further, which could cause London 
to lose valuable economic and diplomatic interests in the region.  Simultaneously 
London would continue to use the delivery and sale of arms to the Libyans, through 
pre-existing orders, as a lever to gain an advantageous political relationship whilst 
reviewing the whole of the Anglo-Libyan relationship. 
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The creation of good relations stalled and failed because the Labour Government 
would not supply the Chieftain tank, which had been ordered by the Idris regime as 
part of the modernisation program of the Libyan military. British ministers were not 
willing to export this powerful weapon to the nationalist RCC until the political and 
strategic orientation of the new Libyan regime was understood and progress been 
made on the review of the relationship. The Labour Government was specifically 
concerned that the RCC should not contribute to the Arab-Israeli conflict and believed 
that the tanks could be used against Israel and so destabilise security in the Middle 
East. Harold Wilson played a role in determining CaELQHW¶VSRVLWLRQRQGHOLYHU\DVZHOO
as maintaining this stance up until the election defeat in June 1970. The Libyans 
countered with their own negotiating position of insisting on the delivery of the tanks 
as a symbol of good faith, whilst demanding back payments on the subsidy which had 
been suspended since 1965, before a relationship could be created. The RCC also 
demanded a resolution of the BAC air defence scheme which was mired in 
accusations, against the previous regime and BAC, of being conceived through fraud 
and bribery.  Due to this impasse, from   January 1970 to June 1970, the British 
Government¶V VHDUFK IRU D SROLWLFDO UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH 5&& IDLOHG DQG YDOXDEOH 
investments and trade ties, defence training facilities in the Cyrenaican desert, the last 
remaining military presence in the form of the missions and Western strategic security 
in Libya were lost.  
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6.1 New Political Relations  
 
In the immediate aftermath of the revolution, British Government policy was to 
maintain national interests by building a new relationship with the RCC. Prospects 
appeared promising when the RCC summoned representatives from Britain, the 
United Nations, France and the Soviet Union on 1 September and undertook to 
honour all Libyan treaties and oil concessions whilst offering to protect foreign 
communities.20  The Foreign and Commonwealth Office believed that the sooner 
Britain got on terms with the new regime, the greater the chances were of protecting 
vital interests. 21   
 
The Libyan leaders appeared receptive to building a new relationship but were 
guarded and their political position contradictory, due no doubt to the inexperienced 
and youthful composition of the RCC. On 2 September an unnamed RCC 
representative claimed the Council ³UHPHPEHUHG ZLWK JUDWLWXGH WKH Sast friendship 
between Britain and Libya and hoped for even better relations in the future´  In 
DGGLWLRQ³%ULWLVKVXEMHFWVZRUNLQJLQ/LE\DZHUHZHOFRPHDQGZRXOGEHSURWHFWHG´7KH
³5&& LQWHQGHG WR KRQRXU H[LVWLQJ DJUHHPHQWV WKRXJK WKH TXHVWLRQ RI GHIHQFH was 
FRPSOLFDWHG DQG ZRXOG QHHG GLVFXVVLRQ´. 22  Marrack Goulding, First Secretary and 
Head of Chancery, Tripoli, concluded that the RCC had shown themselves moderate 
and friendly.23  The tone of relations changed dramatically on 3 September when the 
embassy in Benghazi was surrounded by a vociferous anti-British crowd.  
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Meanwhile some officials in London had not quite given up on the former regime. 
The MOD was reluctant to pursue a new relationship with the RCC, believing British 
interests might be best served with the monarchy.  The Chiefs of Staff on 3 September 
expressed an interest in reviving the monarchy and agreed that, whilst there were 
political arguments in favour of doing nothing to upset the new regime, it was not 
certain that that regime would prevail.  There were also strong arguments in favour of 
³VWDQGLQJE\RXUIULHQGVLQDGYHrsity´ 24 
 
On the same day Michael Stewart informed Wilson that Britain would not be 
intervening in Libya and explained WKDWWKHEHVWKRSHRISURWHFWLQJ%ULWDLQ¶Vposition in 
the country lay in an early recognition of the new government. Stewart informed 
Wilson that he considered intervention as dangerous and wrong and this was not 
required by the treaty. Furthermore, the issue was complicated by the fact that it was 
difficult to say what the situation was on the ground in Libya. Stewart described how 
the Libyan officers were consolidating power and the embassy in Libya was urging an 
early decision on recognition´ 25  Counsellor and Consul General, Peter Wakefield 
believed LQWHUYHQWLRQZDVXQOLNHO\DWWKHWLPHEHFDXVHLWZDV³WRRVRRQDIWHU6XH]´D
reference to British intervention in the Middle East.26  At Cabinet on 4 September 
Stewart again stressed that it was important to be on good terms with Libya, due to 
%ULWDLQ¶VRLl, investment and export business there. Investments totalled £100 million 
pounds and exports were running at £34 million per annum.  Stewart believed 
LQWHUYHQWLRQ ZDV ³QRW D SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW Ze need consider seriously´ DQG ZKLOVW D
revolution had long been possible, there was nothing to indicate it would happen when 
it did. It appeared highly likely that the RCC would remain in control of the country. 27  
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There was an added urgency to recognise the regime because the Soviet Union 
and   Egypt had already done so and to delay further would put British interests at risk. 
In addition, replacing Sarrell with Donald Maitland as Ambassador, which had been 
scheduled to happen that summer, would in effect constitute recognition.28  
Furthermore, Washington was also moving towards recognition. On 4 September 
David Newsom, the United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs 
claimed the Nixon Administration wanted to move quickly on the issue and appeared 
eager not to appear attached to the old regime, subsequently keeping former Idris 
advisor, Omar Shelhi, who arrived in the country on 5 September, DWDUP¶VOHQJWK29  
OmaU¶VYLVLW WRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVappeared more concerned with securing his future, 
UDWKHUWKDQWKH.LQJ¶V+HZDVUHEXIIHGZLWKDVDOXWDU\meeting with a middle ranking 
US representative at the UN and received little encouragement from the State 
Department.30 
 
Further reasons for the Cabinet to recognise the regime   came on 5 September 
when Libyan officers approached the Embassy requesting recognition.  Prominent 
Libyan political personalities had already professed their support for the RCC.31  
Additionally, Nasser expressed unqualified   support for the Libyan revolution and the 
.LQJ¶VGHFLVLRQ WRQRW UHWXUQ WR/LE\D IRU IHDURIEORRGshed also cleared the way for 
recognition.32  Wakefield in Benghazi advised the FCO that the criteria for recognition 
had been met. 33   The general practice which the British Government followed in 
UHODWLRQ WRVRYHUHLJQVWDWHVZDV WR UHFRJQLVH ³GH MXUH´DJRYHUnment established by 
revolutionary action, when the British Government considered that the new 
government enjoyed, with a reasonable prospect of permanence, the compliance of 
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the mass of the population and the effective control of much of the country. The RCC 
had by 5 September firmly established itself in Tripoli and Benghazi and units of the 
Libyan army, committed to the RCC, had reached Tobruk.  All centres of population in 
Cyrenaica were under RCC control and public order had been maintained.34   
 
Wakefield was particularly concerned with the political repercussions of delaying 
recognition and advised that hesitation beyond 5 September would affect future 
UHODWLRQVDQG%ULWDLQ¶VLQWHUHVWV+HEHOLHYHGWKDWUHFRJQLWLRQZRXOGDOVRKHOSWRGLVSHO
suspicion about %ULWDLQ¶V FRQQHFWLRQV ZLWK WKH IRUPHU UHJLPH DQG HQFRXUDJH
moderates in the new government, as well as salvaging commercial and military 
concerns. Failure to recognise could encourage the RCC to turn to others for help in 
running the country.35 Wakefield was concerned by growing French commercial 
involvement LQ /LE\D DQG TXHULHG ZKHWKHU LW ZDV QRW ³WRR ODWH WR KROG XS LQIRUPLQJ
WEU representatives about our recognition ideas? After all, the French have spared 
no effort to supplant our interest in Libya. Why should we give them amongst others a 
KHDGVWDUW"´36 This concern with French involvement was to continue over the coming 
months. 
 
Foreign Secretary Stewart received a paper on 5 September recommending 
recognition on 6 September.  Somewhat ignominiously, the British Government 
conveyed the news of recognition to the King by telephone message:  
 
³,Q WKH FLUFXPVWDQFHV I think it is my duty to let you know for your personal 
information that we shall announce today that we are in diplomatic communication 
with the revolutionary authorities 7KLV ZLOO FRQVWLWXWH UHFRJQLWLRQ E\ +HU 0DMHVW\¶V
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Government. I believe that this step is in the best interests if the continued relationship 
of friendship and respect between the two peoples³. 37    
 
Behind the decision to recognise the new regime in Libya was the wish to protect 
%ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ which had once been secured through the intimate political 
relationship between the British and the newly exiled King.  
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6.2 Strategic Implications  
 
The remaining British deployments at Tobruk and El Adem, as well as the British 
military missions had maintained the confidence and political allegiance of the Idris 
regime to Britain and the West. Their former function in %ULWDLQ¶VJOREDOVWUDWHJ\East 
of Suez had ended. However the revolution had strategic implications for Western 
security in North Africa, the eastern Mediterranean and further afield in the Arab world. 
This was because the new Libyan Government tilted these regions still further towards 
Arab Nationalism, could potentially enflame the Arab-Israeli conflict and provided an 
opportunity for further Soviet penetration.  
 
The revolution was just one of several over the immediate preceding years in the 
Arab world, including Syria on 25 February 1969 and Sudan on 25 May 1969. Events 
in Libya were particularly significant because under Idris the country had been a buffer 
zone that isolated the Maghreb from the Arab-Israeli problem and to a degree the 
influence of Egypt. The Idris regime also enabled the West to project influence in the 
region. By September 1969 North Africa had become overwhelmingly Arab 
Nationalist. The immediate concern was that the stability and political future of Libya 
was in question and British planners feared Algerian, Egyptian and Soviet intervention 
which in turn would undermine Western security in the eastern Mediterranean. The 
FCO¶VOLQHZDVWKDW³Vince British security is inseparable from the security of NATO as 
a whole, the MediterranHDQPXVWEHDQDUHDRIVWUDWHJLFFRQFHUQWRXV´38   An early 
draft defence planning document from September recognised that whilst Britain had 
no specific military interests left in the country, there was a need to prevent leaving a 
vacuum in the country.39  In the immediate aftermath of the revolution there was a 
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case for military intervention to place the King back on the throne to restore Western 
interests. 7KH SROLWLFDO IUDJLOLW\ DQG LQH[SHULHQFH RI /LE\D¶V QHZ OHDGHUV PDGH WKH
likelihood of the country falling into chaos all the more likely. The FCO considered that 
Algeria and Egypt would attempt to take advantage of such a situation to secure 
territory. However, British intervention would be problematic as it would require the 
support of   Washington and could possibly complicate the already sensitive military 
and political environment of the Middle East as Egypt conducted a war of attrition 
against Israeli occupiers in the Sinai. 40 
 
In early September the FCO also gave thought to the specific strategic threat to 
%ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ from the Soviet Union.  An FCO draft policy paper on 12th   
September 1969, entitled ³,PSOLFDWLRQV IRU %ULWLVK LQWHUHVWV RI WKH /LE\DQ revolution´
recognised that Soviet influence in the region was a NATO concern because Libya 
bordered the Mediterranean and two member states of the organisation, Greece and 
Turkey, lay to the north. The Mediterranean was also WKH:HVW¶VFRPPXQLFDWLRQOLQNto 
Israel and a transit route for oil from the Middle East, although this was in abeyance 
due to the closure of the Canal.  The report recognised that the West had a strategic 
and political interest in seeing that North Africa should not be united in alignment with 
pro-communist extremists in the Third World.  The Soviet Union was already 
FRQVLGHUHG ³HQWUHQFKHG´ LQ $OJHULD ZKLOVW Egypt, with growing numbers of Soviet 
technicians and military personnel, was anti-Western, anti Israel and pro-Palestinian. 
Another regime with similar sympathies would be more likely to align with the 
Communist world and this could lead to a furWKHU ³SRODULVDWLRQ´RI WKH$UDEVagainst 
Israel and the West. Because Britain was a member of NATO, the FCO considered 
Soviet intervention in Libya a threat to British interests in the region because the 
British maintained NATO obligations in Cyprus, Malta and Gibraltar.41  Therefore the 
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implication was that the revolution posed a strategic concern for British planners within 
the context of the Cold War. 
 
The Arab Nationalist nature of the regime posed additional problems for the British. 
The RCC was likely to be politically, economically and militarily aligned to similar 
states such as NasVHU¶V(J\SWIURPZKLFKWKH5&&drew inspiration.  The RCC would 
be politically sympathetic to Egypt and had oil and financial resources that would 
benefit Nasser¶VZHDNHQHGHFRQRP\.  Furthermore the RCC had the potential to take 
a more engaged role in the Arab-Israeli conflict. A reignited or further enflamed 
situation in the region threatened Western and British security as well as the British 
economic stake in the Arab world.  British interests were seen by the FCO as greatly 
affected by the Arab-Israeli issue. 42   Meanwhile Egypt was determined to support the 
regime in Libya.  Nasser visited Libya from 25 to 29 December 1969 and Egyptian- 
Libya relations improved to a point where the British considered Egypt had undertaken 
a mild absorption of Libya, with Egyptian representatives appearing in hospitals, army 
work-shops, and the state tobacco industry. 43   At the Arab summit conference at 
Rabat in December 1969 Libya, Sudan and Egypt  ³UHFRJQLVHG WKHLUJURZLQJPXWXDO
intHUHVWV LQ WKH EHJLQQLQJV RI IXWXUH XQLRQ´ $IWHU WKH VXPPLW 1DVVHU DQG -DIDDU
Numairi, President of Sudan YLVLWHG /LE\D ZKHUH WKH\ SURFODLPHG D WULSDUWLWH ³$UDE
UHYROXWLRQDU\ IURQW´ 7KLV IURQW ZRXOG PHHW HYHU\ IRXU PRQWKV WR GLVFXVV SROLWLFDO
military and economic action against Israel. In Benghazi Nasser proclaimed that Egypt 
DQG /LE\D ZRXOG ³ILJKW VLGH E\ VLGH LQ WKH VWUXJJOH ZLWK ,VUDHO´44 TKH 5&&¶V $UDE
Nationalist political agenda shared little in common with London in terms of strategic 
priorities DQGWKLVGLGQRWERGHZHOOIRU%ULWDLQ¶Vposition in the country and in the wider 
arena of Arab politics. 
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6.3 Securing Economic Interests 
 
Of great concern to Whitehall was %ULWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWs in oil and trade in 
Libya. The FCO considered that the RCC would put ³WKHELWHRQ´ WKHRLOFRPSDnies 
and on existing defence contracts. 45 By 1969 %ULWDLQ¶V HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWV LQ /LE\D
were substantial.  The country had become extremely important for three reasons. As 
we have seen Libya was an important provider of oil to Britain, with British firms Shell 
and BP also LQVWUXPHQWDOLQ WKHFRXQWU\¶Voil development. As Libya grew rich on oil 
revenues the demand for goods and services was set to continue to rise and London 
would seek to exploit this market.  Secondly, Libya held large sterling reserves. 
Thirdly, in terms of trade, Libya was particularly important especially as an arms 
SXUFKDVHU /LE\D ZDV %ULWDLQ¶V second largest market in the Arab world after Saudi 
Arabia, with exports in 1969 running at £40 million.46  The FCO also recognised that 
there were wider economic concerns for the West which needed to be considered. 
Firstly, the supply of Libyan and Algerian oil was important to Europe and West 
Germany in particular, a major importer of North African oil. Secondly, North Africa 
was a potentially rich trading market which could be exploited by the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Bloc.47 
 
PURVSHFWVIRU%ULWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLFIXWXUHLQSost-revolutionary Libya appeared grim. 
%ULWDLQ¶V former trading relationship with the Idris regime was considered by many 
ordinary Libyans as less than proper, as the British Ambassador Donald Maitland, who 
had arrived in September 1969 claimed:  
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³:HOOGLVSRVHG/LE\DQV- said that they thought the West, and Britain in particular, 
had rushed in to get all the goodies out of this new evolving oil economy on the basis 
of diplomatic or political pressure. One of them said: you have been treating Libya like 
DSURVWLWXWH«««EXW ,WKLQNWKDW WKHUHZDVUHVHQWPHQWDW WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK%ULWLVK
influence, having been military at one time, was now becoming commercial. So that 
was a new form of colonialism and was strongly resented by the young officers´ 48 
 
Turning in more detail to British economic interests, the importance of oil, both in 
production and purchases, was hugely significant. Libya was by 1970 the fourth 
largest oil   exporter in the world. 49  Oil supplies from Libya were approximately 25% 
of total British supplies in 1968 and British oil investment was worth some £100 
million. After Italy and Germany, the British were /LE\D¶VODUJHVWFXVWRPHU50  In 1969 
 PLOOLRQ WRQV RI (XURSH¶V RLO VXSSOLHV FDPH IURP /LE\DQ VRXUFHV RI D WRWDO
consumption of 510 million tons.  Production in the country was dominated by six oil 
companies or groupings.  The US held the highest stake in Libyan oil but British 
companies, Shell and BP had invested £25 million and £75 million respectively. They 
had obtained 14 million tons of crude oil from Libyan sources and profits were 
expanding rapidly.51  
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Following the revolution WKHUHZHUHFRQFHUQVRYHU WKH5&&¶V LQWHQWLRQV WR the oil 
companies.  In September 1969   the Libyan regime stated they would stand by the 
concessions but press for increased benefits. The potential threat to oil production in 
Libya had implications for the security of British and European oil supplies, as well as 
the British economy.  The Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated that interruption 
of production and restrictions on supplies from Libyan sources would have 
progressively serious effects on British and European oil supplies. Extra tankers would 
be required to ship substitute oil from Nigeria or the Gulf and this would raise tanker 
rates and in time increase the cost of oil to the customer. 52 
 
A second economic concern was the large sterling holdings the Libyans 
possessed.  The net balances of the Sterling Area Arab countries in June 1969 were 
approximately £400 million and of this total Kuwait and Libya held approximately two 
thirds.  These amounted to £ 97million for Libya on 31 October 1969 or 23.5 % of her 
reserves.  Whilst the existing agreement with Libya on sterling would run until 
September 1971, the concern was that the RCC could run down sterling balances 
suddenly and in contravention of the sterling agreement. This would lead to further 
attacks on the British currency which would in turn weaken the economy. There were 
PRRWHG LGHDVRI   ³EORFNLQJ´DQ\ZLWKGUDZDO WRVWHPRUSUHYHQWD ODUJHRXWflow, but 
such action was seen as counter-productive because Britain would be seen to be 
breaking faith and signalling problems with sterling. 53 
 
The third source of interest to the British economy was trade. In 1969 Britain had 
extensive arms and defence contracts with Libya. The existing weapons contracts 
including the air defence contract and the army and security weapons packages which 
had been negotiated before the revolution. These contracts comprised surface to air 
missiles and associated radar for the BAC air defence scheme, 188 Chieftain tanks, 
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20 Abbott self propelled guns, 303 armoured cars and other minor weapons, spares, 
ammunition and equipment for the Libyan Army. Also at issue were supplies under 
smaller contracts, and a frigate for the Libyan Navy due to be launched in October 
1969. The frigate was valued at £6.8 million and was not due for final delivery until 
autumn 1971 but was almost completed.  Under the terms of the contracts for the BAC 
air defence and support   packages the Libyan Government had already paid £35.5 
million to BAC by October 1969 and deliveries of the first surface to air missiles were   
due to take place in early 1971. The army equipment contract, valued at £46.8 million 
had been signed on 21 April 1969. Negotiations for a support contract covering the 
maintenance of the Chieftains and Abbots were proceeding with the former regime at 
the time of the revolution. The Libyan Government had so far paid £9.75 million under 
the equipment contract. The first six Chieftains were due in December 1969. 
Deliveries of armoured cars were proceeding under a contract valued at £6.3 million, 
signed with the Libyan public security forces in December 1967.54 
 
Following the revolution the RCC expressed continued interest in the air defence 
scheme and army equipment plans and stated that it respected all agreements and 
treaties with nations.  However at the time the Libyans had not decided if they wanted 
all the Chieftain tanks.55 No mention was made of the treaty, which the British 
considered the arms and training packages had been purchased under. London 
expected that the Libyans would wish to terminate the treaty before it expired in 
1973.56  During October the RCC appeared to grow less interested in the air defence 
system and   were only willing to accept a reduced contract which would not cover a 
Thunderbird missile deployment.  Negotiations between BAC and the RCC over the 
contract dragged on into December and because the Libyans had made no payments, 
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BAC terminated the contract on 24 December 1969 with the Libyans losing the £35 
million already paid.57   
 
ThH IXWXUH RI %ULWDLQ¶V HFRQRPLc stake in Libya would become a significant 
consideration when formulating policy. The government aimed   to create a good 
working relationship with the RCC to maintain these interests   and to hold on to 
training rights and missions, in tandem with a Libyan army partnership, all of which 
would continue to help the British to promote arms sales. Ominously, a draft paper by 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office recognised that the future of specific defence 
contracts would be problematic, as they were considered unpopular and perceived to 
have been negotiated in a corrupt manner. Creating a good working relationship with 
the Nationalist regime also required the political relationship to be fundamentally 
revised if trade and commercial interests were to be maintained. The paper 
recognised that the Anglo-Libyan treaty signed by the former regime was becoming a 
hurdle to better relations and was unlikely to be retained by the Libyans.  It was felt 
necessary to convince the RCC of the advantages of the treaty and to confirm British 
arm sales and support through continued use of missions and training rights.  
However, it was concluded that it was unlikely that the coming period would be 
advantageous for British trade. 58  
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6.4 The Chieftain tank 
 
The decision to recognise the RCC as the legitimate government of Libya on 6 
September 1969 had been a result of the Labour Government¶V GHVLUH WR maintain 
%ULWDLQ¶V SRVLWLRQ in the country. The Wilson Government now sought to forge a 
political relationship   with the RCC which would preserve the missions, training 
facilities and possibly even the staging post at El Adem, at least until the expiry of the 
treaty.  A working relationship with the RCC would also enable the British to steer the 
Libyan Government towards the Western camp and maintain British economic 
interests.  
 
On 7 September 1969 the RCC announced that it had appointed a Cabinet to 
conduct the government of the new republic. The Council of Ministers was to 
implement policy drawn up by the RCC. On 8 September 1969 the RCC promoted 
Muammar Abu Minyar Gaddafi, of the Signal Corps, to the position of colonel and 
appointed him Commander in Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces.  Gaddafi had 
successfully organised and led the revolution.59  It was not until 1970 that other RCC 
members were named and Gaddafi was recognized as the new de facto head of state. 
As a result, throughout the rest of 1969 it was very difficult for other governments to 
understand who was holding power in the country and what the political and 
administrative positions were of the individuals they dealt with. 
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The British approach was to remain positive and constructive about a future 
relationship.  At a Chief of Staff meeting on 23 October 1969 Ambassador Maitland 
stressed that what had happened in Libya was a true revolution. He felt it would be 
necessary for the British to justify maintaining the previous political arrangements with 
the new regime in order to preserve British national interests in Libya. The Chiefs of 
Staff considered that whilst the RCC would align with other revolutionary regimes its 
DLPVZRXOGEH³/LE\DIRUWKH/LE\DQV´DQGWKH\ZRXOGDLP to keep open a line to the 
West. 60  Restoration of a productive Anglo-Libyan relationship could not be achieved 
until the future of the deployments and the treaty had been determined. Shortly after 
the revolution, the Libyan Government had said they did not propose to renew the 
treaty after its expiry in 1973.The Foreign and Commonwealth Office considered that 
the RCC apparently saw no value in the treaty and increasingly resented the British 
presence for the "treaty is in many ways an anachronism in the context of the Middle 
East today´ 61       
 
The Cabinet agreed that policy was to agree to a termination of the treaty and to 
XVHD³FDUHIXOO\ZRUNHGRXWRIIHURIHDUO\GHOLYHU\RIDPL[HGSDFNDJHRIDUPV´ZKLFK
the RCC showed continued interest in, to negotiate a new relationship.62 This strategy, 
the government hoped, would enable the British to maintain training facilities and 
military missions and this would, in turn, allow them to exercise political and economic 
influence in Libya. The FCO recognised that whilst the missions had not been charged 
with gathering intelligence in the past, the events of September 1969 and the ³urgency 
and importance of LibyaQUHTXLUHPHQWV´now justified such a role.63   
 
Arms sales played a significant and contentious role in /DERXU¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\ LQ
the 1960s. Arms sales to the apartheid regime in South Africa were debated 
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aggressively before being sanctioned in November 1965 because of the potential loss 
of overseas earnings and legal problems of cancelling an existing contract.  Despite 
being ideologically and morally opposed to the regime, the Labour Government 
DOORZHG DV )UDQNHO QRWHV ³D GHDO EHWZHHQ 5LR 7LQWR =LQF DQG the South African 
Government on uranium mining which virtually gave the latter a nuclear capability´  
George Brown favoured the sale of Buccaneer aircraft and naval    equipment to 
South Africa to help limit the cuts in government expenditure and to maintain the 
lucrative South African market.64  The Labour Government also acceded to a request 
from the Nigerian federal government in 1967 to send arms for use against Biafran 
separatists, GHVSLWHFRQVLGHUDEOHSXEOLFDQGSDUOLDPHQWDU\SUHVVXUH:LOVRQ¶Vattitude 
to Nigerian arms sales, according to Pimlott, was to supply to the federal government 
for fear that the Soviet Union should interfere and gain political influence in Nigeria.65 
Ziegler also concludes that Wilson did not want the Soviets getting in on arms deals in 
Nigeria and that arms contracts to the Greek military junta were also honoured despite 
disquiet in Cabinet and a long standing commitment to supporting democratic rule. 66  
In these three cases, economic self interest and the preservation of a market for 
Britain swayed the decision.  But they were also an example of what Wrigley claims to 
EH:LOVRQ¶V ³PXOWL-IDFHWHG WDFWLFDODVSHFW´ WRRYHUVHDV UHODWLRQVDQGFRQVLGHUations, 
DV ZHOO DV DQ LOOXVWUDWLRQ RI /DERXU¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR WKH PDLQWHQDQFH RI Hconomic 
interests. Wrigley has noted that this traditionalism was in opposition to thH ³PRUDO
VRFLDOLVW SROLF\´ of a large body of the party and led to condemnation of the 
*RYHUQPHQWDVD³VHOO-RXW´67  
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Turning to Libya, the Government had agreed to sell arms to Libya in accordance 
with the recommendations of the 1968 Mogg report on reform and rearmament of the 
Libyan army. Arms supply to the Middle East , in the wake of the Six Day War, had 
been  restricted by a   DOPC decision  in November 1967, which stated  that the 
balance of forces in the area should be maintained. Policy was to avoid as far as 
possible supplying arms of greater offensive power than those already deployed in the 
area, as this would affect the military balance in the Middle East.68  In May 1968 
Foreign Secretary 6WHZDUWKDGUHFRJQLVHGWKDWLQVXSSO\LQJ&KLHIWDLQVWRWKHDUHD³ZH
should be introducing into the region a tank of greater offensive power than is already 
deployed there´ But the pro-Western orientation of the Idris regime and the limited 
military consequences of supply led to the order being sanctioned and a contract duly 
signed in April 1969. Ministers were influenced by the arguments that it would take 
three years before Libya could even use the tanks and the earliest delivery date would 
be 1969. Libya was also considered too far from the Arab front with Israel, so would 
be unable if unlikely to use the tanks against Israel.  Before the revolution Stewart was 
in favour of supplying Chieftains to the Libyans, Defence Secretary Denis Healey 
strongly supported the sale and Chancellor Jenkins also agreed because ³DGHFLVLRQ
QRWWRVXSSO\FRXOGRQO\SUHMXGLFHRXUIXWXUHSURVSHFWVLQWKLVLPSRUWDQWPDUNHW´. 69    
 
7KHTXHVWLRQRIWKHH[SRUWRI&KLHIWDLQVWR/LE\DZDV OLQNHGZLWKDQ³DJUHHG´, but 
not contracted, export of the same type of tanks to Israel in 1968.  By early 1969 
doubts had grown in London about this decision and at DOPC on 1 May 1969 it had 
EHHQGHFLGHGWKDW LWZRXOGEH³XQZLVH WRHQWHU LQWRDQ\ IXUWKHr commitment with the 
,VUDHOLV´on the sale and export of Chieftains. Opposition had come from the FCO who 
were concerned about the impact of the delivery on peace in the Middle East, as well 
as the effect on trade with Arab countries. The Chieftain deal in particular had alerted 
$UDE DWWHQWLRQ DQG ³FDXVHG (J\SW 6XGDQHVH ,UDTL /LE\DQ DQG -RUGDQLDQ
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*RYHUQPHQWV WRPDNHVHSDUDWHDQGVSHFLILF UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV«RQ WKH VXEMHFW´ 7KH
Israelis were told that a decision would be put off until the autumn of 1969.70  Golda 
Meir, the Israeli Prime Minister in a meeting with Tony Benn, Minister of Technology in 
/RQGRQ RQ  -XQH   DVNHG WKDW WKH\ ³EH SXW LQ WKH VDPH SRVLWLRQ DV /LE\D´
regarding the Chieftains.71 As Gat has shown, British relations with Israel had 
deteriorated after the Six Day War, as a result of British efforts to find a settlement in 
the region. These actions the Israelis considered to be too pro-Arab and designed to 
appease the Arab world.  Anglo-Israeli relations ³GHJHQHUDWHG LQWR DQ DVVRFLDWLRQ
blighted by mutual suspicion, resentment and hostility´ 72  
 
By late 1969 the Libyan order had also become questionable, given that the RCC 
was Arab Nationalist and anti-Israeli and the political environment in the Middle East 
had become fragile.  The Arab-Israeli cease-fire KDG³ODUJHO\EURNHQGRZQ´ with the 
war of attrition and the Libyan revolution KDGDGGHG³WRWKHHPRWLRQDOJURXQGVZHOO LQ
the Arab world´73 Therefore the export of offensive weapons into the Middle East at 
this time was not appropriate. Furthermore London had an important economic and 
diplomatic stake in the region working towards a peaceful resolution to the conflict. 
%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWKDGZDQHGFRQVLGHUDEO\WKURXJKRXWWKHVEXW
whilst having played little part in the Six Day War, the Labour Government perceived 
Britain   still had a role to play in the region. This was not surprising given Britain had 
extensive oil and economic interests there, involving arms sales, oil exploration and 
production and reciprocal investment and financial relations. As we have seen the 
British Foreign Secretary during 1967, George Brown, voiced a sympathetic attitude to 
the Arab cause after the war, calling for a lasting peace in the region and this helped 
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to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt in late 1967. The British delegation played a 
visible role in searching for peace in the Middle East at the United Nations.  Draft 
resolution 242 on a peaceful resolution to the conflict was presented by the British 
Ambassador, Lord Caradon, who was selected as a sponsor because of his 
acceptability to the Arab states. 74 7KHUHIRUH%ULWDLQ¶VLQWHUHVWVLQPDLQWDLQLQJSHDFHLQ
the Middle East made any decision on the supply of Chieftains dependent upon wider 
regional considerations. The inter-wined issues of working towards a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict in the Middle East, the protection of British interests and the 
export of arms to the region were emphasised by Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State at the FCO, Evan Luard.  He stressed that the supply of Chieftains had to be 
FRQVLGHUHGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH³PLOLWDU\EDODQFHLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQGWKHHIIHFW
of DSDUWLFXODUWUDQVDFWLRQRQLW´DQG³Ze do not want a situation to arise in the Middle 
East in which one nation enjoys such superiority that it may be tempted to further 
PLOLWDU\DFWLRQ´ %ULWDLQ¶VDLPZDVD³SROLWLFDOVHWWOHPHQW´WRWKHFRQIOLFWZKLFKSUHVHUYHG
British interests and allowed these to flourish. 75 
 
The Cabinet had requested a review of arms deliveries on 4 September 1969 and 
this led to two memoranda by Michael Stewart on supplying Chieftains to Libya and 
Israel, presented   in early October 1969.  Both memoranda emphasised the wider 
regional political, strategic and military concerns of introducing Chieftains in to the 
Middle East.  An export of   Chieftains to Israel could unsettle the fragile peace in the 
0LGGOH (DVW DQG %ULWDLQ DOUHDG\ KDG ³DQ LPSRUWDQW UROH WR SOD\ LQ WKH VHDUFK IRU D
political settlement´SRVVLEO\LQWKHIRUPRIDrestoration of the suspended Four Power 
talks. 76  President Nixon wanted France and Britain to play an active role in these 
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talks in order to maintain   communication to the Arab states and   to avoid polarization 
in the region. Stewart had held talks with the UN Special Envoy Gunnar Jarring in 
September 1969 and believed that there was a good chance that the Four Power 
Talks could be resumed later in the year. He noted that resumption of the talks was 
³ODUJHO\ DW RXU LQVWLJDWLRQ´7KH VDOH RI &KLHIWDLQV WR WKH ,VUDHOLV ZRXOG QRW KHOS WKLV
process. Furthermore sensitive talks were being held on the Iranian claim to Bahrain 
and it was feared that Bahraini hostility to the sale of tanks to the Israelis could 
undermine the negotiations and lead to a deterioration in relations with Arab 
countries.77  Working through the Four Power Talks was in keeping, as Parr and 
Dockrill have noted, with a new approach by the Labour Government to international 
issues, focusing upon internationalist and interdependent methods, using diplomacy 
and economic intervention, to maintain influence. 78  
 
Stewart considered that British material interests were important in the Middle East 
and suspected that Israel would attempt to draw the British into an irrevocable deal to 
get the tanks.  This was something the British could ill afford to do without the risk of 
damaging irrevocably her interests in the Arab world.  The supply of Chieftains to 
Israel could lead to action against British concerns in the Middle East in terms of 
property, sterling balances and oil investments. By contrast, it was believed that failure 
to supply to the Israelis would not harm materially the links between the two countries, 
despite the fact that during the 1960s Israel was the single largest market for British 
exports in the region. Whilst Stewart emphasised that British policy should be that 
³,VUDHO PXVW EH HQDEOHG WR VXUvive´ KLV memorandum indicated that Israel could 
weather any war within the next five years even without the tanks. It was concluded 
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that the Britain should not proceed with the sale to Israel.79 However Stewart later 
VWDWHG WKDW RQ WKH LVVXH RI ,VUDHO DQG WKH $UDE VWDWHV ³P\ V\PSDWKLHV ZHUH ZLWK
,VUDHO´DQGWKDWJHQHUDOO\%ULWLVKSROLF\ZDVWR³DOORZ,VUDHOWREX\LQ%ULWDLQVXFKDUPV
WRGHIHQGKHUVHOI´80 
 
6WHZDUW¶V PHPRUDQGXP RQ Drms to Libya stressed an appreciation of NATO¶V
strategic position in the Mediterranean should the Soviets replace Western arms sales 
in Libya. However, the primary concern was that Britain was introducing an offensive 
battle tank into the Middle East and to an $UDE QDWLRQDOLVW FRXQWU\ WKDW ³PXVW EH
H[SHFWHGWRIROORZDPRUHDFWLYHSROLF\RIRSSRVLWLRQWR,VUDHOWKDQWKHLUSUHGHFHVVRUV´.  
The key was that ³WKLVPHDQV«WKDW VRPHRIRXUDUPVZLOO HLWKHUEHXVHGE\/LE\D
against Israel or be handed over to Egypt for WKHVDPHSXUSRVH´  ,QPLWLJDWLRQ WKH
Chieftain tanks could not be used effectively for five years and required British 
technical support to be maintained, serviced and then employed. British material 
interests in Libya would be severely endangered  by noW VXSSO\LQJ IRU ³ZH VKDOO
strongO\RIIHQG«QDWLRQDOLVWIHHOLQJ´GULYLQJ  WKH/LE\DQV LQWRGHQRXQFLQJ WKH WUHDW\
demanding  the immediate removal of British forces and facilities, and possibly leading  
to a Libyan request for arms from  the Soviet Union.  This would have commercial 
repercussions, with a serious loss of business to the British defence industry, 
cancellation of contracts in the civilian field, possibly to the benefit of the French, 
problems for British oil investments and a political reorientation of the Libyan regime 
into the arms of Egypt and the Soviet Union.  This would damage the political and 
strategic interests of Western Europe to such a degree that it would prompt criticism of 
British policy from NATO partners who were concerned over Soviet penetration on 
1$72¶V VRXWKHUQ IODQN  6WHZDUW UHFRPPHQGHG WKDW DOO GHOLYHULHV RI DUPV WR /ibya 
under existing contracts go forward as planned.81   Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend 
agreed with the conclusion of the memorandum on Chieftain sales to Libya, but hoped 
                                                   
79 OPD (69) 47, Chieftains for Israel, 3 October 1969, CAB 148/93.  
80
 M. Stewart, Life and Labour (London, 1980), p. 212. 
81 OPD (69) 48, Arms for Libya, 3 October 1969, CAB 148/93.  
247 
to extract something WDQJLEOH IURP WKH VDOH WR %ULWDLQ¶V DGYDQWDJH LQ OLQH ZLWK WKH
benefits the British had enjoyed before, advising that ³ZHVKRXOGH[WUDFWWKHPD[LPXP
of advantage from the concessions in terms of a guarantee of the continuation of 
training facilities, over flying rights, other defence contracts´82 
 
At DOPC meetings during 15 and 16 October 1969 the arms sales to Libya and 
Israel were debated. On 15 October ministers agreed that a final decision on the 
supply of tanks to IsUDHO FRXOG QRW EH WDNHQ ³LQ LVRODWLRQ IURP D GHFLVLRQ RQ WKH
question of supply of Chieftains to Libya´VRHQWZLQHGZHUHERWKVDOHVLQWHUPVRIWKH
Middle East conflict. Foreign Secretary Stewart UHLWHUDWHG WKH WKUHDW WR %ULWDLQ¶V
interests by supplying the Chieftain tank to Israel, as Arab states could damage ³RXU
economy through their holdings in sterling and through interference with the flow of 
RLO´ :LWKLQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVW VXSSO\ WR ,VUDHO ZRXOG ³FRPPLW XV LUUHYRFDEO\ on their 
VLGH´DQGWKH%ULWLVKwouOGH[HUFLVH³QRLQIOXHQFHLQWKH)RXU3RZHUWDONV´$ttempts to 
³VHFXUHDVHWWOHPHQWRIWKH,UDQLDQFODLP´WRBahrain, under consideration at the time, 
would also be undermined. Healey said, that in present circumstances, KH³UHOXFWDQWO\
agreed´+H recognised that Israel was in a dominant military position in the Middle 
East and arms sales to Israel would put commercial relations with the Arabs in 
jeopardy.  There was a danger that the British could lose the important training 
facilities in Libya as well aV ILQG WKHPVHOYHV LQ D ³YHU\ XQSOHDVDQW VLWXDWLRQ LQ WKH
3HUVLDQ*XOIDWWKHWLPHRIRXUZLWKGUDZDO´LIWKHVXSSO\WR,VUDHOZHQWDKHDG83  
 
,Q GLVFXVVLRQ WKHUH ZDV D JHQHUDO DFFHSWDQFH RI 6WHZDUW¶V DVVHVVPHQW RI the 
possible economic consequences of a decision in favour of supplying Chieftains to 
Israel. Interestingly some ministers argued that effect of supplying tanks to Israel on 
%ULWDLQ¶V UROH LQ WKH)RXU 3RZHU 7DONV ZDV ³RYHUVWDWed´ EHFDXVH a British refusal to 
VXSSO\ ZRXOG DFWXDOO\ VWLIIHQ ,VUDHO¶V position, when that country would need to be 
³IOH[LEOH´ DQG DSSURDFKDEOH Therefore, to export to Israel would make Jerusalem 
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more amenable to talks.  It was also noted that a decision not to supply Israel could 
ZHOO ³DOLHQDWHVRPHRI WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVXSporters in the country´as well as in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party. 84  
 
Some ministers considered any refusal to supply Israel should be balanced by a 
refusal to supply Libya in order not to show partiality at the Four Power talks. In 
addition , supply to Israel could well seem to look like  an escalation of the arms race 
in the Middle East, given that there was no evidence at the time that the Soviet Union 
was supplying the modern and almost equivalent T62 tank to Egypt. This would run 
counter to British arms policy and could unsettle regional relations. In contrast some 
ministers DUJXHGWKDWVXSSO\LQJWDQNVWR,VUDHODQG/LE\DZHUHQRW³SDUDOOHOFDVHV´DQG
it was apparent that there were concerns over WKH SRWHQWLDO GDPDJH WR %ULWDLQ¶V
economic and military position in Libya.  There was a firm contract with Libya and 
FDQFHOODWLRQ ZRXOG ³jeopardise essential militaU\ WUDLQLQJ IDFLOLWLHV LQ /LE\D´ ,W ZDV
noted that both the air defence scheme as well as the tanks were entirely reliant on 
British support facilities and therefore unusable if they were then transferred to the 
Suez area to be used against Israel.  However, the support facilities contract had not 
been signed and it was still not certain that the Libyans wanted all the tanks. 85   
 
Stewart suggested that if the Soviets were to supply the Egyptians with T62 tanks 
then the sale of Chieftains to Israel should be reconsidered, although this would risk 
escalating the conflict in the Middle East, but Israel should not be provided with the 
tanks in the meantime.  +HDOH\ ³UHOXFWDQWO\´ supported him. 86  Richard Crossman, 
now Secretary of State for Social Services records that Roy Mason, President of the 
%RDUGRI7UDGHZDV ³IDQDWLFDOO\ LQ IDYRXURIDVPXFK WUDGHDVSRVVLEOH´DQG IRU WKH
%ULWLVKWRXQORDG³ million-worth of the most modern kind of armaments on these 
SRRU $UDEV ZKLFK LV SHUIHFWO\ VDIH EHFDXVH WKH\ DUH QRW ILW WR XVH DQ\ RI WKHP´
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Mason and Tony Crosland, who had been President of the Board of Trade, agreed 
with the sale to Libya for the sake RI %ULWDLQ¶V EDODQFH RI SD\PHQWV In conclusion 
Crossman, considered the meeting ³WKHPRVW LJQRPLQLRXVDQG WHUULEOHH[DPSOHRID
real old fashioned Foreign Office policy, combined with a cynical merchant of sales 
policy´ in that the emphasis from officials had been on selling to Libya. 87  However, 
&DVWOH LGHQWLILHG :LOVRQ DV EHLQJ WKH RQO\ RQH ZKR ³PDGH LW FOHDU WKDW KH ZDV LQ
IDYRXU´ RI VXSSO\LQJ WR ,VUDHO ZKLFK &DVWOH FRQVLGHUHG ZDV GRZQ WR IHDUV RI ³DQ
electoral backlash for seeming to discriminate agDLQVW,VUDHO´6KHQRWHVWKDW³PRVWRI
XV´ DW '23& ZHUH ³DSSDOOHG WR OHDUQ WKDW WKH )RUHLJQ 2IILFH DQG WKH 02' DUH
SUHSDULQJWRVXSSO\&KLHIWDLQVWR/LE\D´&DVWOHFODLPVFRQFHUWHGDFWLRQJRW³'HQLVDQG
Michael to take the whole thing back till they got WKHSRVLWLRQFOHDUHU´DQGDGHFLVLRQ
FRXOGQ¶WEHPDGHRQ,VUDHOXQWLOWKH/LE\DQLVVXHZDVFODUified. 88  
 
The Chieftain sales were debated again on 16 October. DOPC had been widely 
split regarding the supply to Israel. :LOVRQVWDWHGWKDWWKHSUHYLRXVGD\¶V meeting had 
seen some ministers supporting the supply of tanks to both countries and others had 
been averse to supplying Israel but held that the contract with Libya had to be fulfilled.  
Others, ³SHUKDSVWKHPDMRULW\´, had judged it politically impossible to refuse the tanks 
to Israel but to supply Libya.  This point was further discussed and considerable 
support was given once more to this line. However, %ULWDLQ¶V HFRQRPLF LQWHUHVWV, in 
Libya and the Middle East came to the fore in the debate. Failure to sell to Libya would 
jeopardise other orders and provoke   ³the Libyan Government to diversify the 
substantive sterling EDODQFHWKH\KROG´ which could lead other Arab nations to follow 
with the same action.  %ULWLVK³FRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVWVLQWKH$UDEZRUOd were far greater 
WKDQLQ,VUDHO´DQGWKHUHIRUHconsiderable damage could be done if Libya did not get 
the tanks. Furthermore the DOPC recognised that %ULWDLQ¶V WUDGLQJSRVLWLRQmight be 
WKUHDWHQHG  ZLWKDFWLRQ IURP$UDEQDWLRQVZLWK ³VSHHGDQGELWWHUQHVV´ LI WKH WDQNV
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were sold to Israel.  In discussion it was decided that any decision on supplying tanks 
to Libya needed a final assessment of the risks to British interests if the Libyan 
contract was cancelled and so a decision on supply was postponed. The 
postponement was also the result of the recognition that the Libyans wanted another 
month to review defence contracts, but then a final decision upon Israel and Libya 
would have to be made. Ambassador Maitland was to be recalled for consultation and 
six Chieftains destined for Libya were to be withheld. A decision on supplying the 
WDQNVWR,VUDHOWLHGLQWKH'23&¶VYLHZWRWKH/LE\DQRUGHUZDVVLPLODUO\GHIHUUHG89   
Crossman wrote in his diary that on the second day of deliberations the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, who had been pressing for a decision 
because the Israelis were sending a General to London to discuss Chieftains, KDG³JRW
together and found DQH[FXVHIRUDPRQWK¶VGHOD\´RQ WKHEDVLV WKDW ³QRERG\UHDOO\
knew what was going on in Libya since the fall of King Idris´ 90  
 
Therefore the issue remained unresolved. Highly contentious and divisive for 
DOPC, it was rare that such a foreign policy issue would come to be debated. Richard 
Crossman recognised that Wilson and Stewart only allowed foreign policy issues to be 
debated at OPD when there was a disagreement between the two ministers. In this 
case Wilson wanted to supply to Israel whilst Stewart saw the advantages in supplying 
to Libya and was supported by Healey.  Wilson, a strong supporter of Israel was 
PLQGIXO RI WKH -HZLVK HOHFWRUDWH  /DWHU LQ  &URVVPDQ UHIHUUHG WR :LOVRQ¶V
concerns over antagonising the Jewish vote, in an election year, over the issue of 
British proposals for the Four Power talks.91 Postponement   satisfied the government   
and Wilson in particular, given the complexity of the issue and its potential to split the 
Cabinet.  
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After further investigation it was clear by the end of October that the Libyans 
wished to receive the Chieftain tanks as well as Abbot guns ordered by the former 
regime. Furthermore, the RCC on 29 October 1969 also demanded urgent 
QHJRWLDWLRQVWRDFKLHYH³WKHHDUO\HYDFXDWLRQRI%ULWLVh Forces from Libyan territory´DV
well as requesting negotiations on the treaty. 92  The continued deployment of foreign 
forces upon Libyan land was intolerable to the RCC who UHJDUGHGWKHEDVHV³DVDQ
unacceptable compromise made by a corrupt regime´ 93 
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6.5 Reviewing the Relationship  
 
As a result of the Libyan withdrawal demand, on 30 October 1969 Stewart 
LQIRUPHG WKH &DELQHW WKDW ³LW ZDV FOHDU WKDW RXU IXWXUH UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK /LE\D ZRXOG
have to be placed on an entirely different footing´  Stewart believed this should be 
possible to achieve whilst still using the arms order as a basis for negotiation.94  
Stewart, having reviewed with Ambassador Maitland Anglo-Libyan relations, urged in 
D '23& PHPRUDQGXP GDWHG  2FWREHU WKDW WKH 5&&¶V XUJHQF\ to acquire arms 
should be used to achieve British political objectives, by incorporating a carefully 
worked out offer of early delivery of a mixed package of arms.  Whitehall now 
considered the revolution irreversible   and   Stewart also urged acceptance of the 
request for withdrawal because future relations could suffer if the British stalled. The 
RCC saw no value in the treaty and resented the British presence DQGPLJKW³wish to 
break away from the relationship and commitments entered into before´ It was 
therefore clear that the defence guarantee enshrined in the treaty and the 
deployments were obsolescent. Stewart stressed that the treaty had served Britain¶V
strategic requirements  ³ZHOO´DQGDORQJZLWKWKHWUDLQLQJIDFLOLWLHVDQGRYHU-flying and 
VWDJLQJULJKWV LWKDG³been the means of keeping Libya, now one of the richest Arab 
countries, firmly linked to the West and moderate in its policy towards Israel´95  
Creating a new relationship, despite the apparent differences in strategic, defence and 
political outlook, became a priority.   
 
Policy was to be aimed at achieving three objectives in Libya, outliQHGLQ6WHZDUW¶V
memorandum. The first objective was political and strategic; to deny Soviet bloc or 
Egyptian penetration or subversion and to prevent Libya becoming an area of 
instaELOLW\RQ1$72¶VVRXWKHUQIODQN The British should aim to encourage the RCC to 
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pursue moderate policies and to favour a peaceful settlement to the Arab-Israeli 
dispute. To do this as close a political relationship as possible should be sought with a 
view to maintaining military liaison and experts in the country. Secondly, British policy 
should seek to preserve the very important economic stake in the country. Thirdly, 
British policy should aim to hold onto training facilities and military missions which 
would secure military sales and prevent the undermining of Western interests in Libya 
by Soviet penetration. 96   This would also enable London to maintain a political-military 
profile in Libya which could be used to influence the RCC.  
 
Michael Stewart counselled that the Ambassador should approach the Libyans with 
a request to establish a new relationship and to enter negotiations on the termination 
of the treaty. Furthermore, the British should express their desire to enter a new arms 
agreement including Chieftain supplies, the provision of advisors, as well as continue 
commercial and economic links. There was added pressure on the British to secure 
their position in Libya as reports began to emerge of Soviet offers to supply arms to 
the RCC.  To placate the Libyans Stewart advised the authorizing of an offer of some 
Chieftains, if only for ceremonial functions.  Stewart also suggested that a supply of 
Chieftains to Israel should not go ahead, primarily for the reasons originally set out in 
his earlier memorandum from October, but also because the supply of Chieftains to 
Israel would frustrate the purposes of an approach to the Libyan Government. 97  
 
Meanwhile Anglo-Libyan relations began to deteriorate. On 2 November a 
demonstration was held outside the British embassy in Tripoli on the anniversary of 
the 1917 Balfour Declaration. The Libyan Government proved their Arab Nationalist 
credentials when they stated that they would make a contribution to the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, although this was not defined.  This raised the spectre of Libya introducing 
Chieftain tanks, should they acquire them, into military action against Israel.  Burke 
Trend said that whilst these events did not bode well for negotiating a new relationship 
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with the Libyan regime, there seemed to be no alternative to negotiation because of 
%ULWDLQ¶VH[WHnsive oil, sterling DQGPLOLWDU\ LQWHUHVWV ,Q IDFW7UHQGDGGHG WKDW ³LQ VR
PDQ\ZRUGV´WKH5&&KDGVDLGWKDWthe reasons for the maintenance of the treaty had 
disappeared. It was clear that Anglo Libyan relations must either be put on a new 
footing or allowed to lapse completely. Trend pointed out that the British policy of 
hoping to trade off military equipment for access to training facilities was now 
redundant JLYHQWKDWWKH/LE\DQVZDQWHGWKH³HOLPLQDWLRQRIIRUHLJQEDVHV´but thought 
that there was nothing to lose by trying to utilise existing arms contracts to procure 
British policy priorities. 98  
 
At DOPC on 4 November Michael StHZDUW VWUHVVHG WKDW WKHUH ZDV ³much to be 
gained politically, economically and in the field of defence, by preserving as much as 
possible of the existing Anglo-Libyan relationship´ The RCC had already signalled a 
desire to review the whole of the Anglo±Libyan relationship that had existed before 
1969 including discussion of arms sales, training assistance and training facilities in 
Libya.  However the atmosphere LQ /LE\D ZDV QRW SURPLVLQJ DQG ³Uecent 
demonstrations in Tripoli, entailing damage to our Embassy and to British 
property....suggested there was anti ±British feeling´ 99 
 
 Wilson, in an extensive summing up of the meeting stated that there was general 
DJUHHPHQW ZLWK 6WHZDUW¶V DGYLFH WKDW %ULWDLQ VKRXOG ³VHHN WR QHJRWLDWH D QHZ
UHODWLRQVKLS´WRVXSHUVHGHWKHROGRQHThe key to forming a new relationship was to 
understand the nature of the regime. However, as little was known about tKH³DWWLWXGH
DQGLQWHQWLRQV´RIWKHQHZUHJLPH WKH³ILUVWREMHFWLYHLQGLVFXVVLRQVZLWKWKHPPXVWEH
to discover what these are´. This would then enable London to gauge the implications 
for British interests and determine their position. Importantly, ³VXEMect to this, in our 
initial approach to the Libyans we should neither commit ourselves specifically to the 
supply of Chieftains nor rule it out´  ³&RQVLGHUDEOHGRXEWV´ZHUHH[SUHVVHG in DOPC 
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DERXW ³LQGLFDWLQJDW WKHRXWVHWRIGLVFXVVLRQV WKDW the government were prepared in 
principle to reach an agreement embodying the supply of Chieftains´ ZKLFK KDG
caused disagreement already at DOPC in October and had led to a postponement of 
a decision.  In discussion, during this DOPC on 4 November, it was accepted that it 
ZDVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKH/LE\DQOLQHLIWKH&KLHIWDLQWDQNLVVXHZDVGLVFXVVHG³DVSDUW
of the review of the Anglo-/LE\DQ UHODWLRQVKLS DV D ZKROH´ LQFOXGLQJ DUPV VXSSOLHV
training assistance and facilities. Any eventual agreement to provide Chieftains would 
depend upon attendant training packages and arms supplies and ³on developments in 
the international and domestic situation´D UHIHUHQce to the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
the influence of the British electorate. In summation, delivery of the Chieftain would be 
reliant upon understanding the political orientation and intentions of the new Libyan 
regime, the development of the Anglo-Libyan relationship review and the support and 
arms agreements that would accompany any supply of the tank. With these 
considerations in mind there was general agreement at the DOPC that London should 
enter into negotiations with the Libyans to end the treaty and to negotiate a new 
relationship. 100  
 
The Libyans had accepted that a first consignment of Chieftains would not be 
delivered in December 1969 and the next delivery was not due until the second half of 
1970. The supply of Chieftains to Libya was once again postponed and was now firmly 
tied to the development of the Anglo-Libyan review of the relationship 6WHZDUW¶V
advice that some tanks were to be delivered was over-ridden. Barbara Castle, 
6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWHIRU(PSOR\PHQWFRPPHQWVWKDW³:HKDGRXUUHYHQJHRQ/LE\DDW
OPD....I weighed in rigorously to point out that Anglo-Libyan relations were in a state 
RIIOX[´DQGWRFRPPLWWRVHOO&KLHIWDLQV³ZRXOGEHOXGLFURXV´DQG+HDOH\EHOLHYHGWKH
TXHVWLRQVKRXOGEHOHIWRSHQ³HLWKHUZD\´101 
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At the same meeting the supply of Chieftains to Israel was discussed and a 
compromise decision made. The political and economic disadvantages of Britain 
completely withdrawing the original agreement in principle to supply Chieftains to 
Israel was stressed.  However, the Israelis were to be informed that a memorandum of 
understanding on supply, which the Israelis had demanded, would not be signed at 
this stage. This left the situation unresolved, but it did not rule out the possibility of 
signature at a later date, and the Israelis were to be told that the British Government 
would understand if they chose to look elsewhere. 102  
 
Matters became more complex when the RCC suggested at the beginning of 
November that London should resume payment of the subsidy. The RCC claimed that 
the understanding on which the changes to the subsidy were made back in 1965 was 
informal and with the King, rather than with his ministers. They refused to recognise 
this arrangement and demanded that the subsidy be reinstated and back dated. 103 On 
13 November Gaddafi kept up the pressure on arms supplies by stating  that the RCC 
wished to strengthen the Libyan armed forces whilst later that month Israeli Prime 
Minister Golda Meir criticised the British policy of refusing to supply Israel while 
offering the tanks to Libya.104  The fraught nature of Anglo-Libyan political relations 
were further compounded on 11 December 1969 when Libyan troops encircled the 
British and United States Embassies in Tripoli less than a day after the Libyan 
Government claimed to have foiled an attempt by elements of the army to overthrow 
the regime. The RCC claimed both Western nations had been behind the plot. 105  
 
To make matters worse, Anglo-Libyan diplomatic relations became increasingly 
erratic. In December 1969 and then January 1970 Ambassador Maitland spoke with 
the Libyan Foreign Minister Buaisir, and expressed hopes for cooperation on 
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technical, trade, consular and political consultation but was rebuffed by Buaisir who 
VDLG WKDW ³WKHJDSEHWZHHQRXUSRLQWVRIYLHZRQ LPSRUWDQW LVVXHVSROLWLFDOZDV WRR
wide to make such consultaWLRQSURILWDEOH´106  Furthermore economic relations were 
not progressing well, hindered by debts owed to British companies by the Libyan 
Government. Busair brushed this off, claiming this was down to problems with 
bureaucracy but he wanted the British WR³PDNHDJHVWXUH´ OLNH WKH)UHQFKZKRKDG
sold Mirage airplanes to the RCC. This was obviously a reference to fulfilling the 
Chieftain order.107  Sustaining and developing %ULWDLQ¶V HFonomic interests in Libya 
was an important reason for seeking a working relationship with the RCC. Foreign 
Secretary Stewart had elaborated on these extensively in memoranda but these 
concerns were under threat.  Within the first four months of the regime taking power 
foreign trade competition in Libya had increased.  Policy documents show continued 
concern over Soviet arms deliveries to Libya whilst Crossman recognised on 23 
January 1970 that   ³7KH)UHQFKDUHKDYLQJDWUHPHQGRXVSUR-Arab drive. They have 
XQGHUFXW XV ZLWK WKH QHZ UHJLPH LQ /LE\D «WDNLQJ RYHU HYHU\WKLQJ IURP XQder our 
noses´ 108  The French Mirage sale numbered around 110 jets. The French claimed 
that introducing this offensive weapon into the Middle East would not cause problems, 
as a settlement in the region would be reached by the time the jets were delivered, 
which  as John Wright has pointed  out, begged  the question why they were needed 
DWDOO7KH0LUDJHV¶RSHUDWLRQDODUHDZDVUHVWULFWHGWR/LE\D, where they were to be 
based, serviced and repaired. The aircraft were specifically prohibited from being used 
against other Francophone countries, particularly Chad, where Muslim rebels were 
fighting the French supported government, and in Niger, where there were significant 
Uranium deposits important to the French nuclear programme.  Wright identifies this 
sale as a strategic initiative; an H[DPSOHRID³SROLF\RIVWUHQJWKHQLQJ interests on the 
Mediterranean basin in general and in Libya in particular´ Delivery  of the Mirages, 
ZKLFK³ZDV WKRXJKW WRSURPLVHFRQVLGHUDEOHSROLWLFDOLQIOXHQFH LQ7ULSROL´ LQIDFW  did 
                                                   
106
 D Maitland to FCO, 5 January 1970, FCO 39/634. 
107
 Ibid.  
108 Crossman, The Diaries, Vol. 3, p. 787. 
258 
not lead to better Franco-Libyan relaWLRQV³so effectively did the Libyan Government 
maintain its freedom of political and economic action´109 British aims were the other 
way round, looking for a relationship, political influence and strategic security first, 
before the sale of arms could be sanctioned.  
 
By the end of 1969 it was apparent that a British withdrawal from the remaining 
military facilities was necessary if Anglo-Libyan relations were to develop 
constructively. The Libyans had asked for negotiations for the speedy evacuation of 
%ULWLVK IRUFHV LQ D ³PRGHUDWHO\ SKUDVHG QRWH´ RQ  2FWREHU DQG RQ  'HFHPEHU
Anglo-/LE\DQQHJRWLDWLQJWHDPVPHWLQ/LE\DWRGLVFXVVWKHZLWKGUDZDO³$WWKHRXWVHW
the Libyans made it clear that they were primarily interested in obtaining agreement to 
an early date for our final withdUDZDO´110  At DOPC on 12 December 1969 Stewart 
sought approval for a draft telegram of instructions to the Ambassador on the 
withdrawal of British forces, to be discussed in Tripoli on 13 December. The Libyans 
wanted an early and unconditional withdrawal of British troops to virtual exclusion of 
all other considerations and Ambassador 0DLWODQG KDG UHSRUWHG WKDW WKHUH ZDV ³QR
chance of establishing a satisfactory relationship unless the British could give them a 
firm and early date for the completion of the withdrawal of our forces´111  To Gaddafi 
these military bases were, ³UHPLQGHUV RI /LE\D¶V ODFN RI ³WUXH LQGHSHQGHQFH´´   and 
WKHLUHYDFXDWLRQ³KDGEHHQRQHRIWKHPDLQWKHPHVRISXEOLFVSHDNHUVVLQFHWKHVWDUW
of the revolution´. 112  Stewart reported that Maitland was to propose 31 March 1970 
for the withdrawal, on the understanding that the Libyans would afford their full 
cooperation and would agree to talks at an early date on all aspects of the 
relationship.  Stewart wanted Anglo-Libyan relations to work in order to avoid a repeat 
of the mistakes made after the Egyptian revolution RI  ZKHQ ³SURVSHFWV RI D
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useful future relationship had been damaged by conceding points too little and too late 
in negotiations for a withdrawal which had already been agreed LQ SULQFLSOH´ He 
wanted the Libyans to commit themselves publicly to discussions, which would 
continue after a date for withdrawal had been agreed. Defence Secretary Healey 
agreed it was right to keep GLDORJXH ZLWK WKH /LE\DQV RSHQ ³to protect strategic, 
economic and FRPPHUFLDO LQWHUHVWV´. He stressed that London should continue to 
make the ³maximum possible use of such cards´WKDWZDV the Libyans known desire 
to obtain supplies of British arms and associated training, to achieve an effective 
relationship with the RCC. 113 Meanwhile American-Libyan discussions on a 
withdrawal from Wheelus were to begin on 15 December.   
 
The agenda for the Anglo-Libyan talks included the discussion of the settlement of 
financial claims outstanding since British forces evacuated Benghazi in 1967, 
withdrawal from Tobruk and El Adem, training and equipment of the Libyan armed 
forces and termination of the Anglo Libyan treaty.114   In due course the negotiating 
teams only achieved an agreement on a withdrawal date for British forces of 31 March 
1970, although the withdrawal was subsequently completed on 28 March in order to 
avoid any incidents. The American evacuation from Wheelus was set for 11 June 
1970. The British kept in touch with the US during negotiations but made it clear to 
Washington that LonGRQZRXOG³not be deterred from doing what was best in our own 
interest´.115 
 
The Anglo-/LE\DQ QHJRWLDWLRQV OHG WR ³VLJQV WKDW D SURPLVLQJ UHODWLRQVKLS FRXOG
SRVVLEO\EHGHYHORSHG´7KH&KLHIVRI6WDII, somewhat disappointed, recognised that 
³ZHZHUHKDYLQJWRJLYHXSDQDLUILHOGLQH[FKDQJHIRUDUDWKHULQWDQJLEOHSURPLVHRI
IULHQGVKLS´EXWWKHHSLVRGHZDVVHHQSRVitively, as being the first time Britain was able  
³WRIRUPDVDWLVIDFWRU\QHZUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKDQ$UDEQDWLRQDOLVWJRYHUQPHQW´'HVSLWH
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a perception of the Libyans as young, arrogant and fanatical, they were considered to 
be visibly friendlier than previous revolutionary regimes in Iraq or South Yemen. The 
&KLHIVRI6WDII UHFRJQL]HG WKDW/RQGRQ¶VSROLF\SUiority was still ³WRkeep the Libyans 
on tKHVLGHRI WKH:HVW´DQG WKH³PRVW important strategic requirement was to keep 
the USSR out of Libya.  Positive political and diplomatic action to this end should be 
PDLQWDLQHG´.116    
 
On 18 December Stewart informed Cabinet on the progress made at the 
negotiations and WKDWLWKDGEHHQDJUHHGWKDW³RQWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWWKH/LE\DQV
ZRXOG JLYH XV WKHLU IXOO DVVLVWDQFH WKDW %ULWLVK WURRSV ZRXOG EH ZLWKGUDZQ´ RQ WKH
proposed date.  It now remained to be seen what the Libyan attitude would be over 
training facilities for British troops; and what line should be taken when considering 
further supplies of arms to Libya´ 117  The successful negotiations for the speedy 
withdrawal of British troops led to the formation of two Anglo-Libya committees in 
connection with the withdrawal.  Two other committees were formed, one looking  into 
WKH 5&&¶V future requirements for  military equipment and training and another to 
discuss questions connected with  defence relations such as the termination of  the  
1953 treaty and financial matters . This latter committee would then go on to discuss 
outstanding political matters.118  In fact Anglo-Libyan relations improved slightly 
following the successful negotiations for the withdrawal of British troops and the arrival 
in Libya of British consignment of arms which had helped in those negotiations. On 18 
December 1969 Wilson said that it was advisable for a report to be made to the 
Cabinet in the early months of 1970 on developments in negotiating a new 
relationship.119 
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In early January, Wilson, concerned with the progress of the Chieftain issue, 
inquired whether ministers would be discussing the question of the tanks at DOPC 
and making a decision.120  He was reminded of his conclusions on 4 November that 
arms sales were reliant upon a number of developments in negotiating a relationship 
with the RCC and as yet Stewart was not in a position to bring the question of supply 
of Chieftains to DOPC.121  Wilson, clearly committed to keeping the British position 
non-committal uQWLOVXFKWLPHDV/RQGRQ¶VUHTXLUHPHQWVZHUHPHWRQWKHQDWXUHDQG
orientation of the RCC were met,  agreed with this VRORQJDVWKHUHZDV³no element of 
DFRPPLWPHQWDFWXDORULPSOLHGZKLFKWLHVRXUKDQGV´122  
 
On 4 January Ambassador Maitland raised with the RCC the formal termination of 
the 1953 treaty.  Maitland also requested the Libyan Government to FRQVLGHU³JLYLQJ
form to the relationship´. 123  :KLOVW WKH5&&¶VSROLWLFDOSURJUDPPH remained vague 
and non-committal, Maitland later stated in a telegram to the FCO that British interests 
were ultimately best served by cooperation with the regime. Apart from the  strategic 
³PDLQ DLP´ RI SUHYHQWLQJ ³6RYLHW SHQHWUDWLRQ´ RU D ³OLQH´ RI UHYROXWLRQV,  Maitland  
considered that British objectives should focus on securing oil to Britain and Western 
Europe, maintaining unhindered trade for British companies and  ensuring Libya 
remained  in the Sterling Area.  Maitland was uneasy about the prospects for securing 
a working relationship as he considered negotiations were fundamentally undermined 
by the respective demands of both countries. What the British wanted was in the main 
³QHJDWLYHRUDEVWUDFW´SRVVLEO\DUHIHUHQFHWRWKHHQGLQJRIWKHWUHDW\DQGWKHFUHDWLRQ
of a new relationship with attendant privileges for the British, whereas what Libya 
wanted was positive and material, a reference to the Chieftains and payment of the 
subsidy.  A relationship satisfactory to both sides was bound to appear unequal or as 
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Maitland termed it, D ³JLYH DQG WDNH UHODWLRQVKLS´ ZKHUHE\ ³ZH JLYH DQG WKH\ WDNH´
The Ambassador urged a quick, flexible and sympathetic response to Libyan requests 
for help, especially in the field of education and training, both military and civilian.  The 
Ambassador thought developments had come to a critical point.  He believed that 
London must decide if Libya was sufficiently important to justify the special 
administrative and presentational effort necessary to meet Libyan requests for help.124 
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office DJUHHG ZLWK 0DLWODQG¶V REjectives but his 
obvious enthusiasm for taking a more amenable approach to the Libyans was 
considered problematic.  Julian Walker, Assistant   Head of the North Africa 
Department at the FCO stated that if Britain was to be the ³JLYHU´ DQG /LE\D WKH
³WDNHU´, the reaction in Parliament and amongst the public would have to be taken into 
account and might be a problem. 125   
 
Further Anglo-Libyan talks were held on 21   January at the Ministry of Defence in 
Tripoli. These addressed the Chieftain tank and army equipment supplies, training 
facilities, and the role of the British missions, as well as the nature of the new Anglo-
Libyan relationship.126  Specifically, the talks were to explore possibilities for Anglo-
Libyan cooperation and the attitude of the RCC to the Arab-Israel conflict, with a 
particular reference to the role they envisaged for the Libyan armed forces.127  
Ambassador Maitland also pursued the question of what use the Chieftain tanks would 
be put to and explained that the British wanted cooperation with Libya but needed to 
know the 5&&¶Vattitude to the Arab-Israeli situation and whether any British supplied 
material would be transferred to the Middle East as the government would have to 
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explain policy to the Commons and Parliament. The Libyan delegation side stepped 
the issue and referred Maitland to the Foreign Affairs Ministry. 128 
 
At a further meeting on 26 January the Libyans appeared to accept the political 
sensitivity of the Chieftain issue and stated that equipment supplied by Britain would 
only be XVHG IRU /LE\D¶V GHIHQFH129 Maitland emphasised again the military 
considerations of supplying arms into the Middle East.  The Ambassador explained 
that Britain and Libya had a stake in peace in the region and an arms request made it 
necessary for the BritLVK WR FRQVLGHU WKH ³HIIHFW WKHLU UHVSRQVH ZRXOG KDYH LQ WKH
prospects for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East´  They would have to consider 
not only the nature, capability and quantities of the weapons but the political 
relationship of the two countries and their relations with other countries should the 
Chieftains be delivered to Libya. The Ambassador, attempting to distance the 
Chieftain contract obligation to the new Libyan regime, said the legal basis for the 
contract was the 1953 treaty from which was derived the contract for the sale of arms 
signed in April 1969. The British regarded the treaty as defining the political 
relationship and thought it right to consider the framework and nature and extent in 
which there would be cooperation in the defence field in future. Major Jalud for the 
Libyans said the agreement and treaty were mere legalities and considered the British 
to be beating about the bush. 130    
 
The talks then turned to the last remaining British facilities which were the 
missions. As ZHVDZHDUOLHUXQGHUDUWLFOHWKUHHRIWKH7UHDW\WKH³3DUWLHV´KDGDJUHHG
WR³IXUQLVKWRWKHRWKHUIDFLOLWLHV´WR³SURYLGHIRUWKHLUPXWXDOGHIHQFH´7KLVJDYH
ULVHWRWKH³$JUHHPHQWRQ0LOLWDU\)DFLOLWLHV´DQGunder article one of the agreement 
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Libya and Britain agreed to their WZR DUPHG IRUFHV ZRUNLQJ WRJHWKHU ³WR VHFXUH
HIILFLHQF\LQFRRSHUDWLRQDQGXQLIRUPLW\´RIWUDLning and equipment. This article allowed 
the British to promote weapons sales and gave rise to the creation of military missions 
in the country, operated by the British Army and the Royal Navy to facilitate joint 
WUDLQLQJ DQG DWWDLQ ³HIILFLHQF\ LQ FR-RSHUDWLRQ´131  British policy sought to keep the 
missions because through them political influence and commercial advantage could 
be maintained. Their status depended on the treaty of 1953 but because the Treaty 
had effectively been annulled by the planned withdrawal from El Adem and Tobruk   
London considered negotiating an exchange of notes with the RCC. This would aim to 
separate   the missions from the treaty, lengthening the legal basis for their presence 
in Libya.132  Both during and after the revolution WKH%ULWLVKKDGEHHQ³KDQGLFDSSHGE\
D ODFN RI DGHTXDWH LQWHOOLJHQFH´ DQG the MOD FRQVLGHUHG FUHDWLQJ DQ ³XQRIILFLDO´
³GHIHQFHDWWDFKp´DQGEURDGHQLQJ WKHUHPLWRI WKHWUDLQLQJPLVVLRQV WKDWZRXOGEH LQ
place to supervise delivery of the Chieftain tanks.133  The FCO felt political intelligence 
was what the British lacked rather than military intelligence and the present status of 
the PLVVLRQV SURYLGHG DGHTXDWH ³LQWHOOLJHQW XVH RI H\HV DQG HDUV´ DQG WKLV ZRXOG
continue to be their remit.134 However, little progress in negotiation was made on the 
status of the missions. The Libyans appeared more concerned with the issue of the 
supply of Chieftains and had little interest in maintaining Western deployments. Wright 
VWDWHVWKDW³OLNHPDQ\/LE\DQV*DGGDILVDZWKHIRUHLJQEDVHVQRWRQO\DVDFRQWLQXLQJ
affront to Libyan independence but also as a potential springboard for the Western 
assault on neighbouring revolutionary Arab states´  The alleged coup attempt in 
December by disaffected officers had been revealed to the Libyan public just as the 
December talks for the withdrawal of British troops were to commence. Gaddafi had 
used the two episodes to claim the plotters wanted imperialism to continue in the 
guise of a Western presence in Libya and were planning the coup to obstruct 
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negotiations.135 Therefore any planned British military presence appeared unlikely to 
be welcomed by the RCC. 
 
The January talks deteriorated into a discussion of UN Resolution 242, the 1917 
Balfour Declaration and Nigerian-Biafran issues.  The Libyans countered British 
concerns over the supply of Chieftains by pointing out that Israel was receiving arms 
from the USA, Germany and Belgium and the Libyans needed arming for their own 
defence.136  Tantalisingly, the Libyans stated that   if the Chieftains were supplied there 
ZRXOGEH³QRUHVWULFWLRQV´RQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK³IXWXUHUHODWLRQVLQWKHGHIHQFHILHOG
could develop´ In the $PEDVVDGRU¶s view the attempt to secure an Anglo-Libyan 
relationship in January failed because the RCC appeared preoccupied with the 
domestic situation and their desire to get Chieftains made them take the line that no 
future relationship would be possible unless Britain agreed to supply them.  The 
Ambassador surmised that the Libyans were turning the Chieftain issue into one of 
confidence which could ultimately put British interests at risk.137 He believed it would 
be best to supply the arms according to the April 1969 contract, except the number of 
Chieftains should be limited to two regiments and be delivered under detailed 
arrangements for their prospective use.138 
 
The talks also floundered because the British had a close relationship with the 
previoXVUHJLPHDQGWKH5&&ZHUHKLJKO\VXVSLFLRXVRI/RQGRQ¶VPRWLYHV The RCC 
were also playing to their Arab Nationalist credentials and could not be seen to back 
down in the face of British and Western pressure.  Furthermore, the RCC often 
appeared disorganised and lacking in direction and it was difficult for British policy 
makers to understand what Libyan intentions were. This was not helped by the fact 
that the RCC tended to speak through a number of representatives in the first twelve 
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months of the regime and Cabinet reshuffles were frequent, particularly following the 
alleged attempted coup in December 1969. The British negotiating team was also tied 
by the Labour Government¶V FRQFHUQV with supplying the Chieftain tank to Libya. 
Eventually British ministers recognised that they were not going to get the firm 
conditions or commitments from the Libyans on the use of tanks and on the form of a 
future relationship.  Matters were not helped in the early months of 1970 as Gaddafi 
made frequent bellicose statements regarding the war on Israel, stating that he was 
ZLOOLQJ WR SODFH DUPV SXUFKDVHG IURP)UDQFH ³DW WKHGLVSRVDO RI WKH DFWLRQ IRU $UDE
OLEHUDWLRQ´DQG³/LE\D¶VDUPHGIRUFHVZLOOKDYHWKHJUHDWKRQRXUWRWDNHSDUWZLWKPHQ
and arms, in the battle of liberDWLRQ RI WKH $UDE VRLO´  6XFK VWDWHPHQWV GLG QRW
reassure London that a delivery of Chieftains would not be used in the confrontation 
whilst also serving to confirm the very different strategic priorities of the RCC. 139 
 
At a meeting on 9 February 1970, Foreign Secretary Stewart and Defence 
Secretary Healey discussed the sale of Chieftains. Stewart said there were defence 
and commercial arguments for selling Chieftains but he was driven to the conclusion 
that the political and general arguments against were overriding. Healey agreed, 
especially as there was no guarantee that the Chieftains would produce a relationship 
with Libya that the British sought and there appeared lLWWOHFKDQFHRI³ULQJIHQFLQJ´the 
tanks operational area outside of the Arab ±Israeli conflict.  However, the 
consequences of not selling the Chieftains would be that the Anglo-Libyan relationship 
would wither, unless there was any chance of satisfying the Libyans with something 
else such as alternative tanks. Stewart believed no substitutes would be acceptable to 
the Libyans. With an eye on the electoral calendar, Healey was concerned that even if 
the Government could be satisfied on safeguards surrounding the employment of the 
tank and supplied them, the British might find themselves in a difficult situation in the 
Middle East if the conflict restarted. In this case the British would be compelled to cut 
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off further supplies to the Libyans, perhaps in an electoral period, so causing 
redundancies at the Leeds Arms factory, which would be highly unpopular. 140  
 
British arms supplies to Libya could also run contrary to British policy in securing 
peace in the Middle East. At the time Wilson had referred to a possible arms embargo 
of the Middle East in a statement to Premier of the Soviet Union, Kosygin. 141  Healey 
favoured stringing the Libyans along and this could be done if the British looked to be 
taking vigorous action on the mooted embargo. He also suggested that the Libyans 
could be persuaded to take the less advanced Centurion tank instead of Chieftains. 
Stewart agreed to look at the arms embargo tactic, although he was not hopeful that 
one could be achieved, and repeated that he thought that no substitutes would be 
acceptable to the Libyans.  He agreed with Healey that they should work together in 
Cabinet on the matter.142  Wilson showed continued interest in the Chieftain matter 
and on 10 February he inquired where policy stood on the sale. He introduced a new 
element into the debate by indicating concern that any sale of the Chieftains to Libya 
would be tantamount to giving the Soviet Union full specifications for the tanks.143  
 
As we have seen, France was more easily satisfied by the strategic conditions 
attached to the sale of arms to Libya. On a visit to London in January 1970 the French 
Foreign Minister, Schumann, had emphasised to the British that France had taken  
some precautions  that the Mirage jets  would only be used  for self defence and the  
aircraft could not be used from Iraq or Egyptian bases. The French had concluded that 
the Soviet Union would sell if Paris did not. The British reported the French attitude to 
Washington on   27 January 1970 and the Americans agreed with the logic of the 
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French decision to sell in order to keep the Soviets out. 144 The US State Department 
also gave no indication that they opposed Chieftain sales to Libya. The British 
Ambassador, John Freeman explained that ³DWZRUNLQJ OHYHO WKHLUFRQFHUQKDVEHHQ
more about the possible effect on our common Western interests in Libya if we should 
decide to go back on WKHFRQWUDFW«LQWKHVHFLUFXPVWDQFHWKH\ZRXOGVHHDUHDOULVN
of Libya turning to the 6RYLHW8QLRQ´. Freeman considered the State Department would 
be quite pleased if the British supplied Chieftains to the Libyans in order   to avoid the 
RCC turning to the East.  The Ambassador believed that as Washington had agreed 
to sell further arms to the Israelis, then a British sale to Libya would balance the 
issue.145  
 
Despite this advice the Labour Government would not move on the issue until they 
got firmer commitments about the tanks and movement had been made on the Anglo-
Libyan relationship.  The Government¶V FRQFHUQ ZLWK WKH UDPLILcations of supply did 
not go un-criticised and dissenting voices over policy emanated from  individuals in the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Ministry of Defence and from the British 
Ambassador in Libya.  Officials in the FCO criticised policy for being too firmly planted 
in the Arab-Israel dispute and not in an overall British policy for the region. Walker 
neatly summarised the conWUDU\ SHUFHSWLRQV RI %ULWDLQ¶V UROH DQG FRQFHUQV LQ WKH
Middle East: ³,I RQ WKH RQH KDQG +0* LV FRQYLQFHG WKDW WKH ULVN RI DPDMRU 0LGdle 
Eastern war is now so great and our efforts to prevent its occurrence so important, 
that this must take priority over other considerations then in my view we should 
decline to sell Chieftains to Libya´ %XW³,IRQWKHRWKHUKDQG ....we regard a Middle 
Eastern ZDU«DVVomething which is not much affected by British policy" then he felt 
the tanks ought to be sold.146   
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The Labour Government   appeared to consider the former perception to be partly 
the case, GHVSLWH%ULWDLQ¶VPXFKreduced capacity to play any political or military role 
in the region. Peter  Hayman, Deputy  Under-Secretary of State at the  FCO believed 
the real issue was that  ministers  were more concerned over public and international 
opinion, but he was convinced the Foreign and Commonwealth Office  would do 
HYHU\WKLQJWRPDNHVXUHRWKHUGHSDUWPHQWVZRXOGQRW³ZULWHRII´/LE\D, since to do so, 
³ZRXOGEHZRUNLQJDJDLQVWRXURZQLQWHUHVWV´. Hayman indicated that elements of the 
FCO were FRQFHUQHGRYHU WKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VKDQGOLQJRI WKLV LVVXHDQGVXJJHVWLRQV 
on Libyan policy, which were not contested by other departments, had ³EHHQ VKRW
GRZQIURPWKHWRS´DOWKRugh it is not apparent what these were.147   
 
The Ambassador in Libya considered that there was little evidence of a clear policy 
and the British   seemed to be in Libya merely to collect debts on existing contracts.  
Maitland, referring to events during the revolution, FODLPHG WKDW  ³,KDYHHYHQKDG LW
said to me that some people in  Britain have regarded Libya as the whore of the Arab 
world, whose body could be plundered for the gratification of our balance of 
payments´ Maitland, rather disparagingly,  belLHYHG WKDW /RQGRQ¶V DWWLWXGH WR /LE\D
was based merely upon recent events during the revolution and that: ³RQH PLJKW
conclude from the exchanges in Parliament that through some catalytic process our 
interests in Libya have now disappeared and this because two British women (out of a 
total community of 5000) were raped, because the only training areas we enjoyed 
outside our alliances and the commonwealth are no longer available, because the last 
British forces on African soil are being withdrawn, and because British companies are 
owed large sums of money´  He wondered whether the Government had lost its 
political will to continue to hold onto British concerns. Maitland suggested that policy 
QHHGHGWRKDYHDQ³HIIHFWLYHFXWWLQJHGJH´WR³SUHYHQWGDPage to interests´DQG³LIZH
opt out of Libya politically how can we prevent the Libyans from doing the same. If the 
Libyans opt out of their relationship with us there will be no possibility of our being able 
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to collect our debts. The whore will take her favours elsewhere´148  Maitland later 
FRQFOXGHGWKDW³PD\EHLQWKHHQGwe will have a rather exiguous relationship with 
UHYROXWLRQDU\/LE\D´EXWhe remained upbeat, remarking that businessmen from Britain 
were visiting Libya more and his embassy was not giving up on the issue.149  Maitland, 
as well as the Chiefs of Staff considered that providing some Chieftains would help 
relations, suggesting that 120 tanks would not be unbalancing within the context of the 
Middle East and would be useful to the RCC only for prestige purposes. 150 
 
A draft policy paper by the Ministry of Defence and Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office dated 19 February 1970 was strongly in favour of supplying the Chieftains to 
Libya.  The RCC were expected to survive and consequently there was no reason to 
delay any decision on the Chieftains which   the Libyans would consider a negative 
response.  Domestically there were also negative repercussions should the order not 
be confirmed. The rate of Chieftain production at the Royal Ordnance factory in Leeds 
had been built up to meet the Libyan order, in addition to British army requirements. It 
was concluded that if orders were cancelled after March 1970 then this would enforce 
an uneconomic rate of production resulting in redundancy and disruption at the 
factory. The document also pointed out that the Ambassador thought the Libyans 
would settle for fewer tanks. In any case Israel was already superior in tanks and a 
refusal to supply would be criticised by Egypt and other Arab states.  The commercial 
reasons for supplying were stressed as failure to supply could possibly lead to Libyan 
discrimination against British business.  In fact any failure to supply would put existing 
contracts under threat as well as the status of the military missions. There were also 
sound political reasons for selling and these were entwined with the trade issue.  If the 
British supplied Chieftains then they would have settled the most contentious issue, 
with minimum damage to the relationship. The arms contracts and missions would 
then continue to give tKH%ULWLVKEXVLQHVV7KH5&&¶Vpolicies were considered to be 
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still unformed and the British could thus influence them outside the defence field and 
SUHVHUYH/LE\D¶VWLHVZLWKWKH:HVW7KHSDSHUDWWHPSWHGWRGLPLQish the wider military 
ramifications of supply to Libya in the Middle East and reaffirmed /RQGRQ¶Vstrategic 
aims that Libya should not fall under Soviet or other hostile influence and that Britain 
should continue to benefit economically. 151   
 
Whilst the paper appeared to provide a persuasive argument in favour of selling 
the tanks, Evan Luard, in correspondence with Foreign Secretary Stewart, thought it 
RYHUVWDWHGWKHDGYDQWDJHVRIVXSSO\LQJ+HFRQVLGHUHGWKHSDSHU³SDUWO\SURSDJDQGD´
and was concerned, like the Cabinet, that supply of the tanks could undermine Middle 
East security7KHGHDOFRXOGDOVREHVHHQDVDF\QLFDOH[SORLWDWLRQRI%ULWDLQ¶VRZQ
FRPPHUFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO LQWHUHVWV LQ WKH $UDE ZRUOG DQG WKH UHSXGLDWLRQ RI ³RXU ILQH
ZRUGV DERXW DUPV FRQWURO´ HVSHFLDOO\ at a time when even the USSR would not 
provide the advanced T62 tank to the Arabs. He believed the FCO paper would be 
unlikely to convince the DOPC.152 
 
On 22 February 1970 Maitland held further talks with the Libyan Foreign Minister 
Busair.  The Ambassador asked for Libyan comments on the 4 January request that 
Britain and Libya should look into the form that might be given to the Anglo-Libyan 
relationship after the ending of the 1953 treaty.  Busair said this would now depend on 
%ULWDLQ¶V DWWLWXGH WR the Arab-Israel issue and intimated that the British were better 
qualified to come up with suggestions. At the same time Maitland submitted to the 
Libyan Foreign Minister a draft exchange of notes which would have re-enacted 
verbatim all those articles of the military agreement relevant to the status of the 
missions and enable the British to maintain their remaining presence in the country. 153 
It was evident to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that the Libyans regarded the 
British decision over the supply of Chieftains as a matter of confidence upon ³which 
                                                   
151
 Draft report, Arms for Libya, 19 February 1970, FCO 39/659. 
152
 E Luard to M Stewart, 23 February 1970, FCO 39/659.  
153
 D Maitland to FCO, 23 February 1970, FCO 39/634. 
272 
our future relationship in the political, commercial and defence fields would 
depend´154  In order to secure some sort of working relationship with the RCC, and 
following his conversation with Denis Healey, Michael Stewart told Wilson towards the 
end of March 1970 that policy should be to play the Chieftain contract long. The British 
would try to buy the Libyans off by offering an alternative package made up of the 
older main battle tanks, the Centurion and the Vickers. The Vickers tank substitute 
was considered an improvement on the Centurion replacement but together these 
tanks did not represent a major escalation or a disturbance of the military balance in 
the Middle East.155  Wilson agreed with this approach and considered that there would 
be no difficulty in gaining PLQLVWHUV¶ agreement. Stewart explained that an offer of an 
alternative package would avoid the unfortunate consequences of refusing to supply. 
+HFRQVLGHUHGLW³EHWWHUWKH\EHFRPHLPSatient than be turned away´ 156    
 
At DOPC on 25 March 1970 it was decided that the Libyans were to be told a 
decision on Chieftains could not be taken at that time but that they would be offered 
the alternative tanks.  IQWURGXFLQJLQWRWKH0LGGOH(DVW³DSRZHUIXOQHZZHDSRQ´KHOG
by no other Middle Eastern country as well as not being supplied to Israel was 
FRQVLGHUHGE\6WHZDUW WREH³FOHDUO\ZURQJ´7KHSURSRVDOZDVFRQVLGHUHGULVN\EXW
would be better than simply refusing the tanks. Healey agreed on the grounds that if 
the Government did not offer some tanks, then Britain would lose existing contracts 
and wider repercussions were likely. He also considered that the political argument 
were in favour of supplying the revised order. Chancellor Jenkins said he accepted the 
policy because it was politically not possible to supply the tanks. He believed that the 
proposal was clearly much less advantageous to Britain economically and there was 
no firm guarantee that it would produce the desired effect. However, if the political 
argument was that the attempt was worth making he would not dissent from this.  In 
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discussion it was accepted that Chieftains would not be supplied ³DW WKH SUHVHQW
MXQFWXUH´. 157  
 
On 4 April 1970 Maitland informed the Libyans that the British would not be 
supplying Chieftains but would offer instead the Centurions and Vickers.158  The 
Libyans did not make an immediate decision on the issue though initially Major Jalud, 
a senior member of the RCC and Deputy PM showed   great interest in the alternative 
package.159  However, the Libyans would eventually decide that they wanted 
Chieftains and if they did not get them they did not want other equipment. The 
acquisition of the advanced Chieftain tank would have prestige value for the regime,   
which was struggling   to stabilise authority. Whilst undeniably in control, their 
domestic policies, in the eyes of the British diplomatic community, proved ineffectual 
or created new problems.  Their performance was erratic and gave grounds for 
potential public discontent. However there was no sign of organised opposition and 
the main threat was from GLVVLGHQFHLQWKHUDQNVRIWKH5&&$³FRPLFGHYHORSPHQW
SODQ´KDGEHHQSXEOLVKHGDQGHPSKDVLVHGDIRFXVRQDJULFXOWXUH7KH7ULSROLembassy 
FRQVLGHUHG*DGGDIL³DVLQFHUHDQGVLPSOe man, woefully ignorant of the techniques of 
international discourse´ Increasingly, the regime voiced their opinions on the 
Palestine problem, giving the RCC   an emotional issue to weld the Libyan people 
together whist they transformed   the country. Maitland believed the Libyans could 
only take part in the Arab-Israeli dispute in a token way for many years to come.160  
 
Gaddafi used the evacuation of the bases on 31 March 1970 to play a nationalist 
FDUG VWDWLQJ WKDW ³WKHVH EDVHV WXUQHG WKH JRRG $UDE ODQGs of Libya into a base 
threatening Arab Nationalism in every part of the world´ He claimed the bases were 
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used against the Egyptians in 1956.161 Then he turned his attention to the oil 
companies in a similar vein stating ³ZHKDYHWREDWWOHZLWKIRUHLJQRLOcompanies as we 
did with foreign bases to achieve our political freedom´.162 As part of a new 
³/LE\DQLVDWLRQRIVRFLHW\´$UDEH[SHUWVDQGDGYLVRUs had flooded into Libya to work in 
the oil industry and administration. In October 1969 the oil minister Anis Ahmad 
Shtaiwi had ruled out nationalisation of the oil industry, but the regime cracked down 
on oil ventures and annulled a joint venture agreement between the American 
company Chappaqua Oil and state owned Lipetco at the end of October 1969. In 
December 1969, in a sign of further Libyan independence, the British Daily Telegraph 
reported that Algeria and Libya were to set up joint companies to work on all aspects 
of the oil industry. The oil relationship with foreign companies was also damaged by 
the increase in posted oil prices.  Anxious to increase the Libyan share of oil wealth 
and score a political point, the RCC had set out to raise oil FRPSDQ\GHILQHG³SRVWHG
SULFHV´ RQ RLO ZKLFK KHOSHG WR FDOFXODWH WKH LQFRPH WD[ DQG UR\DOWLHV RQ SURGXFLQJ
operations, despite the fact that the Libyan Government received more oil revenue in 
1969 than any other Arab or Middle East government.163 The Foreign and 
&RPPRQZHDOWK2IILFHGHGXFHGWKDWWKH5&&DQGLWVDGYLVRUVKDG³VHWWKHmselves to 
pursue radical and nationalistic policies against the oil companies , in an effort to wring 
HYHQJUHDWHUEHQHILWVRXWRI WKHPDQGWRDVVHUW WKHLU VRYHUHLJQDXWKRULW\RYHU WKHP´
although Idris had himself put forward inflated claims. The Libyans also harassed the 
oil companies administratively.164  /LE\D¶Vultimate intentions to the oil companies were 
not clear, and there was some doubt as to how far these actions had been endorsed 
by the RCC. However, in April 1970 Gaddafi firmly declared his hostility to the oil 
FRPSDQLHV FODLPLQJ ³ZH KDYe to battle with foreign oil companies as we did with 
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IRUHLJQEDVHV WRDFKLHYHRXUSROLWLFDO IUHHGRP´ 165  Despite this rhetoric in May the 
RCC Deputy Prime Minister stated that the RCC only wanted the posted prices 
corrected and had no intention of expropriating or nationalising any of the oil 
companies.  The British GRYHUQPHQW¶V involvement in the oil issue was minimal and   
policy was to leave the oil companies to make their own decisions on relations with the 
RCC, giving   diplomatic support only when required.166  The deterioration in relations 
between the oil companies and the RCC subsequently led to a decline in oil 
production.  
 
Politically the regime drew closer to its Arab nationalist counterparts and further 
from British and Western influence. As mentioned earlier, between 11 and 13 January 
1970 Egypt, Libya and Sudan had met in Cairo to consider the formation of joint 
committees to lay the foundations of cooperation and integration between their states. 
The Soviet and Egyptian threats were also inter-wined. In May 1970 there was 
speculation that Egypt was pressurising the Libyans to allow the Soviets to use 
facilities at Tobruk and in Cyrenaica, although Gaddafi in February and April had 
criticised both the US and Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean.167  
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6.6 Labour Leaves Office   
 
Anglo-Libyan talks resumed on 8 June 1970 with a wide ranging agenda covering 
many of the issues raised but unresolved during the January talks.  Topics included 
the status of the British military missions, the formal termination of the treaty, the 
future of bilateral relations and arms contracts. The Libyans had been pressing for a 
swift start to these negotiations and the Tripoli embassy believed the main motive 
behind this was mercenary.  The RCC appeared concerned with the financial issues of 
BritDLQ¶V DOOHJHd obligations under the subsidy, and the thorny issue of the BAC air 
defence contract. These issues were being used as negotiating tactics by the RCC to 
extract as much from the British as possible and served the regime in terms of anti-
British propaganda. The BAC affair also appears to have been used by the RCC as a 
case study in the corruption of the Idris regime and by its very nature was highly 
emotive and complex to unravel.  The RCC regarded the   BAC problem as a political 
issue because they alleged London had heavily influenced the King to order the 
system. To an extent this was true as the Ministry of Defence had written twice to the 
Libyan Government at the time advising that the contract be signed and the RCC 
subsequently placed a number of prominent former members of the Libyan 
Government on trial for corruption involving the contract. The RCC wished to extricate 
themselves from the costly arrangement with BAC with the minimum of expense, 
although they had already lost money on the contract by defaulting on payments. 168  
London was only willing to discuss the BAC contract in terms of the effect on Anglo-
Libyan relations and not as a matter that the Government were directly responsible 
for. 169   
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The intractable nature of negotiations so far led Ambassador Maitland to conclude 
that the deciding question was what each side would pay to begin relations afresh. He 
EHOLHYHG ³RXUPDMRU REMHFWLYHV LQ /LE\D ZRXOG EH VHUYHG E\ ZLSLQJ WKH VODWH FOHDQ´
Maitland made a number of recommendations which he hoped would maintain a 
residual British presence in Libya.  He urged seeking a formal termination of the treaty 
and a Libyan agreement to an exchange of notes on the lines of drafts on the missions 
presented in February.  He wanted to press the Libyans to agree to a military, advisory 
presence, and advised that British policy should aim to ensure that the treaty was not 
ended before agreement was reached on the status of such service personnel as 
were still in Libya.  To secure these aims Maitland stressed that London should listen 
sympathetically to the Libyans over the BAC issue as well as on the issue of the 
subsidy.170 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated that the aim on Libya and 
%$&ZDVWRNHHSWKLQJV³RQWKHPRYH´, although officials and the British Government 
held no responsibility for the contract.  The   Ambassador¶V other objectives were 
accepted.171 
 
The Anglo-Libyan committee met on 15 June 1970 in Tripoli and discussed the 
military and naval missions, the very ODVWHOHPHQWVRI%ULWDLQ¶VGHSOR\PHQWV LQ/LE\D
The Libyans stalled, claiming they needed to hear from their military on how many 
people were required in the missions. It was agreed to defer discussion of the future 
numbers and status of the military missions pending preparation of a report by the 
Libyan Chiefs of Staff.  Major Jalud remarked that the RCC would find it difficult to 
agree to the retention of the pre-revolutionary privileges enjoyed by the missions. Any 
further progress on the treaty was also postponed because the Libyans said its formal 
termination could not go ahead until agreements on the missions and financial matters 
had been resolved.172 *LYHQ WKH 5&&¶V DWWLWXGH WRZDUGV DQ\ :HVWHUQ SUHVHQFH LQ
Libya, it is more than likely that the position of the missions and financial matters were 
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being used by the RCC as a negotiating tactic to delay further discussions until the 
Chieftain issue was resolved. 
 
The Chieftain and BAC orders again dominated the talks.  The British offer to 
supply Vickers and Centurions in March had been rejected by the Libyans and 
Ambassador Maitland had instructed the Libyan Government that London was 
prepared to terminate the contract. On 17 June the Libyans took a different line 
reaffirming the need for Chieftains but adding a request for the rest of the material in 
the army equipment contract.  This order would be dependent upon a satisfactory 
resolution of the BAC air defence scheme and of the Chieftain question. The Libyan 
line was that LIWKH%ULWLVKSURPLVHG³WRVXSply Chieftains at a later stage, if the political 
situation in the Middle East improved´ then the\ ³might be able to buy´ UHPDLQLQJ
equipment under new contracts. The Libyans said the Chieftains would demonstrate   
British confidence in the revolution and preserve relations with Libya. Major Jalud also 
made it clear ³that a satisfactory settlement of the air defence scheme contract was 
the key to the future of Anglo Libyan relations´ The British responded that the BAC 
affair was strictly a matter for negotiation between BAC and the Libyans.  Major Jalud 
stressed that the Libyans regarded the BAC air defence contract as a matter which 
involved the British Government because they had influenced the King to take it. He 
insisted the BAC issue be included in the agenda for any discussion. Maitland offered 
to act as bridge between the two sides but the Libyans put pressure on the British by 
requesting that the issue was resolved in two months.173 Michael Hannam, 
Commercial Counsellor at Tripoli later stated that: ³, realise the difficulties of this 
%$&PDWWHU«%XWWKHDOWHUQDWLYHLVWR allow Anglo-Libyan relations to be hampered 
for the foreseeable future by the commercial considerations of a single British 
company. I submit that the present is too delicate a time to allow ourselves to be 
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cornered is this way´  He recommended BAC salvage some element of the contract if 
necessary by terminating the present arrangement swiftly in order to procure a new 
one. 174 
 
The Labour Government¶VDWWHPSWVWo secure an effective political relationship with 
the RCC and to maintain BritDLQ¶V position in Libya ended on 18 June 1970 when 
:LOVRQ¶V Government was UHSODFHG LQ WKH *HQHUDO (OHFWLRQ E\ (GZDUG +HDWK¶V
Conservative administration. This had a small, but immediate consequence for Anglo-
Libyan relations because Ambassador Maitland left to take up his role as press 
secretary to Heath and there was a hiatus in the continuing negotiations for a 
relationship.  The election of a new government in Britain probably caused the Libyans 
to be even more cautious.175 Alec Douglas-Home, the new Conservative Foreign 
Secretary, wrote to Gaddafi on 6 July stating that ³+0*DUHPRVWDQ[LRXVWRGHYHORSD
new relationship with the Libyan GRYHUQPHQW«LWLVRXUILUPLQWHQWLRQWRVHHNDQHDUO\
and honourable settlement of the various problems outstanding´ 176   
 
The Libyans did not VHHPWREHSUHVVLQJWRRKDUGIRUDUHVROXWLRQDQGWKH³JHQHUDO
atmosphere remained reVLJQHG QRW WR VD\ GRFLOH´177  Hannam outlined the 
consequences for British interests. He stated that following his experience during the 
previous six months he had been in Libya:  ³,DPGHSUHVVHGE\WKHZD\/LE\DVHHPV
to have developed no settled policy and in consequence is being pulled strongly into 
UAR orbit, while still being subject to Algerian attraction, especially in the oil front. 
While at the time they seem set on resisting Soviet blandishments. I cannot help but 
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feel disquiet at the long term prospects on that direction´178  Unidentified Soviet 
equipment (later described as T54 and T55 tanks) arrived in Tripoli at the end of 
July.179   These tanks effectively annulled the value of the Vickers and Centurion tanks 
which the British were offering. Hannam believed WKDW³:HPXVWUHVLJQRXUVHOYHVWR
watching Russian influence spread over the Libyan army or we must make further 
efforts to get into contact with these inexperience subalterns with their predilection for 
instant government´ 180 Russian military and sales involvement in Libya after the 
revolution KDG EHHQ OLPLWHG GHVSLWH /RQGRQ¶V FRQFHUns and had been thwarted by 
1DVVHU¶VVXSSRUWIRUWKHUHJLPH7KH%ULWLVK(PEDVV\LQ&DLURFRQVLGHUHGWKDWNasser 
KDGQRWOHWWKH5XVVLDQVLQWR/LE\DDQGUHJDUGHGWKHFRXQWU\DVD³FKDVVHJDUGHH´
He had given the Libyans many trainers, not only to get influence, but also to stop 
Libya going elsewhere and there was no evidence he had encouraged the Libyans to 
look to the Soviets for arms.181 
 
Prospects for the future of Anglo-Libyan relations certainly seemed poor. Hannam 
believed: ³Eeneath the calm (of negotiations) I have fears that there may be an 
undercurrent propelling us towards the rocks represented by the show trials promised 
by Gaddafi´ Former Prime Minister $O %DNNRXVK¶V WULDO ZDV DQ RSSRUWXnity to 
demonstrate the corrupt nature of the former regime and this would involve criticism of 
the negotiations with BAC over the air defence contract.  Hannam wanted to supply 
Chieftain tanks to the RCC and requested a ministerial visit to Libya as a show of 
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good faith.182 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office considered that the heat had 
gone out of the talks because the Libyans were too tied up in their own affairs and 
would not entertain a ministerial visit or make an early decision on the Chieftains.183 
 
From the summer of 1970 onwards the Libyans adopted a number of negotiating 
positions on outstanding issues which seemed targeted at extracting as much from the 
British as possible. On 18 August Hannam was summoned to the Libyan Foreign 
Ministry and asked for the earliest possible date for the resumption of talks. However, 
the Libyans requested that the leaders of both the Libyan and British sides should be 
of comparable position and rank. 184 On 9 September the frustration of dealing with the 
/LE\DQV¶QHJRWLDWLQJWDFWLFVOHG$lec Douglas-Home to state that ³WKLVLVULGLFXORXV´RQ
seeing the telegram about the UDQNV RI QHJRWLDWRUV +H VWDWHG WKDW ³, DPPRUH DQG
more doubtIXO LI LWZRUWKWU\LQJWRKXPRXUWKHVHSHRSOH´DQGH[FODLPHGWKDW³WKHWLPH
has come to tell the Libyans where they get off´ 185  
 
At the end of September Hannam was summoned to see Jalud, who again brought 
up the BAC issue but claimed he was willing to compromise by buying some of the 
equipment manufactured by BAC. Hannam sensed that Jalud had moved away from 
just wanting all of /LE\D¶VPRQH\EDFNDQGZDs willing to make a financial settlement, 
but BAC needed to be brought to the table. Libya had threatened to publish its 
allegations that BAC had inflated prices but the company remained rooted to its letter 
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of contract.186 The next round of talks began in London on 2 November and the Libyan 
delegation was led by Major Jalud.  He began the talks with a bellicose statement on 
BAC corruption and how the British Government was entirely responsible for the affair 
and the Chieftain problem.  He said the British owed £3.25 million a year from 1965 for 
the facilities enjoyed at the bases, a reference to the unresolved issue of the subsidy, 
and all other outstanding issues had to be sorted out before movement could occur on 
Anglo-Libyan relations. 187  
 
The nature of the Anglo-Libyan negotiation process had become a case of merely 
demonstrating   established positions. Little had been achieved as the BAC contract 
was unresolved, the Chieftain supply was under review, and the treaty had not been 
formally ended, whilst the thorny issues of Libyan demands for subsidy compensation 
remained. The only movement was on the 5&&¶Vdecision to no longer maintain the 
missions¶ GLSORPDWLF RU WUHDW\ status. The headquarters of the military mission in 
Benghazi were closed on the 24 July and personnel transferred to Tripoli.188 All that 
ZDV OHIW RI %ULWDLQ¶V /LE\DQ IDFLOLWLHV ZDV DQ XQVHFXUHG PLOLWDU\ DGPLQLVWUDWLYH
presence. Washington had broken up a military advisory group in Tripoli that they had 
maintained but still had a military assistance agreement with the Libyans which 
needed terminating. 189 
 
In January 1971 the Annual Review for Libya from the new British Ambassador, 
Peter Tripp, summarised the condition of Libya and the Anglo-Libyan relationship 
which had deteriorated considerably.  7KH5&&KDGDFKLHYHGDVHULHVRI ³QHJDWLYH
DQG PRVWO\ [HQRSKRELF DFKLHYHPHQWV´ ZKLFK KDG KDG ³GHOHWHULRXV HIIHFW RQ WKH
/LE\DQHFRQRP\´7KH5&&IHOWWKH\KDGD³NH\UROHWRSOD\LQWKH$UDE-,VUDHOLFRQIOLFW´
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WKURXJKD³*DGGDIL3ODQ´DQGWKLVOHGWRDn RCC tour of the Middle East in May and 
June 1970. Anglo-/LE\DQ UHODWLRQV KDG ³QRW SURVSHUHG´ Anglo-Libyan negotiations 
proceeded on settling problems outstanding from the previous treaty and British 
exports declined, mainly due to stagnation in the Libyan economy. In 1969 Libya 
accounted for £42milion of British exports and Britain was the third largest exporter 
into Libya with transport equipment and other machinery of great importance. This had 
declined to £18.7 million in the first nine months of 1970. Whilst the British naval 
mission maintained a good working relationship with the Libyans and the military 
mission had just two representatives, hopes of an entirely new relationship appeared 
bleak. The Ambassador concluded WKDW /LE\D GHVHUYHG D ³EHWWHU JRYHUQPHQW´190  
Relations worsened in due course when, in 1971, Gaddafi nationalised foreign banks 
and in December of that year nationalised the Libyan holdings of BP. US oil interests 
were also nationalised, Bunker Hill losing their investments in 1973. 191   
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6.7 Conclusion  
 
From September 1969 the Labour Government attempted to forge a new 
relationship with the RCC. The remaining Libyan facilities served no strategic purpose 
as the East of Suez role had been wound down and they had no practical military 
purpoVHLQ%ULWDLQ¶V1$72UROHin the Mediterranean. Given the Arab Nationalist nature 
of the RCC the deployments and defence guarantee were also superfluous. The 
revolution was interpreted, by British policy makers, as a threat to British interests as 
well as those of the West, so placing the revolution in the strategic perspective of the 
Cold War. The   Foreign   and Commonwealth Office urged swift recognition of the 
new regime feeling that British and Western interests stood a better chance of survival 
by doiQJ VR  7KH )&2¶V OLQH ZDV SURPRWHG E\ WKH 6HFUHWDU\ RI 6WDWH IRU )RUHLJQ
Affairs and agreed to readily in Cabinet.  
 
Thereafter the Labour Government endeavoured to secure a relationship with the 
new regime. Michael Stewart was anxious that progress on this should not stall as it 
had done with Egypt in 1952. The Government hoped to achieve its goal by utilising 
arms contracts as a basis for negotiation and to retain access to El Adem, training 
grounds and military missions. When the Libyans requested complete withdrawal the 
British Government acceded readily but thereafter continued to use the arms contracts 
as a negotiating tactic to create a new relationship, which would enable London to 
maintain influence. A review of the whole Anglo±Libyan relationship that had existed 
before 1969 was initiated. The Government believed the key to creating a relationship 
was to understand the attitude and intentions of the regime, gauging the implications 
for wider British concerns which in turn would enable them to determine their own 
position. 
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A successful review of the existing relationship and creation of a productive new 
one proved to be a failure. This was due to the stand-off between the two 
governments over the major element of the arms contracts, that of the Chieftain tank. 
The Labour Government saw the supply of the Chieftain within the context of Middle 
Eastern securit\ DQG %ULWDLQ¶V LQWHUHVWV in the region.  Initially Stewart called for a 
delivery of Chieftains to Libya to be honoured given the concern that the Soviet Union 
and Egypt sought to gain influence in Libya.  However, the Government decided that 
WKH 5&&¶V DWWLWXGH WRZDUGV WKH $UDE-Israeli conflict was too important an issue to 
ignore when considering supply. London had an economic and political stake in 
maintaining peace in the Middle East and concerned over the strategic alignment of 
the Libyan regime, feared destabilising the region if Chieftains were provided. 
Ministers chose to make the order reliant on developments in the review of Anglo-
Libyan relations, postponed the delivery and then strung out the negotiations with the 
Libyans with the offer of other tanks.  
 
7KH *RYHUQPHQW¶V policy position on export was reached at DOPC and was 
essentially a compromise that stalled a decision because ministers were divided on 
the issue.   7KHVLWXDWLRQ LVLOOXPLQDWHGXSRQE\&URVVPDQ¶VREVHUYDWLRQWKDWIRUHLJQ
policy was only debated at DOPC when Foreign Secretary Stewart and Wilson 
disagreed and this was a rare event. 192 Stewart has been described by Defence 
Secretary +HDOH\ DV ODFNLQJ ³WKH GULYH DQG WKH LPDJLQDWLRQ´ WKH MRE RI )RUHLJQ
Secretary required but he was loyal to Wilson. 193 However, Wilson was averse to 
letting ministers take a decisive position on any issue that had the potential to split the 
government and would have repercussions for Labour at any future election. Instead, 
given that Wilson played a role in the unresolved debate on Chieftains, frequently 
showing interest in the sale whilst warning against export of the tank XQWLO %ULWDLQ¶V
demands were met as well as extensively summing up the DOPC debate on 4th 
November 1969, reinforces :ULJOH\¶V REVHUYDWLRQ WKDW :LOVRQ ³HVFRUWHG KLV &DELQHW
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FROOHDJXHV´ ZKLOVW DWWHPSWLQJ WR DYRLG D PDMRU LVVXH RI SULQFLSOH194  The issue of 
supply was compounded by ministers who believed they had a role to play in bringing 
a peaceful resolution to the conflict through Four Power Talks and mooted 
international arms embargos, illustrating that the government considered wider 
regional and inter governmental issues within the Chieftain debate. The problem was 
further complicated by the possible sale of Chieftains to Israel, which had the potential 
WRFDXVHHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOUHSHUFXVVLRQVIRU%ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH0LGGOH(DVW. 
 
In due course London failed to be reassured by the RCC over their intentions 
towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. ,Q HDUO\  *DGGDIL GHFODUHG ³WKDW KLV JUHDWHVW
ambition was to see a free, sovereign DQGLQGHSHQGHQW3DOHVWLQH´DQGKHFRQWLQXHGWR
express his utter hostility to Israel throughout WKH \HDU ,Q -XQH KH ZDV ³UHDG\ WR
prepare the Arab world for the annLKLODWLRQ RI ,VUDHO´  *DGGDIL toured Iraq, Syria, 
Jordan and Egypt to propose a grand strategic plan for co-ordinated military action.195 
The Labour Government remained committed to the policy on supply from November 
1969, although their search for a relationship with the RCC was increasingly unlikely 
to prove productive given the Arab Nationalist nature of the regime in Tripoli and the 
5&&¶VPRXQWLQJLQYROYHPHQWLQWKHSROLWLFVRIWKH$UDE-Israeli conflict. That the Labour 
Government remained steadfastly focused on creating a relationship was possibly a 
result of a PLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH5&&¶Vpolitical position as well as a miscalculation 
on the likelihood of achieving a result, especially after negotiations for the withdrawal 
from El Adem and Tobruk which seemed to bode well for the future. However 
/RQGRQ¶VSHUFHSWLRQVZHUHin part due to the position taken by the RCC. 
 
The RCC were determined to acquire the Chieftain and made progress on the 
relationship entirely dependent upon its delivery7ULSROL¶VGHPDQGVZHUH then raised 
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by demanding a resolution of the BAC and subsidy issue. Creating a new relationship 
was not helped by the new, inexperienced regime in Tripoli who took confusing and 
often contradictory stances on issues and grew demonstrably more Arab Nationalist in 
their rhetoric as months passed. Over time it became clear that the RCC did not 
subscribe to maintaining a shared strategic position with London, given their Pan 
Arab, anti±Western political orientation and proclamations of support for the 
Palestinian cause. However, the Libyans were amenable to negotiations with the 
British even a year after the revolution of September 1969 and this held out the 
possibility that London could secure British interests in Libya although these talks 
proved fruitless. Whatever the ultimate aims of the RCC were over maintaining 
negotiations, the new government in Tripoli were not in a position to be seen to be 
reaching an agreement with the British given the strong former relationship between 
London and Idris. The RCC appeared little inclined to recreating that relationship given 
that they put on trial those involved in arms-contracts with the British and openly 
proclaimed their own anti-imperialist credentials whilst condemning Western influence 
in the Arab world. 
 
Meanwhile the FCO considered the *RYHUQPHQW¶VSROLF\RQWKHChieftain issue to 
be too firmly planted in the Arab-Israeli conflict and policy was criticised by British 
diplomatic representatives as piece-meal and confused.  The Ministry of Defence drew 
similar conclusions. France and the USA showed little concern with the wider 
UDPLILFDWLRQVRIVXSSO\DQG/DERXU¶VDSSUHFLDWLRQRIWKHPLOLWDU\WKUHDWWKHWDQNVSRVHG
was probably exaggerated, as the Chieftains were unusable without British technical 
support. TKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V DWWLWXGH WR QRW supplying the Chieftain tank certainly 
cannot be explained on ethical grounds, although the Government was bound by a 
1967 ministerial agreement on supplying arms to the Middle East that prohibited the 
sale of offensive weapons, although even this was not thought to apply to Chieftains 
sold to the Idris regime.196  The Labour Government¶VUHFRUGRQWKHVXSSO\RIPLOLWDU\
equipment showed little ethical concern and ministers appeared   more interested in 
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the consequences for British trade should supply of the Chieftain contract not be 
honoured.  
 
In conclusion, the /DERXU &DELQHW¶V IRFXV RQ the wider implications of Chieftain 
supply, the deadlock between ministers over the supply to Libya and the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V FRPPLWPHQW WR GHWHUPLQLQJ WKH DWWLWXGH DQG LQWHQWLRQV RI WKH 5&&
REVWUXFWHG  /RQGRQ¶V DLP of achieving a relationship with Tripoli and maintaining 
LQWHUHVWV LQ WKH FRXQWU\  7KH 5&&¶V FRQIXVLQJ GLSORPDWLc approach and more 
pronounced radicalisation and vocal Arab Nationalist stance from September 1969 
stymied any progress on creating a new relationship. The two countries were now 
politically opposed. The impasse in negotiations led to the failure to achieve 
successful termination of the treaty and a continued residual British presence in terms 
of missions and of British training rights. The preservation of %ULWDLQ¶V HFRQRPLF
position was also irrevocably compromised. Finally, the deadlocked negotiations led to 
a failure to secure Libya strategically for the West.  Anglo-Libyan relations on a 
political, strategic and economic basis broke down over the months following the 
revolution of September 1969 and were to grow worse over the next thirty years.  
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7 General Conclusion   
 
During the first half of the 1960s the British prized the Anglo-Libyan relationship 
because it gave them access to military facilities that played a role in an East of Suez 
defence strategy. However, as London shifted strategic priorities the Libyan 
deployments became less valuable for that purpose. Instead the military presence was 
increasingly prized for its economic and defence training value and for maintaining 
British and Western political influence in the Arab world and eastern Mediterranean. 
Meanwhile Libya developed economic and political independence from London. The 
King, along with his ministers continued to value the relationship with the British 
because it afforded security against threats from the Arab Nationalist regimes in Egypt 
and Algeria. Throughout this period the core of the Anglo-Libyan relationship remained 
the 1953 treaty. 
 
This study has shown that from 1964 to 1970 the Anglo-Libyan relationship 
reflected %ULWDLQ¶V changing foreign and defence policy and has added to an 
appreciation of this subject.  Initially, the Labour Government had been committed to a 
policy based on a world role for Britain, with no more a vocal supporter than Harold 
:LOVRQKLPVHOI/LE\D¶VVWUDWHJLFUROHZDVUHDIILUPHGLQWKH$QJOR-Libyan review during 
1965 although the British withdrawal from Tripoli went ahead and a withdrawal from 
Benghazi was scheduled for some time in the near future. However, the strategic 
value of the facilities was questionable given the Sudanese restrictions on over-flying. 
From late 1965 until 1969 London withdrew from a strategic policy based East of 
Suez, and developed a new role focused on Europe and NATO responsibilities. The 
Wilson Government sought further cuts in the Libyan deployments as part of this 
process.  The pace of withdrawal was tempered by the Foreign Office and Ministry of 
Defence, who counselled on the importance of maintaining facilities to   preserve the 
relationship with the King, retain British economic and training privileges and provide a 
suitable presence to fulfil the defence plan for Libya.  A residual presence was 
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maintained at El Adem and Tobruk and the 1965 planned withdrawal from Benghazi 
was repackaged into the wider strategic contraction. In order to continue to honour the 
defence commitment to Idris military support from Washington was sought and a 
Libyan contribution to defence mooted, but neither of these initiatives proved 
successful.  
 
The 1966 Defence White Paper signalled an end to British overseas military bases, 
although officials continued to stress the importance of the Libyan facilities in securing 
/RQGRQ¶VLQWHUHVWVLQ/LE\D. With these considerations in mind the Foreign Office and 
British diplomatic representatives in Libya were instrumental in attempting to forestall 
the planned withdrawal from the Benghazi base, but British domestic economic 
difficulties and ministerial commitments thwarted these plans. Ministers after the Six 
Day War in June 1967 were eager to take advantage of the Libyan withdrawal request 
by reaching immediate agreement to withdraw the deployments.  In due course they 
were dissuaded by civil servants who re-emphasised the benefits of the facilities, 
although the strategic redundancy of the deployments was finally accepted.   
 
This thesis has also developed and broadened knowledge of the Anglo-Libyan 
relationship during the 1960s, which has been a neglected area of study and builds on 
previous work focused upon the 1950s.  Analysis has shown that the relationship had 
grown in importance as the oil economy in Libya boomed. The British were eager to 
exploit this opportunity for exporting goods, services and military hardware, which in 
turn would benefit the British economy. The Libyan oil market was important to 
%ULWDLQ¶VGRPHVWLFDQGLQGXVWULDOGHYHORSPHQWDVZell as that of Western Europe and 
therefore was of strategic as well as economic importance. London was especially 
keen to reduce the drain on sterling expenditure which foreign deployments incurred 
and exports were duly encouraged. The British facilities, particularly the missions, 
acted as unofficial arms exporters and technical support centres and enabled the 
British to coordinate and run joint training activities with the Libyan armed forces.  
Maintaining these facilities and the treaty reassured the KiQJRI%ULWDLQ¶VFRPPLWPHQW
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to his regime and enabled London to retain political influence. Idris and his 
government reciprocated by demonstrating a preference for British arms and services.  
The record on Anglo-Libyan relations in the 1960s has also added to an 
understanding of British foreign policy, bringing out the importance of economic 
considerations and priorities in policy formulation.   
 
Turning to the Libyan Government¶s approach to the relationship, during the 1960s 
Tripoli SOD\HGD³QDWLRQDOLVWFDUG´by condemning the deployments from time to time, to 
assuage popular discontent.  However, they remained resolutely committed to an 
amicable and productive relationship with London and were content to have a British 
presence in the country. The King, avowedly pro-British, hoped to maintain a 
significant foreign military deployment in his country to secure his own DQG /LE\D¶V
security. The 1967 withdrawal request led only to the removal of the Benghazi 
garrison, which had been sanctioned in 1965.  
 
In January 1968 the Anglo-Libyan treaty relationship was reviewed and reaffirmed.  
British policy sought to encourage Libyan autonomy in political and defence issues; a 
FRQFHSW WHUPHG ³/LE\DQLVDWLRQ´ and looked to support this through the sale of arms 
and increased trade. London hoped the Libyans would play a more pronounced 
strategic role in the region, possibly building an economic bloc with other countries 
DQG WDNLQJ JUHDWHU FRQWURO RI WKHLU RZQ GHIHQFH %ULWDLQ¶V less obtrusive and more 
diplomatic approach, but still with some military element, was in keeping with other 
disengagements in the Middle East and until the revolution Anglo-Libyan relations 
appeared to be following a similar diplomatic model that Britain had with other 
traditionalist Arab leaders.1 However, the Libyans continued to raise concerns over 
perceived threats from Algeria and Egypt and appeared reluctant to take full 
responsibility for their own security.   
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Withdrawal from East of Suez, confirmed in 1968, formally ended the strategic role 
of the British presence in Libya although the Ministry of Defence and Foreign Office 
continued to promote the importance of maintaining the relationship, given the 
emerging Soviet threat in the Mediterranean.  The Labour Government accepted this 
conclusion, and although the facilities played no specific military role in NATO 
strategy, they continued to reassure the King and allowed the British to retain political 
influence. The British remained treaty bound to the defence of Libya and the facilities 
provided for this defence purpose.  This commitment had potentially wider strategic 
consequences for defence planning JLYHQ WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ¶V political and military 
support for Egypt.  
 
From 1964 to 1969 policy on Libya was strongly influenced by permanent officials 
in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.  Decisions were taken as a result of 
the Ambassador¶V UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV WHPSHUHG DQG FRQVLGHUHd in light of wider 
foreign, defence and economic policy.  Advice took into account Britain and Western 
strategic security interests East of Suez   and   American diplomatic pressure, threats 
from Arab Nationalism and Soviet involvement in the reJLRQDVZHOODV/LE\D¶VGHIHQFH
concerns.  British interests in Libya such as the Anglo-Libyan political relationship, the 
defence commitment, trade, oil, and sterling finances were also considered.  Final 
decisions were made at DOPC or at Cabinet and policy recommendations by officials 
were generally accepted, such as the 1965 Defence Review and the May 1968 
decision to maintain a residual Libyan commitment.  
 
Whitehall also promoted department agendas with regard to the Anglo-Libyan 
relationship. For example the Ambassador sought, along with the Ministry of Defence 
and Foreign Office, to promote a continued deployment in Benghazi in 1966, although 
financial pressures on the defence budget undermined this campaign. Officials, to a 
degree, undermined the Labour Government¶Vposition on withdrawing from overseas 
deployments. The Ministry of Defence promoted the military value of the training 
arrangements and the Foreign Office emphasised the value of the deployments to the 
293 
relationship.  Officials persuaded Labour ministers to abandon requests for a financial 
contribution to maintain the military commitment and not to withdraw unilaterally from 
Libya given the 1967 request. The Foreign Office also steered policy in 1965 when 
seeking a replacement for the subsidy, by advising against the formalisation of any 
new arrangement. There were few occasions when ministers took personal initiative 
on Libya before 1969, although they were involved in high level talks when seeking a 
military contribution from the US to Libyan defence costs.  When ministers initiated 
SROLF\ LGHDV DV LQ +HDOH\¶V UHTXHVW WKDW WKH /LE\DQV IXQG WKH IDFLOLWLHV, this was 
undermined by the force of argument of officials.  The Foreign Office and the MOD 
also drew upon the importance of Anglo-/LE\DQ WUDGH DQG /LE\D¶V strategic 
significance in the Mediterranean in 1968 in order to stress the value of .LQJ ,GULV¶
regime to Britain and the West and to retain the relationship as it stood. 
 
Whilst there were some interdepartmental rivalries and debates over Libyan policy, 
the importance of Libya in terms of trade and the valuable training facilities led to a 
consensus on policy between the Foreign Office and the MOD.  However, the 
Treasury continued to push for greater cuts in British overseas defence expenditure 
and the reduction of Libyan facilities. The Treasury was especially concerned by the 
0LQLVWU\ RI 'HIHQFH¶V request for building works at El Adem in 1969.  The Libyan 
experience was not unlike that of the withdrawal from Malaysia and Singapore where 
a debate occurred between the political and economic departments in Whitehall. The 
political departments argued that withdrawal had to be carefully managed so as not to 
lose allied cooperation or contribute instability to the region. The Treasury was 
concerned that a continued capability in the region would be costly. 2  That said policy 
on Libya was generally approached in a pragmatic and measured way.  For example, 
in 1967 a full withdrawal from   Libya was not in British interests due to the fact that 
the treaty obligation had little time left until expiry in 1973 and London was eager to 
continue to exploit the military presence.  The Foreign Office often played the situation 
as it developed, HYLGHQFHG E\ WKH LQIRUPDO DFFHSWDQFH RI D YDJXH ³WHFKQLFDO´
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replacement for the subsidy in 1965 and securing the future of the El Adem facilities in 
1967 by avoiding the issue during negotiations.  This approach generally showed a 
lack of creativity or boldness, as little consideration was given to a post Idris regime or 
what to do after the expiry of the treaty, other than proposing policy options that would 
make the British more amenable to a successor regime.  The Foreign Office Minister 
RI 6WDWH *RURQZ\ 5REHUWV¶ visit to Libya in 1968 and his call for less emphasis on 
military trade with Tripoli failed to develop a new approach.  
 
Events from 1964 to September 1969 illustrated the ³shared tradition´ of mutual 
strategic interests that permeated Anglo-Libyan relations during the period. The 
Libyan facilities had supplemented the British East of Suez strategy until 1965 and 
provided for the defence of Libya, assuaging King Idris and KLVJRYHUQPHQW¶VIHDUVRI
Arab Nationalist attack. As London wound down the East of Suez strategy, British 
economic ties and training opportunities in the country came to the fore as the chief 
motivations for maintaining a residual presence. Maintaining a pro-Western regime in 
Libya against Soviet and Egyptian encroachment also became a priority, in order to 
secure interests through a continued close Anglo-Libyan relationship.  
 
This study has offered an alternative perspective upon the strategic withdrawal 
from East of Suez. &RQVLGHULQJ 3HWHUVHQ¶s FRQWHQWLRQ WKDW %ULWDLQ¶V ZLWhdrawal from 
East of Suez was ideologically driven, this study of the   Anglo-Libyan experience from 
1964 to 1969 shows a strong FRPPLWPHQWWRHQGLQJ%ULWDLQ¶VRYHUVHDVFRmmitment in 
Libya for financial reasons. It is not apparent in the documentary evidence that there 
was an over-riding ideological commitment to withdrawal from Libya. Certainly the La-
bour Government showed the political determination to pursue reductions in East of 
Suez deployments but the Government, as Petersen observes, ZDV ³IOH[LEOH LQ WKH
ZD\VDQGPHDQVWKHGHFLVLRQZDV LPSOHPHQWHG´ throughout the region and this was 
also the case in Libya. The Labour Government was strongly influenced by the For-
eign Office and MOD to remain at El Adem and Tobruk, at least until the expiry of the 
treaty obligation.  PeterVHQ¶VRWKHUFRQWHQWLRQWKDW little consideration was given from 
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1964 to 1968 ³WRH[SORUHDQ\SROLWLFDORUHFRQRPLFRSSRUWXQLWLHV WR UHPDLQ´ LQDUHDV
where Britain deployed forces was not the case in Libya.  Officials were aware of the 
value of remaining and the benefits of doing so were frequently stressed in policy 
documents.3 Through a limited military presence London maintained training privileges 
as well as trading and political influence in Libya and was content to allow the deploy-
ments to remain until the treaty expired for these very reasons. However, that said, 
little consideration was given to forward planning for the period after the ending of the 
treaty in 1973. The conWLQXHGYDOXHRIDSUHVHQFHWR%ULWDLQ¶VWUDLQLQJHFRQRPLFDQG
political position was emphasised by the Labour Government¶s determined search for 
a relationship with the RCC after 1969 and commitment to maintaining a residual 
presence in the form of the military missions.  
 
After the revolution the Labour Government was eager to protect the British 
position in Libya and showed concern with a potential strategic threat emerging within 
the context of Cold War security.  Ministers sought to develop a pro-Western regime in 
Tripoli by building a new relationship and preventing a political vacuum which could be 
exploited by the Soviet Union.  As a result the RCC was recognised swiftly as the 
legitimate government of Libya. Michael Stewart was particularly anxious that 
mistakes were not made in negotiating a new relationship and referred to the 
consequences of failed negotiations with the Egyptians in 1953.  Michael Stewart 
RXWOLQHG %ULWDLQ¶V NH\ LQWHUHVWV LQ /LE\D EHLQJ SROLWLFDO DQG VWUDWHJLF HFRQRPLc and 
military, (in terms of training). However as the RCC secured their position their ever 
more pronounced Arab Nationalist credentials did not bode well for Western interests.  
The RCC no longer had an interest in the Anglo-Libyan relationship as it had 
previously been, given the very different political priorities of the regime.  The Foreign 
Office and the Ministry of Defence sought to negotiate a continued role for the 
missions and retain training privileges by using existing arms contracts, which would 
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allow London to maintain some political influence, steer the regime to the West and 
exploit the Libyan economy.  A swift agreement to withdraw from El Adem and Tobruk, 
as a result of the RCC request in October 1969, was followed by a continued attempt 
to negotiate a new relationship to preserve %ULWDLQ¶VSRVLWLRQLQ/LE\D including training 
rights, joint training of the Libyan military and maintenance of the missions.  This was 
to be done through a comprehensive review of the existing relationship and by using 
existing arms deals to achieve results.  This approach was undermined by the Labour 
*RYHUQPHQW¶s concern over exporting the Chieftain tank to an Arab Nationalist regime 
which they considered could escalate the conflict in the Middle East. London had 
important economic and political interests in the region, particularly in terms of trade 
and oil, and therefore a stake in maintaining peace there. The RCC made the creation 
of a new relationship dependent upon the supply of Chieftains. Anglo-Libyan relations 
broke down completely and British training rights, missions, contracts and economic 
interests were all lost as Tripoli turned increasingly Arab Nationalist in political 
orientation and the strategic environment of the region moved further away from the 
West.  
 
7KH &KLHIWDLQ WDQN HSLVRGH LOOXVWUDWHV WKH /DERXU *RYHUQPHQW¶V DSSUHFLDWLRQ RI
wider foreign policy implications, in this case the Middle East and peace in the region. 
This coincidHVZLWKDQREVHUYHG³PRUDO´HOHPHQWLQ/DERXU IRUHLJQSROLF\³7Ke prime 
minister shared the grandiose notions of the Labour Left, believing in the moral weight 
of British foreign policy to bring good to the world´4  0LQLVWHUV¶LQWHUHVWLQ)RXU3RZHU
7DONVDQGPRRWHGDUPVHPEDUJRVLOOXVWUDWHGDIRFXVRQ%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWLnued diplomatic 
UROH LQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVW GHVSLWH /RQGRQ¶V PLOLWDU\ GHFOLQH WKHUH +RZHYHU VXFK
LGHDOLVP KDV WR EH EDODQFHG ZLWK D SUDJPDWLVP HYLGHQFHG LQ WKH LVVXH RI /DERXU¶V
arms deals to Nigeria, South Africa and Greece. Prime Minister :LOVRQ¶VFRQFHUQwith 
%ULWDLQ¶V wider foreign policy priorities also reinforces the interpretation that he held 
onto old fashioned notions of %ULWDLQ¶V international grandeur. Wilson believed that 
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³%ULWDLQKDGDQLQWHUQDWLRQDOGXW\´DQG³WKDW%ULWDLQVKRXOGSOD\LWVSDUWEringing stability 
to the far corners of the globe´ 5  Wilson was not interested in UHGXFLQJ %ULWDLQ¶V
influence in the world but it has been noted that he chose an approach based on 
%ULWDLQ¶VDYDLODEOHFDSDELOLties. Saki Dockrill recognises that Wilson was committed to 
economic strength and diplomatic intervention but not military intervention and from 
the mid-1960s instruments of power were shifted from facilities and   military forces to 
the use of economic, financial and technological pressures.6   
 
The application of these principles was clearly demonstrated in the Labour 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VDSSURDFKWR/LE\DIURP7KH lessons of the Six Day War and the 
decision to not intervene in the revolution demonstrated that military action was no 
longer an appropriate or available option. From 1968 the British Government 
encouraged the Libyans to take more responsibility for their defence and to work 
towards regional cooperation as the expiry date of the treaty neared.  Healey urged 
this upon the Libyans when he visited the country in 1968.  The Wilson Government 
also sought an internationalist and interdependent approach to resolving external 
problems, to maximisH%ULWDLQ¶VSRZHUDQGLQIOXHQFH7KHapplication to the Common 
Market was part of this policy as was the role of Britain at the UN, in the Four Power 
Talks and the mooted arms embargo over the conflict in the Middle East.7 This 
approach was a revisionist and positive one and fits a SHUFHLYHGPRYHIURP³KDUG´WR
³VRIW´SRZHU WKDW$QQH'HLJKWRQUHFRJQLVHV LQ Whe earlier Macmillan years. This was 
DQ DWWHPSW WR PDLQWDLQ ³%ULWDLQ¶V VWDWXV LQ WKH ZRUOG GHVSLWH LQFUHDVLQJO\ GLIILFXOW
ILQDQFLDO EXUGHQV´ WKURXJK PHPEHUVKLS RI RUJDQLVDWLRQV OLNH WKH &RPPRQ 0DUNHW
technological advances and economic growth, policies that were supported by Wilson 
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but met varying degrees of success.8  Healey also wished to remould the role of 
British foreign and defence policy. David Greenwood, economic advisor to the 
Government from 1966 to 1967 states that  Healey reflected   ³DGHVLUH to redefine the 
role...more becoming for a medium power...in reduced economic circumstances´ 9   
However the commitment to internationalism and interdependence had consequences 
for the export of Chieftains to Libya because to export would run against the grain of 
policy in the Middle East where the British sought a resolution through diplomacy and 
international agreement. 
 
5HWXUQLQJWRWKH/DERXU*RYHUQPHQW¶VUHFRUGRQ/LE\DXQWLOCabinet decision 
making appeared to be generally consistent and united;   most ministers showing 
general support for the advice from officials.  The only occasion when the Libyan issue 
became contentious in Cabinet was after the revolution and over the supply of 
Chieftains to Libya, which was further compounded by a mooted delivery to Israel.  
The Prime Minister effectively and not uncharacteristically, given his tactical nature in 
Cabinet allowed a decision on the issue to be stalled, concerned with the implications 
of supply and the potential fractious effect of the issue in Cabinet. This was typical of 
:LOVRQ¶V PDQDJHPHQW RI &DELQHW GHFLVLRQV  $V )UDQNHO KDV VWDWHG :LOVRQ ZDV D
master of avoiding difficult decisions and postponing them as long as possible. 
:LOVRQ¶VREVHVVLRQZDVZLWKFRQVHQVXValthough this could be considered an excuse 
for indecision.10  As a result Cabinet policy on exporting the Chieftain was fixed on the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VVWLSXODWLRQ that the attitude and intentions of the RCC be revealed first. 
Thereafter RIILFLDOV¶ influence upon policy diminished significantly. Diplomats and the 
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Foreign Office were often frustrated by the policy focus on the supply of the Chieftains 
WRWKHGHWULPHQWRI%ULWDLQ¶VSROLWLFDODQGHFRQRPLFfuture in Libya. Diplomats accused 
policy of appearing to lack direction and being too firmly focused on the strategic 
concerns of the Middle East and on making money. This reinforces the accusation that 
the /DERXU *RYHUQPHQW RIWHQ IDLOHG WR DUWLFXODWH D VWUDWHJ\ DQG ³indecision and 
apparent desire to face all ways at once meant that the government did not make 
choices that needed to be taken´ 11   However in mitigation, the Labour Government 
did remain committed to the policy decided at DOPC on 4 November 1969. 
Furthermore their negotiating position was not helped as they were dealing with an 
inexperienced and over-enthusiastic Libyan Government composed of committed 
Arab Nationalists who had little inclination or  reason to be seen to conclude any 
agreement with London. This was further compounded by the contrary stances on 
developments in the relationship the RCC took from September 1969 onwards. 
 
This work has enabled further understanding of the conduct and process of foreign 
policy decision making in the Labour Government from 1964 to 1970. Young has 
claimed that /DERXU¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ KDG EHHQ ³DFKLHYHG PRUH E\ PXGGOH DQG D
collapse of alternatives than any long-WHUPYLVLRQ´. However, the policy record on the 
withdrawal from East of Suez and Anglo-Libyan relations from 1964 to the revolution 
of 1969 show a commitment to a strategy of withdrawal as part of the defence reviews 
of the 1960s.12 7KLVVWUDWHJ\KDGEHHQWHPSHUHGE\FRQVLGHUDWLRQVRI%ULWDLQ¶VJURZLQJ
trade interests in Libya and the need to maintain political influence with the monarchy. 
In turn this was supplemented by a determined policy to encourage the Libyan regime 
to build their military and security forces and play a greater defence role in security in 
the Mediterranean. Simultaneously London re-orientated its strategic concerns to 
playing a more significant role in European and NATO defence interests in that region. 
The British experience in Libya from 1964 to 1969 was not a ³KDOI-KHDUWHG´ 
disengagement that Young PDLQWDLQVZDVHYLGHQWLQ%ULWDLQ¶VUelations with other Arab 
                                                   
11
 2¶+DUDDQG3DUUµ7KH5LVHDQG)DOORID5HSXWDWLRQ¶478. 
12  Young, The Labour Governments, p.226. 
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states.13 The relationship involved consideration of what British interests were in Libya 
and how best to secure them whilst reducing commitments to the bare minimum.  
)XUWKHUPRUH +XJKHV¶ DFFXVDWLRQ WKDW GHIHQFH SROLF\ ZDV QRW JRYHUQHG E\ DQ
³DSSUDLVDO RI ZKHUH WKH 8.¶V LQWHUHVWV OD\´  but was formed through a process of 
³PXGGOLQJWKURXJK´ DQGZLWKGUDZDOIURP(DVWRI6XH]³KDGDOOWKHFKDUDFWHUistics of a 
VFXWWOH´ do not  hold when we consider the  Anglo-Libyan experience and the 
emphasis officials and ministers placed on securing British interests.14  After the 
events of September 1969 policy was not a ³PXGGOH´ RU ³VFXWWOH´ reaction as the 
Labour Government was resolutely committed to forging a new relationship with the 
nationalist regime in Tripoli. The government also had a strategy based upon wider 
policy issues and remained dedicated to maintaining peace in the Middle East whilst 
working through multinational organisations. The accusation by diplomats in Libya that 
WKHUHDSSHDUHGWREHQRVWUDWHJ\GLGQRWWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VSULRULWLHV
of playing a role in calming the military environment in the region and protecting 
%ULWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOLQWHUHVWVLQWKH$UDEZRUOG 
 
When the Labour Government unexpectedly lost the 1970 election the policy 
record on Anglo-Libyan relations and the facilities showed that both countries, until 
KDGDUHODWLRQVKLSEXLOWXSRQD³VKDUHGWUDGLWLRQ´RIVWUDWHJLFVHOILQWHUHVWZKLFK
became of increasing economic benefit to the British.  It was very unlikely, given the 
complete failure of negotiations for a relationship from 1969 to 1970 and the 
increasing radicalisation of the RCC that London or Tripoli had any common ground 
upon which to replicate the arrangement that existed between 1964 and 1970. The 
relationship that existed for the next thirty years was marred by diplomatic and 
strategic antagonism between the two very different states that served little economic 
benefit for either party. Not until the turn of the century did the relationship regain any 
                                                   
13 Ibid.,p.109. 
14
 G. Hughes, +DUROG:LOVRQ¶V&ROG:DU,The Labour Government and East-West 
Politics, 1964-1970 (Ipswich/New York, 2009), p.111. 
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RI LWV IRUPHU FORVHQHVV DV WKLV VWUDWHJLF ³VKDUHG WUDGLWLRQ´ EURXJKW WKH two nations 
together once more. 
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